



International Academic  
Research Center - USC

Drita Ferri **AVDYLI**

MONOGRAPH

# **ALBANIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL EMIGRATION 1945-1990**





International Academic  
Research Center - USC



**Drita Ferri AVDYLI, Ph.D.**

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**Monograph**

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## PREMISE

*Albanian anti-communist political emigration and its activity are one of the most acute and debatable problems in today's Albanian historiography, which still remains URGENT for studies ....*

*Prior to the 1990s, the activity of this Albanian Diaspora was treated in a one-sided manner, from the point of view of the policy of the communist regime, although even in the historiographical writings of that time there are interesting facts and arguments that should be carefully considered and scientific objectivity. While in foreign historiography there have been interesting studies that have brought an interesting and valuable contribution to the activity of political emigration, among which stands out the publication of Nicholas Bethel, "The Great Betrayal" published in 1984, and the publications of A. Gerin, EM Cookridge; D. Smajli, C. L. Sulceberger et al.*

*In this Monograph I have used today's historiography in studies, articles, documentaries that have brought an important contribution to the enlightenment with scientific objectivity, it is worth noting the "History of the Albanian People" volume IV, published in 2008 in which for the first time first is re-evaluated, on a scientific basis, in a synthesized way the history of the Albanian political diaspora, during the Cold War.*

*The desire to bring something new to the history of the Albanian political Diaspora was my main impetus to study this problem and present it as a monograph.*

*While working on the preparation of this Monograph as My Project, I focused my study mainly on the Albanian archives, the Central State Archive, the Archive of the Ministry of Interior and the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the World Literature. I paid special attention to the immigration press. political and economic, the official press of the time, as well as the historiographical literature on this issue which was relatively limited. Some foreign and domestic documentary publications such as Foreign Relations of the United State (FRUS) etc., were very useful for my study.*

*In this Monograph, I have tried to address the basic problems of the life and activity of anti-communist emigration such as: its political organization; Relations between political emigration groups, cooperation, contradictions and conflicts between them; Political emigration activity against the communist regime of Albania; Cooperation of political emigration with missions and officials of western countries; The results of this cooperation, the disputes of political immigration groups with officials charged by Western governments; Neighboring countries Greece and Yugoslavia's efforts to cooperate with political emigration, disagreements and compromises reached between the two sides; Exploitation of a limited group of immigrants from these two countries for their own narrow nationalist interests; The relations of political emigration with the Albanian diaspora, the confrontation of political emigration with the representatives and the propaganda of the communist government in the Albanian economic diaspora, etc.*

*For all these problems, I have tried to bring new facts and arguments and make analysis based on them and the arguments given by previous studies, hoping to have made a modest contribution in this regard.*

*In conclusion, I want to thank my professor and friend, Mrs. Greta Angjeli, who pushed me to complete this project of mine, my family, my husband Xhemal Avdyli, sons Erenik, Enkelejt and Arbri who repeated the expression: "... still that you have not finished*

*this Book yet ", as I may have missed the time I should have stayed with them, my conscience to close this project during the pandemic, Iris, which she was the impetus for the completion of this Monograph, Enila, Alketa and the Gift full of others, for me it has been a great fortune to hear their lectures, advice, and scientific expertise.*

*I have a special thanks to my sisters Amben and Kate, my parents who do not live, but also to my grandfather, the People's Teacher, Shaban Ferri, where every time I sat down to write, I remembered the moments when He spoke and I putting on paper his Memoirs in Time of War, thus hardening the patience necessary for this study and in various studies and research. This Monograph will be attached to the many Books of the Family Library, inherited in three Generations, almost 100 years old.*

***Tirana, May 2021***

## Evaluation Reports

### "Albanian Anti-Communist Political Emigration 1945-1990" Monograph by Drita AVDYLI

#### Evaluation Report

23 October 2021

Redact by:

Prof. Dott.  
**M. T. Paola Caputi Jambrenghi**  
Full professor at University of Bari "Aldo Moro"  
Jonico department (Italy)

#### A. AUTHENTICITY

1) The material presented is original and aims to provide solutions to the problems and activities of anti-communist emigration that can be interpreted as a real diaspora, also analyzing relations with neighboring countries. The author Drita Avdyli has selected this topic thinking that it can make a contribution, not only to literature but also to cooperation with Western countries and their officials without neglecting a legal vision. Author Drita Avdyli brought new food for thought to support her arguments.

2) The supporting material helps to further expand research in the field of relations between the opposing blocs of the then "western" part with that "of the east" and the border countries, up to the discussion of relations with the new continent.

3) Sections of the Monograph: The monograph entitled "New Albanian Anti-Communist Political Emigration 1945-1990" introduces the subject under investigation by posing various questions regarding political activities and opposing groups that have developed and / or organized around the actors of the Second World War and their subsequent offshoots up to the development of 1990. It would be interesting to dedicate a specific, subsequent research on these topics by the author.

#### B. COMMENTS ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author's exposition and her arguments ensure the good result of the research and analysis aimed at formulating personal critical opinions; she wanted to ensure a better understanding of the subject matter.

In general, the material is presented complete and has all the components of a scientific article. The language that pervades is easy to understand and intelligible.

It can be described as clear and accurate work with information referenced in the sources.

The monograph is interesting and can be considered exhaustive for publication.

#### C. POSITIVE COMMENTS

The author deals with the research topic with scientific methodology. The methodology is good and the results achieved are appreciable also in terms of originality.

The monograph can be defined as a well written work. The choices made on the methods of analysis and on the treatment of the issues explained in all sections are absolutely acceptable.

#### D. LANGUAGE JUDGMENT

The language is clear and complete and the entire monograph is supported by adequate literature and jurisprudence. The monograph was presented by the author Drita Avdyli in simple and understandable language.

The material does not carry spelling errors. The documentary material contains a considerable number of references which greatly enrich its content.

#### E. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

Taking into account the analysis carried out, the Board is suggested to approve this monographic paper.

#### F. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EDITOR

Based on the above analysis and comments, the publisher is suggested to publish the monograph as it constitutes a serious, scientific and important work.

Best regards,

---

"Albanian Anti-Communist Political Emigration 1945-1990"  
Monograph by Drita AVDYLI

Evaluation Report

23 October 2021

Redact by:

Prof. Dott. Avv  
**Onofrio Montecalvo**  
GOT Judge at the Court of Trani (Italy)  
Writer And Essayist

**A. AUTHENTICITY**

1) The material presented is original and aims to provide solutions to the problems and activities of anti-communist emigration that can be interpreted as a real diaspora, also analyzing relations with neighboring countries. The author Drita Avdyli has selected this topic thinking that it can make a contribution, not only to literature but also to cooperation with Western countries and their officials without neglecting a legal vision. Author Drita Avdyli brought new food for thought to support her arguments.

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Best regards,

## CHAPTER I

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**SITUATION AND ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL IMMIGRATION  
IN YEARS 1945-1949****1.1. The situation of political emigration after leaving Albania**

With the triumph of the communists, some of their opponents fled abroad where they were welcomed by Western countries and Albanian emigration abroad.

There are no accurate data on the number of these emigrants, although the competent bodies of the Albanian communist government claimed that at first the number reached 2,000. Later the number of political emigrants increased with the arrivals from Albania after 1944 and later with the emigrants from the Albanian lands in Yugoslavia, who had left to escape the oppression and the persecution of the Serbo-Slavs. In 1975, the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated the number of political emigrants at 10-12 thousand people.<sup>1</sup>

The group of Kosovars, led by Xhaferr Deven left Pristina on November 17, 1944 for Zagreb, where he was hosted and supported by the Croatian President, Ante Paveliqi, together with the Foreign Minister, who was a Bosnian, a friend of the Albanians. The Kosovar group in Zagreb consisted of well-known leaders such as Xhaferr Deva, Rexhep Mitrovica, Rexhep Krasniqi, Tahir Zajmi, Xhelal Mitrovica, etc. Idriz Lamaj underlined as a model of correctness and honesty of these patriotic Kosovar politicians, the regular surrender, through the fire of war, the administration and the financial situation of the Second League of Prizren, which was quite significant.<sup>2</sup>

The emigrants fled to Italy, Greece and even Yugoslavia, which was still under German control, some of them staying in this country until the end of the winter of 1945. In his memoirs, Kol Bib Mirakaj writes that they stayed in a hotel in Zagreb until February 1945, from where they left traveling to Vienna.<sup>3</sup> He also explains the dangers of being friends of the Croatian government and Pavelic. According to him, in February a plot was prepared against them to execute them, which fortunately failed.<sup>4</sup>

The group of Albanian leaders who settled in Vienna in February 1945 consisting of M. Kruja, Gjon Markagjoni, Xhaferr Deva Kol Bib Mirakaj and others awaited another great danger where suddenly the Hungarian front was exploded by the Soviet army that was approached Vienna, so the Emigrants hurried away to Innsbruck.<sup>5</sup>

The highly heterogeneous composition of anti-communist political groups would inevitably have an impact on political coherence and, consequently, on the effectiveness of its fight against communism and the protection of the Albanian national cause.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Beqir Meta, Anti-communist political emigration and the Albanian issue, paper held at the International Scientific Conference on "The role of the diaspora in state formation" published in the summary with the same title in Prishtina 2012.f 47.

<sup>2</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "Xhafer Deva- In the light of his letters and other revelations of the diaspora", New York, 2002, p.6.

<sup>3</sup> Kol Bib Mirakaj The suicide of a nation. Fiorentia Publications, Shkodër, 2014, p. 223..

<sup>4</sup> Kol Bib Mirakaj The suicide of a nation. Fiorentia Publications, Shkodër, 2014, p. 225.

<sup>5</sup> Kol Bib Mirakaj The suicide of a nation. Fiorentia Publications, Shkodër, 2014, p. 227-228.

<sup>6</sup> Beqir Meta, Anti-communist political emigration and the Albanian issue, paper held at the International Scientific Conference on "The role of the diaspora in state formation" published in the summary with the same title in Prishtina 2012.f 47.

Anti-communist emigration from other countries, at this time, was striving for a unification of all nations, of all races and of all religions, to create a common front against the communist threat. This movement was encouraged and supported by the Western Powers. However, the process of unification and reconciliation between the leaders and anti-communist groups was difficult, lasted a long time and was not complete and final, although important results were achieved in this regard.

After the first moments of gathering in refugee camps, Albanian emigration was engaged in various forms in the economy of the host countries but also in other important sectors. Thus, some individuals managed to become military advisors to the Anglo-American and then NATO armies, experts and organizers of intelligence networks inside and outside Albania, etc. Western countries cooperated closely to support anti-communist emigration and in this context also the Albanian one. In addition to the cooperation that was the main trend, there were discrepancies and rivalry between the English and American discoveries about the impact on Albanian emigration. Initially, the British, because they were more present in Albania before and during the war, had a greater influence on political emigration. The British had extensive connections with the Ballistic and Zogist leaders as well as with Zog himself, whom they tried to make the pivot of the organization of political emigration. But gradually, due to global political-economic power, the weight of Americans increased significantly where in the end the greatest influence belonged to Americans who were superior in some respects.

Americans were more skeptical of Zog. Gradually the immigrants were passing almost all under American influence. Thus, in fact, in the 1950s, the US had a dominant influence on Albanian political emigration, as well as on that from the eastern communist countries, due to its political and economic hegemony after the war.

Anti-communist political emigration, like the traditional economic one, did not remain out of the focus of interests and intervention of the governments of neighboring countries. Greek espionage carried out an extensive activity with fugitives inside and outside Greece. In the first years after the liberation, "the Greek government encouraged the fugitives to go from Italy to Greece among them Koço Muka wanted to go there"<sup>7</sup>, while Ali Këlcyra maintained contacts with the Greek consul in Italy. The Greeks included some of the fugitives in the northern Epirot syllogisms.

A special role was played by the Yugoslav government through OZNA in the 1940s and then the UDB for the gathering and organization of the Albanian political diaspora in Yugoslavia and abroad, especially after 1948, encouraging new escapes to have as contingent in their hands.

Even the Italian intelligence and the Vatican established links with political immigration.

German, French, Austrian, Australian governments, and even the governments of some Arab countries, etc. showed interest in the Albanian emigration that stabilized in their countries. Later, political emigration was supported by other countries, where emigrants were housed and financed. among them were anti-communist economic emigrants and Kosovars.

The migrants were kept under strict surveillance by SOS and IS authorities. Their condition in the camps was miserable. The daily food was soup and 300 grams of bread per person.<sup>8</sup> It was especially difficult until 1949, the situation of immigrants in Italy, so to ensure better living conditions but also to prepare for diversionary actions against the communist regime, they were sent hand in hand to Germany.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 521, p. 29

<sup>8</sup> Thimo Bare, Albanian Secret Service (In the contemporary retrospective perspective), Tirana, 2009. p. 142.

<sup>9</sup> Thimo Bare, Albanian Secret Service (In the contemporary retrospective perspective), Tirana, 2009. p.151.

## 1.2. Beginnings of efforts to organize anti-communist emigration.

From the end of 1944 and during 1945 the anti-communist forces hoped for the intervention of the allies from abroad to change the situation in Albania, so they started their grouping. Attempts were made to establish pro-Western parties within the country, as well as the reorganization of political parties and groups abroad.

After Zog's visit to Cairo, efforts were made to form an "Albanian government" and later to establish the Free Albania Committee in 1949. had high hopes for the internal anti-communist forces. They helped to create a political opposition abroad, at first without defining its organizational form, by setting in motion the main leaders of emigration, especially those in Italy, such as Mit'hat Frashëri, Ali Bey. Këlcyrë, Hasan. Dostin et al 10, while Mehmet Konica who during the war had stayed out of the political conflict in Albania played the role of liaison of these leaders with foreign embassies such as the American, English, French, Turkish, Greek, etc., in Rome.<sup>11</sup> But then no solution was found for a quick unification of all these groups, everyone retained the organizational affiliation they had before, especially the Ballists and Legalists.

In 1945, there were 750 fugitives in Italy, of whom 80 were members of the Independent Bloc, 350 ballistas and 300 Zogists. These were housed in Anglo-American-backed camps, others were stationed in Greece, Turkey, Austria, West Germany, and so on.

After the elections of December 2, 1945, the repressive character of the communist government deepened, thus increasing the resistance of the anti-communist forces, which passed into a new phase. The moment was created and the regrouping and organization of all internal and external anti-communist forces began.

The year 1946 was the year of the reorganization of emigration outside Albania, where the reorganization of the first organizations and groups in exile began, such as: Balli Kombëtar, Legaliteti, Blloku Kombëtar Independent, etc. Later political groups came to increase, as during the war, the National Front and Legality, even at this time were the two main political groups abroad. But many groups like "parties", organizations, groups would already be created around them. committees, associations, factions, etc., which would have different names. In fact, these two main currents in exile were united only by anti-communism and the influence of the Western Powers, as there were many divergences between them. For ease of study, we are dealing here with the main groupings of categories of the Albanian political diaspora abroad.

### 1.2.1. Balli Kombëtar Organization (BK)

It was also called the Movement or the Nationalist, Agrarian Party, but was initially known as the "National Front", a political organization founded in November 1942 headed by Mit'hat Frashëri, general secretary Vasil Andoni and members Hasan Dostin, Abaz Ermenji, Ali Këlcyrë, Zef Palin, Halil Maçin etc., In exile, in 1946, this Movement was called the Albanian Democratic Party<sup>12</sup>. The reorganization of the National Front began in Italy, at the end of September 1945, and a special support for this Movement was given by the Americans.

Since August, it has been propagated that the time had come to organize to fight the Tirana government, and this was also related to the threats to extradite immigrants described by it as war criminals. The BK commission consisting of Hasan Dosti, Lec Kurti, Xhemal Meçe, Zef Pali, Vasil Andoni, etc., addressed the issue with the American advisor and assistant Mr Henderson, who was told that it was time to organize, he also suggested that be careful and at the head of this organization not to come out people politically compromised with the Italians

<sup>10</sup> AMPB, year 1945, File 14, p. 14, Report on Political Emigration, 30 May 1945.

<sup>11</sup> AMPB, year 1945, File 14, p. 14, Report on Political Emigration, 30 May 1945.

<sup>12</sup> Flamuri newspaper, May 1946, p. 1



or Germans during the war like Ernest. Koliqi, Kol B. Mirakaj et al. Henderson promised that the National Front would have the political support of the Americans, and for this he did with these leaders the British aide and officer Mr Herbert. Henderson and Herbert helped a lot in setting the criteria for the reorganization of the National Front, giving it a very democratic profile.<sup>13</sup> Its program was based on the "8 points of Albanian nationalism" of 1939 by Mit'hat Frashëri and the document that is officially called "The Decalogue" of 1942.<sup>14</sup>

BK propagated the promotion of the national movement in Kosovo and Albanian areas, highlighting his support where also Balli Kombëtar in exile, had a clear anti-Greek profile<sup>15</sup>. He waged a real battle against the absurd intentions of the northern Epirus regions, BK spoke against the crimes and ethnic cleansing carried out during and at the end of World War II by Greek nationalists but also against the situation in which Chameria was, without schools and Albanian newspapers, without the right to language etc. and against the Greek chauvinist intentions for Southern Albania. Among other things, he argued that Greek claims and policies were detrimental to the fight against the communist dictatorship<sup>16</sup>, for as it was stated in his documents, "it must be clear to all, that while the wind of fragmentation blows on the border of Albania, no one feels himself stabbing communism for the next day as a reward for the division of the nation."

In 1946, BK spoke about structural changes and political organizations of Albanian emigration and created a special court where he convicted Xhelal Mitrovica and Nuredin Vlora, on charges of treason, for collaborating with Italians and Germans. This created a tense situation within Balli's ranks<sup>17</sup>.

BK was created and remained an organization with different currents and political currents, where from the beginning, in exile, it showed two currents that differed from each other in their attitudes towards the unification of emigration in a single center: the moderate arm with Ali Këlcyra, Koço Muka, Nuredin Vlora, etc., who were for the approach of all currents in exile, including A. Zogu and, the other group called agrarët with Mit'hat Frashëri, Abaz. Ermenjin, Vasil Andonin, etc., who were against the union with Zogu and other persons implicated to one degree or another with the Italians and Germans, such as Shefqet Vërlaci, Gjon Marka Gjoni, Kol Bib Mirakaj, etc., who had created the organization Independent National Bloc. Thus, BK had internal divergences and very soon split into two factions in fact, from the beginning in exile, but these remained in one grouping until 1950.

In 1947, Ali Koprencka tried to form a new party, but he did not succeed, but in 1949, the Besa Group was formed in Turkey,<sup>18</sup> by Qazim Prodani and Ali Koprencka who became director (1949 - 1956), of the anti-communist leaflet "Besa", which was followed by Qazim Prodani (1956 -1983, while in 1949, Seit Kryeziu tried to create another agrarian party<sup>19</sup>.

In November 1949, Balli Kombëtar held the Assembly of Naples, where it approved its Program, which was now called the Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party or again the Decalogue of Balli Kombëtar.<sup>20</sup> The program called for the implementation of the Agrarian Reform, after the overthrow of the communist regime, the organization of capitalist cooperatives in agriculture, the introduction of modern technology, etc. He emphasized the freedoms of the individual, denied by the communist regime, the collapse of the Soviet kolkhozes in Albania, the creation of a common and united front against communism,

<sup>13</sup> AMPB, E. Cakos Process, pp.31-33, Regrouping practice

<sup>14</sup> Approved at the Congress of Berat in 1943 and reaffirmed at the first congress in exile in 1946. The Decalogue contained: -Americans, social reforms, free elections according to the will of the people "etc.,

<sup>15</sup> Flamuri newspaper, maj 1946, f. 37 – 44

<sup>16</sup> Bulletin of the BK congress, 1970, p.55

<sup>17</sup> AMPB, year 1946, file 88, p. 5, Report on the state of "traitorous" emigration, 13 July 1946.

<sup>18</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 30 October 1983, p.5

<sup>19</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 26 August 1974, p. 4

<sup>20</sup> Hasan Dosti- A life for the Albanian cause, BOTART, Tirana, 2008. F. 169-184.

friendship and cooperation with neighboring peoples, and support for the "union of peoples in the form of confederations." regional, continental, etc. as well as joining efforts with any international democratic organization that truly seeks peace, harmonious cooperation and the happiness of humanity ".<sup>21</sup>

### **1.2.2. National Organization "Legality Movement" (OKLL)**

The Legality Movement Party or the National Organization Legality Movement (OKLL) was associated with Ahmet's activity. Zogu and, after his death, with that of his son Leka Zogu, who aimed at overthrowing communism and restoring legality in Albania. As it is known, Legality was established in September-November 1943, after the annulment of the Mukje Agreement by the Communist Party. Its members, in exile, were reorganized in 1946 in Cairo, under the name of the National Organization Movement of Legality (OKLL), headed by Abaz Kupin, behind whom stood King Zog. At first, this Movement did not have a clear organizational structure, but in 1948 it established a leadership headquarters or as Zogu called it, the "National Liberation Front", which included the Zogist leaders who followed him into exile.

The OKLL program contained: "Unceasing war against the communist regime in Albania, until its overthrow; establishment of the monarchy as a legal regime; unification of Albanians in exile; efforts for integration, especially in the Council of Europe and for inclusion in the European Union", etc. The Legality Movement rightly underlined the fact that it had initially collaborated with the Communists for the sake of the liberation of the homeland and was separated from them when they embarked on the path of civil war. , whether fratricidal war, provoked by the Communist Party.

From the beginning, OKLL had internal contradictions, Ahmet. Zogu criticized the position of Abaz Kupi during the war, underlining the lack of results of his policy, and the latter replied that "Zogu did not make any contribution during the war."<sup>22</sup> Zogu, despite appreciating the influence of Abaz Kupi, supported him in his post as chairman of Legalitel until his death. Abaz Kupi propagandized for Ethnic Albania and against Greek territorial goals. The American and British emissaries helped keep cooperation between the two leaders. Abaz Kupi displayed a more democratic profile, claiming that the form of government should be decided by the popular plebiscite, he declared that he had "reservations" for the 1928 constitution, he supported the unification of emigration and the establishment of new uncompromising elements in the posts of high of the Legality Movement. While Zog relied on the elders and never refused to make concessions. Some former young officers, Zogists like Sefedin Çollaku, Ibrahim Farka, etc., did their best to remove Abaz Kupi from the presidency of Legality, but they could not. They further described Zog as the main reason for not uniting emigration outside Albania.

Zog cooperated closely with the British, especially with Colonel Sterling, and in 1948, a CIA cadre was stationed next to him, as his chief adviser.

### **1.2.3. Organization "INDEPENDENT NATIONAL BLOCK" - (BKI)**

This organization is also called the National Conservative Party, where some of its elements had been members or leaders of the organization "Albanian Union" and the Albanian Fascist Party ", created by the collaborators of the Italians, Mustafa Kruja, Qazim Koculi, Sejfi Vllamasi, Kole Bib Mirakaj etc .. In the beginning, in the years 1945 - 1946, Ernest Koliqi, KB Mirakaj, Shefqet Vërlaci, etc., wanted to be part of the leadership of the National Front, but Balli did not accept them, due to cooperation with the Italian and German occupiers. to this, apparently, there was also a suggestion from the Italians that this group of emigrants should not accept the views of the National Front and create the Independent National Block.

<sup>21</sup> Hasan Dosti- A life for the Albanian cause, BOTART, Tirana, 2008. F. 183-184.

<sup>22</sup> AMPB, 1948, File 133, p. 3, MIA report on the organization, Legality Movement, 12 January 1948.

BKI was established on November 6, 1946 in Rome, under the leadership of Shefqet Vërlac with the leaders Gjon Marka Gjoni, Kol Bib Mirakaj, Ernest Koliqi, Ismail Vërlaci etc. where according to Albanian intelligence data, Italy financed 1300 fugitives in the years 1946 - 1947.<sup>23</sup> The BKI emerged as the most organized group in 1946, with a statute adopted on February 3, 1947, and had 142 members. Whereas in 1945 there were 500 sympathizers called independent d.m.th. outside the National Front of Legality. The elements of this organization were mainly pro-American and pro-Italian. The organization published the newspaper "Albania Libre" with editor Eduart Liçon.

On the political platform, the BKI emerged as an anti-communist party. where unlike other organizations, the BKI was for the "preservation and protection of the ethnic rights of Albania", but did not specifically define the borders, which it claimed would be set through diplomatic channels.

The BKI program also included: "following the cult of traditional values"; "Honoring the human personality"; and "family institute", "social and political freedoms"; "Respect for the right to private property", "the right of the people to political self-determination"; "The secular character of the state and the respect for freedom of conscience"; "Prohibition of political revenge, in the conditions of a political transition from communist dictatorship to democracy"<sup>24</sup> etc.

The BKI spoke of rapprochement with other groups, in anticipation of a more favorable situation for the "liberation" of Albania, stating that "Albania should not deny the former relations with Italy", that "geographical and historical position should impose cooperation between two countries"<sup>25</sup>. The Blocists presented themselves as anti-Zogists, anti-fascists and anti-Ballists. They said that the issue of the regime is a right of the Albanian people only, when full freedom was returned to them.<sup>26</sup> In fact, the BKI was for an independent and sovereign state with the presence of Italian influence.

In the magazine "Shejzat" no. 7-9 of 1969 Father Valentini wrote that the Catholic Albanians are Latin Ghegs and called the military occupation of Albania on April 7, 1939, a union. The numerous accusations about the activities of some of the leaders of this organization during the war are countered by an interesting presentation of the reasons for the re-engagement in politics by Ernest Koliqi, who wrote in a letter dated May 21, 1951: "Someone advises me to give up politics". This advice does not come from a simple feeling but after how many friends and loved ones we killed, in this tragic situation in which our country finds itself, until the most basic human rights are not returned to our brothers of the same blood and a language, it would be a crime to take me aside and deal only with literature. It is enough for me to see the Captain of Mirdita who lost two sons as two gods of light, Kol Bibën who left in the mountains as a sacrifice in the highlands of Albania his brother's son, and many others, to feel myself forced to work without getting tired of the liberation of our people. This today is not a political campaign to overthrow a government, this is a national crusade to save the tribe, and with it, the inherited spiritual wealth. How can an intellectual avoid me and remain indifferent, in the face of the incomparable situation that has ravaged us, as individuals and as members of a nation? Therefore, I will take this Council into account only when Albania is released. Today, armed with will and with patriotic flame, I feel obliged to fight in the political field as well."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> AMPB, viti 1947, dosja 132, f.16, Relacion i MPB i datës 25 prill 1947.

<sup>24</sup> Romeo Gurakuqi, Ernest Koliqi and the Independent National Bloc, in the publication *Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, Prizren, 2005; f. 163-164.

<sup>25</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 132, p.1, State Security Report, dated 12 March 1947.

<sup>26</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 132, p.16, Report of the Ministry of Interior dated 25 April 1947.

<sup>27</sup> Romeo Gurakuqi, Ernest Koliqi and the Independent National Bloc, in the publication *Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, Prizren, 2005; f. 161.

**1.2.4. "Katundare Party" Organization**

The Katundare Party was formed in 1943 in Albania as the Party of the Peasants, was reorganized in 1948, under the leadership of Seit Kryeziu and Beqir Maloku. Her program contained the Reform in the sphere of agriculture, she had the support of the British and Italians. In April 1955, he was divided into two factions, led by Seit Kryeziu, Eqerem Telhain and Ibrahim Farka, under American and British influence, and the one led by Isa Elez Ndreu, Hysni Mulleti, Lec Shllaku, etc., supported by the Italians.

**1.2.5. "Albanian Heroism"**

It is also called the "Group of Anti-Communist Revolutionaries" with Ndue Pjetër Gjonmarkaj as its leader, based first in Palermo (Italy) and later in the USA. This group emerged as the BKI faction. He was a group that carried out diversionary activities, was associated with Legality, ties that were strengthened, especially after 1973, when he began close cooperation with Leka Zogu. This group tried to exert its influence in the ranks of the Arbëresh of Italy and elsewhere and in the Albanians in Montenegro. Published a newspaper of the same name and. propagated the creation of Ethnic Albania, a group which was for the unification of the entire Albanian anti-communist emigration.

**1.2.6. Kosovar diaspora organizations with anti-communist orientation.**

The Kosovar group, which in November 1944, had settled in Zagreb, with great difficulty managed to cross the Slovenian-Austrian Alps in early December of that year and, after many vicissitudes, settled in Vienna, where it remained until the beginning of the year. 1947. The news of the end of the Drenica uprising, led by Shaban Polluzha, Mehmet Gradica and Ymer Berisha, shocked the Kosovo Group, which was also finding that the hopes and promise of the Western Allies to intervene in the Balkans had such uprisings and organized resistance against communist regimes were being extinguished. Xhaferr Deva and the Kosovar Group in early 1947 moved to Italy and then emigrated to Syria, where they began their political activity, with the publication of the newspaper "Union of the Nation", which was one of the first newspapers of Albanian nationalism after the war.<sup>28</sup> Its editor was Xhelal Mitrovica, this newspaper was known for its clear nationalist and anti-communist program.

Immediately after leaving Albania, the Ballists, Zogists and other anti-communist emigrants tried to establish ties and cooperate with Kosovar emigrants. A number of Kosovar political emigrants joined the Zogists, despite Mit'hat Frashëri's efforts in 1947 to bring Kosovars closer to the National Front.<sup>29</sup>

In August 1945, Xhafer Deva and Rexhep Krasniqi established ties with the Americans through Colonel Mr Karl Thomson in Austria. The reason for the first meeting was for security reasons, because the strong operating network of Soviet espionage had begun to kidnap anti-communist political refugees, who it handed over to the respective communist governments. They were executed on charges of war crimes, but Thomson housed some in a hotel, where they remained until February 1947.<sup>30</sup>

In 1947 Tahir Zajmi and others, Kosovar fugitives, declared themselves followers of the Second League of Prizren created during the Second World War<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "Xhafer Deva- In the Light of His Letters and Other Revelations of the Diaspora", New York, 2002, p.8

<sup>29</sup> AMPB, 1947, File 131, p. 28, Report of the Ministry of Interior on political emigration, March 23, 1947.

<sup>30</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "The efforts of XH. Deva and R. Krasniqi on the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US "in the publication: The Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania, vol. 2. Prizren, 2005. Ff. 149-152.

<sup>31</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 79, Information of the Ministry of Interior on political emigration, 16 May 1947.

During the years 1948-1949 Xhaferr Deva was engaged with the Americans, in implementation of Washington's strategy for the Balkans, where in particular, efforts were made to organize an anti-communist uprising in Albania. Although the KSHL had accepted the localization of the uprising only in Albania, Deva and the BKI leaders managed to convince a group of important and influential American friends that an armed conflict in Kosovo should be provoked at all costs, arguing that the Yugoslavs would not allowed the overthrow of the communist regime in Albania and thus planned the arrival of nationalist forces in power.<sup>32</sup>

In 1949, Xhaferr Deva tried to represent Kosovo within the KSHL through the Kosovar Group. Some other emigrants, who were part of the "Kosovar Group" in 1949, were scattered in Turkey, Syria, Austria, France and elsewhere, but were not organized. They were sympathizers of Xhaferr Deva and made efforts to group as a continuation of the "Second League of Prizren". They, in the political program, announced that they would cooperate with any Albanian political group in exile, which would help the return of Kosovo to Albania. On the whole, this group was a determined anti-communist and nationalist and was led by Xhelal and Rexhep Mitrovica, Xhaferr Deva, etc., who had gathered around the "Unity of the Nation".

Several religious organizations and groups were established, such as: "Albanian Catholic Action" in 1948 in Italy with branches in the US, Belgium, France, FRY, etc., where there were Catholic immigrants in the Diaspora;

#### ***1.2.7. Organizations of non-Albanian character***

The anti-communist political emigration also included some Albanian citizens who belonged to the minorities or were a rudiment of the layers of Greek or Slavophile Albanians who were grouped around political organizations with anti-Albanian character. The main organizations with this profile were:

##### ***1.2.7.1. "Central Committee of Northern-Epiriot Efforts" (KEVA)***

KEVA was created by the Greek government in 1918 to fight for the unification of Southern Albania with Greece. During World War II, in 1942 it was reorganized by the Greek intelligence (QIP) led by Pandelejmon Kotoko<sup>33</sup>, former bishop of Gjirokastra, fled in 1941 with Greek forces. Although this organization served the Greek regions regarding the issue of Vorio Epirus, we are dealing with it in this paper, because most of its leaders and the Vorio Epirios (provincial committees) in Greece and abroad were fugitives from Albania or economic emigrants, not only from the Greek minority in Albania, but also from other regions of our country.

After the end of World War II, the Greek state and its discovery, greatly expanded the activity, through northern Epirote syllables. Also reorganized the Panepirot Sylog in Greece and the USA, the North Epirus nationalist youth (ENVI) etc., with anti-Albanian and diversionist groups, where some of the Albanian fugitives were included, the QIP reorganized the North Epirus branches in the US, Canada, France, Egypt, England and elsewhere, introducing into them, fugitives and expatriates of pro-Greek Albanians. The English Lord Mr N. Bethell, in his book, described KEVA as "a branch of Greek intelligence, which was indignant with the British activity on Greek territory and the British intervention in without an agreement with the Greek side"<sup>34</sup> in the years 1949-50 in diversionary actions against Albania. These northern Epirus organizations were oriented to coordinate their subversive

<sup>32</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "The efforts of XH. Deva and R. Krasniqi on the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US" in the publication: *The Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, vol. 2. Prizren, 2005. Ff. 149-152.

<sup>33</sup> AMPB, year 1945, File 27, p. 31, Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the Ministry of Interior on the activity of the Greek government towards Albania. August 24, 1945.

<sup>34</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, 1984, p.191

activity against Albania, with other Albanian groups in exile or internal opponents of the communist regime, but this cooperation was ineffective.

Since 1945 KEVA carried out intense activities against Albania through diversionist gangs, etc. Then, and later, as stated in the statement of the Panepiriot Congress of Philadelphia (USA) in July 1982, the Greeks said: "Northern Epirotes are brothers of Epirots, with them we common national origin, common language, customs, religion and common liberation wars, even many Epirots have close or distant relatives in Vorio - Epirus"<sup>35</sup>

The KEVA platform underwent a few changes, since its establishment, but after the liberation, the change of the borders between Albania and Greece was no longer required diplomatically, but the war liberation of Vorio - Epirus was propagated by the northern Epirotes themselves<sup>36</sup>. This platform was laid at the secret meeting in Ioannina by 60 Albanian minority fugitives under the leadership of Metropolitan Spiridon and QIP Captain Grigor Papadopoulos, where the task of creating northern Epirus detachments was laid.

The KEVA Congress in 1946 in Athens called for "rapid Allied intervention" in Albania, citing claims of a "state of war" with Albania.<sup>37</sup> These efforts were coordinated with the diplomatic activity of the Greek government which at this time was trying to sensitize the allies to the oppression of the Greek minority in Albania, due to its resistance and mass non-participation in the 1945 elections, which the Greek government stated that he did not know them.<sup>38</sup> The Greek government also made allegations of the imprisonment of dozens of people in Delvina and Himara, and deliberately added to this the sentences against the "northern Epirotes" who were in fact Orthodox Albanians..<sup>39</sup>

#### **1.2.7.2 Organization "Political Union of Fugitives of Albania in Yugoslavia.**

Immediately after the establishment of the KSHL in Rome, the Yugoslav Government organized a group with Albanian emigrants in Prizren and Peja, consisting of Gani Bej Kryeziu, Bajram Bajraktari (brother of M. Bajraktari) Cen Elezi, Dan Kaloshi and Caf Bej Ulqinaku<sup>40</sup> as well as the organization "Political Union of Albanian Fugitives", which is also known as the Prizren Committee. This organization, unlike the KSHL, was declared the government in exile, which was headed by Apostol Tanef.

It is interesting that the French, especially their media, made it a great publicity, trying to convince the international public that, under the leadership of this organization, there was a whole army, with over 50 thousand people that would march towards Tirana. .

In these circumstances, an unfavorable situation was created for the ANC, where Belgrade's actions with the "Political Union of Albanian Fugitives" aroused the reaction of Moscow, on which the Albanian government had relied, as well as several different circles in Europe. The Russians neutralized the Yugoslavs, but the latter also managed to neutralize the KSHL even though its members had made several landings so far in Albania and some others remained in the attempt.<sup>41</sup>

It is debatable whether the Yugoslavs were really trying to overthrow the regime in Albania, or to take the KSHL out of the game, given that after the creation of this pro-

<sup>35</sup> AMPB, KEVA Practice, p. 56

<sup>36</sup> AMPB, year 1946, File 64, p. 18

<sup>37</sup> AMPB, year 1946, File 64, p. 21

<sup>38</sup> The Greek Minority in Albania- A documentary Record (1921-1993) Thessaloniki 1994, p.114-115.

<sup>39</sup> The Greek Minority in Albania- A documentary Record (1921-1993) Thessaloniki 1994, p.115-116.

<sup>40</sup> Rexhep Kastrati, "Program aspects of some Albanian political organizations after the Second World War, seen in the geopolitical context of the time" in the publication Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania, Vol. 2, Prizren, 2005, pp.117-127.

<sup>41</sup> Rexhep Kastrati, "Program aspects of some Albanian political organizations after the Second World War, seen in the geopolitical context of the time" in the publication Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania, Vol. 2, Prizren, 2005, pp.117-127.

Yugoslav organization, the importance of the KSHL for the Americans went down, and with it their support. for this the Committee went towards zero.<sup>42</sup> Of course, this also happened due to the different geopolitical contexts of the Soviets and Yugoslavs, as they had made state hegemony of chauvinist interests a state policy, which would be a serious obstacle to achieving the objectives of Albanian nationalist anti-communist political emigration.

### **1.3. Efforts to unify political emigration**

Political emigration attempted to organize and unite in the form of a united anti-communist opposition in exile, on a single anti-communist front, to overthrow the communist regime from within and without with the support of Western states. These efforts encountered numerous objective and subjective obstacles and difficulties. In addition to internal divisions, these quarrels have been influenced by the intervention of different countries, which had different priorities and interests towards Albania and in this context also towards Albanian emigration.

The first attempts to unite the Albanian political emigration had begun during World War II when King Zogu tried to create a united national front for the liberation of the country and the preservation of its political unity. These efforts followed from 1945 to 1946 in Cairo, now with the support of the Anglo-Americans. Zogu was propagated with all possibilities, as the epicenter of the political union of the Albanian emigration. But even in this case there were difficulties, as He did not meet all the conditions of the Anglo-Americans to realize this union. Also the leaders of other anti-communist emigration groups did not unanimously accept the figure of Zog as the axis for their unification.

In 1946 in Rome efforts were made to create the "Albanian Balkan Front "<sup>43</sup>, led by Shefqet Vërlacit, Ali Këlcyra, Gjon Marka Gjoni, etc., but the Ballists sabotaged this front because they did not accept Zogu in this union, they even published a tract against him, criticizing Zogu that he could not solve any of the problems Albanian interior. The Ballists declared that only Balli represented the pure Albanian nationalist tradition, and united the old generation with the young. After that, Zogu was not discouraged but in 1946 he tried to create the "True Albania Committee" headed by Abaz Kupin. The essence of the program of this union was the creation of the "True Albania" which meant ethnic Albania. He tried to unite political emigration from below not through group leaders. For this purpose, the Immigration Chiefs were summoned by him to Cairo by Zog, but the ballistas did not go. By this time many groups of political emigration had already been formed. Even the Anglo-Americans did not adequately support Zog's effort, as they aimed to overthrow the communist regime from within without Zog.

After 1946 - 1947, the Western Powers reactivated the issue of unification of political emigration and Zogu repeated the efforts for unification by inviting the heads of emigration again to Cairo, but again he failed although he was unreservedly supported by Mustafa Kruja etc.<sup>44</sup> Ballistic leaders like Mit'hat Frashëri and Abaz. Ermenji opposed this call, accusing Zog that he had brought about the fascist occupation of Albania, and that he had been expelled by the Albanian people and not the occupiers, as the legalists claimed. BK also accused BKI as a fascist organization, that it was neither independent nor national and that it had sold its homeland to Italy. While the blockade leaders, sued the ballistas in the Italian

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<sup>42</sup> Rexhep Kastrati, "Program aspects of some Albanian political organizations after the Second World War, seen in the geopolitical context of the time" in the publication *Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, Vol. 2, Prizren, 2005, pp.117-127.

<sup>43</sup> AMPB, year 1946, file 91, p.15

<sup>44</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 40-41

bodies as communists in the camp of Reggio Emilia, sending a report to the Prime Minister Shelba, asking for help to continue the fight against the communist regime in Albania.<sup>45</sup> After that BK added the accusations against BKI, these accusations were made based on the meetings that the blockchain leaders had with Greek scouts, with the Greek consul Spiro Milo in Rome and with a Greek military commission in Milan<sup>46</sup>. Thus BK became the main obstacle since then, for the union with the Zogists and the Blocists. Perhaps these attitudes were also influenced by London, as Abaz. Ermenji wrote to his people in Rome "not to join Balli with Legality, that BK has sympathy in Albania, that ballists have faith in him and work in Albania"<sup>47</sup>. The ballistas also presented the activity of Mustafa Kruja as an argument for compromising the blockers.<sup>48</sup> Mit'hat Frashëri himself had expressed reservations about the actions of the Greeks on the issue of their unification.

But in the meantime, quarrels broke out in BK over the issue of unification between its leaders, especially the contradictions between Mit'hat. Frashërit and Ali Këlcyrë. It seemed that these controversies were also influenced by a discord between the English and the Italians. London did not support union with the BKI and the Zogis, while Rome sought a broader anti-communist front in exile, without ideological differences. Mit'hat Frashëri, advised by the Americans, wanted to keep BK's anti-communist policy in emigration intact, while Ali Këlcyrë was more pragmatic, emphasizing the widest possible political union to strengthen the anti-communist front against the Regime in Tirana. In this climate of strife, Vizhdan Risilisa - former fascist prefect in Vlora was killed and this murder was propagated as revenge for the murder of ballist Skënder Muços during the war, as he tried to put the ballistas in the Italian espionage network. There were also rumors that the murder was committed by the government of Tirana<sup>49</sup>. This act prompted the ballist Muhamet Karamani to injure the blocker Ago Agaj, while the Zogist Zenel Çami killed Shaqir Preza. Ali Këlcyrë was shot with tomatoes by the blockers, in a meeting in Reggio Emilia, while the ballistas assassinated the new chairman of BKI, Ismail Shefqet Vërlac<sup>50</sup>, who took his father's place after his death. In December 1947, Italian police arrested 15 ballistae, who were aware of the murder of Vizhdan Risilia, after denunciations to the BKI, but with Hasan's intervention. Dosti, the Italian police released them. At this time, some new elements issued the tract "Long live freedom and democracy"<sup>51</sup>, where unification was demanded "without the traitorous politicians of Albania" demanding the creation of a group without a party. It was clear that this disruption was also the result of foreign interventions, especially of neighboring countries, to create a chaotic situation to have the leaders of these groups under their control.

However, the signs of compromise for reconciliation and the settlement of quarrels soon began to appear after in 1947 BKI accepted the compromise for union with Zog, but BK spoke against this union again. Zog tried to lure the fugitives to Arab countries to support him. The contacts of the leaders in Rome with the Americans, the British, (with Colonel Hill), the Vatican, the Greeks, etc., increased their interest. The head of the Greek military mission in Italy told Th. Papalilos that "for now our situations do not allow for any agreement, that others will not agree either ... be very confused, that you are divided into groups ... Abaz. Ermenji is a professor of culture and should not be left out".<sup>52</sup>

Meanwhile the Englishman Pearson (SIS cadre) demanded the establishment of a joint immigration committee in France. According to the British, the fugitives "needed a political

<sup>45</sup> Bulletin of BK, 1970, p. 73

<sup>46</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 30

<sup>47</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 30

<sup>48</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 2

<sup>49</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 19

<sup>50</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 8

<sup>51</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 8

<sup>52</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 28



base, a government in exile, which would unite all anti-communist Albanians and give the guerrilla fighters some form of legitimacy."<sup>53</sup> Regarding these quarrels, the American embassy in Rome, in 1948, wrote to its center that "each of them (political groups of Albanian emigration) was originally created with the main goal of destroying others"<sup>54</sup>.

The year 1948 marked a significant increase in the efforts for the unification of the Albanian political emigration where as the first option was discussed: the creation of the "Liberation Committee", without Zog. The talks took place in Rome and BK remained in the minority, because the others agreed on the need for unification and the agreement with the Greeks, especially Ali Këlcyra, Koço Muka, etc. But BK succeeded in ousting BKI, as it wanted to lead the talks itself with the Greeks, who were pursuing an active policy in the ranks of reactionary emigration. To favor this union, Ernest Koliqi declared that the BKI accepted cooperation with the Greeks against the common enemy. In these conditions, Ahmet Zogu met the Greek archbishop in Alexandria, while a Greek explorer propagated that only Zogu could unite the Albanians.<sup>55</sup> Other leaders such as Hasan Dosti, Gjon Marka Gjoni, Vasil Andoni, etc. increased their contacts with the Greeks. Later, the Italians also approved the cooperation of the BKI leaders with the Greeks <sup>56</sup>.

In May 1948 at the BK meeting in Turin two currents on the issue of unification appeared. These divergences were not resolved by the BK congress, which condemned Ali Koco Muka's whining as troublemakers and why they had made talks without his authorization with Zogu<sup>57</sup>. Zogu reacted harshly to this attitude and disregard from BK. At this time and under these circumstances Abaz Kupa advised him to abandon the old leaders and work with the young, but Zogu did not accept either this or Zenel Shehu's proposal that the union be charged to Ernest Kolic.<sup>58</sup> Under these conditions, the Greek intelligence agreed that Zogu should head the emigration and the Italians encouraged the BKI to unite without fuss, and not to leave the initiative to the Greeks (at the behest of the Secretary General of the Italian MFA, later its representative in OKB)<sup>59</sup>. In these circumstances, BK sent Hasan Dosti to the Italian MFA to present BK as the only nationalist force in exile and to put an end to misunderstandings with the blockers. This new BK move was also influenced by American and British councils. Zogu, for his part, intensified efforts to get closer to Rome, where on the occasion of the death of Italian King Victor Emmanuel, he sent a delegation, which met with his son, and he himself met with the Pope's representative and had established good relations with the Italian minister in Cairo. In July 1948, Mehdi Frashëri went to Athens, from Rome, to meet with the group of ballistas there, whose most important personality was Abaz. Armenian.

In the summer of 1948 the idea of uniting emigration was thrown through the creation of a provisional government in exile. The Americans and the British again gave the lead role to Zog in this project.<sup>60</sup>, who summoned the leaders to Cairo. At this time, calls were made for the unification of the Albanian patriotic colony in the US with Fan Noli, but it refused <sup>61</sup>. Believing in compromise, Zog thought he would strengthen his position to continue with his goals later. At the meeting of August 12, 1948, he laid down the conditions for joining these two conditions: to be recognized as king and to establish a single command with Zog at the

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<sup>53</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 28

<sup>54</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, 1984, p. 62 and 72

<sup>55</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 29

<sup>56</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 29

<sup>57</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 29

<sup>58</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 2

<sup>59</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 2

<sup>60</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 2

<sup>61</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 197, p. 3

helm, still adhering to the monarchist constitution of 1928. But his efforts failed, though set up a "Standing Committee" in Cairo, headed by Zogist and Ballistic leaders.<sup>62</sup>

Since this Committee did not give him the power he sought, Zogu sought the support of Xhafer Deva to clarify the heads of emigration to Italy and elsewhere that Zogu wanted a covenant of all groups and persons, the establishment of a political committee with him at the helm, and that all currents of emigration to attend a congress in Egypt<sup>63</sup>. And this time this goal was not achieved, because the contradictions between the leaders had not yet been overcome. At this time the Americans had taken the dominant role in promoting the process of unification of the Albanian reaction abroad so in 1948, Mit'hat Frashëri wrote to Abaz. Kupit that "How can we appear before the public opinion side by side as collaborators with people on whose shoulders weigh ugly events that made Albania a desert, ending in the current situation."<sup>64</sup> In this case, the ballistas also recalled the accusations made from time to time by some Zogists who had accused them of being communists.<sup>65</sup>

Zogu summoned key leaders to Cairo<sup>66</sup> and attracted many fugitives to Arab countries such as Syria, Transjordan, Egypt, etc. In the Cairo talks a rapprochement was seen between the leaders and the withdrawal of the Albanians of the colonies to the US and elsewhere was discussed. There were difficulties especially as the Albanian colony in the US led by Fan Noli refused to rejoin them.<sup>67</sup> The head of the SIS for the Middle East, Mr Clayton got in touch with immigration leaders, this time meeting Zog, as their representative.

Further, the meeting of August 12, 1948 was organized, where Zogu set the following conditions: to be recognized as a king, to create a single command headed by Zogu, which would finance the actions against the communist regime. But unification was not achieved, as there were objections to Zog's request for the 1928 constitution to be recognized as valid.<sup>68</sup>

The Cairo Committee in 1948 did not accept Zog's terms, so he sent Xhafer. The door to talk to the main leaders of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Italy and elsewhere, about a Covenant of all groups and persons, with a political committee headed by Zog. He again called for all currents to gather in a congress in Egypt but even this initiative did not succeed.

After the creation of NATO, American intelligence took the initiative to unite the Albanian emigration abroad, trying to give a new impetus to the battle to overthrow the communist regime of Albania, which was already geographically isolated from the camp. socialist. This unification would already take place in the form of the anti-communist bloc, without merging all the groups into a single front. This time the Americans recognized Balli Kombëtar a leading role in organizing the Albanian emigration. Balli continued to insist that he had strongly opposed the advice of some foreign agencies from the time of the war onwards to submit to corrupt individuals with the fascist occupiers to fight communism.<sup>69</sup>

To advance the union, Mehdi. Frashëri traveled to Turkey, France, England, Egypt, the FRY and elsewhere to specifically discuss the issue of reunification with other political immigrants. Also in January 1949 in Turin a meeting was organized with the leaders of the main Albanian groups, where it was decided to unite emigration. In February 1949 the BK Congress approved this directive and Zogu e Legaliteti accepted the conditions of the Americans and the British for the realization of the union, the new strategy of the war against the communist regime of Tirana. This action was supported by the governments of

<sup>62</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 197, p. 9

<sup>63</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 198, p. 23

<sup>64</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 25 March 1975 p. 3

<sup>65</sup> Flamuri newspaper, March 25, 1975, p. 4

<sup>66</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 7

<sup>67</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 3

<sup>68</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 197 p. 9

<sup>69</sup> Bulletin of BK, 1970, p. 64

neighboring countries as well as other Western governments such as the French, German, Italian governments, etc.

Zogu summoned to Alexandria some of his political opponents who were not engaged in political groups and called for a wave of national reconciliation.<sup>70</sup> Abaz Kupa was the first to shake hands with his political "opponent" Mustafa Kruja "only for the sake of the homeland"<sup>71</sup>. Zogu declared in 1949 that the issue of the regime would be decided by referendum by the people with free votes after the liberation of Albania<sup>72</sup>.

From 1948 to 1949, British emissaries McLean and Emery continued to meet with leaders in Rome, Cairo and elsewhere to persuade them to cooperate in the project of overthrowing the communist regime.<sup>73</sup>

In June 1949 the Americans Robert Lon and Robert Mainor went from London to Rome with a team of British spies to complete the talks with the Albanian emigrants, for their reunion. Their task was to persuade Albanians to agree on a president and executive committee, on the people who would form the country's government after liberation."<sup>74</sup> According to Robert Lon, these talks were so "difficult" that they had to overcome the rivalry and mistrust between the royal and republican groups, Christian and Muslim, northern and southern, of those who had collaborated with the invaders; the worst problems of family quarrels, blood feuds, which divided whole areas and often ended in murder, that the leaders at the last moment found a chord of disagreement and so the whole structure fell so complicated<sup>75</sup>. Emeri claims that "especially Abaz Ermenji could hardly be persuaded", even after five years he still had not changed ... as the new military commander of the BK, a furious anti-communist, he instinctively held a hostile attitude towards the Anglo-American plan for an agreement with Zog "(who during the war should have been in Albania and not in England); he did not like the removal of Mit'hat Frashëri in the foreground, he was afraid that BKI was plotting to kill him there. Therefore the English took him to the Trieste talks, where his influence was lesser and he was kept under surveillance by Arlei Liell, an English explorer there."<sup>76</sup>

Even the Americans and the British pressured him to obey, as he threatened that he "would offer his services to the Soviet embassy".<sup>77</sup> Zogu and Mehdi Frashëri partially agreed, after Zogu agreed to let Abaz Kupa emerge as the main figure and would appoint his people to the KSHL, whom he would not openly support, nor would he openly oppose.<sup>78</sup>

But in the organizational sphere the difficulties still persisted. Thus, Kosovars with Seit Kryeziu posed a problem for the union, as well as people known as Ihsan Toptani, etc., who, relying on family prestige and personal skills, sought their place in this Committee.<sup>79</sup>

Mit'hat Frashëri wanted to preserve independence in action against the regime and declared that "all the money of the 1949 operation was a loan to the future Albanian government." All accounts would be kept and after the liberation, American and British money would be atone"<sup>80</sup>. They declared forcefully and sincerely that they would not become foreign agents to attack their country.

Greek territorial claims to Albania were a source of dissatisfaction with political emigration, the Anglo-Americans called these claims a threat to the operation against the

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<sup>70</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1974, p. 41

<sup>71</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1974, p. 42

<sup>72</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1971, p. 10

<sup>73</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, 1984, p. 62

<sup>74</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, 1984, p. 80 - 81

<sup>75</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, 1984, p. f.81

<sup>76</sup> J. Amery, *Bijtë e Shqipërisë*, 1948, p. 286

<sup>77</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, p. 82

<sup>78</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, p. 82

<sup>79</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, p. 90

<sup>80</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, p. 70-71

communist regime. Greece was more interested in taking Vlorë-Epirus than in establishing a Western democracy in Albania.

"In fact, some of the emigrants were worried, suspecting that the West was plotting with Greece to take away 20 percent of its territory from Albania, possibly even to divide the country between Greece and Yugoslavia."<sup>81</sup> Also, some of them looked with disbelief at the Western allies, as well as the neighboring countries, who demanded the annexation of the Albanian territories, because they had tolerated the submission of Greek demands for Vlorë - Epirus and those Slavs for Kosovo.

In 1949 the propaganda against the communist regime intensified. The western press gave alarming news from Albania, emphasizing that the bay of Vlorë opposite Otranto was becoming the base of BS submarines, that Albania was turning into a Soviet fortress, etc., BK rightly denounced that the communist government, during the civil war in Greece had used the Albanian land as a military background and as a shelter for the Greek communist gangs, etc. In this situation, efforts were intensified to regroup the Albanian and Kosovar emigration forces to activate it in a comprehensive war against the government of Enver Hoxha. The main efforts were made to unite political immigration into a single organization.

In the spring of 1949, McLean and Emery were invited to serve as special advisers to the British government.<sup>82</sup> They would make a trip to Albanian emigration centers to create a political base from which to organize operations to overthrow Hoxha's government."<sup>83</sup>

"Emery and McLean had a good relationship and were trusted by immigration leaders."<sup>84</sup> They worked to quell the strife and unite immigration. The main problem for the union was Zog's persuasion to cooperate. He had opposed the creation of a shadow government without it because he saw it as an "usurpation of royal prerogatives"<sup>85</sup>, since he had never abdicated and had left Albania with the approval of parliament in the face of fascist aggression. The plan was laid out to Zog in May 1949 in Alexandria, by Robert Lou and Robert Mainor. The talks passed in a positive atmosphere where Xh also talked with Zog. Emery, who told him that "the US and Britain were not forming a government but just a committee of representatives and they were not asking him to give up royal prerogatives"<sup>86</sup>. The first step was to carry out the operation against the communist government and overthrow it then a referendum would be held on the form of the regime. Zogu also engaged in a wide range of diplomatic activities on a number of issues such as the settlement of diplomatic disputes with Greece through indirect talks with the Greek king, etc.<sup>87</sup>. To facilitate efforts to establish the SSC without wanting to run counter to American policy, Greek Prime Minister Diomedes declared that "Greece had no intentions over Albania and that the claims of both sides could be resolved with a liberated Albania with the help and UN mediation"<sup>88</sup>.

Finally Zogu was persuaded to cooperate in this operation, Robert Lou recalls that working lunches and talks on the establishment of KSHL took place in a restaurant in Borgeze villas <sup>89</sup>. The conversations were long and tedious they lasted from 9am to 3pm or 4pm, all the time. The planning of actions for the liberation of Albania from the communist regime was widely discussed<sup>90</sup>.

<sup>81</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, p.84

<sup>82</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.70

<sup>83</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.70

<sup>84</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.70

<sup>85</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.85

<sup>86</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.89

<sup>87</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.87

<sup>88</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper, 26 August 1947, p.4

<sup>89</sup> AMPB, files of the years 1948-1953; N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.81

<sup>90</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.86

On July 7, 1949, a compromise was reached for the creation of the KSHL, its head was given to the leader of Balli, Mehdi Frashëri, then the Military Committee was created that would lead the military operations headed by Abaz Kupin and his deputy A. Ermenji e Seit Kryeziu. Gago Gogo, Zogu's secretary, became Secretary of the Military Committee as well as secretary of the Albanian National Executive Committee (KSHL)<sup>91</sup>. Xh. Emer Lou and Robert Lou and many others, on July 14, 1949, went to Zogu in Cairo, to inform him of this agreement, putting him before the fact committed, Zogu reacted angrily but did not object further. This union of immigration was a complicated act<sup>92</sup>. The union was both a victory and the merit of the Americans and the Western allies who managed to create the "Free Albania Committee", this body was the official opposition against the communist regime to carry out the plan of operations to overthrow the Tirana regime.

On July 17, 1949, the diplomatic part of the talks ended and the time came for the paramilitary activity to be undertaken<sup>93</sup>, i.e. training and throwing gangs in Albania.

Thus, through many political combinations, the creation of the "Free Albania Committee" (KSHL) was achieved<sup>94</sup> as a body for the unification of Albanian anti-communist emigration, based in Rome. He was proclaimed in Paris, on August 26, 1949. In this Executive Committee, of 10 people, participated many members of BK, Legality and the neutral group (Seit Kryeziu). Balli and Legaliteti had equality of persons (Medi. Farshëri and Zef Pali for the first, Abaz. Kupi and Nuçi Kota for the second) while a place was left open for the representative from inside Albania. Even in the consultative committee there was equality (from 3 seats), from 2 seats the other groups without a party<sup>95</sup>.

The rejection of BKI in the executive committee remained an obstacle to the merger issue. But further this cooperation became real in illegal ways, as the blockers were among the most active against the communist regime. This committee was a leading and coordinating body of political emigration for the actions against the communist regime where besides it a Senate was formed with the leaders G. Gogo, Myftar Spahia, Gani Tafili, Halil Maçi, A. Ermenji, Vasil Andoni, Eqrem Telhai, Hysni Mulleti, M. Bajraktari and Ihsan Toptani. This subcommittee also had sections: military, political, financial and propaganda. The headquarters of the KSHL was also established with Abaz Kupin as chairman, A. Ermenjin as vice-chairman and M. Bajraktar as chairman. Later, a subcommittee of a military office was established under the leadership of Gani bej Kryeziu in Prishtina, who were in fact an integral part of the SAC of Rome<sup>96</sup>, that complemented the unification of Albanian emigration.

This Committee was given a great deal of publicity at a press conference, in the presence of representatives of news agencies and the western press. The proclamation was addressed to the Albanian people for resistance against the communist government and called the committee "provisional government in exile". So in the essence of KSHL was the problem of the liberation of Albania d.m.th. the overthrow of the communist regime. Its leaders M. Frashëri, A. Kupi, A. Ermenji, etc., made a tour and were received by senior officials in the US, England and elsewhere, making propaganda through the press and radio, especially in London, Paris, New York, Bonn, Rome, Athens, etc. Near the KSHL in Rome, American, English and other intelligence agents had a representative. Regarding the establishment of this committee, V. Andoni emphasized: "Those were golden times. They promised us the moon. They were protecting us from our greedy neighbors and, at the same time, they were

<sup>91</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.84

<sup>92</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.83

<sup>93</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.90

<sup>94</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.72

<sup>95</sup> AMPB, *Practice of the Free Albania Committee*.

<sup>96</sup> E. Hoxha, *Titists*, 1983, p. 27; *Flamuri* newspaper, August 26, 1974

liberating us from the communists."<sup>97</sup> Although the unification was achieved, the Western emissaries who helped to achieve it remained dissatisfied with the attitude of many immigration leaders, who said that they were very controversial and poor."<sup>98</sup>.

#### 1.4. Anti-communist activity of political emigration in the years 1945-1949

In the first years, after the war 1945 - 1947, Western countries hoped that anti-communist forces inside the country would be able to reverse the situation in Albania. Political emigration abroad, at this time was still disorganized and in a difficult situation but the efforts to overthrow the regime took place in two stages.

The first stage began on January 21, 1945 with the anti-communist resistance in Shkodra that was followed by the accumulation of Albanian political emigration, especially in Italy and Greece. The main force of emigration, at this time, were the political fugitives, a total of 17,000 people. Thus began a large-scale propaganda campaign for the mobilization of emigration where the Allied Missions in Bari, in May 1945, tried to encourage emigrants, claiming that the situation in Albania would soon change.<sup>99</sup>

Initially, political emigration started the anti-communist campaign in the hope of a rapid change in the situation in Albania, words began to circulate that "November 28, 1945 will be celebrated in Tirana",<sup>100</sup> that "the return of the Bird was being prepared" and the landing of the English was imminent. Thus Dervish Duma from London wrote to the fugitives in Italy that "the situation in Albania is turbulent and will change soon"<sup>101</sup>.

Political emigration tried to cooperate with the Western Allies in various forms. while Abaz Kupa gave the English officers two reports on the situation in Albania, one to Iden, the other to General Alexander, and a copy of them was sent to Zog.<sup>102</sup> So did many other leaders of political emigration such as S. Damani, H. Dosti, T. Xhindi, Xh. Dino etc., where the Albanian Emigration Abroad, called on the anti-communist forces inside Albania for resistance and for the organization of a nationwide "Covenant".

Pati bashkërendim e bashkëveprim kur shumë emigrantë nga jashtë ose të riatdhesuar, me unparalleled courage and selflessness came to Albania to organize the anti-communist uprising. Thus, the leaders of anti-communist emigration to Italy tried to contact M. Bajraktari and Markagjoni through the British and send materials to Albania.<sup>103</sup>

The Allies were helping M. Bajraktari with money and war materials <sup>104</sup> when he was fleeing the country and in July 1945 on the Vasha stone, between Lura, Macukulli and Qafë e Murrës, he held talks with Ali Nivica's envoys, who had fled to Greece, to act against the communist regime.<sup>105</sup> This group was destroyed by government forces and M. Bajraktari fled to Greece <sup>106</sup> and on July 27, 1945, M. Bajraktari, who was still on the run inside the country, sent a letter to the British consul in Tirana, requesting that British and American soldiers as well as Albanian fugitives be brought to Albania, together with the necessary means for assisted and organized the armed uprising against communist rule.

<sup>97</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal*, p 84

<sup>98</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal*, p 83;

<sup>99</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 52, p.26

<sup>100</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 52, p.26

<sup>101</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 52, p.30

<sup>102</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 52, p.4

<sup>103</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 53, p.14

<sup>104</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 53, p.14

<sup>105</sup> Newspaper "Shqipëria e re", November 1963, p.4

<sup>106</sup> Newspaper "Shqipëria e re", November 1963, p.4

BK also echoed the war of internal and external anti-communist forces such as. with the war of Preng Cali in Kelmend, on January 14, 1945<sup>107</sup>.

The second stage of the anti-communist resistance coincides with the organization of the Parliamentary Group to create the "opposition" inside the country or outside the Albanian Democratic Front<sup>108</sup>, where among them Halit Gjoleka stood out. At this time, the Americans and the British activated Ahmet Zogu<sup>109</sup> for the union of political emigration. This plan was financed by the British with about 100,000 <sup>110</sup>, it was even supported by the Arab League. In 1946, political emigration was organized and reorganized. Zogu traveled from London to Cairo and stated that he wanted to return to Albania.<sup>111</sup> Meanwhile, preparations began for the release of diversionist groups of fugitives in Italy, Greece and elsewhere. Preng Previzi from Greece sent a memorandum to the UN, instigated by the allies, while the Associated Press Agency distributed this memorandum. The New York Times correspondent asked E. Koliqi to prepare a memorandum and send it to President Truman. In it he demanded the intervention of allied troops in Albania and the control of free elections by them<sup>112</sup>.

All Albanians, declared BK, have turned their eyes to the sea and are waiting for the salvation of the homeland from the Anglo-Americans, who descended in this giant war to save the world from totalitarian rule and to provide humanity with four freedoms, which sadly are not at all in our country. He echoed the squads that were keeping "the fires burning in the mountains of Albania, ready to spread the sparks of the uprising in every direction, as soon as the opportunity arises."<sup>113</sup> Balli Kombëtar called on the Western Powers to act quickly as the communist regime was destroying Albania's independence. He also stressed that "Kosovo was no longer talked about in Albania", that "the Albanian government will sooner or later realize Albania's entry into the Yugoslav confederation"<sup>114</sup>.

On December 1, 1946, Mit'hat Frashëri sent them a letter <sup>115</sup> expatriate Albanians, especially those in the US, with calls to mobilize them in the fight against communist rule. In this letter he tried to explain the truth of the events in Albania; why ballista leaders fled their country and asked for their help to liberate the homeland.

In 1946 Zog was received by King Farouk as a brother with a large royal circle of over 30 people. Already, after London, Cairo also became the center of the fleeing kings. There Zog and Victor Emmanuel reached an "agreement between two enemy kings"<sup>116</sup>.

In addition to the connections with the fugitives inside the country, with the mediation of the Anglo-Americans, the leaders who fled abroad were also connected with the legal and illegal internal opposition, such as the group of deputies, that of the resistance, etc.<sup>117</sup>.

The British also issued the card recognizing Zog as a provisional government in exile. Zogu requested Albania's participation in the UN Conference in San Francisco and his return to Albania. Mit'hat Frashëri sent telegrams and letters to the UN and other countries about Albania's non-admission to the UN.

In 1946 Balli Kombëtar distributed materials to the Peace Conference condemning the communist regime, noting that it did not represent the Albanian nation and people who were

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<sup>107</sup> Flag, 15 September 1970, p.1-2

<sup>108</sup> Enver Hoxha, *The Anglo-American Danger for Albania ...*, p.490 - 493

<sup>109</sup> Enver Hoxha, *The Anglo-American Danger for Albania ...*, p.490 - 493

<sup>110</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 91, p. 25

<sup>111</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 91, p. 319

<sup>112</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 131, p.15

<sup>113</sup> Flamuri newspaper, May 1946, p.91 – 92

<sup>114</sup> Flamuri newspaper, May 1946, p.91 – 92

<sup>115</sup> Gazeta Besa, December 3, 1971, p.3

<sup>116</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal ...*, p.86

<sup>117</sup> History of Albania, Tirana 1984, vol. IV, f. 50

enslaved. In this memorandum, the Albanian national issue was also defended with arguments<sup>118</sup>.

The Albanian political emigration also supported the position of the USA and England for not inviting the RPSH to the conference for the establishment of the UN or in those for the compensations from Italy and Germany<sup>119</sup>. Albanian emigration condemned the stance of Enver Hoxha's government in the Corfu Canal incident and rightly described it as an anti-Western criminal act, contrary to the interests of the Albanian people. BK assessed this crime as one more argument to intervene and overthrow the communist regime<sup>120</sup>.

#### ***1.4.1. Political emigration propaganda campaigns against the communist regime.***

The main campaigns carried out by the anti-communist emigration against the regime were: 1. The campaign to prevent the recognition of the Albanian communist government, in 1945, where the emigrants Zef Sereqi, Seit Kryeziu, Xh. Staravecka et al. who organized this campaign in the ranks of the Albanian diaspora abroad. Even a prominent figure like Mehmet Konica, who had not been involved in the civil conflict during the war in Albania, called for the British not to recognize the Albanian government and that sooner or later they would return to Albania. Kostë Çerkezi also propagandized that for Washington "the issue of recognizing the Tirana government is a closed notebook"<sup>121</sup>.

Albanian emigration strongly supported the just American request for recognition of all agreements signed by previous Albanian governments with the US before April 7, 1939, which had been denounced by the Përmet Congress in violation of international law and practice.<sup>122</sup> According to the data that the communist government had, Mit'hat Frashëri also sent a report to all Western governments and some political personalities who were asked not to admit Albania to the UN."<sup>123</sup> On November 2, 1945, the main leaders of political emigration gathered in Rome and drafted a memorandum demanding the non-recognition of the communist government. This memorandum was sent to the American president, through the American ambassador Alexander Kirk in Rome on November 8, 1945. It denounced the communist violence and terror in Albania, demanded the implementation of an open door policy, demobilization and disarmament of the armed forces, cessation of the war against domestic and foreign political opponents, the organization of an international control over the situation inside the country and the admission of foreign journalists in Albania<sup>124</sup>.

Albanian political emigration denounced the grave violations and policies of violence and terror of the communist regime during the election campaign for the Constituent Assembly that was announced in September 1945. Balli Kombëtar denounced these elections because they were conducted under the secret surveillance of horrific police agents communist; that only the list of the Front was presented in them, etc. He also vehemently denounced the first communist constitution, stating that the Assembly drafted and approved a statute, which was a faithful copy of that of Yugoslavia, and that the flag was starred, like the fascists, Liktor's swords<sup>125</sup>.

Albanian emigration strongly denounced the dangerous policy of the communist government towards Yugoslavia in the years 1945-1948, documenting its submission to the Yugoslav leadership and the serious threat to the independence of the homeland and its integrity from Yugoslav annexation.

<sup>118</sup> E. Hoxha, *The Anglo-American Danger for Albania* ..., p. 40

<sup>119</sup> E. Hoxha, *The Anglo-American Danger for Albania* ..., p.379-385

<sup>120</sup> AMPB, 1947, dos 32, p.21; Report dated 9 September 1947.

<sup>121</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 53, p.9

<sup>122</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 53, p.103

<sup>123</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 53, p.103

<sup>124</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 53, p.5.

<sup>125</sup> Flamuri newspaper, May 1946, p. 89



The anti-communist emigration denounced the agency and propaganda activity of the representatives of the communist government. This is what happened to Thoma Sinica who in April 1948 was arrested by the Italian police<sup>126</sup>.

As he informed Tirana: "Albanian criminals, upon learning that I had come here, had gone and reported me to Doctor Del Fiore. We know this with the greatest precision. Dr. Ismail Vërlaci has gone and complained about the great danger that my coming here to Italy poses to all Albanians who have fled here and have opened words that before this provocation they have intervened from time to time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy to confuse me. After my arrest, Koliqi came and met with the personalities of the Questura and the MFA to intervene to arrest me again or to expel me from here. "They said that I came to Italy illegally and for assassinations and so on."

### **1.5. Anti-communist immigration and foreign states**

With the establishment of the communist regime, the cooperation of non-communist foreign states for its overthrow took on a breadth, depth and international character like never before. International links of foreign services against the regime continued until the late 80s<sup>127</sup>.

But despite the common intensity and close ties between the secret services, there were also rivalries and contradictions, which appeared widely in cooperation with the Albanian anti-communist political emigration. Each secret service tried to secure the direction of the intervention in Albania, in order to secure greater benefits after the overthrow of the communist government. This resulted in the fugitives, while facing the imperative need to join, split up, recruiting some of them as undercover agents of various services.<sup>128</sup>

#### **1.5.1. Relations with the US and the UK**

Faced with hardship and severe conditions of violence and intimidation by the communist regime, political emigration regarded the US and other Western powers as the only hope for his salvation and the homeland he was forced to abandon.

During 1947, in the framework of the "Truman Doctrine" which on March 12, 1947 declared before the American Congress that in the future it would help free peoples threatened by armed minorities or external pressure, and the Marshall Plan, began to be implemented in June 1947, with political emigration leaders getting involved in the anti-communist plans of the western powers<sup>129</sup>. Thus, they were included in the framework of UNSKOB, the UN Commission of Inquiry, where they participated as witnesses and brought evidence that Albania was interfering in the internal affairs of Greece. But at the same time they denounced the Greek plans for the annexation of Southern Albania. The emigrants testified in UN commissions of inquiry, in international courts, etc., where they brought valuable evidence against the adventurous policy and the violation of international laws and conventions by the government of Tirana. Prominent anti-communists such as A. Ermenji, M. Bajraktari etc. testified before the UN Commission of Inquiry, UINSCOB where they brought important evidence on the communist government interference in the internal affairs of Greece, and the support it gave to the Greek communist guerrillas in the Greek civil war. N. Kota also participated in the International Court of Justice in The Hague regarding the provocation of the Corfu Canal, testifying against the communist regime.

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<sup>126</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 144; Report of Thoma Sinica on his arrest by the Italian police, April 28, 1948

<sup>127</sup> Thimo Bare, *Albanian Secret Service (In the contemporary retrospective perspective)*, Tirana, 2009. F. 141.

<sup>128</sup> Thimo Bare, *Albanian Secret Service (In the contemporary retrospective perspective)*, Tirana, 2009. F. 141.

<sup>129</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 133; 137.

In 1947, with the help of Colonel Levi Lugachev <sup>130</sup>, Captain Jorgji Ruço <sup>131</sup> etc., were sent from Greece and Italy Abaz Ermenji <sup>132</sup> etc., to obtain information coordinated actions with internal groups. According to the data of the communist government, the British detectives Evans, O. Hill, etc., especially the British military intelligence <sup>133</sup> operated with the ballistae in Ioannina, Florina, etc. CIA, with Harry Fulcin <sup>134</sup> of Stevenson, etc., operated during 1947 with the leaders in Italy. In 1947 - 1948 the Greek QIP, especially the military intelligence <sup>135</sup> and the consulate in Italy, coordinated the actions, not only with the fugitives in Greece, but also in Italy and elsewhere. <sup>136</sup>

The activity of the political diaspora against the communist regime in the years 1948 until the summer of 1949 was one of the intense periods of its struggle against communism.

1948 was the year of preparatory plans to remove Albania from the Soviet orbit. <sup>137</sup>

U. Kolbi wrote that "wherever people fought against communist totalitarianism the CIA had to intervene and it sought to do so without a doubt in Albania, Korea and China". <sup>138</sup> Political emigration was encouraged by the breakdown of Albanian-Yugoslav relations. "The news of Tito's betrayal, stressed E. Çako in his trial, has been a great news for us that we saw that Albania was isolated and that we would be helped by Yugoslavia to overthrow the government in Albania." <sup>139</sup> Therefore, by the American and British governments, Albania was defined as the most appropriate target for subversive activities. <sup>140</sup>

The Americans and the British led the efforts to organize and unite the Albanian political emigration. On the eve of the breakdown of relations with Yugoslavia, meetings of immigration leaders were held, organized by US officials Anderson and Stevens. In these meetings it was talked about the unification of all emigration groups and Mit'hat Frashëri agreed to cooperate with Legality, but asked Zogu to give up his claims. He said that, even if Zogu objected, others would be called upon to accept the union according to the BK program. Mit'hat Frashëri demanded that the Bloc be cleansed of fascist elements known as K. Bib Mirakaj, E. Koliqi, etc., severely compromised with the occupiers. He also demanded the strengthening of ties with the Albanian colonies, these requests were accepted and it was decided that they should talk to special groups. .

At this time, some Albanian emigrants, driven by satisfactory salaries, took part in several conflicts, as paid soldiers alongside the forces of Western states. During the years 1947 - 1948, when the Israeli-Arab armed conflict took place, A. Këlcyra went there with some Albanian emigrants, supporting the English policy, where some were killed. Some immigrants participated as paid soldiers in the French forces in Algeria.

Western powers decided to actively engage political emigration in military efforts to overthrow the communist regime. In May 1949, Xh. Emer and McLean discussed with the BK military commander, Abaz Ermenji, who had been in Greece since 1945. The British i. proposed him to now act to unite his supporters to face the Greek and Yugoslav ambitions and at the same time his country would be liberated from the communists. "They indirectly threatened that Albania was a country without defense, a vacuum of powers and it could be

<sup>130</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 144, p. 1

<sup>131</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 131, p. 25

<sup>132</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 131, p. 25

<sup>133</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 144, p. 2

<sup>134</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 131,fp32, p.2, p.18

<sup>135</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 131,p.32, p2, p.18

<sup>136</sup> AMPB, year 1947, dossier 131,p.32, p2, p.18

<sup>137</sup> N. Bethell, The Great Betrayal, ... p.56

<sup>138</sup> N. Bethell, The Great Betrayal, ... p.48

<sup>139</sup> U. Kolbi, 30 years in the CIA, ... p.113

<sup>140</sup> AMPB, E. Çako Process File, p.65

divided very easily."<sup>141</sup> They also told him that he was the only one who could take such an initiative <sup>142</sup>. But he demanded that this plan be approved by Mit'hat Frashëri as well. The two Balli leaders met in Rome and approved the plan. The Fort Bin Xhema castle of the 15th century was designated as the training base for emigrants. XIX in Malta <sup>143</sup>.

Although the US and Western states supported anti-communist immigration, some non-governmental entities did not always have a friendly attitude towards it. In some cases, Western agencies, which were based on objectivity, provided critical news about any of the Albanian leaders. Thus e.g. Western press and radios reported in 1953 that King Zog was under surveillance by Egyptian police and would appear in court for allegedly engaging in smuggling, having abused the diplomatic rights granted to him by former King Farouk, for plotting to shot in hand the throne of Egypt etc. He was accused of acting as an agent of Israel even against the Arab League<sup>144</sup>.

### ***1.5.2. Relations with neighboring countries***

#### ***1.5.2.1. Relations with Greece***

Immediately after the war, emigration with anti-Albanian tendencies was activated. In particular, KEVA supported the Greek intentions on the eve of the 1946 Peace Conference. KEVA sent a delegation to the United States to make known the Greek theses towards Albania, which the Albanian colony strongly opposed. KEVA chanted the slogan: "Preparations for the liberation of North Epirus by war from the north - Epiriots"<sup>145</sup>.

This political platform was laid at the secret meeting in Ioannina, chaired by Metropolitan Spiridon and QIP captain Grigor Papadopoulos. The meeting was attended by 60 Albanian fugitives and it was decided to create terrorist groups for provocations against Albania.<sup>146</sup>

In 1946, the idea that was circulating in the provinces of the Greek minority at that time that southern Albania would soon be occupied by the Greeks and the British, encouraged the activation of refugees in the provinces of the minority and Kurvelesh, whose purpose was to activate the elements of dissatisfied with the regime.<sup>147</sup>

A feverish activity, in support of the Greek claims to Southern Albania, was also carried out by the Pan-Pyrrhic Association of America. She succeeded in creating a powerful pro-lobby lobby in the high US legislative spheres, where this lobby initiated and supported the resolution of Senator Claude Paper on the passage of Northern Epirus to Greece, which was approved by the US Senate on July 29, 1946.<sup>148</sup>

The Albanian government reacted with all the possibilities it had, it even managed to use in aid of its propaganda campaign against the Greek claims for North Epirus also the Greek left. On June 12, 1946, the organ of the Greek Communist Party, "Agnostis" republished a letter from a group of immigrants from the Greek minority in the US stating that "the time had come to strike at the adventurous policy of Megali Idea, which in Greece finds no resounding, because there the people realized it was a lie and deception"<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.75 – 76

<sup>142</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.75 – 76

<sup>143</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.61

<sup>144</sup> The newspaper "Il Tempo", September 27, 1953

<sup>145</sup> AMPB, year 1946, file 64, p.21

<sup>146</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, Report on the activity of Greece against our country.

<sup>147</sup> Sonila Boçi, *Minorities in Albania-between identity and integration; 1939-1949*, Tirana 2012, p.293

<sup>148</sup> Sonila Boçi, *Minorities in Albania-between identity and integration; 1939-1949*, Tirana 2012, p.183

<sup>149</sup> Sonila Boçi, *Minorities in Albania-between identity and integration; 1939-1949*, Tirana 2012, p.182

Police and State Security took extreme measures to remove minority from Greek nationalist influence<sup>150</sup> but also anti-communist ones. From January to March 1946, an arrest campaign was launched in the area of the Greek mission. Interestingly, a large number of those arrested had worked with the Greek minority to bring it closer to the National Liberation Front. The regime failed to mobilize the minority population in its mass sentencing of those arrested.<sup>151</sup>

For his part, political emigration was too committed to protecting Albania's borders and interests, which it deemed to have been seriously threatened by the communist government's policies. The Memorandum of the National Front stands out at this time, signed by Mithat Frashëri, Lec Kurti and Vasil Andoni, sent to the Peace Conference in Paris.<sup>152</sup> He directed against the Greek claims and in it were attacked, one by one, all the theses and arguments of the Greek annexationist policy towards Albania. The memorandum was presented on behalf of the political emigration and the Albanian people, who were said to have not lost faith in the Western Allies, although, in those moments, it was under the rule of a small group, which had established an illegal, totalitarian regime. so despotic. In this basic political document, the favorite argument of Greek diplomacy was attacked that the independence of Albania had turned out to be a failed experiment and it was argued that, despite the difficulties through which the Albanian state had been forced to go, arising mainly from the fragmentation of lands Albanian, from his heritage and the hostile attitude of the neighbors, his achievements were considerable. The absurd Greek claim that Albania had supported the Italians in their aggression against Greece was further refuted, giving real facts about the Albanian resistance and their willingness to cooperate with the Greeks against the Italian invaders. The Peace Conference was called upon to consider the borders of Albania inviolable, because their re-discussion would be an injustice and a great insult to the Albanians, as these borders had been examined and set many times by international organizations. The Greek claims were considered baseless and a challenge to UN principles that were simply intended to disguise Greek imperialist aspirations. Emphasizing that Albania could serve as an element of balance and progress in the Balkans, the Conference was urged not to allow its independence and existence to remain in a state of simulation, but to become a reality. For this purpose to unite important Albanian territories annexed by neighbors, including Chameria, a region that at all times had been known as Albanian land.<sup>153</sup>

But efforts for co-operation between Albanian anti-communist emigration and the Greek government did not stop. Greek king sends delegation to Albanian political emigration leaders to discuss border issue, but to no avail<sup>154</sup>. Former Greek General Kafdas went to Italy to buy weapons and talked to Verlac about a Greek-Albanian and Greek-Turkish-Albanian alliance that would help coordinate an intervention in Albania.

In 1946 Zog met with the prince of Greece<sup>155</sup>, The Patriarchate in Istanbul and the Greek authorities tried to admit Albanian and Kosovar fugitives to Northern Epirus clubs and to register Orthodox Albanians as Northern Epirotes. A large number of them refused and some were interned in the Greek islands. Albanian political emigrants in Turkey made an anti-Greek resolution condemning these actions, publishing it in the Turkish press and

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<sup>150</sup> Sonila Boçi, *Minorities in Albania-between identity and integration; 1939-1949*, Tirana 2012, p.295.

<sup>151</sup> Sonila Boçi, *Minorities in Albania-between identity and integration; 1939-1949*, Tirana 2012, p.295-299.

<sup>152</sup> Beqir Meta, *Anti-communist political emigration and the Albanian issue*, paper held at the International Scientific Conference on "The role of the diaspora in state formation" published in the summary with the same title in Pristina 2012.f 47.

<sup>153</sup> Beqir Meta, *Anti-communist political emigration and the Albanian issue*, paper held at the International Scientific Conference on "The role of the diaspora in state formation" published in the summary with the same title in Pristina 2012.f 47.

<sup>154</sup> AMPB, year 1945, file 91, p.43

<sup>155</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p.14

broadcasting it on Turkish radio. At this time, Zogu met with the representative of anti-communist emigration with anti-Serb tendencies, Loutfi Tozanin, from Bosnia.

During 1946, the ground was prepared for the Albanian fugitives gathered in Greece, to act extensively to carry out diversion from Florina, Kosturi, Ioannina, Corfu, etc., Abaz. Ermenji, Preng Prevezi, etc., came from Greece to cooperate and interact with the internal factions. In 1946, the Balli Kombëtar military affairs group was tasked with establishing links with resistance groups inside Albania led by Abaz. Ermenji, H. Matjani, M. Bajraktari, L. Nuro, I. Vrazhdo etc. For this purpose in 1946 Balli Kombëtar (M. Frashëri, H. Dosti and L. Kurti) made an agreement with the Greek legation (with Kostas Himarios) and the Greek government agreed to allow the passage of ballistic groups in Albania.

In action was also "Ballist punch" by A. Ermenji from Greece.

During 1947, several groups of Albanian emigrants, from time to time, entered Albania to gather information and to organize Albanian anti-communist groups within the country, such as Hamit Matjani<sup>156</sup>, Nuri Plaku, Naun Sula et al.

At the insistence of the Western Powers, during 1948, Albanian emigration talks were held with representatives of the Greek government, where in these key talks were held in Rome by Greek diplomats<sup>157</sup>. On April 10-12, 1948, the Minister of Greece in Rome, Kapsalis, held a series of meetings with the main leaders of the BKI such as Eqerem Libohova, Ekrem Vlora, Ernest Koliqi, Ismail Verlaci, Gjon Marka Gjoni, Nuredin Vlora and the head of BK, Mit 'hat Frashërin.<sup>158</sup>

The Greeks wanted the unification of the Albanian emigration without Zog at that time but the Albanian emigrants did not accept the revision of the border<sup>159</sup>. Hasan Dosti accepted the merger of the groups, while Gjon Marka Gjoni accepted only the cooperation protocol.<sup>160</sup>, others called for the strengthening of the "Liberation Committee" with the Greeks, but the Zogists still opposed Greek attempts<sup>161</sup>. Eqerem. Libohova and Ekrem Vlora rejected the Greek invitation for talks in Athens, previously demanding that the Greek government declare that it gave up Korça and Gjirokastra.<sup>162</sup> Eqerem. Libohova also presented as a condition of cooperation between the two countries, the assistance of Greece for the unification of Kosovo with Albania<sup>163</sup>.

To favor the union Ernest Koliqi wrote the article "Common danger"<sup>164</sup>, where he stressed the need for unity between Greeks and Albanians against the same enemy, communism. The Greek newspaper "Le mesazhe d'Aten" (The Messenger of Athens) published the above article and the Greek right responded favorably to E. Koliqi<sup>165</sup>.

Greek diplomats, meanwhile, stepped up contacts with immigration leaders in Rome to co-ordinate actions.

Zogu paid a visit to the Greek patriarch in Cairo and established ties with the Greek government, talking about an agreement of interest to both parties.<sup>166</sup> This movement stimulated numerous contacts between the leaders H. Dosti, Gj. M. Gjoni, E. Koliqi, V. Andoni, E. Libohova, Mit'hat Frashëri etc. with the Greek Minister Kapsalis in Rome and other Greek diplomats.

<sup>156</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, January 1953, p. 4

<sup>157</sup> AMPB, 1948, file 178.

<sup>158</sup> Beqir Meta, Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949, Tiranë, 2012, p.317.

<sup>159</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.29

<sup>160</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.40

<sup>161</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.48

<sup>162</sup> Beqir Meta, Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949, Tiranë, 2012, p.317.

<sup>163</sup> Beqir Meta, Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949, Tiranë, 2012, p.318.

<sup>164</sup> Gazeta L'Albanie Libre, no.4, 1948; Gazeta Le Messenger d'Athènes, March 1948

<sup>165</sup> Gazeta L'Albanie Libre, no.4, 1948; Gazeta Le Messenger d'Athènes, March 1948

<sup>166</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.10

In 1948 Mit'hat Frashëri and A. Ermenji, at the urging of the Americans, talked with the senior Greek diplomat Panayotis Pipinelis<sup>167</sup>, former Greek consul in Albania and expert on Albania. John M. John was also invited to visit Greece<sup>168</sup>. In these conditions, a meeting of the main leaders was held, chaired by E Libohova, to whom he spoke about the Greek proposal for unification and the drafting of a joint protocol between the political organizations of the Albanian emigration. This protocol would be presented to the Americans and the British for approval before the start of talks with the Greeks in Athens. H. Dosti stated that the Greeks had serious intentions, therefore every effort should be made to achieve cooperation between the two parties."<sup>169</sup> However, there were difficulties in this regard, including some hesitations about the role of Zog. According to the allegations made by Kapsalis to E. Koliqi, the Albanian-Greek cooperation was suggested by the Americans<sup>170</sup>.

In March 1948, Eduart Liço, together with Nexhat Peshkëpinë, Tahir Kolgjini, etc., took part in the secret talks that took place in Rome<sup>171</sup> with representatives of the Greek embassy, where an agreement on cooperation was reached in advance and a secret visit was prepared to be made later in Athens by the head of BK Mit'hat Frashëri. Through the newspaper "L'Allbanie libre" (Free Albania), the BKI called on immigrants to cooperate with the Greeks and other allied countries against the communist regime.

In April 1948 I. Vërlaci recommended the cooperation of the Albanian emigration, but his proposal was not approved and the BKI instructed E. Libohova to talk to the Greeks, whom he asked to support the BKI's demands for Kosovo, becoming a "concession for Vorio - Epirus"<sup>172</sup>. Për këtë çështje Xhemil Dino shkoi urgjent nga Roma në Kajro për të vënë në dijeni Zogun. BK, meanwhile, did not approve the merger, so BKI was forced to notify the Greeks that the time had not come for a merger.

Seeing that the issue of unification was protracted, the Greek intelligence put pressure on the Albanian anti-communist leaders, telling them that "only Zog would fix the Albanians who did not unite"<sup>173</sup>. Under these conditions, the Greek intelligence agreed that A. Zogu should be the head of emigration as commander of the armed forces.<sup>174</sup>

On the other hand, Zogu also met with the Greek Archbishop in Alexandria (Egypt), whom he asked to respect the territorial integrity of Albania in order not to prevent Albanian political emigrants who would go to fight in Albania against the communist regime."<sup>175</sup>

After talking to Zog, A. Këlcyrë wrote from Egypt to E. Koliqi in Rome that Zog had not expressed opposition to talks with the Greeks, but he wanted to be the commander-in-chief of the Albanian army abroad, while leaving the issue of unification and the plebiscite for later<sup>176</sup>.

In early 1949, the leaders of BK, Mr. Paul, etc., visited Greece, where they talked about allowing operations by the Greek government<sup>177</sup>. In the summer of 1949, Eduart Liço, Eqrem Vlora, Kol Bib Mirakaj, Qazim Mulleti, etc., held talks with the Greek Deputy Minister Kapsalis in Rome<sup>178</sup>.

<sup>167</sup> AMPB, file on the E. Çako Process

<sup>168</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.29

<sup>169</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.79

<sup>170</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.42

<sup>171</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, November 1967, p.4

<sup>172</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.2

<sup>173</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.3

<sup>174</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.9

<sup>175</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.3

<sup>176</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.62

<sup>177</sup> Flamuri newspaper, March 25, 1975, p.4

<sup>178</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, November 1967, p.4

Albanian emigration, in general, wanted cooperation with the Greeks to change the political situation in Albania, but he had deep doubts about Greek policy, especially its annexationist intentions towards southern Albania. It is interesting that this conclusion is also confirmed in the informative reports of the State Security, in which it is evidenced that the vast majority of Albanian political emigration, opposed the Greek nationalist policy.<sup>179</sup>

From the reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, it results that the main leaders of the Albanian political emigration, such as Zogu, Mit'hat Frashëri, etc., resolutely opposed the intention of Athens to penetrate the Albanian emigration and to get from it the consent for the creation of a Greek-Albanian Federation, after the overthrow of the communist regime<sup>180</sup>.

Various scholars have expressed the opinion that the Greeks were playing a double game. The activity of the Albanian political emigration was sponsored by the Americans while the Greeks were entrusted with the administration of the camps and the funds which were not a little misused or appropriated by them. Moreover, the Greeks sabotaged in various ways the efforts to change the system and government in Albania<sup>181</sup>. The reason was that for the Greek chauvinist circles, a communist government and an Albania hermetically sealed in deep enmity with the west and with a class war wreaking havoc among the Albanians, it was in the gains of their annexationist aspirations. They hated the return to power of a nationalist government with aspirations for Chameria and Kosovo and allies of the West<sup>182</sup>.

Therefore, although they were forced to cooperate with the Americans, they worked under the mat against the restoration of a pro-Western democratic regime in Albania. The Greek government tried to use part of the American funds and the people at their disposal for the purposes of annexing North Epirus. There were also clashes between the parties, where anti-Albanian and northern Epirus tendencies appeared openly and provocatively. A similar quarrel took place between Hamit Matjani, Safet Malushi and Muhamet Bedos with a Greek major which ended with the imprisonment of these Albanian emigrants for three months.<sup>183</sup>

The Greek government allowed the anti-communist activities of Albanian emigration groups in the years 1949-1953. The communist government and courts have tried to discredit these groups for allegedly accepting and fulfilling the conditions of the Greek government: their activity being controlled by the Greeks; groups not to speak against Greek intentions towards Albania; all Albanian groups also performed tasks for Greek espionage and provided a copy of information on Albania. The Greek side undertook to organize the bases of the groups in Corfu, Ioannina, Kostur, Florina, etc., and to select suitable people for diversion.<sup>184</sup>

According to the Albanian intelligence documents, meanwhile especially KEVA was very active, with the new Greek platform, for the "Liberation of northern Epirus" with war by the "northern Epirotes" themselves, organizing and sending diversionist gangs to Pogon, Vurg, Dropull<sup>185</sup> etc., such as that of Spiro Cikos with 15 people, of Lufter Guveli, Dhimitër Maksakuli etc., which consisted of 182 fugitives in the syllabus of Ioannina<sup>186</sup>, i who created several gangs under the leadership of Colonel Muzaqitis<sup>187</sup> who has operated for a long time in the area of Konispol, Himara, etc. Many Greeks also gathered in Piraeus, Corfu, Florina, Kostur, etc. Ali Nivica was said to have been appointed commander of the southern area<sup>188</sup>.

<sup>179</sup> Beqir Meta, *Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949*, Tiranë, 2012, p.319.

<sup>180</sup> Beqir Meta, *Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949*, Tiranë, 2012, p.321.

<sup>181</sup> Tanush Kaso, *Hamit Matjani-Between legend and truth*, Tirana, 2008, p.138-139

<sup>182</sup> Tanush Kaso, *Hamit Matjani-Between legend and truth*, Tirana, 2008, p.139

<sup>183</sup> Ta Tanush Kaso, *Hamit Matjani-Between legend and truth*, Tirana, 2008, p.139-140

<sup>184</sup> AMPB - The practice of diversion, *The Process of E. Çakos*, p. 38, 39, 47.

<sup>185</sup> AMPB, year 1946, file 64, p.21

<sup>186</sup> AMPB, year 1946, file 64, p.21

<sup>187</sup> AMPB, year 1946, file 64, p. 21

<sup>188</sup> E. Hoxha, *works*, vol.4, p.101 – 116

The leaders of the KSHL concluded in Rome the cooperation agreement with the Greek explorer Kostandin Himarinos. Greece agreed that the Greek-Albanian border be used to introduce saboteurs in Albania, it made available to the Albanian reaction all the bases of diversion in Corfu, Ioannina, Florina, Kostur, Athens, etc. The Greek government had followed with interest the efforts to creation of KSHL. On August 5, 1949, the Greek Prime Minister Alexander Diomedos confirmed to a British diplomat in Athens that he had been aware of the proposals for the establishment of an Albanian committee, before informing the British, and added that "we have followed developments with benevolent approval."<sup>189</sup> While Panayotis Pipinelis, Secretary General of the Greek MFA office, stated to the Charge d'Affaires a.i.i of the US Embassy in Athens Robert Minor, that small incidents may occur from the Albanian border<sup>190</sup>.

The Americans and the British acted so that the Greek intentions did not become an obstacle to the operation. In May 1949 Xh. Emery and McLeani<sup>191</sup> KEVA members were told in Ioannina not to become an obstacle to the unification of Albanian emigration. On the other hand, in August 1949, Zef Pali, the delegate of KSHL, met with Xh. Emerin in London, who had a plan aimed at the annihilation of the Greek UD - the creation of Albanian anti-communist gangs in southern Albania<sup>192</sup>. The issue was even published in the English press by Anton Logoreci. Xh. Emeri thought that this plan would make the West interested in Albania, so he linked the war of Albanian emigrants with the civil war in Greece to facilitate the Greek front.

On the other hand, the Albanian political emigration carried out a wide activity against the northern Epirus organizations in emigration, which were engaged in a feverish campaign to support the nationalist policy of the Athens government. This war took place in the USA, Australia, Argentina, Egypt, etc. Also political emigration, especially Balli Kombëtar, from the very beginning was put under the protection of important national institutions in the diaspora, from Greek penetration. The greatest efforts were made to protect the national character of KOASH. BK supported the national element within the Albanian Orthodox Communist of America<sup>193</sup>.

#### ***1.5.2.2. Relations with Italy***

Among the basic problems between Albania and Italy in the years 1945-1947 was the repatriation of Italians left in our country after the war and of Albanian political emigrants who were in Italy. The Albanian communist government tried as much as possible to link these two issues together, in order to force the Italian side to hand over the anti-communist fugitives. As early as December 1944, the Head of the Italian Military Mission in Albania, General Piccini Gino, wrote to Enver Hoxha to allow the repatriation of a part of the Italians who were incapable of rebuilding Albania.<sup>194</sup> In response, the Albanian government in February-March 1945 demanded the repatriation of some Albanians interned in the Karbunara camp in Italy. Among them, as reported by the Albanian Military Mission in Bari, were some anti-communist political emigrants, whom he described as "traitors"<sup>195</sup>. According to scholar Hamit Kaba, the Albanian Mission found that the Italians were treating anti-communist political internees very well, differentiating them from other nationalities. There were quarrels between the Albanians who came from Thessaloniki, who had been interned there by the

<sup>189</sup> FO 371/78443

<sup>190</sup> FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States), Washington D.C. 1949, vol.VI, p. 386

<sup>191</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 73

<sup>192</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 August 1974, p.4

<sup>193</sup> Beqir Meta, *Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949*, Tiranë, 2012, p.321.

<sup>194</sup> Hamit Kaba *Albania in the course of the Cold War (Studies and documents)* Botipex, Tirana, 2007, p. 80-81.

<sup>195</sup> Hamit Kaba *Albania in the course of the Cold War (Studies and documents)* Botipex, Tirana, 2007, p.. 81-82.



Germans, during the war, and the people whom the communist regime considered to be war criminals, who were in this camp, which had led to physical clashes.<sup>196</sup>

The issue of repatriation of Italians went towards resolution, as during the months of May-June 1945 16,500-17,000 Italian soldiers were repatriated from Albania to Italy<sup>197</sup> while the Albanian government's objective of handing over political fugitives was not achieved.

Later the Albanian government would try to use as a support for its demands for the surrender of political emigrants, the Peace Treaty with Italy which was signed on February 10, 1947<sup>198</sup>. The implementation of the Peace Treaty with Italy coincided, in terms of time, with the culmination of the Cold War. According to scholar Hamit Kaba, the covert operations of Albanian political emigration against the communist regime, launched by neighboring countries in the years 1949-1954, made the implementation of the Peace Treaty very difficult<sup>199</sup>.

The Italians encouraged cooperation with the Greeks against the communist regime, but without allowing concessions to be made at the expense of Albania's independence and integrity<sup>200</sup>. The Italians urged the BKI to cooperate without fuss with other groups not to leave the unification initiative to the Greeks. Zopi (Secretary General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) suggested to the Albanian emigrants to cooperate with the Greek neighbors for the overthrow of the communist regime, but firmly preserving the independence of their country. Cooperation to be done under the motto: for an "Independent Albania without foreigners"<sup>201</sup>.

As part of the unification efforts, Mit'hat Frashëri also visited Greece in June 1948. After holding talks with American, British and Italian officers, he asked them for support in cooperating with the Greeks, but to discourage them from claiming to be masters of Vlora and Otranto<sup>202</sup>. The secretary of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured that "the Albanian issue is an issue of Italy", while the Vatican intervened in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help the fugitives, whom the Italian Foreign Minister Sforza advised to bring new people to the "union bodies", after the old leaders had abused the politics of THEIR homeland"<sup>203</sup>. Mit'hat Frashëri met with the secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Pipinelis, but the talks were unsuccessful, so he wrote to Hasan Dosti that "any kind of cooperation with the Greeks is impossible, that they do not give up their old claims"<sup>204</sup>.

Hasan Dosti and others held talks at the Italian Foreign Ministry to organize a battle against the communist regime. Zogu, taking advantage of the death of the King of Italy, V. Emanuel, sent a delegation to the funeral, and met with his son and the Pope's representative in Cairo, where he had good relations with the Italian minister<sup>205</sup>. According to Xh. Deva, Zogu wanted a friendly policy with Italy, because this was the only big neighboring country that could help their return home<sup>206</sup>.

After the break-up of the Albanian-Yugoslav relations, a new situation was created in the Albanian emigration. Albanian intelligence reported on new controversial trends in the ranks of political emigration. According to them, "after the SNP communiqué of June 29 and

<sup>196</sup> Hamit Kaba *Albania in the course of the Cold War* (Studies and documents) Botipex, Tirana, 2007, p.82.

<sup>197</sup> Hamit Kaba *Albania in the course of the Cold War* (Studies and documents) Botipex, Tirana, 2007, p.86

<sup>198</sup> Hamit Kaba *Albania in the course of the Cold War* (Studies and documents) Botipex, Tirana, 2007, p.93.

<sup>199</sup> Hamit Kaba *Albania in the course of the Cold War* (Studies and documents) Botipex, Tirana, 2007, p.. 129.

<sup>200</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.2

<sup>201</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.3

<sup>202</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p f.2

<sup>203</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.3

<sup>204</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p 62

<sup>205</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p 2

<sup>206</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.2

September 4, Albanian criminals were very surprised by this action of the SNP. The most democratic elements say that the SNP has known how to orient itself and they are looking at the work with sympathy <sup>207</sup>.

It was also informed that in Italian circles the divergences between Albania and Yugoslavia were being commented a lot and that the Italians "hope now and say that the day has come in which they can establish diplomatic relations with our government. Many of the personalities of the Italian MFA have sought the opinion of the exponential elements of Albanian emigration. "They are now seen as very encouraged and indirectly suggest that now Italy is ready to help Albania." The government of Tirana was also informed that some Italian leaders had hinted "that Italy had not looked favorably on the Albania-Yugoslavia friendship and union, especially for the delicate position of the Adriatic." "Now they say that Italy is ready to accept everything with Albania for this." It was even said that this attitude of Rome had "aroused some tension between the Italian counties and others"<sup>208</sup>.

The orientation of the emigration chiefs was almost entirely in the direction of the Western Powers. Italy was a promoter of the political union of Albanian anti-communist emigration. M. Frashëri, H. Dosti and others met with the Italian Foreign Minister Sforza. M. Frashëri went to Turkey, while Zogu met the French minister in Egypt<sup>209</sup>. The conditions for unification were maturing.

On the other hand, Italy allowed the start of diversionary operations against the communist regime in Albania. In October 1948 H. Dosti called E. Çako who informed him that the CIA had instructed to organize and send saboteurs to Albania. E. Çako gave his consent to operate in the South of Albania where he knew the country. After that they went to Naples, where they met the Italians Grili and De Agostini, in charge of diversion groups. E. Çako signed the statement to serve the CIA for 10 years as a guarantee not to betray<sup>210</sup>.

In 1948, Italian intelligence stepped up efforts to send anti-communist groups to Albania, and together with the CIA, studied the sending of radio stations<sup>211</sup>. The Albanian intelligence informed that A. Leshanaku was summoned to Rome for consultations. The Italians made the study of persons who could act as saboteurs <sup>212</sup>, fugitives' salaries increased, their treatment expanded, Mehmet Alltun released from prison <sup>213</sup>, who was given tasks for diversion in Albania. Colonel Pavella, who had previously been to Albania, was in charge of preparing the saboteurs. According to the Albanian intelligence, the center of Bari became a very active base. According to communist revelations also the Vatican<sup>214</sup> took an active part in sending saboteurs to Albania. Western governments, and especially the US, were informed that the internal resistance in Albania was still disorganized and ineffective<sup>215</sup>, and that there seemed to be no immediate prospect of liberating Albania from the communist regime. However armed groups of immigrants would be sent to organize the war from within. Xh. Emeri hoped that the areas of Northern Albania could be raised against Hoxha<sup>216</sup>. Inside Albania in 1948-1950 several anti-communist armed groups were created.

As part of the operations to be carried out against the communist regime, H. Dosti, Lec Kurti, etc., met with the Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi, the Italian Minister of Interior Shelba, etc., at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with whom they made an agreement

<sup>207</sup> AMPJ, year 1947, file 100, Information of Thomas (Sinica) 16 October 1948

<sup>208</sup> AMPJ, year 1947, file 100, Information of Thomas (Sinica) 16 October 1948

<sup>209</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p.62

<sup>210</sup> AMPB- The practice of diversion, The Process of E. Çakos, p. 66

<sup>211</sup> AMPB, year 1947, file 131, p. 59

<sup>212</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 9, p.8. f.11

<sup>213</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 9, p.8. f.11

<sup>214</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 9, p.8. f.11

<sup>215</sup> C. L. Sulceberger, In the Whirlpool of History

<sup>216</sup> N.Bethel, The Great Betrayal, p. 164; AMPB - files of the years 1948 - 53

for the Italian government to establish intensive training courses for emigrants to be sent to Albania.<sup>217</sup> The Italians especially helped BKI<sup>218</sup>. The CIA's James Engillton had close ties to the Italian secret service on these issues.

In July 1949, the anti-communist group led by E. Çako was launched in Albania with concrete tasks to carry out acts of sabotage and espionage, to organize counter-revolution from within the country. This plan was also coordinated with the Yugoslavs. According to Zef Palit, in July 1949 he, Mit'hat Frashëri and A. Kupi went to Yugoslavia and after reaching an agreement with the Yugoslav authorities, moved to Kosovo, where we organized the Central Committee of the BK, which would work to implement the program of Free Albania Committee"<sup>219</sup>. Thus, the Albanian emigration was given the task to start the armed uprising. In April 1948, the government of E. Hoxha was informed that Rome was intensifying its support for the actions of Albanian political emigration. Th. Sinica informed his government that the Italian government would implement the policy of expansion towards Albania and that this had been confirmed by De Gaspari himself. He reinforced this opinion with the events that had taken place in the past, with the unchanged intentions of the Italians and with the caresses that the Italian authorities were giving to the "Albanian war criminals". Sinica wrote that "their encouragement, their contacts with the personalities of the Italian MFA, show that they are starting the policy of reserves for the next day to use them when they need, when it is their turn". He added that he was informed that Italian personalities had encouraged Albanian political emigrants to wait until after the elections, as after their completion they would be given more aid in case the right wins. Since the right came to power, he was worried that now their help would become more efficient. He concluded that the Italian government that was in power and, moreover, what would be formed, would pose not only a risk like the previous one but this one would increase. He shunned the negotiations for an eventual Greek-Turkish-Italian connection. Here he drew attention to the Sforza-Caldaris talks that had taken place in Paris as well as Coldaris's recent statements in Athens.

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Sinica stated that he had previously reported how his "big friends" had advised him about this and added that on February 22, they repeated such a thing to me, asking me why you started the repatriation of Italians and what "Do you intend to do this?" The Soviet adviser had told him that "this is not so right, that the only tool left to you is this, i.e. the Italians who are there to stay, until Italy implements the commitments made to Albania in the Peace Treaty". Sinica had responded that he personally thought that "Our government should show good will for relations with Italy and even more so when we have enough interests here in Italy to take it". But in this case the Russian representative had laughed and stressed: "What goodwill did Thoma get with this government?"<sup>220</sup>. Following Soviet advice, the communist government strongly linked the issue of Albanian political emigrants taking refuge in Italy with the repatriation of Italians remaining in Albania. This policy of pressure was an absurd stance of E Hoxha's government. The Italian Communist Party was also involved in this issue, which put pressure on the repatriation of the remaining Italians in Albania.

<sup>217</sup> AMPB, investigative process of E. Çakos, year 1949

<sup>218</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 136

<sup>219</sup> AMPB, Investigative file on the activity of Zef Palit

<sup>220</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 144; Report of Thoma Sinica on his arrest by the Italian police, April 28, 1948

As the Charge d'Affaires of Albania in Paris, Llambi Dishnica, announced, the Italian communist senator Eugenio Reale had requested that the Albanian government repatriate the remaining 500-600 Italians in Albania<sup>221</sup>. He had said that they had written letters to their families, asking for intervention to be made for their return to Italy. These Italian workers had announced that the contracts they had entered into had been accepted by the force exercised by the regime. These letters were being published in the right-wing press, which was waging a major campaign against the communist regime in Albania. But what worried the senator very much was that this issue was being used as a weapon against the Italian Communist Party. Real stated that he had been advised by Toliati to do something for a good solution of this issue. Toliat had pointed out that this campaign greatly damaged the PKI.

To find a compromise solution, Real proposed that if Albania needed engineers and technicians, and if the Albanian government wanted, other specialists could be sent from Italy. But the remaining Italians in Albania had to be repatriated as they had 10 years without going to their families.

Dishnica had the impression that Real was quite influenced by the right-wing press, he had even used the word "prisoner of war", and that his presentation of the issue had been stronger and not in the way De Vittorio had handled it before.

At the end of the meeting, Dishnica asked the Italian senator to hand over from the Italian government Mitat Frashëri, M. Kruja, E. Koliqi and 2-3 others whom Dishnica did not specify. These were to be handed over to the communist government in exchange for its permission to repatriate Italian prisoners of war. Real promised to study their case in Rome<sup>222</sup>.

Presionin për të dorëzuar emigrantët politikë shqiptar nga qeveria italiane e përsëriti edhe përfaqësuesi i Shqipërisë në Sofje Theodhor Heba në mesin e korrikut 1948<sup>223</sup>. The Italian ambassador to Bulgaria had asked Heba to return the Italian citizens who were forcibly detained in Albania. Heba denied the real fact that they were forcibly held. The Italian Ambassador then expressed the desire of the Italian government to establish diplomatic relations with Albania, adding that the situation for such a relationship had matured after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. The Italian ambassador tried to justify his proposal with the extensive trade ties that could be established with Albania, citing as an encouraging model the good trade relations they had with Bulgaria.

Heba responded to these proposals by submitting only one request. In the form of a personal request he submitted the resolution of the issue of "war criminals" by the Italian government, restorations, and other obligations of the Peace Treaty<sup>224</sup>. The Italian ambassador replied that he did not know exactly the opinion of his government but promised that he would be interested. Heba was impressed by the fact that this time he had spoken less than he had spoken one evening to the French ambassador about the Italian government's readiness to implement immediately the obligations arising from the Peace Treaty, but added that with the Italians it was not difficult talked and that with the establishment of relations the Albanian side would have facilities<sup>225</sup>.

Even in early October 1948, the Italian government repeated its efforts to reach an agreement with the Albanian side. De Vittorio of the Italian CGT paid a visit to the Albanian legation in Paris and reiterated the proposals he had made earlier for the establishment of

<sup>221</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 146, Notification of Llambi Dishnica (Charge d'Affaires of Albania in Paris), dt. 18.06.1948, on a visit of the head of the external sector of PKI, Senator Eugenio Reale, on dt. 11.06.1948 in the Albanian Legation.

<sup>222</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 146, Notification of Llambi Dishnica (Charge d'Affaires of Albania in Paris), dt. 18.06.1948, on a visit of the head of the external sector of PKI, Senator Eugenio Reale, on dt. 11.06.1948 in the Albanian Legation.

<sup>223</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 143, Notification of Theodhor Heba from Sofia to the MFA, July 16, 1948

<sup>224</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 143, Notification of Theodhor Heba from Sofia to the MFA, July 16, 1948

<sup>225</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 143, Notification of Theodhor Heba from Sofia to the MFA, July 16, 1948

relations, especially economic relations between the two countries, the repatriation of other remaining Italians and the replacement of the cadres of valid, to send others from Italy under the responsibility of the CGT and Italian friends. Heba denied that there were Italians detained in Albania by force and immediately after that he demanded the surrender of the "war criminals" who were sheltered in Italy. De Vitorio replied that he did not know anything but promised that, if he had a list of them, he would raise the issue in Parliament.<sup>226</sup>

By the end of 1948 the communist government was studying the possibility of several other movements against Albanian emigration to Italy. Th Sinica proposed that many Albanian technicians staying in Italy, return to Albania as they would serve the country a lot. Likewise many students and, moreover, many merchants who had an interest had to return. He noted that all immigrants who were not guilty of crimes could return and they would be used for labor in Albania. The aim, as he pointed out, was not to allow them to become enemy soldiers. Moreover, this measure was considered useful because thus they would be "in our (regime) permanent control and we could clear all the unwanted element"<sup>227</sup>.

But this does not mean that the pressure to hand over the leaders of anti-communist political emigration would be lifted. Sinica claimed that, under the Peace Treaty, the Albanian government had the right to ask the Italian government for "war criminals". He suggested that every effort be made to ensure that they were not left alone for even a minute. Pressure on the Italian government, therefore, had to continue. "We, he wrote, with diplomatic pressure, must always remember and remind that they must be handed over to us, thus making it impossible to continue their activity against the RPSH and squeezing them into criminals and simple thugs"<sup>228</sup>.

To implement this policy, he proposed taking these measures:

1. To raise the issue of repatriation of Albanians abroad, by making some announcements, inviting all Albanians to return to Albania. This route was considered more valuable because it would allow many technicians to return to Albania and, on the other hand, would prevent anti-communist political emigrants from having a large mass of Albanians and supporters behind them which could make it possible for them. them to find a way of life.
2. To achieve this goal, migrants should be shown a path to repatriation and some facilities created for them.
  - It would be appropriate to apologize to those who "had committed a few crimes and fled in fear." In this case, he suggested that action should be taken as other communist countries had done, which had taken this problem very seriously, repatriating as many political immigrants as possible. Thus, a few days ago, the Hungarian government had issued an announcement for Hungarian citizens to return home within 60 days, otherwise they lose their citizenship. Sinica affirmed a very important fact, which he recommended to be used as a model by the Albanian government. He underlined that the policy pursued by the friendly states was to return as many people as possible, starting from the aim "that this is how to get rid of the imperialists".
3. He proposed that the Albanian state spend only \$ 5,000 to help some poor students who had been left without passing 1-10 exams. This would be a propaganda measure in favor of the regime in exile, as they would see the interest of the communist government in them. This would affect the return of many others who "for fear of the bad propaganda that has been done have preferred to do dirty work." Sinica considered

<sup>226</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 146, Report of the Albanian legation Paris for MFA, October 2, 1948

<sup>227</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 218, Report of Sinica - MFA, December 3, 1948

<sup>228</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 218, Report of Sinica - MFA, December 3, 1948

this measure more appropriate than anything else and that it would be a masterpiece to educate Albanian emigrants<sup>229</sup>.

There is no doubt that the refusal to hand over Albanian political emigrants from Rome significantly influenced the attitudes and relations of the E Hoxha regime with the Italian government. By the end of 1948 the Albanian government had reached these conclusions:

1. The Albanian people and their government with B.S. at the top has pursued a peaceful policy towards Italy. The Albanian government has established diplomatic relations with many other countries, but with today's Italy, where the dark forces of the fascist reaction are being revived, our people and its government can not accept such relations. Our country has been threatened and attacked many times by Italy. The existence of the neo-fascists in power in Italy, the aggressive policy and expansion of the Italian government towards Albania, nurtured and encouraged by the US, not only does not guarantee the respect of Albania's independence and territorial integrity, but on the contrary, threatens these. And it is precisely for this reason that our government has made no attempt at diplomatic relations and has rejected the proposals of the Italian government which conceal in themselves certain aims.
2. Subjecting economically and politically to the interests of the American imperialists, the government of De Gaspari, under the dictates of the Washington government and for its imperialist interests, has pursued and is pursuing against our country an incompatible hostile policy by a former main satellite state of Germany and the main responsible for the great damage caused to Albania. The non-acceptance of many of our demands deriving from the provisions of the Peace Treaty (including the refusal to extradite political refugees), under the pretext of the lack of diplomatic relations, are inappropriate interpretations of the articles of the Peace Treaty. This can not justify the Italian government for its responsibility for the violations it is committing today against the treaty. These pretexts have their source in its Western imperialist masters who have directly and indirectly supported the revision of the Treaty with Italy and for this the Italian government has given a lot of evidence.
3. The implementation of the Treaty with Italy, for those issues related to our country, is in the economic and political interest, not only of our country but the entire democratic and anti-imperialist camp, therefore the government of Albania has asked and will ask with insistence that Italy, if possible, and that it has accepted the signing of the Peace Treaty, rigorously implement all decisions deriving from this treaty. Thus, until the end of this period, that is, until 1949, relations with Italy were frozen and strained. The issue of political emigration was one of the hotspots of the controversy between the government of E. Hoxha and the Italian one..

## **1.6. The war of the communist regime against the Albanian political diaspora**

The communist regime waged a fierce war against political emigration in several directions. One of them was the shooting and annihilation of fugitives trying to return home. Although on a small scale, this war took place from the first days of the communists' rise to power. The first phase of the communist regime's war against the armed groups of Albanian political emigration is that of 1945-1948. At this time the groups were preparing and conducting military exercises in special camps in Greece and Italy.

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<sup>229</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 218, Report of Sinica - MFA, December 3, 1948

Meanwhile, the regime was violently suppressing the internal forces of the anti-communist resistance, especially from December 1944 until the end of February 1946.

During this period the regime tried to militarily crack down on any immigrants attempting to enter the homeland. Thus in the years 1946-47 the gorge of Konispol was called the "gorge of death" because many immigrants were killed there. It was even claimed in the trial of E Çako that Qazim Mulleti had protested why the persons who were sent as saboteurs had not been asked before.

Another direction was the diplomatic, propaganda and legal battle in the international arena to realize the forcible repatriation of refugees and further their condemnation by the dictatorship. During this period the communist government tried to turn the issue of the extradition of anti-communist political refugees into an international issue. Describing anti-communist political immigrants as war criminals, she sought to force Western countries to hand them over to the communist regime.

In July 1946 she asked the Peace Conference to intervene for their surrender <sup>230</sup>.

A memorandum said: "Given that in Italy today there is a large number of Italian, German, etc. war criminals. who have committed crimes in Albania to be added at the end of art.38 a new paragraph no. 4 in order to recognize Albania the right to benefit from the provisions of this article "

The Albanian government first accused the Italian government and the Vatican of supporting all the "war criminals" who commit crimes in Albania and that a part of the Albanian criminals were held, sheltered, protected and supported by the Italian government and the Vatican.

On June 19, 1947, under the instructions of the Albanian government, the Plenipotentiary Minister of Albania in Belgrade, Tuk Jakova, presented a note from the Government to the British Ambassador to Belgrade, Charles Peake, and the US Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade, John M. Cabot. Albanian, with which the US asked Britain to hand over the "Albanian war criminals" who were under the jurisdiction of the American and British authorities in Germany, Austria, Italy. But the answer was categorically negative. In its note of October 4, 1947, the British Embassy in Belgrade rejected the Albanian request, arguing that the wanted persons were all in Italy and that the matter should be resolved with the Italian government. The British government claimed that it had not made any statement to return the "collaborators" and that Albania was not on the list of 20 allied governments to which the British government had specific commitments on this issue from those taken by it in October 1945.<sup>231</sup>

Later, on September 25, 1947, the Albanian government addressed a request to the UN Commission on War Crimes in London for the surrender of "Albanian war criminals", as well as Germans and Italians who had committed crimes in Albania. The request was accompanied by lists and all charges against them. In his letter dated. 30 October the Commission replied that it was not within its competence to extradite the requested persons.

After this, the government of Tirana, by means of another note, on January 3, 1948, requested that, in accordance with its competencies, the Commission declare these people "who had committed crimes in Albania" as war criminals. But on 3 March 1948 the Commission replied that, after considering the above-mentioned request and, seeing that Albania had never been at war with Italy and had not been a member of this Commission, the Commission considered that this matter was outside its jurisdiction. his. On the other hand, the Commission announced that it was ending its activities on March 31, 1948<sup>232</sup>.

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<sup>230</sup> AMPJ, year 1946, file 159, Memorandum of the Albanian government presented at the Peace Conference regarding reparations with Italy, Paris, 31 August 1946.

<sup>231</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 144, Report on Albanian-Italian relations after the war

<sup>232</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 144, Report on Albanian-Italian relations after the war

The Albanian Government, through its Legation in Belgrade, submitted on 11 February 1948 a note to the Italian Legation in this country, requesting, on the basis of Art. 45 of the Treaty, the surrender of "Albanian and Italian war criminals". She also handed over their respective list. The Italian government accepted this note. This attitude was different from her subsequent action regarding the Albanian government's request for restitution and her protest against the arrest of Thoma Sinica, for which she refused to accept the protest notes, justifying that between the two countries did not have diplomatic relations. But even on the issue of political emigrants, the Italian government did not give any answer as required in the note of the Albanian communist government<sup>233</sup>.

In the fight against political emigration, Hoxha's regime also engaged the Italian Communist Party. In August 1948, the representatives of Albania in Rome met with the envoy of the well-known leader of PKI Terecini who, in order to disguise himself as the Italian authorities, allegedly introduced himself as a UNITA correspondent<sup>234</sup>.

Terecini thought that the claims of the Albanian government for the Italian intervention in Albania should be widely presented in the Senate. But to achieve this goal, he lacked the material to expose these "imperialist" plans. He asked Hoxha's government to supply him with materials proving Italian intervention in the Greek-Yugoslav provocations against Albania. He also asked the opinion of the Albanian side, if this issue should be raised in the Senate and if so, when it should be done. In addition, Terecini and PKI leaders demanded material from some of the leaders of the Albanian emigration to crack down on them in the press together with the Italian government.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> AMPJ, year 1948, file 144, Report on Albanian-Italian relations after the war.

<sup>234</sup> AMPJ, year 1949, file 312, Telegram of Zeneli for MP, Rome, 25 August 1949

<sup>235</sup> AMPJ, year 1949, file 312, Telegram of Zenel for MP, Rome, 25 August 1949



## CHAPTER II

### POLITICAL IMMIGRATION ACTIVITY IN 1949-1953

#### 2.1. Organization and relations between political emigration groups in the years 1949-1953

After the creation of KSHL M. Frashëri, A. Kupi, N. Kota, S. Kryeziu and Mr. Pali went first to London and then to the USA in September to propagate it. M. Frashëri and N. Kota stayed in New York to establish the KSHL office, while Mr. Pali was appointed as the editor of his newspaper. On September 19, 1949 the KSHL delegates were received by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ljulin E. Thomson, Deputy. the chairman of the Eastern Europe affairs section and the representative of the American government John C. Campbell, to whom M. Frashëri spoke about the goals of the KSHL and asked for the help of the USA<sup>1</sup>. Political emigration eagerly awaited the creation of the KSHL, hoping that, finally, something was really beginning to be done to liberate the homeland from communist captivity<sup>2</sup>. M. Frashëri would keep in touch with the "Free Europe Committee"<sup>3</sup>. As Mr. Paul later wrote, the care that America and Great Britain were showing for the liberation of Albania, without the neighbors interested in evil, gave power to the prestige and work of the Committee"<sup>4</sup>. The committee strongly defended the rights of Kosovo and Chameria, although it was careful in public statements, strongly instructed by the Americans<sup>5</sup>.

In London, M. Frashëri was advised by the Anglo-Americans not to mention the Kosovo issue as this would incite the Yugoslav government to react to political emigration and its action for the liberation of Albania<sup>6</sup>. The Americans were also careful not to weaken Tito, who had just broken away from the socialist camp<sup>7</sup>.

After the reception in Washington, M. Frashëri stayed in the USA, while the others left for Europe and arrived in Rome at the end of September<sup>8</sup>. Xh. Emeri claimed that the secret services asked me to create the organization for an Albanian counter-revolution and I was happy about that. I was not a professional, but they were my friends and that's why I wanted to help them "<sup>9</sup>.

After the creation of the SAC of Rome, the quarrels between the parties over their special statute did not disappear. H. Dosti was disappointed that in 1949 he remained outside the Committee, although he thought that he "summed up the benefits of M. Frashëri, without his flaws"<sup>10</sup>.

"As soon as the KSHL was proclaimed, under the leadership of M. Frashëri, Yugoslavia removed the Tanefi committee (which was not of Albanian origin), Greece increased its interventions in Albania and Italy requested that its former agents be members of the committee." The bad thing was that even the two great Western powers (Anglo-

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<sup>1</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, August 1962, p.4

<sup>2</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.147

<sup>3</sup> USNA, DS 875.00 / 9-1949

<sup>4</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 26 August 1974, article by Zef Palit, p.4

<sup>5</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 26 August 1974, article by Zef Palit, p.4

<sup>6</sup> Bulletin of the Kosovo League, year 1973, p.6

<sup>7</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 25 March 1975, p.4

<sup>8</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 25 March 1975, p.4

<sup>9</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ... p.70

<sup>10</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 26 August 1974, Article by Zef Palit, p. 41.

Americans) who supported the committee, changed their position, they wanted the SSC to expand with every kind of element<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, later, the Albanian Democratic Agrarian Ball created the Paris Committee. Even later, Balli Kombëtar accused some of the Allies that they wanted to undermine the SAC of Rome and some neighboring countries that they were obstructing because "their goal was to dismantle the Albanian forces, pursuing their old dream".

In the positive atmosphere caused by the creation of the KSHL, Mit'hat Frashëri died suddenly in New York in October 1949. The SCTL temporarily suspended its activity because the previous disruption was renewed. Quarrels immediately began over the replacement of the committee chairman. The candidacies proposed by BK (for H. Dosti, Nuredin Vlora and A. Këlcyra) were not accepted, nor was the candidacy of Stavri Vinjau, former trader in Italy and former minister of the Fan Noli government. Then after much pressure, after two months of quarreling, the Americans and the British nominated Hasan Dosti as its chairman. A. Kupi did not like this, although he was his friend, that Legality wanted to have the political leadership of the KSHL and not only the military leadership. "This node," Flamuri newspaper wrote, was resolved with the help of the Americans, that the US government saw fit for the president of the KSHL to be an exponent of BK".<sup>12</sup> But to make the KSHL stronger, the Americans assigned salaries to the leaders, and mobilized them to persuade the mass of fugitives, sending them to different places where they were, categorizing and dividing them into camps, organized the work of counter-espionage in their ranks, increased the ideological elaboration of the Albanian and Kosovar diaspora, etc.

The KSHL formed a single front against the communist regime and, on the whole, almost the entire Albanian emigration, mobilized around it in the action of 1949 - 1953 against the government of Hoxha; BK took over the main keys of Albanian emigration. KSHL initially engaged 216 people in espionage and diversion courses and schools; the leaders worked to increase the ranks of saboteur volunteers. Despite the successes, there was also anarchy. Abdyl Sina claimed that "it was not understood what was being done ... there was a lack of coordination ... the problem was who should take Albania first"<sup>13</sup>.

Cooperation between anti-communist political emigration and international organizations began immediately. At the Third Congress of the International Agrarian League in 1952, Hasan Dosti, on behalf of the National Front, delivered an interesting speech, in which he underlined the difficult situation in Albania under communist terror, the rule of Soviet politics in this country, persecutions against religion. ; the dangers of Russia's exit to the Mediterranean through Albania. He underlined cooperation with the US; the importance of the principle of confederal organization of the Balkans and Central Europe and the necessity of the unification and brotherhood of these peoples to escape the communist tyranny<sup>14</sup>.

After 1949 and the defeats suffered by the armed groups thrown in Albania, the divergences between the foreign discoveries of the emigrant leaders deepened. There were also disagreements between the British and Americans as well as BK<sup>15</sup>.

BKI withdrew from the coalition with BK and approached the "Irredentist Party" of Xh. Deva (or the second League of Prizren), which later came closer to the Legality of Zog. A. Këlcyra approached BKI. Thus the positions of BK in KSHL were weakening, while Legality was disoriented. These quarrels also spread between the diversionist groups thrown in Albania from abroad and the opponents of the regime inside the country who had gone to

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<sup>11</sup> Bulletin of BK, 1970, p.67

<sup>12</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 25 March 1975, p.4

<sup>13</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 19

<sup>14</sup> Hasan Dosti- A life for the Albanian cause, BOTART, Tirana, 2008. F.231-240

<sup>15</sup> AMPB, 1950, file 46, p. 14

the mountains. Thus the BKI instructed its people not to accept a fusion of thoughts and actions and not to make any contact with ballistic groups, casting doubt that they would betray them. The Americans put pressure on the KSHL to maintain cooperation, threatening the leaders that they would cut their salaries, etc.

In parallel with KSHL, the active life of political parties and groups continued. By the end of 1949 significant changes took place in the ranks of the National Front. At the congress of Banjoli (Italy) in 1949, the faction of A. Ermenji turned into the "Agrarian Democratic Party"<sup>16</sup>, and in November 1949 in Naples, he turned the principles of the 10-point decalogue into a program of the "Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party (PADSH)"<sup>17</sup>. PADSH recruited more uninvolved persons with Italians and Germans during the war. Its press said that "The Nationalist Party will continue to defend and implement the social and economic reforms of Albania ... to strengthen human freedom and equality among all Albanians ... to achieve the realization of an advanced state and flourished through moral and human endeavors, always based on patriotism"<sup>18</sup>. " "We do not take into account whether Albania will be done tomorrow or after many years: let Albania be done without us, but let it be done", it was said in the documents of Balli Kombëtar <sup>19</sup>. In these first moments, despite the difficulties of emigration, there was no lack of optimism for the overthrow of communism, it was wished that: "To strive for a free, happy and honored Albania, let us make the next congress in the Albania of Albanians". <sup>20</sup>

The great split of the National Front occurred in 1950, after the death of M. Frashëri, when BK was still the main organization in exile and the Anglo-Americans used its supremacy in many ways to organize emigration against the communist regime. The political division ended with the expulsion of A. Këlcyra, K. Muka, etc., from the leadership who were accused of compromising cooperation with the occupiers. The quarrels with them were for the unification in the Committee "Free Albania" of Rome, which would be a unification body for the activity against the communist government. that of A. Këlcyra who was supported by the Italians and that of H. Dosti by the Americans.

Further A. Këlcyra created the traditional "National Ball", as a new party, with his loyal people, with Italian and American support. The factions of A. Këlcyra and H. Dosti remained isolated until 1962, when they joined the "United Front National Organization" (traditional front) led by Isuf Luzaj, Qa-zim Emra, etc. (followed by A. . Këlcyra by H. Dosti) based in the USA, closely connected with the CIA, where they also had a radio for ballistic propaganda in the ranks of emigration and the newspaper "National Defense". Ballistas in the US and Canada gathered around this grouping.

In 1954, the PADSH (Balli agrar), as a counterweight to the KSHL of Rome, with the English and French encouragement, would create the "National Democratic Committee of Free Albania" of Paris, headed by Abaz Ermenji. In this group participated: Balli Agrar of V. Andoni, the group of independent M. Bajraktar in France, the Anglo-Albanian association, the group of liberals in England, the group of Turkish-Albanian brotherhood in Turkey, etc., and later the Kosovar League, Albanian Democratic League etc. At the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Balli Agrar and the Kosovo League took part in it. This committee did not have any wide activity, but propagandized against the communist government and in favor of the Kosovo issue, especially in the world opinion through the newspaper "Qëndresa Shqiptare" which was published in Albanian and French and on a radio in the USA. He made various historical publications with a nationalist spirit.

<sup>16</sup> Bulletin of BK, Congress of 1970, p.72

<sup>17</sup> Bulletin of BK, Congress of 1970, p.72

<sup>18</sup> Flamuri newspaper, May 1946, p. 59

<sup>19</sup> Bulletin of the BKI congress, 1970, p.56

<sup>20</sup> Bulletin of the BKI congress, 1970, p.56

In 1950, the "Albanian Democratic Alliance" was formed, where A. Këlcyra's BKI and BKI joined, trying to put pressure on the Albanian Democratic Agrarian Party (PDASH) to accept their accession to the New York SSC. At American insistence, some Ballist leaders accepted the union. Some leaders such as V. Andoni, A. Ermenji, Zef Pali, etc., at the urging of the English did not accept that solution. In addition, the British tried to openly introduce the Committee of Fugitives in Yugoslavia into the SLA, but the Americans resisted.

Also in 1950 a KSHL delegation met with a Greek minister in Athens, but the talks went badly and were characterized by accusations and bilateral insults. In 1951 at a luncheon with a representative of the US State Department, Mr. Paul raised the issue of KSHL enlargement. Such a thing was raised from the KSHL center in Rome, especially after M. Bajraktari was transferred from Greece to the NATO headquarters in Paris and after BKI had submitted a memorandum to the US Embassy in Rome against BK which was hindering accession. his in KSHL. BKI protested to the US State Department that BK did not cooperate with him<sup>21</sup>.

These constant quarrels and defeats suffered by the armed groups in Albania made it necessary to reorganize the KSHL, introducing H. Dostin as chairman; A. Kupin vice-president and members: A. Këlcyra, S. Kryeziu, I. Vërlaci, M. Bajraktari, N. Peshkëpia d.m.th. 6 groups were included: PADSH, BKI, Legality, groups of A. Këlcyra, H. Dosti, and S. Kryeziu. But again the quarrels did not cease. Relations between BK and Legality deteriorated.

In 1952 A. Ermenji with the British ordered the ballistas not to go to Albania, while H. Dosti with the CIA continued the operation against the communist regime. BKI committed to fill the gaps created by BK's withdrawal"<sup>22</sup>. V. Andoni claimed: "We broke up because the Americans let us know that we had to work under their orders, as they were financing us "<sup>23</sup>. In 1952 tensions in Rome escalated between the CIA Lesbians and Arshi Liolli, the British representative "due to the escape to Philip's group in BS "<sup>24</sup>.

Disputes between the CIA and the SIS were exacerbated by the defeats they were suffering in Albania and because the fugitives were becoming demoralized and sought to emigrate to the US, Canada, Australia and elsewhere and not to go saboteurs to Albania, because they realized that they did not succeeded, and as the relationship between Legality and BK changed from rivalry to fierce suspicion and strife. The Kings quarreled with the American captain Thomas Mangelli next to them and accused him of anti-Zogist tendencies"<sup>25</sup>. Thus, in addition to the disruption of BK, Legality was also divided into groups. Disputes led to the fact that in December 1953 the SIS representative in the KSHL left him, withdrawing the group of A. Ermeni and V. Andoni, since the CIA did not accept the British terms.

From 1950, with American support, Balli Kombëtar also established the "Albanian company" based in Kaiserslautern (FRY), which it maintained until recently as the nucleus of the "national army" for the fight against communism. For this Balli also participated in several international anti-communist organizations such as the "Agrarian International" etc.

In 1949 in the National Organization Movement of Legality (OKLL) two factions appeared more openly: the first, with Zogu and his old guard and the second, with A. Kupin, Gaqo Gogon, etc., who in some cases did not agree with Zog This was clear when A. Kupi entered the SCTL of Rome and especially after the defeat in 1953 of the diversionist groups of Zenel Shehu etc. After that Zog was no longer considered a major political figure until his

<sup>21</sup> Flamuri newspaper, March 25, 1975, p. 4

<sup>22</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 270 - 271

<sup>23</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 270 - 271

<sup>24</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 270 - 271

<sup>25</sup> N. Bethell, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p. 251

death in Paris in 1961. It was also during this time that in Egypt Zog was accused, along with King Farouk, of smuggling. He was fined by Nasser for smuggling gold<sup>26</sup> with 10 thousand pounds. He was forced to flee to the US, but eventually settled in France.

In 1954 even G. Gogo would create the "Monarchist Party", which had American support. He had controversies with A. Kupi, S. Damani, etc., but also with Zog. This faction disappeared in 1968 when a part of it returned to the ranks of Legality.

In the first moments of the establishment of the Free Albania Committee, the blockers did not join this organization due to the strong opposition of other anti-communist parties. BKI also had divergences within its ranks. In 1949, during the talks for the unification of the KSHL of Rome, two factions appeared in it: the first, led by Ismail Vërlac, who was against the concessions to Balli Kombëtar, and the second, with the other Eqerem Vlora, who were for sacrificed blockade leaders compromising with the Italian invaders. In 1950 the leadership of the B.K.I was reduced from 9 to 5, removing 4 leaders, former well-known fascists, in order to make possible the entry into the KSHL later. Also, seeing the disintegration and quarrels in its ranks, the BKI set up a disciplinary commission, headed by Kol Bib Mirakaj, to monitor the admissions and expulsions of members and to monitor their political stance in relation to other parties. In 1954 they broke away from BKI, the "Albanian Democratic League" of the Gjonmarkaj brothers, which became closer to Balli Agrar.

Xhelal and Rexhep Mitrovica, Xh. Deva in 1950 created the "Irridentist Party"<sup>27</sup> headed by Xh. The camel to gather around it the anti-communist and nationalist emigration of Kosovo. This group approached Legality against BK, because Xh. Deva compromised with A. Zogu. Later, on this basis, the "Third League of Prizren" was created. The Americans supported the creation of an organization with Albanians fleeing Yugoslavia. According to Rexhep Krasniqi, the goal of this organization would be "to fight the red regime in Albania ... that Tito's person should not be attacked, that Tito has given our people there many rights to develop and progress, etc."<sup>28</sup>. Later, at the end of 1956, this organization would be accepted as a member of the Federation of European Ethnic Communities. From this time onwards he continued to send protests to the MFA of the Great Western Powers; UN, European League, etc., on the occasion of the anniversary of the capture of Kosovo, etc., the "Muslim Association" in Italy established in 1950 with Mentor Çoku who acted mainly with Albanians emigrated from Kosovo and Albanian areas in Yugoslavia, who moved to Italy and with Albanians in Arab countries.

Changes also occurred in the organization of organizations with foreign anti-Albanian influence. In the Greek attack of 1949, KEVA was at the forefront of propaganda and war efforts against Albania. In 1952, the diversionist organization "Destle" was created to mask the compromise of the Greek government in the subversive activity against Albania, that allegedly "it is the Albanians who act against it and not the Greek government".

"Albanian Orthodox Diocese in the US" created in 1950 by the Greek bishop Marko Lipen (former illegal priest of the Greek Phanar)<sup>29</sup>.

Meanwhile, the "Union of Albanian Political Emigrants in Yugoslavia" continued to function.

This group gathered Albanian fugitives after the breakdown of relations between the two countries in 1948, most of which were elaborated by Titoist propaganda, which OZNA and later the Yugoslav UDB, used against the government of Hoxha. Until 1951, fugitives in Yugoslavia were not part of the SCT of Rome. At first they had no organizational structure and were not treated well by the Yugoslavs, which aroused distrust of the Yugoslav state, so

<sup>26</sup> AMPB Practice on the activity of A. Zogu in several volumes

<sup>27</sup> AMPB, Internship on the activity of Xh. Deva; R. Mitrovica and Xh. Mitrovica.

<sup>28</sup> Gazeta Shqipëria e Lirë, April 1964, p. 4

<sup>29</sup> Gazeta Besa (organ of the National Front), June 10, 1970, p. 3

in their ranks there were quarrels, disagreements, declines and upheavals, so much so that some of them began to emigrate to the west, to be repatriated or surrendered to Albanian border forces. The UDB further began efforts to organize them, although it encountered numerous quarrels among the fugitives. In order to pave the way for the repatriation of the fugitives and for a better activation of them against the government of Tirana, on May 10, 1950 in Prizren a conference was held, where a steering committee with 21 people was elected, with the participation of 200 people. fugitives, under the leadership of Dushan Mugosha. The committee announced as a political platform: the unification of Albanian emigration for a united and indivisible republic<sup>30</sup> (i.e. for a 7th republic of Yugoslavia); The committee would turn into a government when Albania was liberated, etc. The Yugoslav authorities took measures so that the fugitives would not unmask each other. UDB leaders also threatened and even imprisoned those who opposed its platform. The fugitives over the age of 18 were registered, diversion squads were created, economic treatment was improved, the leaflet "Flag of Freedom" was published, etc. On June 20, 1952, the UDB made an attempt to create an "Albanian communist party".<sup>31</sup> with 70 laraged by the SNP. At a meeting in Peja, D. Mugosha spoke to them about Stalin's "deviation" and told them that "the communist nucleus is in Yugoslavia"<sup>32</sup>, that "I am the one who formed the Communist Party in Albania ... You are the ones who will be the first to form the real communist party of Albania". This initiative was repeated several times but failed.

In 1951 the Committee, not without purpose, established its headquarters in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, and in 1952 measures were taken again to strengthen the organization of Albanian fugitives in Yugoslavia. On May 31, 1952 a conference was held, which approved the statute. The steering committee was increased from 21 to 40 people, with Apostol Tanefi as deputy chairman. chairman Nik Sokolin; the committee court of a 7-member control council was established. The Committee of Fugitives praised Tito and carried out extensive diversionary activities against Albania.

## **2.2. Preparations for the anti-communist armed operation of 1949-1953**

Under the leadership of the KSHL, and with the support of the allies, propaganda against the communist regime was intensified, special radio stations were set up, in addition to the existing ones, and the publication of newspapers and books with anti-communist content was increased. R Cookridge wrote that "in 1949 the exiled patriots continued to prepare to oust the communist regime. The US secret services began to help them more efficiently. The CIA and the British SIS decided to equip several hundred Albanian patriots in Greece. The aim was to prepare an attack group, with which thousands of Albanians would join, after crossing the border and settling in the forests and mountains, which offered an ideal territory for the guerrillas. In previous historiography, but also in today's publications, this operation has been described simply as a diversion and espionage activity and the paratroopers who were trained in American captives and entered Albania and Kosovo have been called CIA saboteurs and spies. But here it must be borne in mind that this operation took place at the height of the Cold War, and it must be borne in mind that the events that dictated it were: the establishment of the communist regime in China; The bloody Korean War; and the threat to Western Europe from the Soviet B.. From this point of view, an Albanian scholar has also expressed critical views towards the book widely referred to in this

<sup>30</sup> AMPB, file 339, year 1951, Conference Resolution

<sup>31</sup> AMPB, The Practice of Refugees in Yugoslavia, file 339

<sup>32</sup> AMPB, The Practice of Refugees in Yugoslavia, file 339

work by N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal*, because the author of this publication "covers the political factors of the time and treats the topic in the form of espionage adventures".<sup>33</sup>

American and British officers volunteered to take part in the invasion. Only a few diplomats and secret service officers were aware of this venture. Many of the Albanian emigrant leaders had gone to Washington and London to financially prepare the enterprise and to ensure that as soon as the occupier was expelled, Britain and the United States would recognize the new provisional government. "British and American officers prepare operation in Greece and Turkey"<sup>34</sup> David Smajli has written in detail about this operation in his book "*Albanian Duty*" and Nikola Bethel in his book "*The Great Betrayal*"<sup>35</sup>.

David Smajli has written in detail about this operation in his book "*Albanian Duty*" and Nikola Bethel in his book "*The Great Betrayal*"<sup>36</sup>. If the plan failed and caused concern to America, the US government would hand over all responsibility to the CFE and could openly deny that it was unaware of the plan. For this reason, even the English did not receive the leaders of the KSHL with great fanfare. KSHL leaders were concerned about the lack of any sign of official support for their action<sup>37</sup>.

Anti-communist elements inside the country were preparing to go to the mountains and "their escape was taken over by the Yugoslav government"<sup>38</sup>. For some Albanians on the run and in the mountains, the communist government granted an amnesty in 1949.

In July 1949 the OPC / CIA assigned a cadre to Europe to organize the Albanian guerrilla force, Michael Berk, who disguised himself as the representative of the "Imperial films" in Rome and collaborated with Peter Kemp<sup>39</sup>, SIS representative. American, British, Greek, Yugoslav, Italian, German, etc. instructors, specialized in secret warfare, would teach Albanian emigrants the tactics of fighting the regime<sup>40</sup>. Thus, the veteran CIA OSS specialist Berku went to Rome in mid-August 1949 as a liaison between the OPC / CIA and the KSHL, to round up and prepare the saboteurs<sup>41</sup> that would be sent to Albania. He was ordered not to meet with the US embassy. His mission was to have an informal character. The State Department had reservations about the operation. The Americans had preferred to use their bases in Germany. Britain and the United States had agreed to cooperate in inciting any Albanian who opposed the communists and would work together to overthrow a regime supported only by a minority of the Albanian population<sup>42</sup>. The joint committee that was set up decided that the Americans should be responsible for operations in northern Albania, dropping most of their agents by parachute, while the British would operate in the south, sending their agents by sea<sup>43</sup>. The saboteurs would get in touch by radio with the CIA liaison center in the FRY and elsewhere for instructions and information<sup>44</sup>.

D. Smajli, would create a training school for Albanians in Malta and as soon as we saw that their preparation was satisfactory, their landing on the coast of Albania would be organized. There, together with those already fighting, they would form the nucleus of active opposition against the communists"<sup>45</sup>. David Smajli, who in 1949 was in Germany as deputy,

<sup>33</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "The efforts of XH. Deva and R. Krasniqi on the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US" in the publication: *The Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, vol. 2. Prizren, 2005. Ff. 154.

<sup>34</sup> R. Cookridge, *The Truth About Philbin*, ... p. 172 – 173

<sup>35</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal*, ... p.45

<sup>36</sup> USNA DS 840.00 / 6-2149

<sup>37</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.141

<sup>38</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.277

<sup>39</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.179 - 180

<sup>40</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.217

<sup>41</sup> *To Vima* Newspaper, December 5, 1984

<sup>42</sup> D. Smajli, *Albanian task* ..., p.254

<sup>43</sup> D. Smajli, *Albanian task* ..., p.255

<sup>44</sup> A. Gerin *Cold War Commandos*, p.184

<sup>45</sup> D. Smajli, *Albanian task* ..., p.255

was elected to train the saboteurs there militarily. commander of the English royal cavalry regiment. D. Smiley wrote of the saboteurs that "they were not mere recruits, but brave patriots who had volunteered to risk their lives, hoping to liberate their country from hated tyranny"<sup>46</sup>.

The military part of the plan began in October 1949 when the first armed and trained groups landed on Albanian territory. "They had agreed to come under British protection and use British instructions to overthrow the communist government, which they hated." <sup>47</sup> Headquarters <sup>48</sup> of the plan against Albania in 1949 consisted of the commander of the CIA plan - OPC, the Office of Political Coordination (established in 1948 for covert operations against the socialist camp) Kim Philby and Duke George Jelico, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States. Colonel Harold Perkins thought that "the situation in Albania was very honorable ... there are still pockets of resistance, where members of the BK and followers of the A. Kupa Legality movement have taken the mountains and are fighting the communists. groups get in touch and help with weapons and money, they may have a chance to destroy communist power" <sup>49</sup>.

The activity of anti-communist emigration became even more intense especially in the years 1950 - 1953. This was the second phase of the fight against the communist regime through the armed actions of the Albanian political emigration.

To organize the operation, M. Farshëri and H. Dosti talked with the Italian Minister of Interior Shelben, the Chief of Police Miklioni, and even De Gasperi. According to the communist dictatorship's bodies, the Italians allegedly took over the organization of the diversion bases, provided that immigrant groups carried out various tasks for Italian espionage<sup>50</sup>. Groups of immigrants existing in Malta began to revive and set in motion. Yugoslavia also sent armed groups of saboteurs to carry out acts of sabotage, sabotage, and incite new escapes.

Communist spies claimed that for these purposes, in 1949, other related neighboring intelligence sent over 144 saboteurs, including those sent to precede the aggression of August 1949. Also in 1949, to coordinate actions, they traveled in Yugoslavia the leaders of the Albanian emigration Mit'hat Frashëri, Abaz Kupa etc., where it was agreed to organize the expulsion of diversionist groups from Albania from the Yugoslav territory at the same time<sup>51</sup>.

The preparation of those who were sent to Albania was comprehensive, from the use of weapons, learning the history and geography of the country, studying and recruiting the agency, etc. Psychological preparation was given great importance<sup>52</sup>. Usually the professors were Americans, speaking in their own language to immigrants. Voice of America, BBC gave constant messages to immigrants and propaganda news to escape postal censorship<sup>53</sup>. The Greek intelligence prepared for 4-5 months the saboteurs for radio, telegraph, telephone, the way to pass in the background in a group of 3 people, the collection of information of military, political, economic character <sup>54</sup> The CIA and the SIS made intense political preparations, talking about the difficult and turbulent situation in Albania, about the persecutions carried out by the communist regime and reviving the emigrants' belief that the situation would change and one day they would return to their homeland. their free<sup>55</sup>. The

<sup>46</sup> D. Smajli, Albanian task ..., p.257

<sup>47</sup> N.Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p. 8; AMPB - files of the years 1948 - 1953

<sup>48</sup> N.Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p. 130

<sup>49</sup> N.Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p.130

<sup>50</sup> AMPB, year 1948, file 178, p. 134 - 135

<sup>51</sup> AMPB, file on the Process of E. Çakos, p. 347-348

<sup>52</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p.52 - 53

<sup>53</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p.. 202

<sup>54</sup> AMPB, year 1953, file 405

<sup>55</sup> AMPB, year 1953, file 599



American instructors told them that "the Albanian people are against the Hoxha regime and would welcome them as liberators". The saboteurs were provided with Albanian passports and documents as KSHL soldiers. In their bags was also a call to the local population to join them and overthrow the communist government<sup>56</sup>. According to the Anglo-American plan, the first BK guerrilla fighters would enter Albania, as a fighting force against the regime<sup>57</sup>.

The diversionist groups had different sizes numerically but in the years 1949-1953 they were larger<sup>58</sup>. While later all groups were small with 3-5 people or only individuals.

There was generally great enthusiasm to go to Albania and fight against the communist regime. The main problem, claimed A. Ermenji, was the desire of the young people to volunteer and their anger when it turned out that only 30 people would be allowed to participate in training in Malta<sup>59</sup>.

In the spring of 1950 the plan for the overthrow of the communist regime was drawn up<sup>60</sup>, claimed the English explorer Cookridge. New York Times correspondent L. Sulcberger wrote several articles, emphasizing that the weakening and eventual change of the Albanian communist regime was a basic objective of the West, that there was strong anti-communist resistance in Albania, and that the ranks of the guerrillas were increasing, that they had landed landings on the Albanian coast with orders to install radio stations on the coast and to establish links with the movement against Hoxha<sup>61</sup>.

Among the most active emigration leaders in 1950 were: Nuçi Kota, legalist,<sup>62</sup> Athanas Gega, Vasil Germenji, A. Këlcyra, Rakip Frashëri, Isuf Begeja, Odhise Dhima<sup>63</sup>.

Meanwhile, political immigration organizations began to adhere to sister international organizations, which spoke of a strengthening of their anti-communist activity. PADSH (National Agrarian Front) was admitted to the International Agrarian Union at the Washington congress<sup>64</sup>.

In the 1950s, labor camps were set up in West Germany, where labor battalions were stationed<sup>65</sup>, which were in fact the basis for the diversion of fugitives from Eastern European countries, under American command of the occupation. These immigrant forces, in addition to preparing to fight against communist regimes, did communal work, repaired roads, etc., for the reconstruction of the country after the war, performed work in the American army as guards of weapons depots, military bases. Lorenc de Nefvij, special adviser to the CIA, based in Frankfurt, put forward the idea of disguising the Albanian saboteurs as special work battalions, under the command of the American army, where Berku worked; CIA Representative Roland E. Dalin in Heidelberg, Captain of Albanian Origin, American Thomas Mangelli<sup>66</sup> etc.

In June 1950, the "Albanian Labor Army 4000" was established in the FRY<sup>67</sup> (Albania Labor Army Service 4000), which Balli Kombëtar called symbolic military power<sup>68</sup>. This was the largest ward among other wards of anti-communist emigration from other eastern communist countries. The Albanian company consisted of 2/3 of Zogists, 2/5 ballists and 1/5 blockers, and later returned to the ballistics group. Its main task was diversion in Albania. The

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<sup>56</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 225

<sup>57</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.90

<sup>58</sup> AMPB, 1955, dossier 443

<sup>59</sup> AMPB, 1955, dossier 443

<sup>60</sup> E. H. Cookridge, *The Truth About Philbin* ..., p.181

<sup>61</sup> New York Times, March 27, 1950

<sup>62</sup> Newspaper *Shqipëria e Re*, August 1953, p. 4

<sup>63</sup> Newspaper *Shqipëria e Re*, September 1963, p.4

<sup>64</sup> Bulletin of the National Front, 1970, p. 92

<sup>65</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 179 - 180

<sup>66</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 179 - 180

<sup>67</sup> AMPB, the practice of the Albanian company in the FRY

<sup>68</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1976, p.8

first saboteurs to gather in June 1950 were 3 platoon, led by Xhemal Laçi, Sami Butkë and Kol Hilë. This unit had General Commander Abaz Kupin and Deputy Commander Abaz Ermenjin. The field commander was Major Chaush Basha. About 300 Albanian fugitives gathered here, who under the leadership of the CIA and allied espionage, conducted military exercises 10 hours a day and psychological preparation and propaganda to reverse the situation in Albania. From these special groups were selected and prepared in schools and reconnaissance courses especially in Bershtengergen near the city of Frankfurt am Main, in Munich, Kaiserslautern. The main saboteurs in the 1950s were trained here. In Munich, 300 people were trained in 1952 and 250 in 1954, about 15 km away, near Munich from the refugees who were in camps in Italy, Greece and elsewhere. Xh. Laçi, the former deputy commander of the company, stated that "Some of the vans gave their lives ... Din Lusha, Kalem Xhepexhi and Dilaver Kacuqi were surrounded in a house, fought for hours and when the ammunition was kept, they set the house on fire and burned it down. inside, they refused to surrender ... A part of them went to Albania, kept the mission and came out safe and sound in the free world. The rest, if it had not been stopped by order of the Committee, since the landing plan had failed, they would have fulfilled the task they had undertaken. More than 100 people from the ranks of the Albanian company were killed<sup>69</sup> in Albania. Due to party differences and lack of political formation, there were many quarrels in this company, especially in the years 1950 - 1953 during the preparation of the diversion. KSHL intervened several times, because there the Zogists and the Ballists were confronted.

N. Bethel writes that at one point "the two factions confronted each other in readiness to open fire and a civil war would have begun"<sup>70</sup>. To put an end to these quarrels in October 1951, some well-known American and British officials involved held a meeting in Rome with the leaders of the Albanian emigration<sup>71</sup>. The difficulties were great. Xh. Laçi wrote to KSHL in 1952 that they were losing faith in American friends because of our inability to meet what is required of us and that our people are not living up to their expectations<sup>72</sup>. He demanded that fugitives not be allowed to emigrate to distant lands, as gloomy news came about the saboteurs in Albania. He wrote to A. Kupi that "in the future, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or lack of responsibility on our part, I propose that no one leave the group without any mission, without your order or approval. This order must be given to us." in writing, so as not to leave Americans free to act arbitrarily"<sup>73</sup>.

The "Albanian company", which consisted mainly of ballistas, continued until the 1990s in Kaiserslautern, with about 100 people guarding US military weapons depots, but also occasionally training small group saboteurs or individuals. elsewhere.

Regarding the plan of using Albanian emigrants in the operations of the '50s, he has written a very interesting and documented book N Bethel, therefore we will not focus on this issue in detail.

Groups of migrants ready to act were also established in Yugoslavia in the so-called labor camps such as "Koçi Xoxe" in Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia who were sent to Albania, especially in the years 1948 - 1953.

In 1950, the so-called "nationalist anti-communist organization" (ONASH) was created as a diversionary group, headed by the leaders living in Greece, Fiqiri Dine, Hysni Dema, A. Ermenji, P. Previzi, M. Bajraktari, etc., who will to serve the organization of the uprising.

<sup>69</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1980, p. 10

<sup>70</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 251 - 252.

<sup>71</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 252

<sup>72</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 264

<sup>73</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 218

The Greek QIP set up other bases under the leadership of Asfalia in Pirgo, Konica, Ioannina, Filat, Athens, Llavro, etc., where about 60-150 fugitives trained by American, British and Greek officers passed. These Albanian emigrants disguised as Greek soldiers were sent to Albania, where they formed several intelligence groups and carried out diversion missions. In 1952, the QIP created the diversionist organization (Destle), with Albanian and northern Epirote emigrants who, during the 1950s, carried out provocations at the border, carried out acts of diversion, and carried out anti-communist propaganda.

Immigrant camps in Italy were also activated. The leadership of the armed groups in the years 1949-1954 was made by the "Free Albania Committee" of Rome, headed by S. Kryeziu, Mr. Palin, G. Gogon, etc. R. Krasniqi, chairman of the New York City Council, said that "after the initial fighting, the nationalist forces in exile gathered themselves and continued the war in the mountains of Albania for 8 years from 1946 to 1954. Thus, Albanian nationalism rehabilitated itself in this war that a priori was lost to international circumstances"<sup>74</sup>. While D. Smajli writes that "Albanians who came to Malta or were recruited by General Abaz Kupi, leader of the legal movement and a staunch supporter of King Zog in exile or by Prof. Abaz Ermenji, leader of BK. Nationalist Party, which though not in favor of King Zog, set aside its disagreements with the Zogists out of their mutual hatred for the communists"<sup>75</sup>.

In the fight against the regime the most idealistic, determined and patriotic people were elected. This is how Captain Zenel Shehu, former head of Zog's personal guard, was elected; Hamit Matjani, described as "Tiger"<sup>76</sup>; Colonel Muharrem Bajraktari; Ihsan Toptani, Gaqo Goga and Hasan Dosti; Alush Leshanaku et al. Abaz Kupi, Abaz Ermenji, General Preng Previzi, Kol Bib Mirakaj, etc. were elected as the main leaders. They had provided evidence of their anti-communism.

In 1949-50 even anti-communist forces inside the country, formed several armed groups, such as the "Resistance Front", with which the State Security played successful games. Many political emigration groups were associated with this front. Anti-communist groups could be added with new elements in the north, especially from the desertions from the military units of the communist government, an anti-communist propaganda was developed which was also supported by the difficult economic situation. According to regime sources, several acts of sabotage were carried out, such as setting fire to oil wells in Kuçova, setting fire to youth houses.

### **2.3. Basics of preparation and firing of armed groups**

The bases for the preparation and disposal of armed groups of Albanian political emigration have been mainly in neighboring countries and have expanded to other European countries, the US and elsewhere. In the years 1949 - 1953, over 39 centers were active (12 in Yugoslavia, 11 in Greece, 7 in Italy, while others in the FRY, Malta, at the Whelus air base in Libya (Africa), Cyprus, London, USA, etc.).

Radio propaganda centers in Vienna, Thessaloniki, Rome, Bari, Istanbul, Cyprus and Belgrade were used for propaganda against the communist regime. A number of immigrants studied in Western high schools such as the University of Strasbourg (European College of Refugees), France and other institutions in the USA, FRY, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, etc. According to the organs of the communist regime, 224 foreign intelligence cadres operated in

<sup>74</sup> Gaeta Shqiptari i Lirë, November - December 1971, p. 4

<sup>75</sup> D. Smajli, *Albanian task ...*, p. 257

<sup>76</sup> A. Gerin, *Cold War Commandos ...*, p. 52

these centers<sup>77</sup>. Po kështu janë përdorur dhjetra kuadro të përgatitura nga radhët e emigracionit politicians of different categories, who have worked in these centers, where several hundred immigrants have been trained militarily.

The centers around Albania were equipped with material bases, where the instruction of armed groups and agents was done. In June 1951, 80 fugitives were sent from Greece to school in Germany. In 1950, 300 fugitives were sent to the FRG<sup>78</sup> to do training courses and further be sent to Albania. In 1952 a total of 1,500 refugees from Greece, Italy and other countries were sent to these courses. Since 1950 KEVA trained elements from the ranks of other minorities in three-month courses in Corfu, Athens, etc., a total of over 100 people, who then focused on Ioannina, Florina, Kostur, Corfu, etc.

In the '50s the CIA set up its secret bases in Greece such as in Klifodhi (near the Haxhi Nikolla station), Kacika, Ioannina, etc.<sup>79</sup>. Albanian authorities alleged that the CIA, QIP and office A of the 8th military division of Ioannina were operating with these immigrants<sup>80</sup>. The QIP trained in 1951 in the Peloponnese 400 people in Greek military formations, a battalion in Llavrio, Athens, Thessaloniki, etc. A directorate was set up at the Greek army headquarters<sup>81</sup> dealing with diversionary activity. Only the center in Ioannina in the years 1949 - 1952 regularly used 30 saboteurs in 4 groups. By 1953 in Greece there were 2997 fugitives at the disposal of the QIP and other espionage. The Americans and the British had 6 bases<sup>82</sup> preparation in Greece where the CIA set up its largest Balkan center in Athens and used its central intelligence office near the royal guard in Athens. Here were also the immigrants trained in the FRY and worked with by Harold Irving Filder<sup>83</sup> (former diplomat in BS). In 1951 the Americans withdrew to Lavrio and prepared 97 immigrants and in 1952, 287 people. The CIA also opened courses in Washington where American cadres also learned Albanian, in New Zealand, the FRG, in Kars, Turkey, etc. At the Grafenwer villa in the FRY near Bad Wiese was the training center for radio, codes, encryption and decryption, preparation of forged documents, study of Soviet weapons types, clandestine work rules, ways of moving at night in villages<sup>84</sup>.

The English intelligence opened the centers in London and Malta, where 50 fugitives were trained, in addition to those in Greece, the FRG, etc., where specialists O. Hill, Julian Smith, Wales, etc. operated.

The Italians operated in the bases of Rome, Bari, Livorno.

UDB established its main center in Prishtina and under its subordination maintained its centers and sub-centers in Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and elsewhere, mainly in Gjakova, Ohrid, Bar, Podgorica, Prizren, Dragash, Debar, Struga, Resen, Skopje, Belgrade, Ulqin, Guci etc.<sup>85</sup>. In 1950 it used 40 groups with 130 fugitives, while in 1952, 75 groups with 288 fugitives in Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia.

Foreign discoveries have used bases in distant lands such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Greenland, etc. In this way it was intended to keep the secret of preparation in the basics of departure.

In addition to external bases, diversionist groups also had internal ones, where they found temporary shelter and support. Thus, according to D. Smajli, in the years 1949-50 "the Albanians were quite well prepared and the right time came to start the operation. They were

<sup>77</sup> AMPB, year 1950, file 44,

<sup>78</sup> AMPB, year 1951, file 345, p. 6

<sup>79</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, April 1954, p. 4

<sup>80</sup> AMPB, year 1951, file 345, p. 7

<sup>81</sup> AMPB, year 1951, file 345, p. 7

<sup>82</sup> AMPB, year 1951, file 345, p. 7

<sup>83</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p. 183

<sup>84</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p. 193

<sup>85</sup> AMPB, year 1952, file 306

divided into small groups accepted by them, depending on politics, relations and tribe and areas from which they were: they could move inland to tribal areas where they had friends and relatives and could report on the situation in the country and the chances for further operations to help those already fighting the communists "<sup>86</sup>

## **2.4. Diversionary actions in the years 1949-1954**

The start of the operation was unlucky. In July 1949, a group of saboteurs led by Et'hem Çako, who had come from Italy to commit acts of sabotage and espionage, were captured in Kurvelesh. Alush Leshanaku's group was later captured and destroyed on December 30, 1950.

Meanwhile the operation against the communist regime that had begun in late 1949 was intensifying. In April 1950, Gracian Jatsevic, a former OSS officer and former deputy commander, became commander of the Albanian operation. US military attachés in Moscow and Sofia. He regularly visited the European centers of this operation such as Rome, Athens, Munich, Heidelberg, and kept in touch with the heads and offices of the KSHL in Rome and New York. He urged Ballista leaders to provide volunteers for guerrilla warfare under H. Dosti and under American responsibility<sup>87</sup>.

In 1950 the SIS tasked the Malta base with increasing the pace of military operations<sup>88</sup> while the CIA set up headquarters in Athens <sup>89</sup> main coordination of activity against the communist countries of the Balkans. IRO, was another Anglo-American organization that supplied immigrants to Albania <sup>90</sup>. The network of anti-communist bases in neighboring countries expanded and strengthened under US leadership, creating a sanitary cordon around Albania. From this center depended all the centers of instruction and training of saboteurs that were thrown in Albania. Albanian and Kosovar fugitives such as former General Prenk Previzi, Adem Hodo, Fuat Myftiu, Luan Gashi, etc. gathered in this center. to coordinate actions with anti-communist forces within the country. The main centers were that of Munich, with 200 fugitives called the "Albanian company", that of Llavrio near Athens, London, Malta, etc.

Yugoslavia participated in these diversionist activities. The Yugoslav Legation in Albania also organized internal intelligence groups, especially in the border areas. In May 1950, under Rankovic's instructions, Yugoslav armed gangs and agencies carried out diversionary acts, such as the assassination of communists, activists, popular advisers, State Security employees, and so on. The Yugoslavs, meanwhile, organized provocations at the border to support these emigration actions from Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

According to the documents of the communist government, Halil Nerguti, Myftar Maloku, Ramadan Velia, Rexh Berisha, etc., worked without reservations for organizing the uprising in this period. The Yugoslavs tried to create an opposition from abroad with Albanian emigration under the leadership of D. Mugosha in the '50s and '60s but failed to achieve this goal. They did not achieve this goal even though they could use Panajot Plaku.

At the same time the Greek intelligence intensified the sending of gangs. According to the sources of the communist government, only in 1950, 56 gangs with 294 people were sent from Greece, such as that of D. Maksakuli, G. Prifti, P. Milec, K. Dinopulli, etc., with propaganda tasks, incitement to escape, organization of the agency network, committing acts

<sup>86</sup> D. Smajli, *Albanian task ...*, p. 259 - 260

<sup>87</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal ...*, p. 212 - 213

<sup>88</sup> N.Bethel, *The Great Betrayal ...*, p. 208

<sup>89</sup> AMPB, practice on CIA activity

<sup>90</sup> Newspaper *Shqipëria e Re*, July 1953, p. 4; newspaper *Albania e re*, April 1954, p. 2

of diversion, provocations, sabotage, damage, etc., in the areas of Korça, Gjirokastra, Saranda, Himara, Përmet, etc.

In 1950 the Greek Patriarchate commissioned in Istanbul the priest Gregory of Galata to open branches of the North Epirus club of Athens, inviting in writing the Orthodox Albanians to register in it.

Among the Albanian emigrants who came to Albania at this time were Alush Leshanaku, Selim Daci, Kol Gjini, Ndue Gjonmarkaj, Nikolle Mëlyshi, etc. They aimed to create espionage and diversionist groups and to launch joint actions with other groups. These groups encouraged and revived the organization of internal resistance. These emissaries tried to connect with internal anti-communist organizations such as the "Resistance Front" which had gathered in its bosom elements from different regions of the country, had created a "Central Committee" in Tirana and several committees in the districts. Explaining his mission, A. Leshanaku wrote in his diary that: "The need was for the gangs in different parts of Albania to be connected with each other. Therefore, I took the initiative to visit all the provinces and, in cooperation with them, study the plan of a general action against the enemy"<sup>91</sup>.

The Western powers had high hopes that Albania as the weakest link of the Communist Bloc would be the first to secede from it. Underlining the importance of overthrowing the communist regime in Albania, the US ambassador to Moscow declared in 1950 that the overthrow of Hoxha's regime "would not only be easier, due to its special geographical position, but It would also serve as an example to push other communist countries to the West. "He openly stressed that what could be done to separate Albania from the communist world moral re"<sup>92</sup>. Also, the Italian Foreign Minister stated in the press, during a visit of the British Foreign Secretary, Bevin that "he talked with the head of the Foreign Office on some delicate issues such as that of Albania, where a new political situation was being prepared"<sup>93</sup>.

In the circles of political emigration, there was talk at that time about the cooperation of the Yugoslavs in the anti-Hoxha operation. A. Leshanaku, in his diary in 1950 wrote: "Tito is organizing all Albanians who take refuge in Yugoslavia (Kosovo) and who together with the ranks of Kosovars intend to annihilate the border forces to destroy the government of Tirana"<sup>94</sup>. He added that "Yugoslavia treats Albanian refugees very well. It has rounded them up in Kosovo and is organizing them for a future operation"<sup>95</sup>.

According to a press release of the SAC of Rome, it turns out that efforts were being made to organize emigration to Greece. During a trip to Greece, Hasan Dosti met with Albanian fugitives and Greek authorities. The latter was discussed on the path followed so far and plans were drawn up for future actions<sup>96</sup>.

According to the information that the Albanian authorities had, the emigration leaders were making moves in the centers where the Albanian emigrants were concentrated to organize them and to coordinate the plans. On October 20, 1950, Zef Pali, Seit Kryeziu and Gaqo Gogo arrived from Italy to Greece, where they were received by M. Bajraktari and on November 30 they visited the camp of Llavrio. Mr. Pali spoke at this meeting, calling on immigrants to work for their return to Albania as victors against communism<sup>97</sup>.

<sup>91</sup> Gazeta Albanie Libre, 1954

<sup>92</sup> Gazeta Albanie Libre, 1 May 1950

<sup>93</sup> Nova Stampa newspaper, Turin, 12 February 1950

<sup>94</sup> Gazeta Albanie Libre, December 20, 1950 (A. Leshanaku's diary)

<sup>95</sup> Gazeta Albanie Libre, December 20, 1950 (A. Leshanaku's diary)

<sup>96</sup> Flamuri newspaper, January 1951

<sup>97</sup> Flamuri newspaper, December 1950

In 1951, the activity of Albanian emigration against the communist regime intensified. In early 1951, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to encourage Albanian anti-communist emigration, declared that the US would help liberate Albania and gain independence"<sup>98</sup>.

In 1951 the activity of anti-communist groups reached its peak. There were 475 people operating in Albania, most of them immigrants from abroad but most of them were anti-communists operating from within<sup>99</sup>. They organized 135 actions<sup>100</sup> against the communist regime. According to regime data, 144 fugitives were killed in clearing operations across the country.<sup>101</sup>

Gani and Seit Kryeziu were also set in motion <sup>102</sup>. The Yugoslav government in 1951 established in Prizren "the Committee of Albanian Political Emigrants" who operated as an operational headquarters near the Albanian border and occasionally sent armed groups to Albania. In October 1951, Mehmet Hoxha was sent from Yugoslavia to Turkey, who, in meetings with many Albanians there, called for "Albania can escape from the current regime in Tirana and from the Greek threats only with its entry into the Yugoslav Federation "<sup>103</sup>.

But completely opposite goals and actions were being carried out by the leaders of the Kosovar nationalist emigration, gathered around the League of Prizren headed by Xh. The camel. They wanted to incite the patriotic war in Kosovo for its liberation from the Serbian yoke. In June 1950 Deva led and organized the "Oscar" Group, led by Riza Osmani and consisting of Destan Berisha, Shaqir Kabashi, Hajredin Vuciterni, who landed in the area of Mirdita and, after a bloody clash with communist forces, in which Alush Leshanaku's group also participated, who fought heroically, traveled to the north to enter Kosovo. The group entered Kosovo, but encountered great difficulties and, threatened with annihilation, traveled to Greece.<sup>104</sup>

On October 3, 1951, Vatican Radio began broadcasting in Albanian <sup>105</sup>. The shows were hosted by ballist Zef Shestani. They carried out propaganda against the communist regime and in favor of the Kosovo issue. Zef Pali, a member of the Central Committee of BK, also worked there for a long time; Dr. Andrea Shuli, sister Lucie Laca etc.

The CIA / OPC decided to speed up the time of operations in 1951. In March 1951, changes were made to the saboteur training team in Germany and large sums of money were given for the operation through the SAC, but their distribution caused controversy and resentment."<sup>106</sup>.

In 1951 Ahmet Zogu visited America. On August 8, he was received at the State Department by James K. Bombright, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs <sup>107</sup>. Zogu also discussed with Gracian Jatsevic and other officials in Washington the causes of the missions sent by Germany and how a more effective approach could be created. They admitted that Hamit Matjani was the person of the moment ... to operate inside Albania<sup>108</sup>. During the winter of 1951-1952 G. Jatsevic went to Egypt, where he talked again with Zog and Hysen Selmani about sending armed groups to Albania, as there was already information from the saboteurs that the moment had matured for an important effort in the years 1952-53. Selim Daci, a member of S. Kryeziu's "Katundare Party", in his trial in October 1951 claimed

<sup>98</sup> History of Albania ..., 1984, vol. IV, f. 166

<sup>99</sup> E. Hoxha, Always vigilant, p. 424.

<sup>100</sup> History of Albania ..., 1984, vol. IV, f. 167-168

<sup>101</sup> E. Hoxha, Always vigilant, p. 424.

<sup>102</sup> AMPB, practice on the activity of S. Kryeziu

<sup>103</sup> Flamuri newspaper, September 1951

<sup>104</sup> Idriz Lamaj, Xhafer Deva, ... New York, 2002, p. 81--94

<sup>105</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 25 July 1976, p.3

<sup>106</sup> N. Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p. 237

<sup>107</sup> USNA DS 767.11 / 8/851

<sup>108</sup> N. Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p. 256

that Seit Kyeziu had told them that, upon coming to Albania, the people would welcome us well and we would unite and we organized the beys, the aghallars, those affected by the reforms, and all the dissatisfied, and with them we would form ready detachments to prepare the ground for the American-British intervention by Yugoslavia and Greece.

To recover the damage suffered in the years 1951-1952 continued the casting of diversionist groups. In 1952, A. Zogu made available his most trusted people Zenel Shehu and Halil Branica, who on May 1, 1952 entered Albania. They were captured immediately and, after learning their mission, the game "Lake Vajkal" was organized by the State Security. Enver Hoxha and communist intelligence officials boasted that the Games with foreign spies were successes in the selfless work of many brave legendary State Security employees and in the strong support of the Party-led mass of the people<sup>109</sup>, denying that the key to success was the information provided by Kim Philby. Emigrants who landed in Albania found the catastrophic situation inside the country. H. Matjani wrote on March 6, 1952 that "the economic situation in the country is very bad. So is the military situation. The recruited army has no motivation. They have no choice but to serve and they just wait for the day when something will "There are officers who also have doubts about the regime"<sup>110</sup>.

The CIA gave priority to bases in Greece at the time. In 1952, after Zogu returned from a visit to the US, Zenel Shehu was put in charge of a group prepared in Athens to organize an armed uprising, but he was captured alive. According to him, he had learned from Hysen Selmani that Zogu had met in the US with General MacArthur, Senator Taft, etc.; that Zogu made available to this operation also his loyal former guards officers, who had guards in exile like Halil Branica, etc. Jatsevich, wrote N. Bethel, explained to King Zog that these officers (H. Matjani, etc.) required visible evidence of royal commitment and approval. They also sought evidence of American support. After that they would act against the communist government. King Zog told Jatsevic that there was only one group with the right authority and courage. These were the people who had stayed with him during the time of exile and who now lived with him in Egypt, that is, his royal guard. Thus 8 people were selected and during 1952 they were prepared in the Frankfurt area and on the island of Kalamiri in Greece for a much more important and much more secret mission than anything else that had been done before<sup>111</sup>. This proved that the operation against the communist regime was quite extensive. At the time of his arrest, the document was found on Zenel Shehu<sup>112</sup>, which described the three phases of his group's activity in organizing this uprising. The first phase was the creation of favorable terrain for work and the popularization of A. Zogu. At the end of this phase, the CIA headquarters in Athens would be notified with the slogan "Good Conditions". The second phase was the expansion of the bases and the recruitment of elements dissatisfied with the government from all the provinces of the country as well as the increase of the ranks of foreign emigration. The third phase would begin with the armed uprising, causing turmoil from the gangs, which would justify the intervention of the American and British armies in August 1952 or in the spring of 1953. Provocations of neighboring governments on the borders of Albania, blackmail and pressure will encouraged and favored the activation of internal forces and Albanian emigration<sup>113</sup> as well as the explosion at the site of the uprising.

This plan was favored by the fact that at that time, according to State Security data, the fugitives numbered 8825 people. They were scattered: 4948 people in Greece, 2515 in Yugoslavia, 350 in Italy, 300 in the FRY, 512 in the USA, etc.

<sup>109</sup> E. Hoxha, *Always vigilant*, p. 393

<sup>110</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal ...*, p. 260 ;.

<sup>111</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal ...*, p. 257

<sup>112</sup> Newspaper *Shqipëria e Re*, April 1954 (Mr. Shehu's trial).

<sup>113</sup> AMPB, files of the years 1951-1953



In May 1952, the group of Zenel Shehu, Hamit Matjani, Halil Branica, Ahmet Kabashi, Mesi Plaku, Zenun Gjolenja, Pal Dushi, Haxhi Gjyle, etc. was sent from Greece<sup>114</sup>. To disguise himself, Zogu instructed Mr. Shehu, H. Branica and H. Gjyle to travel from Egypt to France, to the FRG, Greece and Albania, and so it was. They left on March 6, 1952 to supposedly see Zog's sisters in Paris, where they met US Colonel Hysen Selmani<sup>115</sup>.

On March 14, they traveled from Paris by car to Germany disguised as American officers. From Munich they arrived in Piraeus by plane, where H. Matjani, Xheladin Tresova and Tahir Preçi had also arrived. From Piraeus they were sent to Kostur, then on foot to Albania. Ahmet Kabashi's group (Mr. Shehu's radio operator) was tasked with informing the CIA headquarters in Athens of the weapons these migrants needed, how many people had been trained, and the landing of war materials.

At this time the group of Et'hem Xheraj was also sent. These groups aimed to get in touch with internal groups, to inform about the situation in Albania in the military, economic field, etc., to connect with Bilal Kola's forces, etc., inside the country, to connect with the kulaks.

Preparations were also stepped up to drop saboteurs from bases in Frankfurt, the island of Kalamisia in the Hadjinikolis area of Greece and elsewhere to carry out top-secret missions. Although there were fewer fugitives during 1952 than in 1951, Americans were pleased to have regular contact with anti-communist groups within the country. The American revelation was highly encouraged, as it showed that the bases of the opposition had been established and that they had been properly equipped<sup>116</sup>. However in 1952 again anti-communist activities were defeated, causing quarrels between the CIA and the SIS.

The year 1953, was the last year and of the complete failure of operations. The US government was adamant in continuing the operations. In the spring of 1953, a group of saboteurs led by Hamit Matjani was sent to Albania<sup>117</sup>, which reached the mountains of Dibra. His group consisting of Gani Malushi and Nuri Plaka were thrown on May 1, 1953 to act alongside that of Mr. Shehu (who had been captured). His group was captured while N. Elder was killed in the attempt. In 1953 several other diversionist groups were sent. But all these attempts failed. In the summer of 1953 in Gramsh, a group of 5 emigrants tried, where its chairman Tefik Kokla was killed, while his deputy Muço Çeprati<sup>118</sup>, was seriously injured and captured.

At the end of the unsuccessful anti-communist operations of 1949-1953, J. Deva, seeing that there was a significant change in international policy, especially in US policy towards the Balkans, decided to focus his efforts on establishing a secret center. information in Kosovo, which would be related to the Americans. In mid-1953 he began efforts to establish it in Istanbul.<sup>119</sup>

Against the general background of the difficulties and failures of the anti-communist groups, the American authorities highlighted the excellent successes of Hamit Matjani, who was described as a guerrilla fighter, who was able to freely enter Albania and return to Greece, very smart for you avoid traps set up. He successfully crossed the Albanian border 12 times, always traveling on foot with two or three companions<sup>120</sup>. Foreign authors have singled out the beliefs of Albanian anti-communist fugitives, they "were all enthusiastic volunteers, people who from the beginning begged to be honored by the fighters rather than left to rot in

<sup>114</sup> AMPB, year 1954, file 342, the investigative process of Mr. Shehu

<sup>115</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re (Mr. Shehu's trial, April 1954)

<sup>116</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 263

<sup>117</sup> AMPB, year 1954, file 347; the investigative process of H. Matjani;

<sup>118</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, April 1954, p. 4

<sup>119</sup> Idriz Lamaj, Xhafer Deva, ..., New York, 2002, p.95.

<sup>120</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 256

the refugee camps. They knew what dangers lay ahead"<sup>121</sup>. The saboteurs knew they were in danger, but they fought to the death for the interest of their homeland, whom they were convinced they were serving with unparalleled devotion, fighting the communist regime. When the first saboteurs were thrown they realized the danger of the game being played with them. In the years 1948 - 1953 they understood better when they were thrown into the desert, that "they could find that their bosses had lied to them."<sup>122</sup> Of these Cold War commandos, some were killed, some captured, and only a few dozen survived<sup>123</sup>.

The result of the first two landings from Malta was unsuccessful. "Four of the 20 men who stepped on the ground lost and the others failed to inspire any anti-government movement ... the planners in the American and British intelligence, however, thought that these results, though disillusioning, would not be devastating." The operation was still in its early stages ... the loss of 20 percent of agents was, by wartime standard, common"<sup>124</sup>.

According to Albanian security documents, in some cases they were also lied to. E. Çako's group had been told that the area of Kurvelesh where they landed was liberated by nationalist forces, even Zeqani, Kruja had fallen and Tirana was threatening to fall<sup>125</sup>.

On April 12, 1954, Zogu and his family heard on the radio the accusation against Mr. Shehu, H. Matjani, etc. Leka Zogu, then 16 years old, swore bloody revenge against Enver Hoxha<sup>126</sup>.

Albanian emigration was encouraged in the 1953 action even by Stalin's death. Encouraging information came from inside Albania at that time. Matjani informed that there was a nucleus of army and police officers ready to act against the communist regime<sup>127</sup>. H. Matjani gave the Americans a list of sympathetic peasants and potential allies, some of them officers in the Albanian army<sup>128</sup>.

Meanwhile, H. Dosti, chairman of KSHL, addressed a letter to Foreign Minister Dalles on the work done by this committee. The US Secretary of State responded with an appreciative and supportive message<sup>129</sup>.

The Greeks were also on the move to take advantage of this situation. Bishop Marko Lipa and the leaders of the American Literary Society were received by Vice President Nixon, where they talked to him about the problem of liberating Albania from the red yoke.<sup>130</sup>

The American press also encouraged operations in Albania. The American journalist Alexander T. Jordan, wrote in an American magazine<sup>131</sup>: "The landing of American landers in Vlora would elevate American prestige and provide America with a much larger number of friends than they could have secured the \$ 30 million it has spent to date on foreign countries... In the problem of Albania Tito could provide the necessary assistance because he was an old enemy of Hoxha. On the other hand, it would be the first time that a country ruled by the Soviets is liberated from the Western powers ... The liberation of Albania would put us ahead of the BS. However, it is very likely that Moscow will not embark on an atomic adventure, especially in a transitional period like the one it is going through now"<sup>132</sup>.

<sup>121</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 274

<sup>122</sup> A. Gerin, *Cold War Commandos* ..., p. 53

<sup>123</sup> A. Gerin, *Cold War Commandos* ..., p. 53

<sup>124</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 126

<sup>125</sup> AMPB, year 1954, file 364 on the Process of E. Çakos, p. 72, 51, 65

<sup>126</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.269

<sup>127</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.265

<sup>128</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.256

<sup>129</sup> *Gazeta Albanie Libre*, 25 October 1953

<sup>130</sup> *Gazeta Albanie Libre*, 25 October 1953

<sup>131</sup> *The Fracman*, June 26, 1953

<sup>132</sup> *Gazeta Shqipëria e Lirë*, August 1, 1953

Other American newspapers wrote that Albania would be the first target of the US anti-communist offensive in Europe. With the encouragement of Albanian emigration, articles were published underlining the demand that for this purpose Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey should at the same time publish a solemn declaration guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Albania. Such a statement would encourage resistance within Albania against the regime in power and would have a positive impact on the landing war.<sup>133</sup> The American press also commented on the operation in Albania as support for the American position in the Balkans. It was stressed that a non-communist Albania in the Balkans, under Anglo-American prefecture, would allow Western powers to take up residence in the Balkans, secure Greece's future, assist Tito, and, in the long run, establish US bases in Albania<sup>134</sup>.

The dynamics of actions against the communist regime according to the data of the Ministry of Interior increased. In 1950 this activity increased 2 times in relation to the average of the years 1945-1949, in 1951 it reached its peak and increased 9.5 times, then it decreased 6.8 times in 1952, 2.5 times in 1953 and 0.5 times in 1962. Of the fugitives coming from abroad in 1949 were 32 saboteurs operating since 1944; 16 from 1945, 10 from 1947, 18 from 1948. Most of them were political fugitives, while a minority were ordinary fugitives. In 1950, 67 people were sent from abroad (among them 10 ballistas and 18 blockers from Italy; 21 people (ballistas and northern Epirotes) from Greece, etc.<sup>135</sup>. From the data processed by the documents of the Ministry of Interior, from 1945 to 1985, about 2769 political emigrants were prepared to operate in Albania. According to these sources it turned out that with American support 1200 people had been prepared, while the Yugoslavs in 1952 alone prepared 75 groups of 288 people out of 926 refugees who were then in Yugoslavia<sup>136</sup>. From 1949 to 1963 1558 saboteurs were sent from Yugoslavia<sup>137</sup>.

The tasks of the diversionist groups in the 1950s were mainly to organize armed movements, sabotage, to gather information on the situation in Albania, to make propaganda, to spread leaflets and word of mouth, to create a turbulent situation together with the internal anti-communist groups, etc. E. Çako's group, according to the data of the communist investigation, which should be taken with reservations, had the following tasks: to prepare in the districts of Gjirokastra, Vlora, etc., a base for throwing saboteurs, to collect military information on forces, objectives, depots, equipment military and especially of the coastal forces, for the supplies of the RPSH from abroad; the moral-political situation, on the attitude of the people towards the government, if there were armed groups in the mountains and who led them, etc.<sup>138</sup>.

In addition to acts of sabotage of the economy, armed diversionary actions against the strategic points of the regime, political emigration also used the tactic of direct pressure on the communist cadres, sending threatening letters to some, and suddenly sending saboteurs to others. Home, Party committees sent provocative complaints about each other communists. There were also special cases when any of them was killed.

Many foreign authors, especially English, American, Italian, Yugoslav, etc., have written with sympathy about the activity of the Albanian political diaspora against the communist regime in the years 1948-1953. In particular, in the western and eastern literature, it has been proven that the operations of 1945-1953 to overthrow the communist government in Albania were deconspired by the Soviet intelligence, which was informed by his agent Kim Flibi, who held important positions in the British intelligence. SIS (MI-5 sector) and the

<sup>133</sup> *Gazeta Albanie Libre*, 1 March 1953

<sup>134</sup> E. Hoxha, *The Anglo-American Danger for Albania ...*, p. 413

<sup>135</sup> AMPB, 1950, file 44.

<sup>136</sup> AMPB, year 1963, file 874, the practice of reactionary emigration and UDB

<sup>137</sup> AMPB, year 1963, file 874, the practice of reactionary emigration and UDB

<sup>138</sup> AMPB, year 1954, file 354. p. 75

"Office of Strategic Operations" (OSO) and the "Office of Political Coordination (OPC)", which were coordinating bodies between the CIA and SIS, where Philby worked mainly for Albania, following the operations in Greece, Italy and elsewhere.

There have also been authors who have opposed this version. Mike Burge, a former CIA officer who has led operations against Italy's Hoxha regime, wrote<sup>139</sup>.

Philby's betrayal caused disappointment to a part of the Albanian emigration. Thus Halil Nerguti claimed that "he made us lose faith in our allies ... we have few friends and the great powers do not bother much about us ... We were a small part of the big game, chess pieces that can to sacrifice"<sup>140</sup>. But there were also some who, despite the defeat, declared that their sacrifice was worth it and that they felt proud to have fought for their homeland. Adem Gjura claimed that "despite the horror we saw, the sacrifice was worth making for the king of the homeland. I am sorry that I failed in my mission. And for this reason my life is no longer worth it"<sup>141</sup>.

## 2.5. Forms and methods of warfare of armed groups against the communist regime

The armed groups of political emigration that came to Albania initially made serious preparations for the provision of information and knowledge of the situation in the country, then, carried out concrete actions. When they were unsure these groups returned without carrying out their mission. The armed groups were sent by air in the 1950s, not wanting to implicate neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia, for many reasons, primarily because nationalist immigrants did not want to identify their cause with that of the Greeks and Yugoslavs<sup>142</sup>.

Emigrantët që futeshin në Shqipëri ishin shumë të kujdeshëm që tu jepnin sa më pak që të ishte e mundur informacion inteligjencë të fqinjve kur ata shkonin në duart e tyre. Kështu grupet e dërguara në 1949 ishin të qarta se duhej t'i tregojnë grekëve sa më pak informacion të mundur<sup>143</sup>. Grekët sigurisht kishin përpjekur t'i shfrytëzonin, por ishin përballur me opozitë të vendosur. Prandaj, siç thotë D. Smajli, në shumë raste duhej t'i shpëtonin grekëve nga burgjet dhe t'i kishin shumë vështirësi sepse grekët ishin të përdhumbur ndaj shqiptarëve<sup>144</sup>.

The main methods of activity against the communist regime were as follows.

A key activity was gathering information. One of the leaders of the Albanian political emigration, Gjon Marka Gjoni instructed a group from Italy that "your mission is only informative and only informative, the news given so far does not satisfy the great friends, therefore please give military news, otherwise our help from here, against our will, may become an obstacle"<sup>145</sup>.

The groups sent to Albania made extensive anti-communist propaganda, distributing unmasking materials about the regime. Balli Kombëtar collected material from the groups sent to Albania that proved before the UINSCOB investigative commission that the communist government was helping the Greek partisans with supply bases, etc. A lot of data was collected about this and many immigrants appeared before the UN Commission of Inquiry as witnesses to accuse the communist government. Among them were A. Ermenji, M.

<sup>139</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.233

<sup>140</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.236

<sup>141</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.208

<sup>142</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.215-216

<sup>143</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 190

<sup>144</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.188

<sup>145</sup> AMPB, year 1950, dossier 46

Bajraktari, Hysni Dema, Alush Leshanaku, Preng Previzi etc. This activity was organized by M. Frashëri, H. Dosti, V. Andoni etc., together with the American Anderson and the Greek Kostandin Himarios etc. Such missions were carried out by the group of E. Çakos who managed to discover data on the supply bases for the Greek partisans in Southern Albania<sup>146</sup>.

Providing links between the groups, with other anti-communist groups inside the country and with centers outside Albania was one of their important activities. The emigrants Ndue Pjetër Gjonmarkaj, Gjon Gjinaj, the priest Zef Coku (Oroshi), Ndue Mëlyshi etc. participated in the meeting of the "Committee of the Northern Mountains" on February 14, 1951 in Ugrej of Lezha<sup>147</sup>.

According to State Security documents, importance was given to hostile actions among Chams, minorities and Vlachs<sup>148</sup>.

The release of Albania's military secret was also given importance. The newspaper *Albanie Libre* on April 1, 1951, provided data on the Albanian military, data on defense, economy, etc.

The use of forged documents in the years 1954-1960 and later was a convenient method for immigrants<sup>149</sup>.

The saboteurs tried to encourage escapes, especially in the years 1948-1957, and less frequently until the 1990s.

## **2.6. The reaction of the communist government**

According to the data of the communist bodies, only in the years 1949 - 1954, the border forces of the Republic of Albania withstood 2334 provocations, killed 110 saboteurs of the offenders and captured 964 others<sup>150</sup>.

In the fight against the anti-communist landing groups, the regime used the specialized forces of the SEMP, the People's Defense, the State Security organs, including the political and military intelligence, etc.

The regime exposed in the most brutal and barbaric way immigrants captured alive or killed in front of popular crowds to cause terror and panic to the highest degree. This played a major role in suppressing any attempt at resistance against the regime. Open trials of the people were organized, widely written in the press, spoken on the radio. Intensive propaganda was carried out with other means such as meetings, conferences, etc. Publications were made in Albanian and in foreign languages. Thus, in May 1950, the trial against the group of Et'hem Çako took place, in October 1950, the trial of 14 political emigrants took place in Tirana; on 22 - 25 February 1953 in Tirana was tried against Ndue Bib Brozi, Sejdin Bajrami, Qazim Xhake, Ahmet Bablusha, Ndue Gjon Vuksani, Dehar Oshafi, Kristo Marko, Muharrem Sulejmani, in three groups operating under the leadership of the SCT of Rome; On December 29, 1953, a press release was published in Tirana announcing the capture of Zenel Shehu<sup>151</sup>, Halil Branica, Hamit Matjani, Ahmet Kabashi, Gani Malushi, Naun Sula, Nuri Plaka, Zenun Gjolena and Haxhi Gjyla, who were sent to organize an armed uprising. Their trial took place in 1954.

The communist regime also countered in the realm of propaganda, stepping up its efforts to extend its propaganda to the West. Interestingly, the communist government reacted

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<sup>146</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.48-49

<sup>147</sup> AMPB, year 1952, file 82

<sup>148</sup> AMPB, year 1952, file 83

<sup>149</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.102

<sup>150</sup> Magazine "In the service of the people", no.6. viti 1986, f. 28

<sup>151</sup> Gazeta Bashkimi, April 6, 1954

and reacted in an even more specific and energetic manner to the Yugoslav government, while at the same time carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Soviet government. The Albanian government, at the behest of Moscow, worked hard to distribute leaflets in Yugoslavia published by "revolutionary" (meaning Stalinist) Yugoslav emigrants to the USSR and Eastern European communist countries. For the introduction of this literature in Yugoslavia, the Albanian government, in addition to its people, also used groups of Yugoslav political emigrants.<sup>152</sup> The newspaper "Për liri" published by the Yugoslav emigration in Albania and the newspapers "për a socialist Yugoslavia" and "under the banner of internationalism" which came from Romania, which was the center of distribution of this press, entered through the territory of Albania. Many other pamphlets were also brought into Yugoslavia through Albania. V. G. Grigoryan informed Molotov that the distribution of such materials in Yugoslavia was taking place with great difficulty as a result of the repressive measures of the Yugoslav secret service. However, the Soviet government was informed that during the first half of 1951, about 120,000 copies of newspapers, brochures and tracts had entered Yugoslavia from Albania, and on July 15 of this year, 12,000 copies of political emigration newspapers remained unallocated in Albania. Yugoslav. To understand the role of Albania, it should be noted that the total number of copies of the Yugoslav-Stalinist emigration press in this period was 800-900 thousand copies.<sup>153</sup>

## **2.7. Anti-communist propaganda of political emigration**

The anti-communist propaganda of Albanian political emigration against the regime has always been intense. Albanian emigration declared that the essence of all propaganda for all "should be anti-communism, because of it we are on the streets of the world"<sup>154</sup>.

In 1951 the US passed the \$ 100 million law on psychological warfare against the socialist camp, funds that were added each year more and more later for the same purposes. The propaganda was first made, through radio, television and the western press, which denounced the communist regime and echoed the actions of the Albanian anti-communist emigration inside and outside Albania. Several radio stations were used, such as the one on the Kurie ship, the "Socialist Albania" radio in Greece, an illegal radio station in Yugoslavia, and radio stations in Vienna, Cyprus, Munich, the Vatican, London, Moscow, etc., which processed the press radio news. Albanian. These propaganda agencies and media outlets published publications such as "Talks with Stalin" and "Albania" by Milan Gjlasi (leader of the Yugoslav state KLP, former close associate of Tito) who, among other things, revealed secrets of the KP of Stalin and Stalin. against Albania and unmasked Yugoslav politics. The Albanian political diaspora made his theses entirely his own.

Propaganda materials were distributed legally inside and outside Albania; official and private statements of foreign anti-communist leaders, various manifestations such as demonstrations, meetings and conferences, international meetings, family and religious ceremonies, visits to Albanian and foreign diaspora camps and centers, etc.

One of the forms of war has been the denunciation of the communist regime in international organizations. There were a host of such denunciations. Thus, on October 16, 1952, the chairman of the SACC, Hasan Dosti, denounced to the UN Special Committee the

<sup>152</sup> Islam Lauka & Eshref Ymeri, *Albania in the documents of the Russian archives* (Summary of documents) Toena, Tirana, 2006, pp.338-240.

<sup>153</sup> Islam Lauka & Eshref Ymeri, *Albania in the documents of the Russian archives* (Summary of documents) Toena, Tirana, 2006, pp.338-240.

<sup>154</sup> Newspaper *Consciousness*, April 1, 1979, p. 21

compulsory work and the establishment of concentration camps by the communist regime in Albania, presenting many documents for this purpose.<sup>155</sup>

Sensational trials were organized against the spies sent abroad by the security organs of the Albanian state. Numerous publications were spread against the regime such as Yugoslav, Greek, English "white books" etc.

In general, the quality of the content of the Albanian emigration propaganda, in print, radio, oral, publications, etc., was satisfactory given the conditions of their isolation from the homeland. The stigmatization of the regime was done in realistic tones, even when sarcasm was made with it. In 1946 the organ of Balli Kombëtar wrote that "if they are released, not only the people but also the chickens will leave Albania, because the people know that their interests are closely related to those of the west"<sup>156</sup>. Its effectiveness has been quite high, despite the regime's efforts to neutralize and isolate the country from it. This propaganda has also affected Kosovo and Chameria.

For its spread, political emigration used several methods: 1. through its anti-communist press. Newspapers, magazines, bulletins, leaflets, tracts, publications, etc. were published, which began to appear immediately in 1945 and came to increase. Most groups even some individuals pulled out their organs.

Another very common form was the distribution of propaganda material, leaflets, used as the main method in the years 1949 - 1953, which then came to shrink. In the 1950s, anti-communist tracts were thrown in the name of the KSHL, calling for the overthrow of the communist regime. In the 1950s many tracts were thrown through balloons<sup>157</sup> or by American aircraft<sup>158</sup>.

The anti-communist campaign experienced a new impetus in 1949 when the "Free Albania Committee" was established in Paris. In a press conference with the participation of the foreign press, the proclamation of this Committee was distributed to the Albanian people, calling for resistance against the communist government, chanting the slogan for the liberation of Albania. KSHL also created a section for propaganda through the press radios of the USA, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, England, Germany, etc., which intensified the campaign against the communist government.

Albanian political immigration, especially in the first years after liberation and later keep the relationships with relatives. This anti-communist activity was developed more with political emigrants from Kosovo with which political emigration created extensive links. They left the Yugoslav persecution and when they came to Albania they faced a more savage regime, so they returned to dissatisfied and anticommunist elements. But in many cases they were punished and prosecuted by the regime and they were provided for no reason.

## **2.8. First changes in economic immigration attitudes towards the communist government**

When the KSHL was formed, from the very beginning, there were serious frictions with the Vatra Federation, which appeared in the first issue of the KSHL newspaper, "Albania". In its criticism of Vatra, the KSHL used the terms liberal, communist, or pro-communist. KSHL aimed to become the main spokesperson of Albanian emigration, including the "Hearth" and the Orthodox Church in America led by F. Noli. The realization of this objective was of great interest to KEL and the State Department. The scholar Idriz Lamaj considers the efforts of KSHL in this direction, as failed, because, according to him, Vatra before and during the

<sup>155</sup> Hasan Dosti- A life for the Albanian cause, BOTART, Tirana, 2008. F. 202-203

<sup>156</sup> Flamuri newspaper, May 1946, p. 92

<sup>157</sup> N. Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p. 196

<sup>158</sup> N. Bethel, The Great Betrayal ..., p. 201

activity of KSHL, continued the liberal anti-American political line and supported the communist regime in Albania. Thus, at the end of 1949, shortly after the creation of the KSHL, "Dielli" criticized the State Department for setting up a government in exile under the leadership of King Zog and for conspiring with Greece to annex southern Albania.

In the years 1950-1951 "Dielli" and "Vatra" debated openly and intensively with KSHL, but the enmity of Dielli seems to be spreading throughout the West as with "Voice of America", with the radio "Free Europe", with State Department, with various senators and member of parliament supporting the fight against communism. But exactly during this period, from time to time, "Dielli" publishes soft criticism against the Tirana regime. Precisely for these very prudent criticisms, the editor of "Diellit" Qerim Panariti is declared a traitor by the Tirana regime.<sup>159</sup>

In the years 1952-1953, the campaign of KSHL against "Diellit" intensified. The conferences of Prof. Stavro Skëndit through the American colonies, which are directed against "Diellit", Panariti and Noli. Criticism against them is also made by many US senators and analysts. Prof. Stavro Skëndi called it foolish "to throw this power (Albanians of America) on the side of the Tirana government, because it was harmful" and "because in this way, it was compromised before the American authorities"<sup>160</sup>. The aforementioned leaders of "Vatra" feel pressured and "Dielli" closes the year 1953 with an editorial against Communism, which said: "Human life, no matter how big or small, is not safe at all under the system. communist".<sup>161</sup>

Thus, in the political attitudes of the Albanian economic emigration organizations in America, as a result of the frontal battle that was taking place against the communist regime, gradual changes took place. In the years 1949 -1953 between K. Çekrezi, Qerim Panariti etc. They managed to orient the newspaper "Dielli" in a more realistic and critical position towards the communist regime. But on the other hand, controversy continued between "Diellit" and Vatra with anti-communist political emigration organizations. From this time Fan Noli of the Liria society began to weaken their positions in the Albanian emigration to the USA. Fan Noli engaged in a hard debate with the ballists. He noted with concern that during these years many ballistas had come to America who were conducting a strong activity in some cities and especially in New York and Detroit against the communist regime. Noli, disoriented, wrote that their goal is to overthrow the "democratic government" of Albania and take power back into their own hands. He called on the Albanians of America to distance themselves from the "ballista adventurers" and to oppose their movement, which according to him was aimed at the partition of Albania. He called on the Albanians of America to support the "democratic" government of Albania, which he described as the "safest guarantee" of national independence, territorial integrity and popular freedom. He demanded that all Albanians in America be united in this "patriotic" stance in today's crisis.

At this time, Bishop Marko Lipa came to the USA from Istanbul, who, taking advantage of F Noli's wrong and anti-American stance, tried to engage the American authorities against him, the Albanian Autocephalous Church and the Albanian colony. During this period Zogu increased the efforts and organization of the colony in Egypt and sent 170 political emigrants to Australia, who created the ballistic group "Lidhja Shqiptare".<sup>162</sup> This group begun to expand the links with the albanian patriotic colonies in this country.

In 1950, the Zogist society "Boyhood" was established in Canada."<sup>163</sup> In Argentina, the leaders of the Skanderbeg Society and the editor of its newspaper "November 29" were

<sup>159</sup> Idriz Lamaj, National Committee of Free Albania, New York, 2000, p.81

<sup>160</sup> Beqir Meta, Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace, Tirana, 2012, p.308.

<sup>161</sup> Idriz Lamaj, National Committee of Free Albania, New York, 2000, p.82.S

<sup>162</sup> AMPB, 1953, file 389.

<sup>163</sup> AMPB, 1953, file 389.



arrested because they were carrying out communist propaganda and, since 1946, had been in direct contact with the communist regime. They gave a lot of money to heal the wounds of the war in Albania. But in addition, Skanderbeg and Shpresa society openly supported the communist regime. Since 1946, political emigrants had gone there, who, in cooperation with economic emigrants but anti-communists such as Ferit Cenko, etc., opposed the pro-communist activity of the above-mentioned societies and managed to win over their members. As early as 1945 this society protested against the Greek chauvinist claims and actions of the northern Epirus priest Fotos Pandos in Argentina, who followed the advice of P. Kotokos to protect Greek interests<sup>164</sup>.

In the years 1948-1950, political emigrants took over the leadership of the Skanderbeg society, but the pro-communist elements sued them, which they won. In the 1950s, Zogu sent Hyzeir Toptan to Argentina<sup>165</sup>, who acted to extend his influence in the ranks of the colony together with Filip Llupi, Theofan Caesar, etc.

Anti-communist nationalist Isuf Luzaj tried to create a cultural society in Argentina. The RPSH delegation to the International Telecommunication Conference in Argentina in 1952 established ties with this colony, subsequently trying to crack down on political emigration in its ranks.

In 1952, controversies continued between Diellit, led by Qerim Panariti and KSHL. In one of these replies, Hasan Dosti wrote: Qerim Panariti calls us "traitors". Why? Because that is what the government of Tirana calls us. Qerim Panariti is forgetting that the government of Tirana has called him a traitor like us? When this accusation was made against you, Qerim Panariti did not open his mouth at all. He did not dare to say a word. Why? "He was afraid to say that otherwise the Koromane would be cut off" and when it was seen that the Tirana war had ceased, he came out of the "mouse poop" again and began the usual refrain, cursing and accusing each other.<sup>166</sup>

In 1953 political emigrants influenced the French authorities to ban pro-communist-leaning societies in Paris and Saint-Etienne. The "Patriotic Committee" headed by Nuçi Kota acted extensively in the economic diaspora in France, propagating against the communist regime through the newspaper "Shqiponja" by Vasil Germenji etc. In this committee, many economic migrants with democratic and nationalist convictions. Through him N. Kota tried to connect the Albanian economic diaspora with the Albanian and Eastern European anti-communist political emigration as well as with the magazine "Voice of Europe".

In this clash between pro-communist and anti-communist elements outside Albania, in the 1950s, apparently, incidents occurred. The newspaper "Liria" published the news of the murder of the secretary of the society Free Albania of Perth (Australia) by some Albanians under the influence of Balli and Legality<sup>167</sup>. This murder was related to his close cooperation with the government of Tirana and the fierce conflict he had with the anti-communist emigration in this country.

## **2.9. The attitude of political emigration towards neighboring countries and the Balkan Pact**

In the battles with the communist regime, anti-communist emigration tried to secure the support of neighboring countries, but without giving up Albanian national rights. But even

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<sup>164</sup>S. Bleta, History of the Argentine colony, 1971, p. 32 - 33

<sup>165</sup>Newspaper Shqipëria e Re (letter to patriots), May 1952, p. April 4, 1953

<sup>166</sup>Hasan Dosti- A life for the Albanian cause, BOTART, Tirana, 2008. F. 304-305

<sup>167</sup> Gazeta Liria, 17 korrik 1953

the governments of these countries tried to use Albanian political emigration for their nationalist interests.

After the creation of the KSHL, in 1949, the Greek government, in appearance, declared that it welcomed its creation, but in fact, it was dissatisfied because Greek influence in it was non-existent<sup>168</sup>. Even American sources prove that, exactly at the moment of the creation of the KSHL, the Greek government encouraged the creation of an "Albanian party" in Athens. It was called "Agrotiko Alvaniko Komma" ("Albanian Agrarian Party"). CIA officials thought that, behind this initiative, hid Thales Ritorides, who had previously met some Albanians and some "northern Epirotes" as well as the former bishop of Korça, Evlogos Kurilas, whom he had encouraged to form a party. Albanian agrarian. Ritorides claimed to be the nephew of Fan Noli. This party had nothing to do with the Agrarian Balli Kombëtar party and nothing in common with it. Its creation was an initial attempt by the Greeks to participate in the KSHL. But, apparently, this plan did not succeed and the name of this party was not heard in the future<sup>169</sup>.

At first, the Greek government tried, through the Americans, to obtain information on the involvement of Albanian political figures in the anti-communist movement and the formation of the KSHL. The State Department opposed the request by Greek diplomat Guras. Afterwards, Guras expressed his skepticism about the values of Albanian anti-communist emigration, telling the Americans that "he did not believe in the ability of any of the Albanians to organize an opposition against the current regime" and that he did not believe that they had a sufficient sense of patriotism, enough to risk establishing a new regime"<sup>170</sup>.

Further KSHL would become even more undesirable for Athens. It would be increasingly evidenced as an instrument to oppose Greek nationalist policy. It is not without reason that the KSHL served to distinguish between the policy of the communist government and the real aspirations of the Albanians, their will for freedom, independence and territorial integrity. He helped to blame the riots from Tirana to Moscow.<sup>171</sup> For these reasons Athens would openly demonstrate its negative attitude.

The Greeks also tried to keep the Independent National Bloc out of the KSHL, as they knew that Italian influence was stronger in this organization.<sup>172</sup>

However, with the intervention of the Americans, the Greek government agreed to give permission to the KSHL for the establishment of a camp of Albanian political refugees in Northern Greece. Representatives of various political emigration groups would be stationed in Athens and would liaise with the camp, which would serve as a base for reconnaissance and diversion missions in Albania. The Greek government approved the establishment of this camp on November 4, 1950<sup>173</sup>.

Vasil Andoni had praised this agreement because the Greeks agreed to engage in overthrowing the communist regime. But there was also a compromise from the KSHL which was committed not to attack Greece with its propaganda and to popularize it in the ranks of emigration<sup>174</sup>.

Tepër miqësore dukeshim marrëdhëniet e emigracionit politik me Italinë. Tipik dhe sintezë e These attitudes was an article by Hasan Dosti entitled: "Albania and its neighbors", published in the newspaper "Flamuri", March-April 1950 no. 3-4. Among other things, he

<sup>168</sup> Beqir Meta, *Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949*, Tiranë, 2012, p.324.

<sup>169</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p. 299.

<sup>170</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol.V, Albania, Memorandum of talks between the Chief of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, at the State Department, Jernegan with the Greek Consul in Washington, Guras; Washington, 16 August 1949.

<sup>171</sup> Beqir Meta, *Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949*, Tiranë, 2012, p.325

<sup>172</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p.309.

<sup>173</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p.301.

<sup>174</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p.301.

wrote that the Albanians nurtured a deep sympathy for the Italian people, for its liberal and democratic institutions, that Albania and Italy were two countries associated with great permanent vital interests. Dosti wrote: "this is a reality, we can say a determinism. So the two peoples, free each in its own country, are destined to be and remain in friendly relations, in terms and in the mutual good understanding of rights and interests. Albanian-Italian friendship is not something that responds only to the permanent interests of the two countries. "It's also something else: the condition and necessity of maintaining peace and balance in the Adriatic-Ionian and the co-operation of the peoples of the Balkans"<sup>175</sup>.

As for relations with Greece, he wrote that the political concepts formed in a period, inspired by certain circumstances, are slowly reconsidered over time. Democratic Albanians had faith in the Greek people, in the great virtues, in the living intelligence, and especially in its freedom-loving spirit. He expressed the hope that politicians and circles with a chauvinist tendency in Greece, would be put on the path of understanding with the Albanians, would join the will of the two brotherly peoples for peace, friendship and close cooperation. They, wrote Dosti, "will appreciate that the claims on Korça and Gjirokastra are absolutely, not only unfair from a legal, ethnic, historical and geographical point of view, but also against the political interest of Greece itself and all countries of the Western democratic world"<sup>176</sup>.

Analyzing the relations with Yugoslavia, Dosti wrote that the problems that existed between the two countries, regarding the Albanian "minority" in Yugoslavia, hoped that they would be resolved peacefully, through international channels, according to the principle of self-determination of peoples, based on the Atlantic Charter. He stressed that the democratic Albanians did not have prejudices against anyone and hoped a lot in the future development of things, that the democracy that would penetrate into the ranks of the two peoples, would ensure cooperation between the two countries and that in the not too distant future, "Peace and harmony will be established between Albania and its neighbors, land and sea, and that the Adriatic-Ionian Sea will no longer be a sea of military expeditions, a theater of fighting, but will serve as a route for trade," economic and cultural"<sup>177</sup>.

It should be noted that the anti-communist activity of political emigration took place against the background of old and new Greek-Albanian hostilities. The Greek government took the opportunity to explicitly present the communist repression as an oppression of the national rights of the Greek minority. To prove this, the organizations of Greek Orthodox Albanians from Southern Albania were set in motion. The National and Charitable Society of the Himariots in America, "Ta Akrokeravnia" sent a report to the US Secretary of State, in which, in a completely tendentious manner, it was stated that in the concentration camps in Tirana and Kruja, since 1944, there were closed 18,000 northern Epirotes "who had been tortured and starved to death. "The only crime of these people," the report said, was that they were born Greek, and wanted to remain Greek."<sup>178</sup>

BK maintained a clear and decisive stance towards the Balkan Pact. The BK newspaper noted that on February 28, 1953, the second Pact for friendship and cooperation between several Balkan countries was stimulated in Ankara. She underlined that Bulgaria, Albania and Romania were missing in this Pact. "It would be a big mistake," Flamur wrote, "to think that the Balkans do not love and do not appreciate the union between them. It is just that, then and today, circumstances and constraints that transcend the will of the peoples have not allowed these dance nations to bond and work together."<sup>179</sup>

<sup>175</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p.

<sup>176</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p. 222.

<sup>177</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2008, p.223-224.

<sup>178</sup> *The Greek Minority in Albania- A documentary Record (1921-1993)* Thessaloniki 1994, p. 117.

<sup>179</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 39, vol. IV, March 31, 1953, article "Balkan Pact".

The analysis began with the first Balkan Pact of 1934, which he described as "a seed in the trunk of peace, which was asikoe, the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact." She wrote that the peace-loving world, then terrified by the turmoil of the First World War, tried to secure the brotherhood of peoples with these ties and to avoid war. But "unfortunately, the storm of World War II broke this thread of Balkan peace, just as it overturned the trunk of world peace represented by the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact."<sup>180</sup>

As for the new Balkan Pact of 1953, it was said that it was created "in the footsteps of the principles of NATO and the Atlantic Pact". The circumstances were said to be different, but the thought and purpose was one: The brotherhood of peoples, the preservation of their rights and peace. The newspaper wrote that, just like 19 years ago, even today, "the Balkans come to the fore with a concrete realization, to reverse protect the rights and freedom of each other. In this way, they add to the unity of the peoples of the Balkans, but on the other hand, they indirectly help the unification of all the peace-loving peoples of Europe"<sup>181</sup>.

It was emphasized that the Second Pact, in content, was broader than the first, as it pursued a more complete unification of the Balkans, in the military, economic and cultural fields; stressed the decision of the Pact allies to resolve amicably and peacefully any dispute that might arise between them; the allies vowed not to interfere in each other's internal affairs; neither to participate in alliances and initiatives that opposed the interests of any of them, nor to accept agreements contrary to the Pact. The paper claimed that the Balkan allies "do not want to give the Pact a limited meaning in defending their special interests, so they say that it is inspired by the principles of the Atlantic Alliance and its doors remain open for the entry of any other state, when the co-operation of this other state to be deemed useful by the first signatories"<sup>182</sup>.

Analyzing the value of this Pact, the newspaper emphasized that: first of all, it would help to eliminate forever, the internal quarrels for occupation and rule to the detriment of each other, which had brought destruction, repression and misery of all kinds; the idea of Balkan unification, which had found a realistic expression in the Ankara Pact, was said to be an idea of strength that should and would advance, because it corresponded to a great ideal of a precise and living need. "Today three were connected and tomorrow four and then six states can be made together," Flamuri wrote. The ideal is high for every Balkan man who wants peace and brotherhood of the peoples abroad, it is up to him to act for its realization as soon as possible and as fully as possible, with all the peaceful means at his disposal"<sup>183</sup>.

To help with this lofty goal, Flamur emphasized, it was up to the presidents of the three Ankara Pact states to show, in word and deed, peace-loving friends of unity and brotherhood. They had to prove, in any case and in any way, that "they had completely given up the unbridled nationalist greed that had ugly Balkan relations in the past. They had to affirm and proclaim the basic principle that demanded that the freedom and territorial integrity of others be respected, just as they wanted their freedom and land to be respected. " And, "for a good start and for a good omen, this test should be given, first of all, to the Albanian people, who are waiting with longing and impatience, because ay, the oldest and the youngest Balkan brother, has been and is trembling for unity, peace and brotherhood. That test would be for him hope and encouragement, and it would be, at the same time, a heavy slap in the face for Bolshevism, which claims that only he tries to ensure the freedom and rights of the Albanian people."<sup>184</sup>.

<sup>180</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 39, vol. IV, March 31, 1953, article "Balkan Pact".

<sup>181</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 39, vol. IV, March 31, 1953, article "Balkan Pact".

<sup>182</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 39, vol. IV, March 31, 1953, article "Balkan Pact".

<sup>183</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 39, vol. IV, March 31, 1953, article "Balkan Pact".

<sup>184</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 39, vol. IV, March 31, 1953, article "Balkan Pact".

This was an assessment that reflected, in general terms, the National Front's assessment of the new Balkan Pact. In this position, the spirit of sincere cooperation with neighbors and the aspiration to build a close and fraternal cooperation with them, based on the establishment of democratic regimes in the Balkans, which were conceived as the basis and pillar of this union, stands out. In this case, although exiled, BK expressed the realistic and true national aspirations and interests of the Albanian people, whom he wanted, rightly, to rank alongside the politico-military organizations supported and inspired by the policy and strategic objectives of the West. In this context, this political line, which was diametrically opposed to that of the communist regime of E. Hoxha, listed the Albanian people as allies of the West and gave the Great Western Powers a sign and a hope that in the future this people of the small and ancient Balkans would be a valuable ally of theirs and a security element for peace and democracy in our historically troubled region.

Albanian political emigration developed controversies against the Greek claims with the Greek press. A controversy arose between the most important political emigration newspaper "Flamuri" and the Greek newspaper "Le Messenger D'Athens" in 1951. "Flamuri" widely opposed the legal, strategic and economic "arguments" with which it had operated until this time Greek diplomacy and the press, to justify "Greece's rights in southern Albania"<sup>185</sup>.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Greek territorial claims and the dubious attitude of the Yugoslavs, prevented the anti-communist political emigration from achieving success in the fight against the regime, because the fear of the neighbors paralyzed the will for bold ventures. This fear was not alleviated even by the Western Allies, who did not take positive initiatives, in due time, to curb the greed and annexation plans of Albania's two land neighbors.<sup>186</sup>

## **2.10. The anti-communist operation of the Albanian emigration and the impact on the relations with the western countries**

The operation of 1949-1953 had its impact on further straining relations between the Albanian communist government and the Western Powers of neighboring countries..

In the years 1948 - 1954 at the climate of the cold war the list of subversive organizations and subversive elements of the albanian colonies were completed by the western police bodies. There was pressured to cut the ties of the communist regime. Especially in the period of macartism in the '50s superior measures against them were extremely until the paralysis or completely prohibition of shoquntar's activity of shop. Leaders of political immigration, anti-communist intellectuals tried to develop anti-communist propaganda in the diaspora.

Particularly debates and tensions were exacerbated with the Italian government because the main leaders of political emigration were in this period in Italy. At the end of October 1949, a heated meeting took place between the Italian Minister in Tirana and Vasil Andoni at the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>187</sup>. The Italian Minister asked to clarify the accusations made by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the ALP, Mehmet Shehu at a party meeting on the dropping of Italian paratroopers in Albania, in cooperation between the Italian government, Tito and Calolaris and the accusations of assistance that the Italian government had given to the Committee "Free Albania".

<sup>185</sup> Beqir Meta, *Albania and Greece, 1949-1990-Difficult Peace*, Tirana, 2012, p.314.

<sup>186</sup> Beqir Meta, *Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949*, Tiranë, 2012, p.325.

<sup>187</sup> AMPJ, year 1949, file 225, Memorandum on the conversation with the Italian Minister in Tirana, October 28, 1949

He added that the KSHL had been telegraphed to him by the Italian government which strongly opposed these statements which it considered strange, untrue and demanded where they had come from. The Italian Minister said that, rather than protesting, he wanted to point out once again, as he had previously stated to the Albanian authorities, that "the Italian government is for the independence of Albania and for its territorial integrity."<sup>188</sup>

Vasil Andoni told him that he kept a note of the Italian minister's statement but stressed that M. Shehu's statements were true. He demanded that these observations of the Italian government be presented by means of a note. The Italian minister, dissatisfied, said he was surprised, and regretted this reaction, as these statements of his government were true. He reiterated that the Italian government supported the independence and territorial integrity of Albania. V Andoni insisted that the statements of the Albanian side, "apparently were strange, but this is the reality." The meeting closed with the statement of the Italian Minister that this statement of the Albanian government would be communicated to the Italian government.<sup>189</sup>

After the creation of the KSHL and the start of operations to overthrow the communist regime of Albania, the commitment of the Italian Communist Party against the policy of the Italian government and in support of the Albanian government became even more open and determined. In March 1950, the communist senator Teracini delivered a very harsh and critical speech to the Italian government, which he denounced as destroying the friendship and understanding with neighboring Albania, because he was supporting the Albanian anti-communist emigration.<sup>190</sup> Referring to the answer given by the Italian Foreign Minister in August 1949 to a question posed by Terracini that "the Italian Government respects the independence of Albania", the communist senator added that, first, it was necessary to determine what the Italian government meant by the word independence because even in the time of fascism it was said that Albania was independent. He accused the Italian government of giving a wide range of hospitality, not to the poor Albanians, but to the Albanians, who were organized in numerous parties and, two months ago, had gathered at a congress in Rome, to create an organism which, after being transferred to France, and then to America, took the name "Free Government of Albania". Teracini called this a monkey imitation of those Governments exiled since the War who made such a valuable contribution to the war against fascism. "He therefore stressed that, with this stance, the Italian government was proving that it" did not take the national independence of a people seriously as needed. "He referred to a neo-fascist newspaper, the *Rivolta Ideale*, which boasted of the cooperation of many who had previously been officials of the MFA during the fascist dictatorship and who now had the opportunity to speak and write quietly. The aforementioned newspaper had written about the establishment of this Committee (KSHL) against the Bol dictatorship shevike in Albania.

Teracini then referred to the statements of the Albanian Deputy Prime Minister about the intervention of the Italian government, for which he said that "it would not even be worth refuting from Palaco Chigi" because he could not change the conviction already rooted in the spirit of the neighboring government and if I am not wrong, mike"<sup>191</sup>. Teracini quoted a part of the speech of the Albanian Deputy Prime Minister where it was said that "Rankovi,, who was part of the Albanian fascist groups of 1939 and 1943, is cooperating today with the agents of the Italian SIMI (Teracini added on his part" of that SIMI who you recently resurrected after acquitting its leaders, although they were responsible, according to the

<sup>188</sup> AMPJ, year 1949, file 225, Memorandum on the conversation with the Italian Minister in Tirana, October 28, 1949

<sup>189</sup> AMPJ, year 1949, file 225, Memorandum on the conversation with the Italian Minister in Tirana, October 28, 1949

<sup>190</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 213, Teracin's speech in the Senate, March 9, 1950

<sup>191</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 213, Teracin's speech in the Senate, March 9, 1950

Perugia Court for the murder of the Roselli brothers ") as Nikoll Melyshi and Gjon Markaj who, after conducting an espionage course in Italy, were thrown with parachutes from the Italians over the Mirdita Mountains, where he carried out the assassination of the local secretary of government and today are free in the South...".

He further cited as an example of the Italian government's intervention the fact that it knew for sure that at last October's KLSH meeting, which took place in Rome, he had been appointed chairman of the committee that would act as a government fleeing Albania. "A certain Mitat Frashëri, well known from fascism, listed in the lists of war criminals. But he died suddenly. The Minister of Foreign Affairs charged his highest official - the Secretary General, Zoppi, while on his part the Prime Minister charged one of the senior officials of the Ministry of Interior, the General Director of Police, D'Antoni, to go and present his official condolences. of the Italian government to the group of Albanian fascists based in Rome. And this, even though they knew that the deceased was a sworn enemy of the government in power in Albania and just at the time when the official representation of Albania had arrived in Italy."<sup>192</sup>

Teracini added another accusation, emphasizing that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy were still working with salaries Albanian "fascists" who had been part of the Albanian fascist government like Rrok Stani, who during the war had been Minister of the Albanian fascist government in Belgrade, Ludovik Jakova, a well-known collaborator of the Germans, who were now entrusted with any kind of mission in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Adding his arguments and accusations for the intervention of the Italian government in Albania, he stressed that still in Palazzo Chigi, perhaps formally in liquidation, but never unliquidated, there was an "Ent" for Albanian reclamations "which, 5 years after the end of the war, it stood firm, giving the impression to the neighboring people that in Italy they had not given up the idea of entering its new land as a master and exploiting it. Also, he added, and the Ministry of Education continued to keep at its disposal "a certain prof. Koliqi who had been the Minister of Education of the fascist government of Albania during the war".

Të gjitha këto tha senatori komunist, provonin se, në pikëpamje të korrektesës, qeveria the Italians were continuing to pursue a hostile policy against Albania.

He also referred to the newspaper "Il Tempo" dated 17 February 1950, which he described as a semi-official body, not to say official, of the Italian government. And exactly, an article entitled "Bevin-Gallarati-Scotti Cooperation, Italian-British action to regain Albania" in which it was written that this cooperation "could represent one of those areas where the future Italian-British understanding and increasingly could well find a community of interests "because Albania for England is the path of oil, while for Italy, interests are traditional there and there is no need to try". Teracini said this proved that in Italy there was a political concept that needed to be changed. Referring once again to the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of August 1949 that "The Italian government considers the independence of Albania compatible with the interests of the Albanian people, as well as those of the Italian people", Teracini stated: "So avoid destroying this community of interests. "If you do not hurry to correct this attitude of yours, you will knowingly add a stone to the undesirable and terrible building of the new world war." His speech was applauded by left-wing representatives in the Italian Senate<sup>193</sup>.

Meanwhile, a direct and indirect duel took place between the anti-communist political emigration press and the Italian right-wing press on the one hand and the Italian top press on the other.

The Albanian political emigration press, citing the limited Soviet aid given to Albania, wrote that the BS was abandoning Albania and not providing adequate assistance. On the

<sup>192</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 213, Teracin's speech in the Senate, March 9, 1950

<sup>193</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 213, Teracin's speech in the Senate, March 9, 1950

other hand, he propagated the statements of the American Ambassador in Rome that the Albanian political emigration should be helped.<sup>194</sup>

Ndërsa shtypi i majtë, dhe kryesisht UNITA, shkruajti gjerësisht për procesin gjyqësor against three saboteurs captured in Albania. Albanian diplomats in Rome claimed that "our conversation with the leaders of the local left press here and the visit of the UNITA correspondent in Tirana has increased the publication in the left press here"<sup>195</sup>.

In June 1950, the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party decided, within a month, to raise in Parliament the issue of preparing and sending Ethem Çako's group to Albania from Italian soil. As Albanian diplomats were informed, it was planned to request the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry commission on this issue.<sup>196</sup>

The Albanian government sent another note of protest to the Italian Legation after the trial of E. Chako. Rome replied that it did not consider the grade admissible, as the allegations contained in it were untrue.<sup>197</sup>

In December 1950 the PKI pressure increased. Senators Teracini and Palermo requested an interpellation from Prime Minister De Gaspari and Foreign Minister Sforza in which they stated: "The Albanian government sent us the bodies of Italian partisans. This showed the friendship that exists between the Italian people and the Albanian people and his government. In the face of these gestures of friendship, the Italian government must sever ties with the Albanian fascists who have taken refuge in Italy under the auspices of the government and are working against the independence of Albania. On the other hand, we want to know what answer needs to be given to the grades of the Albanian government for the activity of these fascist groups, with which the important bodies of the Italian state have cooperated."<sup>198</sup>

Awaiting the interpellation, Senator Teracini asked the Albanian delegation to provide information material on this issue. Albanian diplomats in Rome worked to prepare the necessary materials and asked the MFA in Tirana for instructions on how to make this information that should be given to PKI representatives as complete as possible.<sup>199</sup>

Taking advantage of the expansion of ties with the PKI, the communist government tried to extend its influence to the Arbëresh of Italy or, as the Albanian diplomats in Rome called them, the Italian-Albanians. The communist government was pleased because they "stood well" and that 95% of their votes had been given to the Italian KP. The Albanian mission in Rome intended to make propaganda among the Arbëresh to "stick them as much as possible behind the Italian KP"<sup>200</sup>.

As for the Albanian emigrants in Italy, the Albanian legation proposed to deepen the political differentiation between them. She proposed repatriations and pardons for some fleeing Albanians and, on the other hand, for the "Albanian war criminals", ie the main political opponents of the regime, to be stripped of their citizenship.<sup>201</sup>

On October 17, another act of aggravation took place in relations between the two countries. The Albanian government accused the Italian that 3 planes coming from Italy had described the entire airspace of Albania on October 16, 1950, the date of E. Hoxha's birth, and

<sup>194</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 205, Report of the Albanian-Roman Legation on the Italian press for Albania, 17 May 1950

<sup>195</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 205, Report of the Albanian-Roman Legation on the Italian press for Albania, June 16, 1950

<sup>196</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 254, Telegram of Zenel Hamiti from Rome sent to the MFA, June 21, 1950

<sup>197</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 203, Report on our relations with Italy during 1950

<sup>198</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 207/1, Telegram of Skënder (Konica) from Rome sent to the MFA, December 27, 1950

<sup>199</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 207/1, Telegram of Skënderi (Konica) from Rome sent to the MFA, December 27, 1950

<sup>200</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 10, Some issues submitted by the Albanian legation in Rome to the MFA (undated)

<sup>201</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 10, Some issues submitted by the Albanian legation in Rome to the MFA (undated)



had thrown propaganda material of the "Free Albania" Committee against the communist regime. Nota severely accused the Italian government of pursuing Mussolini's fascist intentions and denouncing him, in collaboration with its British and American masters, for harboring Albanian war criminals on its territory, and thus violating its obligations. Peace Treaty<sup>202</sup>. In the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania there are also protests for other violations of the airspace by the planes coming from Italy.

By early 1951, there were other exchanges of mutual accusations and relations were strained. The senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lofaro, called Skënder Konica, to whom he stated that the grades of the Albanian government, which until now the Italian government had denied, would not even accept them, due to their diplomatic incorrectness. He was nervous with the latest note from the Albanian government accusing Italy of preparing for a conflict in the Balkans. S. Konica replied that this attitude of Italy was evident in the process of Et'hem Çako and Alush Leshanaku<sup>203</sup>. Lofaro further stated that the Italian government considered the issue of Italian prisoners in Albania as an essential point for improving relations with Albania.<sup>204</sup>

The next day S. Konica gave an even more concrete picture of the meeting with Lofaro. He wrote "he welcomed us coldly. Said that the notes of your government have propaganda purposes and aggravate relations with Italy. You present our government as fascist, threatening Albania, targeting the Balkans. If you intend to continue like this, why not denounce the relationship and leave from here"<sup>205</sup>.

In this meeting, the senior Italian official stated that he had strongly insisted on establishing relations with Albania, hoping that after diplomatic relations, trade relations would be established and good relations would be established. He underlined that "of all the other states in the socialist camp, only you are so intransigent in not wanting to establish good relations"<sup>206</sup>.

During 1951, the Italian MFA sent two protest notes to the Albanian MFA for the machine gunning of two Italian ships by the Albanian coastal forces. There were also many notes and reports of violations of water and territorial space by Italian boats and planes.

In December 1951 the communist senators repeated the interventions against the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its attitudes towards Albania. On December 12, Teracini and Palermo asked the Foreign Ministry to comment if it had expressed its gratitude to the Albanian government for sending the remains of Italian partisans to Italy. They condemned the Italian government for not responding to this friendly gesture; that he was continuing to hold Albanian fascist groups and "cooperated compromisingly with them, in their nefarious actions against the independence of their country".<sup>207</sup> Teracini submitted documents to prove that the Christian Democrat government, by its provocative actions, had deliberately caused the straining of relations between the two countries.

Deputy Foreign Minister Taviani justified his government and blamed the Albanian communist government for the state of relations. He also underlined that the remains of the Italian partisans had been followed by anti-Italian manifestations, which was nervously opposed by Senator Palermo. Taviani further said that there were still many bones of other Italians in Albania, for whom the Albanian government was not interested at all, but had been

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<sup>202</sup> AMPJ, year 1950, file 204, Verbal note of the Albanian government sent to the Italian government

<sup>203</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 212, Telegram of Skënder from Rome, February 20, 1951

<sup>204</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 212, Telegram of Skënder from Rome, February 20, 1951

<sup>205</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 212, Report of S. Konica for the meeting with Lofaron on dt. 21.02.1951

<sup>206</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 212, Report of S. Konica for the meeting with Lofaron on dt. 21.02.1951

<sup>207</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 226, Telegram of the Albanian legation in Rome addressed to the MFA, December 14, 1951

placed in joint pits in Tirana and Vlora and the Albanian authorities did not allow the Italian legate to take care of maintenance.

Regarding allegations of supporting Albanian political emigration, Taviani responded in two words that the Albanian government's allegations were based on the depositions of defendants that were invalid and that political immigrants in Italy enjoyed asylum under international law. Taviani ended his discussion, underlining that the Italian government respected Albania's independence.

Senator Teracini expressed dissatisfaction with this response, and quoted some phrases from "Esteri" magazine to prove the "aggressive" intention of the Italian government towards Albania. In the article of the MFA - Esther magazine mentioned by Teracini, it was said that Italy had special interests in Albania related to its security and its assets. He also referred to an article in the Balli Kombëtar newspaper "Flamuri", underlining that the article of the magazine was so clear that even among the Albanian political emigrants it produced dissatisfaction, so much so that both fascist and Albanian newspapers were forced to indignantly. Teracini told Taviani that the Albanians' accusations had no propaganda purposes. He asked him if he had ever heard Albania accuse France of these things and he answered: "No"! He explained this difference with the fact that the government of Tirana "maintained the justice of diplomatic relations and, above all, because France had no direct aggressive intentions and claims like all bourgeois and fascist Italian governments." "The protests - said Teracini - are directed against those who have provoked and are provoking: USA, England, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy"<sup>208</sup>. Taviani did not respond to this new accusation.

Tension was also noticed in the Italian press. The official Italian press agency, authorized by competent sources, denied the involvement of the Italian Ministry of Interior in the case of Alush Leshanaku's gang. While the central newspapers of Rome published news that the Soviets were settling in Sazan, and considered this a threat to Italy. Agency C.I.P. stressed that the Russians were turning Albania into a colony. They were not interested in anything there but only Sazan and the kerosene springs. From the Italian press articles, there were remarks with the Yugoslav press on the issue of Albania, as well as mutual accusations that the opposing side was trying to enter Albania.<sup>209</sup>

As the Albanian representation in Rome informed, since mid-March, after the bomb incident in the Soviet legation in Tirana, a wide campaign had started in the entire press of the Italian "capitalist parties", but also in France, England, USA, presented the situation of Albania very badly, giving information that an uprising had broken out there and that the Albanian government had its short days. Especially was written about the terror in Albania, especially about the terrorist acts committed by Mehmet Shehu.

A major campaign had also begun against the secession of the Albanian Catholic Church from the Vatican.

A special importance in the Italian press was paid to the contradictions of the neighboring countries regarding Albania. These contradictions were said to have manifested themselves in the last 3-4 months after the Yugoslavs organized, through Dusan Mugosha, Albanian emigrants to Yugoslavia, into an organization that, with the help of the Yugoslav government, would overthrow the Albanian government. Thus, "Difesa Adriatica" wrote that Tito had emerged as Italy's rival for the issue of Albania. There were other articles that were encountered before about the Greek intentions on North Epirus, about the Italian assets in Albania, etc.<sup>210</sup>.

<sup>208</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 226, Telegram of the Albanian legation in Rome addressed to the MFA, December 14, 1951

<sup>209</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 216, The report of the Albanian legation on the Italian press for Albania during 1951.

<sup>210</sup> AMPJ, year 1951, file 216, The report of the Albanian legation on the Italian press for Albania during 1951.

In January 1952, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Tirana, Umberto Lanzeta, again expressed to Albanian diplomats the wonder why the Albanian side continued to accuse the Italian government of allegedly threatening Albania's independence, when it was well known that the Italian government had respected its sovereignty. the independence of Albania. He stated that "this condition is also mentioned in a Peace Treaty clause. Please tell me in which case the Italian government has not respected the sovereignty and independence of Albania"<sup>211</sup>.

Senior Albanian official Zeqi Agolli responded that the facts were well expressed in the notes sent by the Albanian government, emphasizing the accusation that the Italian government was holding "Albanian war criminals" and was organizing them in Italy, when they had to were handed over to Albania. Lanzeta objected, claiming that there was a law in Italy and that they were treated as political refugees. But the official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Naço intervened, emphasizing that the decision to hand over the "war criminals" was made at the Conferences of Yalta, Moscow, Potsdam, etc. and the law did not work. Lanzeta justified that Italy was not participating in those conferences.

This response irritated the Albanian representatives. Naço intervened harshly, declaring: "Because it was an enemy state. "Should I consider this as official communication that the Italian government does not respect the decisions of the Yalta, Moscow, Potsdam Conferences". After that, Lanzeta clarified that his statement should not be understood in that way, as Albania had not declared war on Italy. But Naço went on to claim that the war of the Albanian people against Italy was recognized by the whole world. The Italian representative insisted that, from the legal point of view, the declaration of war was important, which the Albanian representative again opposed. Finally Lanzeta proposed another meeting a week later<sup>212</sup>.

In March 1952, the situation became even more incandescent, as on March 11 Xhelal Staravecka, who had been accused of killing and massacring Italians in Albania, being the commander of the partisans, would appear in court. It was understood that the accusations would also be made against the National Liberation Movement because the accusations published in the press mentioned a series of actions of the partisans against the Italian forces. In addition to Xhelal and Kadri Hoxha, the main accused of acting against the Italian state were also accused of some of the communist leaders such as M. Shehu and M. Peza. The charge against Starevecka and K. Hoxha was for the murder of 200 carabinieri commanded by Gamusi<sup>213</sup>.

Meanwhile, Albania's communist government continued its crackdown on Italian government policy from within, using senior PKI officials. Thus Behar Shtylla prepared a report for Walter Audisio that would speak in Parliament two days later on Albania's relations with Italy. He informed the MFA that "I talked to him that the main job is to unmask the policy of the Italian governments towards our country. He will come tomorrow and we will give him the material on the Peace Treaty, a brochure on reactionary groups in Italy, published by a reactionary agency and the information that you will give us about the Italian cemetery and the Italian prisoners in Albania"<sup>214</sup>. Informing about the full readiness of PKI to engage in the campaign of the communist government of Albania against the Italian one, Shtylla wrote: "We have the opportunity to raise as many times as we want and when we want issues that interest us, whether in the Chamber of Deputies or in the Senate, through

<sup>211</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Meeting between the Charge d'Affaires of Italy Umberto Lanzeta and Zeqi Agolli, 22 January 1952

<sup>212</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Meeting between the Charge d'Affaires of Italy Umberto Lanzeta and Zeqi Agolli, 22 January 1952

<sup>213</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Skënder's information for the MFA, Rome, March 8, 1952

<sup>214</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Telegram of Behar Pillar for MFA, Rome, 13 July 1952

communist and socialist representatives, etc. miq. For this I propose that you prepare there a plan of these issues as well as the relevant instructions and the date when it should be set up.”<sup>215</sup>

Three days later, B. Shtylla met with Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Taviani, to whom he noted that "the Peace Treaty obliges Italy to reparations, restitution, capture and return of war criminals. You support the war criminals, you give them permission to carry out an activity on Italian soil against the RPSH"<sup>216</sup>. His reports and conclusions on Italian politics were completely negative. One of them said: "The policy of the Italian government towards our country takes place in the framework of the imperialist pact. She is completely hostile. This comes from the application of the Treaty, from the shelter of criminals and from its relations with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey against Albania"<sup>217</sup>.

In September 1952, another heated debate took place between the senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Zeqi Agolli, and the Italian Minister in Albania, Lanzeta, where the Albanian political emigrants were not left unmentioned<sup>218</sup>. After Agolli declared that "we jealously guard the country", Lanzeta told him: "I do not tell you not to be vigilant. I even tell you that you are right that you have savage enemies, such as the Yugoslavs in the north and the Greeks in the south, whom I know well. But I do not understand the speeches of Mr. E. Hoxha when, together with these two countries, he mentions Italy, as if provoking and as an enemy country. This is absurd"<sup>219</sup>. Mr. Agolli replied that the Albanian leaders "know what they are talking about and everything they say and say is documented. How little do you think are the Italian planes that, from time to time, provoke our borders, throw leaflets and saboteurs and enemies of our people. Do they come here for friendship? " Lanzeta: replied that such a thing had never been proven and neither was to be proven. Then he added that, even if there had been such a case, this had happened before he came on a mission to Albania and not now. Agolli insisted that provocations had taken place constantly and that they were always followed and directed by Schelba, former Minister of Interior. He added that the Albanian side had a lot of documents proving the hostile activity of the Italian government against Albania and specifically mentioned the trial against E. Çakos. Agolli stated: "We have communicated more than 100 radiograms with the Italian Minister of Interior P. on behalf of the saboteur Ethem Çako. Is there clearer evidence than this that exposes the hostile activity of the internal organs of the Italian government. Then what is the maintenance and subsidizing of the treacherous organization with Albanian war criminals in Italy, who are incited against our country? Is not it hostile activity? They are fascist elements declared war criminals and as such, under the Potsdam international agreements, must be handed over to us. Not only are they not handed over to us, but you save them, such are Jakomoni, Kol Bib Mirakaj, etc."<sup>220</sup>.

Lanzeta replied that we wished we did not have these immigrants at all. He added that there were about 200,000 such political migrants from all over the country, "who smuggle and engage in politics, but we have nothing to do, so the right to housing forces us to keep them. " He insisted that he wanted to provide the Albanian side with only one thing: the Italian government did not subsidize these emigrants. She would like to send them out of Italy as an example to Canada to escape these troubles. While adding that Jakomoni was regularly convicted by the court and his work was already closed.

<sup>215</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Telegram of Behar Pillar for MFA, Rome, 13 July 1952

<sup>216</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Report of the meeting of B. Shtylla with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Taviani, Rome, 16 July 1952

<sup>217</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Report of B. Pillar on relations with Italy, 14 August 1952

<sup>218</sup> A MFA, year 1952, file 155, Report of the meeting of Zeqi Agolli with Lanzeta, September 2, 1952

<sup>219</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Report of the meeting of Zeqi Agolli with Lanzeta, September 2, 1952

<sup>220</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Report from the meeting of Zeqi Agolli with Lanzeta, September 2, 1952

Agolli reacted with irony and stated that "we would ease the burden of holding Albanian criminals and you do not have to get tired of taking them to Canada. It would be good to bring them to Albania because it is closer and with less expenses. " He then refuted Lanzeta's accusation that Audizio was a criminal after he killed Mussolini without trial and claimed that "seeing how your trials are handling fascist criminals in or near Mussolini's category, my personal opinion is that Audizio has done very well I peeled Mussolini in time because it was no wonder that he, too, escaped from your trials and was now free. Audio with Mussolini's assassination has done a great service to the Italian people"<sup>221</sup>.

It is understood that in this conversation, how tense but also so interesting and open, two completely different concepts of justice were confronted: the communist one and the legal and democratic one. Lanzeta said that this was the view of the Albanian side but the Italian government could not hand over the people who had been in position to a regime that had now fallen. And then, with great caution, he added: "I think that we should add a little sugar to all these issues, soften the relations and that is exactly why, to clarify with our minister, I sent Mr. Azzini in Rome to speed up the exchange of boats. Excuse me, I recommend you to instruct your legate once again to be a little more polite in the issues you deal with the minister"<sup>222</sup>.

In early September 1952 another meeting took place between Pillar B and Secretary Farnesina Zoppi<sup>223</sup>. The senior Italian official expressed the desire to resolve the problems between the two countries and, possibly, to start trade exchanges. He did not touch upon the issue of the Peace Treaty at all.

B. Shtylla expressed the desire of his government to solve the problems and rejected the claim that Italy had supported the independence of Albania. He stated that the implementation of the Peace Treaty was the basis of our relations and asked to authorize the arrival of the delegation. Zoppi claimed that, as a first gesture, they were immediately taking measures to release the Albanian citizens who were in prisons in Italy. The Italian side would do this action without any conditions but demanded that Albania also do this action against some Italians imprisoned in Albania, in a completely independent way later and neither as conditions nor according to the agreement. This would create a good atmosphere for discussions and for the Treaty. But Zoppi opposed the surrender of political immigrants. He was willing to discuss economic problems, although B Pillar thought that the Italians "do not seem to want to give anything, only to admit in principle their guilt."<sup>224</sup>.

B. Shtylla informed that Zoppi had again given assurances that no Italian planes or foreign planes departing from Italian land were coming to Albania, but that they could come from Germany and that Italy's traditional policy has been to support Albania's independence. Zoppi had complained that the Albanian press put Italy in a position with Yugoslavia and Greece in their attitude towards Albania, "while Italy even said that it puts pressure on these countries not to disturb Albania". Pillar B responded that the Albanian side distinguished Italian planes that came and provoked, dropped paratroopers and subversive material<sup>225</sup>. After that, Zoppi, as Shtylla informed, accepted the parachute of the saboteurs in the past, claiming that this was done by the espionage service, but once again insisted that, since then neither Italian nor foreign planes left the Italian land for Albania.

B. Shtylla opposed the proposal for the release of Italians from Albanian prisons, claiming that they had been convicted of war crimes, while in Italy Albanian convicts had been held in prison since the time of the occupation. Then he added: "if you want not to spoil

<sup>221</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Report from the meeting of Zeqi Agolli with Lanzeta, September 2, 1952

<sup>222</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Report of the meeting of Zeqi Agolli with Lanzeta, September 2, 1952

<sup>223</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Behar Telegram for MFA, Rome, September 3, 1952

<sup>224</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Telegram of Behar - MFA, Rome, September 3, 1952

<sup>225</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Telegram of Behar - MFA, Rome, September 3, 1952

the atmosphere, stop the provocations and respect sovereignty, accept the implementation of the Treaty, accepting our delegation here, release the imprisoned Albanians, do not do things like visa ban, do not seize our boats." Zoppi agreed to the exchange as soon as possible<sup>226</sup>.

All the attitudes and conversations of the Albanian side with the Italian side were observed and influenced by the Soviet diplomats in Rome. A few days later, B. Shtylla, during a reception of the Bulgarian Legation, informed the Charge d'Affaires of the BS, Mikhailov, about his conversation with Zopp. Mikhailov asked him about the Albanian political emigrants in Italy and expressed the opinion that Italy could be asked to hand over some of their exponents, in exchange for the release of the Italians who were in prison in Albania. This, he said, could help relax the atmosphere in Albanian-Italian relations<sup>227</sup>.

At the same time, the Albanian communist government was deepening cooperation with the PKI to engage in political attacks against the Italian government. At the end of September 1952, the Albanian Legation in Rome invited to dinner the head of PKI Toliati and the entire leadership of P.K. Italian<sup>228</sup>. Toliati acknowledged that the interpellation that Audisio would request on October 15 was done as suggested by the Albanian representation. He criticized the policy of the Italian government and the application of the Peace Treaty with Albania by it. An important part of the discussions focused on Albanian political emigration and how it should be dealt with in alliance with the PKI.

But the communist regime wanted to go even further. He was trying to establish a friendship association, using PKI which would serve as the masked propaganda agency of the communist regime of Albania in Italy. The Albanian Legation of Rome informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "we talked about the association and the Arbëresh, as we wrote to them in the relations 100 top secret and 106 secret, and for these (Toliati) charged the Audition, which proposed him as a liaison with us." Toliati also acknowledged the PKI's commitment to Albanian and Italian communist propaganda in the Arbëresh areas. Regarding the Arbëresh, he proposed that the Italian KP buy the books of Lenin and Stalin as well as other books on Albania which the PKI distribute to the Arbëresh. The communist government wanted, after strengthening its influence on the Arbëresh, to use them as a force and tool to crack down on Albanian political emigration to Italy.<sup>229</sup>

In the meeting with Toliati, Albanian diplomats also complained that the PKI press did not write enough about Albania. Toliati accepted this remark and proposed to change the correspondents in Albania.

In February 1953 B Shtylla also met one of the top leaders of the PKI, Pajeta, who, after talking to him about the internal situation in Albania and the international one, pointed out the need that the press of the Italian Communist Party and, in general, the progressive Italian press to write more about Albania. Pajeta acknowledged that more needed to be done. The Arbëresh were also discussed at this meeting. Pajeta claimed that a well-organized visit of B Pillar to the Arbëresh would certainly have a positive effect. He proposed that the visit take place in communes that were in the hands of the communists<sup>230</sup>.

During 1952 the Albanian government was convinced that the Italian government would not hand over the leaders of the political emigration it was desperately seeking, but this did not mean that the communist regime would withdraw from the pressure on Rome on the issue, using also PKI, from which he hoped to achieve political benefits. The Albanian Legation claimed that: "We know that the Italian government does not hand over the war criminals to us, but we think that our demands put it in a difficult position and, if we

<sup>226</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Telegram of Behar - MFA, Rome, September 3, 1952

<sup>227</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Behari for MFA, Rome, 12 September 1952

<sup>228</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Notification of the Albanian Roma Legation - MFA, September 30, 1952

<sup>229</sup> AMPJ, year 1952, file 155, Notification of the Albanian Roma Legation - MFA, September 30, 1952

<sup>230</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 217, Report of meetings of the Albanian Roma Legation, February 28, 1953

coordinate our demands with a left-wing press campaign here, the political result will to be good”<sup>231</sup>.

As an alternative action, Legata suggested that the opinion expressed by "a friend" (Soviet diplomat) in Rome "to exchange some Italian prisoners in Albania with some criminal leaders" could be considered. However, even for this version she had strong doubts, if the Italians would accept it, adding the fact that all the immigrants who were in Italy did not depend only on the Italian government.<sup>232</sup>

Earlier, the Albanian government had put pressure on Rome for the release and repatriation of Albanian prisoners in Italy. Legata writes: "We have been following this issue for two years, but when the Italians told us that they were willing to release them, we changed our position. We do not discuss here the reason that pushed you to change our position. " Without worrying about this completely incorrect and unprofessional attitude, now the Legation questioned the benevolent and conciliatory attitude of the Italian government. She wrote: "The very fact that the Italians were willing to hand them over to us, makes you doubt and the explanations you gave us on the radiogram about this point were very valuable to us. But we want to point this out: From experience to date, we should have thought in time that the Italians, if they agreed to hand them over to us, would certainly work to prepare these people as their agents. This we must keep in mind since we raised this issue and we could have adapted from the beginning the last position d.m.th. to demand that they be released and treated in Italy like all other foreigners”<sup>233</sup>. So the strong suspicions that anyone coming from Western countries could have been recruited as an agent, made the Albanian government maintain this not at all serious but also enthusiastic attitude towards these Albanian citizens. Legata now thought that he should raise this issue with the Italians only as proof of their lack of sincerity.

For his part, the anti-communist political emigration, seeing that the regime was being activated through the Albanian-Italians and the PKI, created a similar association with an anti-communist profile. The Albanian Legation announced to Tirana on May 11, 1953 that another "reactionary" association of Italy-Albania friendship had been established in Italy. According to her, the Minister of Justice, Karaani, of Arbëresh origin, was directly interested in her and she was headed by an Arbëresh priest.<sup>234</sup> Legata announced that the Italian KP was interested in fighting this association and thought of organizing a conference in Cosenza where Budiara would speak.

In rivalry with the anti-communist association, in the summer of 1953 the activity of the pro-communist friendship association Albania-Italy was strengthened. Its revival was the result of the interest of the PKI which was trying to exploit it and associations with other socialist countries in favor of its election campaign. The secretary of PKI for Kozenka had presented a study of this problem, which he considered one of the most important problems of his province, because there lived 56000 Arbëresh. The first bulletin of the pro-communist association was published in 1000 copies, the second bulletin was published in 5000 copies and the Legation judged it to be the best.

The largest requests to receive the newsletter were made by the Provinces of Cosenza, Catanzar dhe and Bari. In Bari PKI was trying, through agitation, to attract small and

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<sup>231</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 215, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on relations with Italy during 1952, January 2, 1953

<sup>232</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 215, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on relations with Italy during 1952, January 2, 1953

<sup>233</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 215, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on relations with Italy during 1952, January 2, 1953

<sup>234</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 229, Report of the Albanian Legation, Rome to the MFA on the work of the Italy-Albania association, January 7, 1954

medium-sized traders who had once traded with Albania and who wanted good relations with it. With this propaganda, PKI aimed to hit the policy of the Italian government towards Albania. But later the activity of the association fell and Legata noted that it did not work properly and that it worked with hope. Also not all the leading friends of the association were activated, the only one that was activated was Audisio.

On October 9, the legation communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Audisio had asked the association to set up its center in the south, in Kozence, where the Arbëresh areas were, and to carry out its activity here, because the financial expenses could not be afforded. Otherwise, to maintain it needed 400,000 lire per month, from 200,000 received until then from the Albanian government. The Legation was reluctant to approve this change, as the association would lose its character as an Italy-Albania friendship association and become a local association. The Legation also feared that, when reactionaries saw that the association worked only with Italian-Albanians, they would find pretexts to strike at Albania (meaning the communist government). Also, if the center were transferred, the association and its publications would be out of the control of the association leader, Audisio and contacts with the legation would not be in order. This would be a step backwards. On December 26, the MFA responded that it approved the fund of 400,000 lire per month to give to the association<sup>235</sup>.

The intrasigent and unreasonable attitude of the Albanian Legation, which continued the pressure through the protest notes addressed to the Italian government, caused dissatisfaction and boredom in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During a meeting with B. Shtylla at the end of May 1953, the political deputy director in Farnezina raised the issue of grades on the activity of Albanian political emigration and said that it did not make sense for a legation to deal with sending such grades and returning grades. Italian MFA, as the position of the Italian government on this problem was determined by the constitution, adding that there were concrete problems between the two parties and of mutual interest to solve<sup>236</sup>. B. Shtylla asked him what he meant by the legate's position and whether this was an official warning. The senior Italian official replied that yes and insisted that the Albanian Legation deal with other problems and that this issue be considered closed. B. Shtylla objected and asserted that the grades were correct, both in content and form, while the Italian government grades had been returned because they did not correspond to reality. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that there was no information to prove that political immigrants were war criminals<sup>237</sup>.

Later, Pillar B made a more detailed report about this meeting which is worth reflecting on, as the parties in a more open way, expressed their views on this issue. During the meeting, when the political deputy director of the Italian MFA R. Giustiniani had expressed to B. Shtylla dissatisfied with the return of the response of the Italian MFA from the Albanian legation regarding the grade of the Albanian MFA on the activity carried out in Italy by Albanian political emigrants. Albanians were war criminals and acted with the permission and tolerance of the Italian government, a political-legal debate took place on this issue<sup>238</sup>. B. Shtylla told the senior Italian official that the Italian response did not address the demands of the Albanian note at all, nor the normal policy in diplomatic relations. The pillar noted that the Italian side was confusing the right of shelter of political immigrants with the shelter and activity of "war criminals". He added that the history of diplomacy did not

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<sup>235</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 229, Report of the Albanian Legation, Rome to the MFA on the work of the Italy-Albania association, January 7, 1954

<sup>236</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 216, Telegram of B. Pillar for MFA, Rome, 30 May 1953

<sup>237</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 216, Telegram of B. Pillar for MFA, Rome, 30 May 1953

<sup>238</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 217, Report, meeting of B. Shtyllë with the political deputy director of the Italian MFA, R. Giustiniani



recognize cases in which political refugees were given the right to carry out activities against their country of origin, especially when there were normally diplomatic relations between him and the host country. Giustinian replied that international law moved and changed and all these misunderstandings came because there were different worldviews between the parties. B. Shtylla said that precisely because international law moves and changes, political fugitives and war criminals in international law were two very separate and clear notions. The notion of "war criminals" before the last war did not exist in international law, but has now entered and exists, he stressed. B. Shtylla added that this was not about worldviews and ideologies, but about concrete facts. He insisted that Italy, under the Peace Treaty, was obliged that the "Albanian war criminals" who were in Italy, should be captured and handed over to Albania. Giustiniani then reacted directly by asking the question: "But are these war criminals? Did you announce what they did? Are they really in Italy?" B. Shtylla replied that his predecessors in this position knew very well that they had been war criminals and what crimes they had committed, they also knew their addresses and added that the Albanian side had asked the Italian government to hand them over in 1947. Giustiniani stated that he was not well acquainted with the matter and did not wish to enter into it. Then he said with a laugh, did B. Pillar really think that this activity was dangerous for Albanians? B. Shtylla replied that he did not consider them a danger because his government was not afraid of themselves or those who defended them, but he raised this issue because it proved the hostile attitude of the Italian government towards Albania. Giustiniani then said that, if they entered this street, whenever the Albanian press or radio station wrote under the government control that were under the control of the government, the Italian side would have protested. B. Shtylla denied that the newspapers in Albania belonged to the government, but said that they belonged to social organizations and that the government had only the Official Gazette. Shtylla added that he was not complaining about what the Italian press was writing, "but the Albanian war criminals in Italy were pressing on the Italian radio to arouse hatred against the RPSH of the Albanian people". According to him, these writings were contrary to the precise obligations of Italy to Albania and the existence of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Justinian said that on this issue, each side had its own position and concluded: "Please look at the issues in the general perspective I told you at the beginning and let's not get into these things that we never go out but catch concrete problems. "Make a gesture of goodwill, and it will make things easier." B. Shtylla stated that he was surprised because the Italian government, not only was not implementing the Treaty and was not handing over the "war criminals", but was favoring their hostile actions, thus showing its attitude. He insisted that the implementation of the Peace Treaty was the fundamental problem for the relations between the two countries and it was natural that, without its solution, there was no way to consider other issues.<sup>239</sup>

Two weeks later, the Soviet diplomat in Rome Kostilev asked B. Shtylla about the state of relations with Italy and the developments around Albanian anti-communist emigration. The pillar replied that the situation seemed calmer than before; that the "reactionary" press wrote less and that provocations were rarer from both Italy and Yugoslavia and Greece<sup>240</sup>.

After the Italian pressures, it seems that the Albanian government was somewhat restrained by the previous practice of sending endless grades of protest against the Italian provocations and the attitude of the Roman government towards the Albanian anti-communist political emigration. In October 1953, the MFA announced that it had not protested against the Italian provocations as before. Only in August was the Italian minister summoned to

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<sup>239</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 217, Report, meeting of B. Shtyllë with the political deputy director of the Italian MFA, R. Giustiniani

<sup>240</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 216, Report, B. Shtylla's meeting with Kostilev, June 18, 1953

Tirana, to whom he was handed only a list of provocations, noting that the Italian government had to reconcile the words with the facts.<sup>241</sup>

The creation of the Balkan Pact in 1953 created new concerns in Tirana. The regime was concerned that political emigration to the West and to Yugoslavia could be used under this Pact to change the political regime in Albania.

Initially on May 27, 1953, the Turkish newspaper *Ulus* wrote that Greek Prime Minister Papagos would soon propose that the 3 powers of the Balkan Pact give Albania a guarantee of its borders and then offer the government of Tirana to enter Balkan Defense Committee. In case E. Hoxha refused, a provisional Albanian government would be created in Yugoslavia, with Albanian political emigrants (of course pro-Yugoslav), with which such an agreement would be concluded.<sup>242</sup> *Ulus* newspaper supported this plan while, as reported by the Albanian legation, the Italian press did not comment. But the diplomatic circles of Athens categorically denied this news and reiterated that the position of Greece remained the one that Papagos had proposed to the Parliament on December 17, 1952, when he had presented the program of the Government d.m.th. the demand for the annexation of Northern Epirus, not by war, but in the spirit of the Paris Peace Conference.

According to the Albanian Legation, the Albanian "criminals" had issued a statement expressing dissatisfaction with the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav declaration on Albania, as it expressed only respect for independence and not for the integrity of Albania. The declaration of Albanian political emigration was published in the newspaper *Giornale di Italia* and on Italian radio. Legata also informed that they had sent a telegram to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia inviting them to issue a joint statement guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Albania. Prompted by these developments, *Gazeta Il Tempo*, on July 17, published an article entitled "Integrity of Albania", where he noted that the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav statement did not satisfy either the Albanian emigration or Italy. The article stressed that Yugoslavia had to secure Italy and Albanian anti-communist political emigration and respect Albania's integrity. The article did not write anything about Greek intentions, but criticized the Albanian government for keeping relations with Italy in a frozen state. Legata thought the article was written by the Italian MFA<sup>243</sup>.

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<sup>241</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 217, Overview of the state of Albanian-Italian relations sent to the Albanian Roma Legation by the MFA for the period August-December 1953, October 17, 1953

<sup>242</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 223, Notification of the Albanian Roma Legation to the MFA

<sup>243</sup> AMPJ, year 1953, file 223, Notification of the Albanian Roma Legation to the MFA

## CHAPTER III

### SITUATION AND ACTIVITY OF ALBANIAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION IN 1954-1960

#### 3.1 Crisis in the ranks of political emigration-reorganization of the national committee "Free Albania"

After the failure of diversionary operations against Albania, the emigration leaders maintained their authority. Abaz Kupi, Hasan Dosti, Gaqo Gogo or Muharrem Bajraktari became personalities of the Assembly of Captive Nations of Europe in New York<sup>1</sup>.

During these years, political emigration was concentrated in Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Belgium, France, FRY, etc., but for economic reasons it was emigrating from neighboring countries to the western and even distant ones, USA, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, etc. Organizations, groups, and committees were also reorganized, various meetings and congresses were held, and sharp subversive propaganda was carried out.

In 1954 the division of Albanian emigration increased, forming 4 committees: that of Rome with American support, that of Paris with British support, KEVA created by the Greeks, of the fugitives in Yugoslavia controlled by UDB.

BK, Legality and the "Village Party" were divided into two major groups, while BKI into several factions. This disruption was influenced by the consolidation of the communist regime; disputes between different states interested in Albania, "The same danger, wrote J. Emery, had united the Republicans with the monarchists but their hostility was revived by the common catastrophe"<sup>2</sup>.

Thus in 1954 there was a major rift in the KSHL which continued for a long time. Meanwhile, the Balkan Pact was created, but quarrels between neighboring countries began to escalate. There were also disputes between Western countries.

The competent Albanian bodies thought that the British created the "National Democratic Committee of Free Albania" based in Paris, with A. Ermenji as chairman. This disruption led to the failure of the CIA plan to have the entire Albanian emigration in its hands. Further talks were held on the merger of the Rome and Paris committees between the CIA and the SIS, but no way out was found. Then Colonel O. Hilli communicated to the SSC of Rome, that "we will work on the Albanian issue, but not with the Rome committee".<sup>3</sup>

The third phase of the political emigration war against the communist regime is considered to be that of 1954-1960. After 1953 the gang tactics changed due to the losses they suffered. During this period, diversionary and armed actions were significantly reduced. Individuals and groups were sent to connect with anti-communist elements within the country, through legal channels such as repatriation, visitors, tourists, etc.

At this stage, the repatriation of former saboteurs was used in some cases as a method of expanding influence and presence in Albania. Immigrants were trained in various courses such as technicians, mechanics, agronomists, doctors, engineers, liberal professions, etc. to send them legally and illegally to Albania<sup>4</sup>. They were also trained in several high schools such as the "Free Europe" University of Strasbourg, in the universities of Rome, in Istanbul,

<sup>1</sup>A. Gerin, *Floating War Commandos* ..., p. 54

<sup>2</sup>J. Amery, *Bijtë e Shqipërisë*, 1948, p. 320 - 321

<sup>3</sup>AMPB, 1955, file 468, p. 255

<sup>4</sup>AMPB, year 1955, file 468, p. 254

in Cairo, etc. in schools and courses in the USA, England, FRY, Trieste, Piraeus, Prishtina, Skopje. The Americans had opened a naval school<sup>5</sup> of a religious school<sup>6</sup>, in Bari, a non-commissioned officer school in Rome<sup>7</sup>, an Albanian school in California. Some immigrants enlisted in the U.S. military. They were granted citizenship after 5 years of service.

According to reports from the Albanian Legation in Rome, most members of the Committee had opposed the participation of Ramazan Shpat (who was in Paris) in the reformed committee on the grounds that he was said to be a well-known Yugoslav agent. Now Vasil Germenji had refused his participation, which further weakened Muharrem Bajraktar's independent group.<sup>8</sup> The Legation was informed that the British had recently established an "Anglo-Albanian" friendship association in London with exponents of the "criminals" of intransigent farmers and chaired by "the son of a certain Mrs. Herbert". This association would work to bring intransigent farmers closer to the Prizren Committee and the Yugoslavs.<sup>9</sup>

In the bosom of Legality at this time strong quarrels arose which divided him in two. The quarrel arose between A. Kupi and G. Goga. The first was for the selection of KSHL and for the inclusion in its ranks of the agrarian group DSH as well as against the American representative, while Gaço opposed these attitudes of Abazi, supporting the American missionary with whom he had had close ties. In conclusion the Legality Committee expelled G. Goga from that group. Goga assembled some of his closest people and on April 7, 1954 formed the "Monastic Initiative Group"<sup>10</sup>.

The Agrarian Group DSh continued the propaganda war, had contacts with the American and British embassies in Rome and, after explaining to them that it did not participate in the SACL because it included compromised elements who had collaborated closely with fascism and Nazism, received verbal assurances from them that Americans would be interested in getting things done better from now on. This group tried to rehabilitate H. Dostin but did not achieve the goal and, as a result, the Agrarian Committee expelled Hasan from its chairmanship and appointed Vasil Andoni in his place.<sup>11</sup>

In August 1954, as a result of the split in the ranks of Albanian political emigration, the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" (KKDSHL) was established. This committee claimed to be a continuation of the Committee established in 1949 and led by Mit'hat Frashëri. His tract stated: The "Free Albania" Committee, founded in exile in 1949 by M. Frashëri, after the abandonment of some of its members in November-December 1953, bravely carried the flag of national resistance. KKDSHL continues its efforts to become more representative and more effective in liberating the homeland from communism and gaining the freedoms of the Atlantic Charter". Balli Kombëtar (Agrarian Democratic Party), Democratic group "Besa" participated in KKDSHL; Liberal Group; Independent group and representatives of Albanian colonies. The chairman of KKDSHL was A. Ermenji and it was said that his program was the one announced by M. Frashëri in Paris, London and Washington in August and September 1949<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> AMPB, year 1955, file 443

<sup>6</sup> AMPB, year 1955, file 443

<sup>7</sup> AMPB, year 1955, file 443

<sup>8</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, p. 1, Report of S. Konica sent to B. Shtylla, February 8, 1954

<sup>9</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, p. 1, Report of S. Konica sent to B. Shtylla, February 8, 1954

<sup>10</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, Report of the Albanian Roma legation prepared by E. Çuçi sent to the MFA, June 20, 1954

<sup>11</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, Report of the Albanian Roma legation prepared by E. Çuçi sent to the MFA, June 20, 1954

<sup>12</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, p. 38, Treaty of the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania", Paris, August 12, 1954

The Albanian Legation announced that after the reorganization of the "Free Albania" Committee, the followers of Abaz Ermenji and Vasil Andoni were left out, who remained outside this committee and broke away from the Balli Kombëtar. These, financed by imperialist revelations, began their policy of war against the supporters of H. Dosti and, at the same time, against the Committee "Free Albania". Recently A. Ermenji and V. Andoni created in Paris another committee "Free Albania". This Committee, headed by A. Ermenji, consisted of Balli Agrar of V. Andoni, the Besa of "reactionary" emigrants in Turkey, a part of "reactionary" emigrants in Greece, the Liberals of London and the Albanian emigrants without a party in America. Legata clarified that this committee did not want to be dismissed by its leaders as new, but as an old committee that stays true to the aspirations and directives of Mit'at Frashëri<sup>13</sup>.

The Albanian Legation in France closely followed the developments in the National Committee "Free Albania", when it was reorganized headed by H. Dostin. She pointed out that it was formed by order of the Americans. The following organizations were represented in the Committee: PADSH (Albanian Democratic Agrarian Party) headed by H. Dostin, Legality, with representatives A. Kupi, the Agrarian Katundare Party of S. Kryeziu. Political emigration to Yugoslavia, led by Apostol Tanefi, the Independent Bloc led by I. Verlaci in Italy, and the "National Front" faction of Ali Këlcyra, which split from Balli when it changed its name to the Agrarian Party, were left out.<sup>14</sup>

The Legation was informed that, in order to organize the Albanian emigrants more widely, the Americans had ordered H. Dostin to expand the Committee with the participation of the Independent Bloc and Ali Këlcyra's Ball. H. Dosti, at first, had objected but, when the Americans had coerced him and threatened to cut off the sources of funding, then he accepted. According to the Legation, the war between the two committees was apparently a war between America and England. The English had people on the Friendly Committee, namely A. Kupin but did not have his direction. She specified that the formation of KKDSHL was announced on August 11-12.

The Legation informed that H. Dost's people were more active in America, because those of PADSH were not supported by the USA.

She also announced that this year they could appoint as a father in the Bektashi tekke that was formed in America the "traitor" Dervish Rexhepi and that last year Stavro Skëndi had given a series of speeches against "our popular power"<sup>15</sup>.

The Albanian government received information from its representations that the "Free Albania" Committee after its reorganization was preoccupied with its unfavorable internal situation. The leaders of this committee and the American and British organizers were preoccupied with the recent events that had taken place in its bosom.<sup>16</sup>

Following efforts to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the new Committee, the Agrarians had held their congress in Naples with the help of the English and the Italian authorities. In this congress, the agrarians, being well prepared, had unmasked their chairman Hasan Dosti, because without their approval, he had accepted to be part of the reorganized Committee "Free Albania". They dismissed H. Dosti as their chairman. H. Dosti stated that he did not know the decisions of this congress, neither he nor the "Free Albania" committee.

After that, A. Kupi, chairman of the Legality, and S. Kryeziu, chairman of the Peasant Party, made a memorandum to the Americans and the British not to recognize the Agrarian

<sup>13</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Albanian Legation Italy to the MFA on the situation of "reactionary" Albanian emigration

<sup>14</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, p. 45, Report of the Legation of Albania and France on political emigration

<sup>15</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, p. 45, Report of the Legation of Albania and France on political emigration

<sup>16</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Legation in Rome entitled: The state of Albanian "traitorous" emigration organizations.

Congress in Naples, as it was against the wishes of the "Free Albania" Committee. . They complained that this congress was supported by the American emissary in Italy, who had not consulted with the "Free Albania" Committee to get his opinion. This protest set in motion the Americans who removed the American emissary who approved the opening of the Naples Congress, and declared that the decisions of the Naples Congress would be reviewed<sup>17</sup>.

The Albanian legation in Italy thought that this proved that the contradictions between political emigration were intensifying.

Even for Legality she claimed that there were hasty contradictions. A. Kup's group, under the influence of the English, was against the group of Gaqo Goga, loyal to Zog and the USA. As a result of these contradictions, Gaqo Goga was expelled from Legality, who with his friends, had formed the monarchist initiating group led by himself, Zogu and the Americanst<sup>18</sup>.

Balli - Agrar (Balli Faction - Agrarian Party) led by Vasil Andoni who was elected in the Congress of Naples, after ousting H. Dostin from the presidency, started a wide press campaign, not only to discredit H. Dosti but also his accomplices, attacking, here and there, and the Americans who were accused of allowing H. Dostin to act as he pleased with his people and "against the interests of Albania"<sup>19</sup>.

But on the other hand, the Rome Legation informed that the Albanian "criminals" continued the conferences against the communist regime, at a time when the Italian authorities had banned the manifestations organized by the Italian-Albanian Friendship Association led by the communists.<sup>20</sup>

During 1954 the Albanian political emigration continued divided into these two organizations: 1. The National Committee "Free Albania" headed by Hasan Dostin, based in Italy and New York; 2. National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" with Abaz Ermenji, based in France. According to the information provided by the Albanian Legation in Rome, the Friendly Committee included:

- Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party (Balli Kombëtar faction led by H. Dostin)
- National Legality Movement (A. Kupi faction)
- National Legality Movement (Gaqo Gogo faction)
- Independent National Bloc
- Ali Këlcyra National Ball
- Seit Kryeziu's Village Party
- Independents without party of M. Bajraktar

The National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" headed by A. Ermenji included:

- Albanian Democratic Agrarian Party (Balli Kombëtar) faction of V. Andoni based in Italy
- Covenant based in Turkey
- Liberal Party in London
- Albanians from America 21

<sup>17</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Legation in Rome entitled: The state of Albanian "traitorous" emigration organizations.

<sup>18</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Legation in Rome entitled: The state of Albanian "traitorous" emigration organizations.

<sup>19</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Legation in Rome entitled: The state of Albanian "traitorous" emigration organizations.

<sup>20</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Legation in Rome entitled: The state of Albanian "traitorous" emigration organizations.

<sup>21</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Albanian legation Rome - MFA, Work report for 1954, January 22, 1955

According to the conception of the state of political emigration by the Legation of Rome, which in some respects is correct but also has nuances of tendentious judgments and should be taken with caution, it turned out that the reorganization of the Committee "Free Albania" was imposed more than any another thing, from the threat made to the leaders of the Albanian emigration by the Anglo-American foreign discoveries in November 1953, but especially by the American one, cutting off all your aid and cutting your salaries. Under these conditions, all political emigration groups accepted the expansion of the National Committee "Free Albania", as proposed by the Americans, with the exception of the agrarian part (the faction of V. Andoni, A. Ermenji, etc.). who, despite the ultimatums, refused<sup>22</sup>.

The Legation reported that in December 1953 new Committee elections were held with the participation of all groups, with the exception of V. Andon's faction which emerged during the group unification efforts. This faction included the largest number of members of the Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party (BK). Thus, the "Free Albania" Committee was re-created with 41 members. The 14-member executive was elected, headed by H. Dostin. At the first meeting it was decided to establish 3 subsidiary bodies of the Committee. Military Committee headed by M. Bajraktar Committee for agitation and propaganda headed by G. Gogon Assistance Committee.

According to the Legation, this project of the Committee "Free Albania" "not only remained on paper but exposed the contradictions that existed not only between Albanian immigration groups but also American and British intelligence. The Anglo-American revelations did not want to include all their cadres in the National Committee "Free Albania", but at the same time they did not want these cadres to be burned so he tried to keep them secret to use when they saw fit. the situation, encouraging and using according to their needs these for special bodies from that of the Committee "Free Albania", as later established the National Democratic Committee Free Albania<sup>23</sup>.

The Legation pointed out that the faction of V. Andoni, with the directives of English intelligence, in February 1954 held the congress of the so-called "Party" and expelled H. Dosti and his comrades and elected the new Central Committee headed by V. Andoni. After the organization of this Committee, contradictions were confirmed in the group of the National Movement of Legality and this group was divided into two: on one side A. Kupi, on the other G. Gogo, the man of Zog<sup>24</sup>.

Political emigration in the propaganda for Albanians was using the radios "Voice of America", "Radio London", "Radio Roma", radio "Free Europe", radio "Voice of Free Albania" etc. and the newspapers Albania, Flamuri, Albania Libera, Atdheu, Flamurtari i Lirisë etc.

This was the state of emigration during the first 10 months of 1954, but Legata pointed out that during the months of November-December, the contradictions between the two committees "Free Albania" and their participants were intensifying. The press of the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" accused the other committee that he had deviated and that he had agreed to cooperate with compromised elements such as those of the Independent Bloc, etc.

Numerically, Legata pointed out, the old Committee was larger, but organizationally, the new Committee was more organized and more compact. According to her, this compactness had given this Committee an advantage over the spin, even though it was newly organized.

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<sup>22</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Albanian legation Rome - MFA, Work report for 1954, January 22, 1955

<sup>23</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Albanian legation Rome - MFA, Work report for 1954, January 22, 1955

<sup>24</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Albanian legation Rome - MFA, Work report for 1954, January 22, 1955

Thus the situation between the political groups had not changed. There was only one change: V. Andon's agrarians were waging a great war against H. Dost's group and, to some extent, had managed to paralyze him. This appeared at the International Agrarian Congress held in late 1954 in America, where agrarians were the only representatives of Albanian emigration, while H. Dosti was not accepted to participate there.<sup>25</sup>

After the signing of the Warsaw Pact the communist regime felt safer from the threat of political emigration. According to the Albanian Legation in Paris, "reactionary elements hoped for an attack by American forces against Albania. With the signing of the Warsaw Pact, hopes of a return to triumph were dashed. From the slogan for the "liberation" of Albania with weapons they threw the slogan of the overthrow of our regime with free elections"<sup>26</sup>. According to LL. Peçini, the basis of the "reaction" commented on this Treaty as the end of foreign intervention in Albania and said that "for us there was nothing left but to work hard, as we should and try to find from a woman"<sup>27</sup>.

The Albanian government reports noted that after the signing of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, not only the base of anti-communist political emigration but also their exponents were demoralized and began to lose hope of returning to Albania. Another blow was considered by the regime's bodies for Albania's accession to the UN. It was said that Abaz Ermenji had made this comment on Albania's accession to the UN: "Albania's accession has its positive side because Albania was recognized worldwide and the claims of its neighbors ended once and for all. But there is a downside because the communists will call it the success of their policy and the resistance against the communist regime in Albania will be greatly weakened."<sup>28</sup>

Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary had staged a joint protest in front of the Turkish Foreign Minister against the admission of their countries to the UN, calling this admission as official recognition of the communist regimes in these countries. On the Albanian side, the protest was signed by Ali Koprencka<sup>29</sup>.

The regime was closely monitoring the state of political emigration and noted with great satisfaction the divisions within its ranks. The Albanian Legation in Italy announced that the rift in the ranks of political emigration was deepening. The weight of the KSHL was falling.

### **3.2. Crisis in the largest political immigration organization-national front**

The year 1954 clearly reflected the crisis created in political emigration by the failure of diversionary operations against the communist regime. This situation was also reflected in the attitude of the largest and most advanced political force of anti-communist emigration, which was the National Front. BK took a more intransigent stance towards joining other groups and drafted a political platform with a very prominent democratic profile.

At the BK Congress in Naples in February 1954, in his report Vasil Andoni emphasized the democracy of this organization. He stated that "our party not only preaches

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<sup>25</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 16, Report of the Albanian legation Rome - MFA, Work report for 1954, January 22, 1955

<sup>26</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file.401, Quarterly report of the Albanian Legation in Paris on Albanian emigration prepared by Llambi Peçini, Paris, 18.08.1955

<sup>27</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file.401, Quarterly report of the Albanian Legation in Paris on Albanian emigration prepared by Llambi Peçini, Paris, 18.08.1955

<sup>28</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, Report on the activity of Albanian emigration during 1955 until today

<sup>29</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, Report on the activity of Albanian emigration during 1955 until today



democracy, but follows it in all possible forms and ways".<sup>30</sup> According to him, he implemented it by listening freely to the criticism of each member, but some of them sometimes misunderstood this freedom and demanded, for example, that the center of a democratic party act according to the ideas of one or another group. While those who were educated in the "School of B.K". they knew that the leadership of a democratic party was determined by the decision of the majority. V Andoni claimed that perhaps this system also had its drawbacks but with all this, it was the best way found to date. Thus, he stressed, the principle of majority was obeyed by this congress of BK, which by reviewing the membership decisions gathered between different congresses during these two months would take decisions on the policy of the National Front and the election of the new Central Committee.

In addition, the task of this Congress was that a commission specially charged by him would improve the statute of the party, which was drafted in general terms in the Congress of Reggio Emilia on 31.XII.1945.

The report stated that Balli Kombëtar was born as a party of national resistance and therefore started and continued its actions in secret for several years. Despite this, at the beginning of January 1944, while the civil war with the communists was raging, the first Congress was held in Berat with 74 delegates coming from all over Albania.

In exile the first congress was held in the Emilia Region with 150 people on December 31, 1945. There Balli Kombëtar was declared a democratic party by Midhat Frashëri. The Statute, the Decalogue, the Eight Points of Albanian Nationalism, as well as the Political Principles were accepted.

Another Congress convened in Rome in May 1948, before Midhat Frashëri's trip to Turkey. "Despite the difficulty of calling this meeting truly democratic, after close to 400 members in Greece had not been notified, again for the time being, this assembly was valid to give the party a Standing Committee and a written law: "Decisions must be taken by a majority of votes," the report said.<sup>31</sup> On November 29, 1949, another Party Assembly convened in Naples. 56 people participated. There, the extended principles for the agrarian direction of the National Front were accepted and the party adopted the democratic agrarian surname.

It had been 4 years since that congress. It was emphasized that BK had not met before "due to a lot of work and a change of opinion on the manner of convening a congress, between the Central and the President". During this time there were requests for a congressional meeting from the National Front Committee in Detroit, Canada, and Turkey.

This new congress of BK was considered by V Andoni as the "most democratic congress" that Balli Kombëtar had done so far, because within these two and a half months, all the members of Balli Kombëtar, scattered around the world, had gathered in Congresses of specifically to discuss the policy of the Center which had been presented to them with a lengthy report by the Secretary-General; to vote, after a detailed discussion on this policy and on whether or not to participate in the reconstructed National Committee "Free Albania"; to discuss and vote on the members of the new Central.<sup>32</sup>

The report stressed that the discussion had been and was free, any opposition had the right to formulate criticism, but none of the members had the right to act according to the views of the minority. If this was done, Balli's democracy would be dealt a blow and harmful divisions would be prepared. Andoni declared: We must all obey the decision of the majority!

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<sup>30</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples, in February 1954, delivered by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>31</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples, in February 1954, delivered by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>32</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

Speaking about the internal life of the Party, he claimed that in terms of quality and number of members BK was the strongest party in exile. He added that "I am not talking about our powers in the Homeland and in Kosovo, for reasons you know". In Italy he pointed out, the National Ball had the majority compared to other movements; in Greece, although Balli's group was more organized, the Legality party had more members; in Turkey, the members of the Ball constituted a sound and great power; in Germany, almost half of the emigrants belonged to Balli; in France, BK had only a small group; in England, the vast majority belonged to the National Front; in Austria, Balli had 60% of Albanians emigrating as well as a large number of old Albanians; in New Zealand, the largest group was the National Front; in Brazil, the vast majority (70%) belonged to Balli; in Canada, the majority was always the National Front.

In the US Balli had 70% more than any other expatriate movement. This could be followed by smaller countries and groups scattered to the farthest corners of the world and connected to BK with an interest and love unbroken by time and distance.

While from the emigrants in Yugoslavia, it was said that the youth was for the most part with Ball. "While in enslaved Kosovo, Balli is as open and strong as in Albania".<sup>33</sup>

The report stated that very few new members in exile were accepted, only 8%, "we call the others as friends of Balli, collaborators, but unrelated to the obligations and forms of the party".<sup>34</sup>

The report stated that BK was organized all over the world. There were Provincial Committees, freely elected by the members residing in different regions, in Greece, Germany, Turkey, Italy, England, Australia, Canada, USA. In all places where there were no Provincial Committees there was an official appointed by the Central Committee. In some countries, such as Turkey, Australia, America, the ballistas had helped to create and form local societies "to interest the old Albanians in the life of the Vatan and to awaken those most distant and coldest."<sup>35</sup>

The report stated that "our publications have been judged as the best of emigration". The newspaper "Flamuri" was kept only with the help of members, printed in 6,000 copies which were said to be insufficient in relation to the requests. The task was set for its publication to reach 10,000 copies or to be published more often.

The magazine "Servant" although had technical difficulties, had improved a lot and had taken the place of a youth body of Balli. The bulletin of BK "Lettre d'Albanie" had helped spread the news about Albania. Its effectiveness was shown by the news received from this bulletin from the most famous newspapers and magazines.<sup>36</sup>

V. Andoni claimed that BK's strongest weapon had been the press. "We tried to speak the truth, to protect Albanian rights, to preach the need for a better future, we wanted in our campaign against evil, to fight betrayal without talking about traitors, to discover bad deeds, without add the line of weak people. "Our goal was not to make it look like there were a lot of bad Albanians, such as those who worked for foreign nations." But "alas, do not be misunderstood during this noble behavior, we are msyed by people and organs undeserved to respond. We would be silent, if we did not know the law of slander which forms even unjust suspicions. We would not have uttered the shame and betrayal in our press, as if communist propaganda had not put us all on the side of agents, as if communist propaganda had not sought with constant lies to appropriate the whole fight against foreign invasions. We were forced to bring to light then our work, our struggles. Thus we fell in the war of the two fronts:

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<sup>33</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>34</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>35</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>36</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

on the one hand we had the communists enraged by the denial of the facts; on the other hand the agents of April 7 qi had begun to spread like snakes in the sun of democracy!"<sup>37</sup>

It is interesting that the report also talked about the income and expenses of the party. Expenditures were divided into the following chapters: printing, postage (letters and telegrams) and sending the newspaper, assistance to members outside the camps, assistance to the sick, assistance to students, expenses for members' travel for emigration work. Of these, press and postage expenses were paid entirely from the assistance provided by BK members everywhere. The others were paid both from the members' assistance and from the assistance provided by the organization "Free Europe" through the National Committee "Free Albania", as a member of that Committee.<sup>38</sup> When the organization "Free Europe" had cut the aid to the National Committee "Free Albania" since December 1953, the members of Balli said in the report they had rushed to give even more aid and so all the expenses of BK were paid and were being paid with the help of members of the National Front<sup>39</sup>.

V. Andoni claimed that above all they had taken care not to damage the unit and the union of the ballistae. "This qi unit is based on clear and well-grounded ideas, this qi union has started in the fields of war and effort, it continues to be Balli's greatest power," the report said.<sup>40</sup>

The report stated that since they were in exile, it would have been better if some of BK's relations with foreign friends and other Albanian parties and groups had not come to light. But since others had announced some of these relationships in three brochures published a while ago, BK was forced to state some facts in response to those that had been published.

This analysis began with the formation of the National Committee "Free Albania" which was said to have been formed by the rapprochement of the National Front with the Legality Movement and other independent leaders of the resistance. From his efforts, from the activity of Balli Kombëtar, foreigners woke up and became interested. "It owes to the interest of the Americans and almost at that time also of the British, that the way was paved internationally for the recognition and support of an Albanian Liberation Committee".<sup>41</sup>

Talks had begun in April 1949 and ended in August of that year. Midhat Frashëri and Abas Ermenji from Balli Kombëtar participated at the beginning and with Zef Palin later. On the Legal side was Abas Kupi with advisor Selim Damani. From the independents of the resistance, was Seit Kryeziu. After the appointment of the Executive Committee consisting of 5 people (Midhat Frashëri chairman, Zef Pali, Abas Kupi, Nuçi Kota, Seit Kryeziu), negotiations for a Consultative Committee began. "In this case, Abbas Kupi and not the Americans, as Mr. Dosti, proposed to be appointed to the Consultative Committee Mr. Ndue Gjonmarkaj or any other from the Independent Bloc. "The time had come for the signature of the document that K.K.SH.L. Midhat Frashëri and Zef Pali continued to reject any compromise. Meanwhile, an American friend and Mr. A. Kupi, separately, matures with Mr. Ndue Gjonmarkaj and propose him to join the Committee as a person. This was done without the knowledge of the National Front. Mr. Ndue Gjonmarkaj refuses and begs to participate as a block movement. Friends inform Balli's representatives of the event, stating that Mr.'s refusal. Ndue Gjonmarkaj removed the problem of his admission, they give the right to the thesis of Balli Kombëtar and the agreement is signed".<sup>42</sup>

Greater difficulties were caused for the National Ball when the issue of recognizing Zog's regime was discussed. This thesis was strongly defended by Abas Kupi and strongly

<sup>37</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>38</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>39</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>40</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>41</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>42</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

opposed by Midhat Frashëri. With great difficulty and with the mediation of foreigners, Abas Kupa had succeeded in convincing the formula "the issue of the regime is left to the people with free votes". While among other points where he talked about the freedom, independence and integrity of Albania in the report it was said that it had been "a bargain and good will from all"<sup>43</sup>.

A statement of great political importance was later added to the Statute, which was promulgated in London in September 1949 and thus the whole Committee had done its duty to the problem of liberation and the efforts for Ethnic Albania.<sup>44</sup>

An analysis was made of the National Committee "Free Albania" after the death of Midhat Frashëri. It was said that in this case the Central Committee of the National Front was not able to fill the vacancy with a man who had the prestige, ability, authority and political experience of Lumo Skënderos. Without wasting time, a part of the Central of the National Front proposed the name of Hasan Dosti who was accepted. According to the report, it was thought that this solution would bring closer a group of members of the National Front in Syria, who had taken another political direction, led by Ali Këlcyra. On the other hand, stressed V. Andoni, it seemed that other members of the Executive of KSHL would prefer H. Dosti. But Abas Kupa and Seit Kreyziu deemed it reasonable not to know the decision of B.K. So two months passed in trying to reach an agreement. Legality at this time set as a condition for the acceptance of H. Dosti as chairman of the Committee, that Balli accept Abas Kupa as Commander-in-Chief of military affairs. Balli's center objected. In a secret meeting with A. Kupa, H. Dosti proposed to him to be recognized as the Commander-in-Chief of the KSHL forces, on the condition that A. Kupa accept the leadership of H. Dosti. This meeting did not work out because Balli Central, who was unaware of the deal, rejected it. After that, it was said that "foreign friends" intervened, who proposed that the chairmanship of the Committee be rotated. This proposal was also rejected by the Balli Center. After two months of fruitless talks, the other members of the Executive accepted H. Dosti as Chairman of the SHL National Committee and the work continued.

The report stated that at a meeting in New York in October 1949, H. Dosti, without the approval of his colleagues, had accepted the expansion of the SHL National Committee with people unwanted for the National Front. When he came to Europe, H. Dosti encountered opposition from the entire Balli Central for this enlargement and was thus forced to close this conversation and submit to the political line of the Party.<sup>45</sup>

### ***3.2.1. Ali Këlcyra's departure from Balli***

Later in 1947, at Zog's initiative, several invitations were made to Egypt for a meeting of Albanian leaders in Alexandria. Ali Klissura in charge of Hasan Dosti, along with several others, and Koço Muka, in charge of the Presidency of Balli to be interested in the emigration of Albanians to the East, participated in various meetings that took place in Egypt. Although Këlcyra and Muka had no authority to deal with political issues, they participated in the talks and later signed a "Covenant" without their knowledge, without authorization and outside the direction of the politics of the Balli Central. In addition, Ali Këlcyra went even further and with constant letters praised some outsiders and criticized his friends in Italy and Greece. These actions and letters aroused a great reaction, even among Ali Këlcyra's closest friends. Thus practically began a spiritual division between Këlcyra and the vast majority of the National Front<sup>46</sup>.

<sup>43</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>44</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>45</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>46</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

Seeing the difficult situation, Ali Këlcyra went to Damascus, Syria and there with a group of 20 people, announced the separation from the National Front, taking the name "Balli Luftarak" (proposed by Kadri Cakran) and Balli Demokratik (proposed by Ali Këlcyra). Despite this, Balli Central endured and did not hurry to take any action, as was done by all parties in such cases! In the spring of 1950, Ali Këlcyra went to Italy and, touring the political refugee camps, demanded a quick congress of the National Front. The BK Central Committee, although it did not want to accept his proposal, accepted Hasan Dosti's proposal for new elections to be held as soon as possible through a congress. Ali Këlcyra in contact with many ballistas, realized that the vast majority had opponents and rejected the idea of congress. He then got very close to Seit Kryeziu. At that time, the relations between Balli Kombëtar and Seit Kryeziu were not good, because, according to Kryeziu, Balli had prevented the admission to the Agrarian International, the party he had created in 1949 in exile.

Only when Ali Këlcyra distributed leaflets accusing the Ballists of being communists, etc., and when it was learned of the meeting he was holding in Bagnoli, Naples, was the decision made to expel him from the National Front. H. Doshti approved this exclusion decision by telegraph. V. Andoni emphasized that the Independent Bloc had also played a major role in this.

Ali Këlcyra announced in August 1950 the separation from Balli and proclaimed the continuation of his Organization. Andoni emphasized that "only 8% of the members and not, as Mr. says. "A large majority of Dosti followed the rebel of Balli Kombëtar." H. Dosti said in the report, "tue left with these reasons, lists as reasons for the separation of Mr. Ali Klissura only "personal resentment and lack of goodwill on both sides"! " But V. Andoni pointed out that the big reasons for leaving were those mentioned above. He added these other reasons: Ali Klissura had lost the trust of the National Front when it was discovered that, at the Grenoble meeting, "he had asked for a king for the Albanians from the house of Savoy and the creation of a totalitarian (fascist) Albanian party. The boredom and resentment became even greater, when in exile the telegraphs of Bame Duce were dictated by Ali Klissura after April 7"<sup>47</sup>.

The report also criticized H. Dosti's other opinion, which justified Ali Këlcyra, emphasizing that these reasons were not of an ideological nature.

The report commented on the proposals for the expansion of the SCTL. In the early 1950s, the Independent Bloc and Ali Këlcyra's organization presented two coordinated prayers, requesting entry into the KSHL for the "sharing of national responsibilities." After several meetings, this request was supported by Seit Kryeziu and Nuçi Kotta, and finally accepted by Abas Kupi. But he was opposed by H. Dosti and Zef Pali. The report said: "American friends in this case intervene and declare that in no way can be accepted people who have harmed Albanians and the fact that they seek to enter the difton how important the KSHL Committee has taken."<sup>48</sup> V. Andoni claimed that no concrete proposal was made by "foreign friends" for the entry of Koço Muka only in KSHL. On the contrary, in a letter sent by Hasan Dosti from the USA, he explicitly stated that"<sup>49</sup>. During 1952, the problem of enlargement was raised again, but in two stages:

- a) Organization, which summarized the unification of the Executive and the Consultative;
- b) The extension, with Mr. Ndue Gjonmarkaj and Koço Muka 50.

<sup>47</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>48</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>49</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>50</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

Balli and Legality opposed both: Kryeziu opposed the first and accepted the second. With the return of H. Dosti to America, the work was left in silence. In several letters that Dosti sent to the Secretary General of the BK, he assured the Central that the work had remained silent and that no significant repetition of the extension problem had been made.

In 1953, there were several months that the Committee's affairs were not going well. V. Andoni singled out among these events the action of the Administrative Secretary of KSHL, G. Gogo. Faced with this situation, Balli Kombëtar insisted on his removal from the Secretariat. BK informed H. Dosti in America who, with the letter qj sent on July 28 to the General Secretariat of the National Front, approved the decision of the Central Front. Finally, Kryeziu was appointed Deputy Administrative Secretary of the "Free Albania" Committee. At this time, "foreign friends" intervened and proposed a reorganization of the Committee, giving it. Gaqo Gogos another position on the Committee. Balli's center refused and the matter went back to New York, to H. Dosti, who without notifying his friends in Italy, together with Nuçi Kotta, signed an act-organization, where Gogo appeared in one of the key positions of the Committee, while Legality was left with the direction of the press, which was held until that time by Zef Pali. This solution was rejected by the part of the Executive Committee in Rome and was not considered reasonable even by the "friends". After that, several proposals for other forms of solutions followed, which were rejected not only by Balli, but by the entire Executive Committee.<sup>51</sup> At this time the aid provided by the Free Europe Committee to the Committee was cut and the budget in general was reduced. This help was given to support some of the intellectuals and officers who had left the emigration camps to be put in the service of the Committee, and to help as little as possible the sick and the most needy students. According to the report on the needs of immigration, the assistance was very small, but still quite valuable<sup>52</sup>. It was initially said that the cut in aid was due to cuts and savings being made in America. H. Dosti had stated then that the termination was made to force the Committee to accept the enlargement that was being prepared !. Balli Kombëtar continued its way<sup>53</sup>.

V. Andoni's report also talked about London's decisions on the National Committee "Free Albania". On October 15, 1953, the "foreign friends" informed the Executive that a meeting would be held in London "on the life or death" of the NACC. They sought final opinion on the organization and expansion of the committee. Abaz Kupa stated that he was ready to review any decision in a democratic spirit, but did not accept any imposition. Seit Kryeziu accepted the enlargement, Zef Pali on behalf of Balli Kombëtar, said that the Party he represented was of the opinion that the Committee should be extended with representatives of the colonies, with capable and honest Albanians, who had never been mentioned, and not with representatives of undesirable groups that had harmed Albania's freedom. He was then asked by US officials if a person from these groups, who was not involved in "weak" events, resigned from the movement he belonged to, would the National Front accept him? Mr. Paul replied that "this can be considered"<sup>54</sup>.

In addition, the "friends" presented, along with the official appointments signed by them, a Statute-regulation, "which in terms of national interest and dignity was unacceptable," the report said. V. Andoni stressed that no one made a voice before this dictatorship. Halil Maçi, a member of the Central Committee of the Central Committee, asked if this "Statute" annulled the "Statute of Mit'hat Frashëri and the Political Statement we made in London in September 1949?". "Foreign friends" replied "Yes"<sup>55</sup>.

<sup>51</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>52</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>53</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>54</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>55</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

V. Andoni emphasized that the Statute-regulation that was presented to us led the Committee "Free Albania" to the level of a group of officials without any autonomy and without any initiative of its own<sup>56</sup>. He stressed that BK had in his hand a copy of this "Statute-Regulation" and rejected the interpretations made by H. Dosti who had said that the circular of BK of December 15 did not correspond to the truth. On the other hand, H. Dosti himself in the brochure he had published stated that "he has formally and categorically stated to foreign friends that the observance of the points of the old Statute was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of his responsibilities as chairman of the ANC (page 32 of Mr. Dosti's booklet). V. Andoni asked: If there was no "Statute" we were forced to speak above, what was the need for Mr. Want to impress your big friends?!..."<sup>57</sup>. On the other hand, he admitted that the "Statute" that was later published by KSHL could have been improved, but this was done by the position held by BK and was changed some time later after BK refused to participate in the Committee!<sup>58</sup>

At the end of the examination of this issue, the report stated: The statute drafted in the establishment of the KSHL and the London Declaration constitute the first difficult war of our late President and his comrades. While the "Statute" we published recently, with good and bad, is done on the road paved by Midhat Frashëri"<sup>59</sup>.

Upon receiving this notification, the Central Committee of the National Front decided in principle to refuse to participate in the Committee under these conditions. This was announced by the mayor of New York, H. Dosti, who did not give a clear answer but advised wisdom and democracy. H. Dosti then went to New York and held meetings with BK members, which he also held in Detroit and Canada. The vast majority of ballistas there opposed participation and asked Dost to stop announcing the Committee scheduled for November 28, 1953, and leave for Rome.<sup>60</sup>

At a meeting in Detroit attended by 17 members of the Balli Kombëtar, H. Dosti signed a document committing himself not to participate in the KSHL if the Center was unanimous on this position, or to enter as a person for a time shortly until the consent of all dissolved members was obtained and he resigned if one member more than half decided not to join the Committee. V. Andoni stressed that Dosti did not respect his signature<sup>61</sup>.

The Central Committee of the KB, after much discussion and proposal, was unanimous not to participate. H. Dosti did not obey this decision. The Central Committee later unanimously decided to hold a referendum on joining the Committee without delay. H. Dosti also rejected this decision, considering it unreasonable to "obey in this exciting atmosphere" the brutal law of democracy"<sup>62</sup>

H. Dosti arrived in Rroma on December 6. Balli Central, after hearing his report, made these decisions:<sup>63</sup>

1. Removal of Balli from KSHL;
2. Taking the initiative by H. Dosti himself for the expansion of the Committee following in substance the Statute of Mit'hat Frashëri;
3. Participation of H. Dosti as a person in the Committee, resigning from the Presidency and membership of Balli Kombëtar.
4. Respecting the Detroit decision.

<sup>56</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>57</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>58</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

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<sup>61</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>62</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>63</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

H. Dosti rejected all this and stated that he would participate in the KSHL on behalf of the National Front and as its chairman. He had talked to 5-6 members of the Central Committee of the BK, who were not determined to support the majority. Dosti had submitted a list of his own without asking Central at all<sup>64</sup>.

Meanwhile, the "foreign friends" made a final proposal: They demanded "the participation of H. Dosti as a person and that he represent some Balli votes". They announced that "they are waiting for the official decision of Balli, after his plebiscite, until three months".<sup>65</sup>

H. Dosti did not accept this solution either and "you are ashamed in front of the foreigners two delegates of the National Front, Halil Mëniku and Vasil Dhimitraj". H. Dosti's admission to the Extended Committee became officially final at midnight on December 12, 1953.

The report kept by V. Andoni stated that "The Standing Committee, abandoned by the ousted chairman, had no choice but to decide on the opening of Provincial Congresses all over the world where members of the National Front are present and new elections"<sup>66</sup>.

The report stated that Dosti himself in some cases had stated that "this or that other should not have participated in the Committee because he is one of those who have worked to the detriment of the Albanian Nation and State: with the proclamation of the Republic of Prizren pushed and supported by Serbs in 1920; with the call *qi i bani i ati* the armies of the Duce to occupy Albania in 1939, etc. etc. ", "no one else should have participated in the KSHL, because he is from the most feudal Albanian family, which would serve the communist propaganda "; "No one else should have participated because he worked in the dam of Albania even before 1939. He was sentenced to death by the Vlora Uprising Committee in 1920, etc. ETC..<sup>67</sup>. With these previous statements V. Andoni criticized the current assertion of Dosti who had written in his book that "the entry of some right-wing elements in the KSHL is not a sufficient reason for non-cooperation with the Anglo-Americans" (His Brochure, page 21). " He also claimed that he had made objections to the non-entry of the Bloc and its people into the KSHL in order to preserve the harmony of Balli.<sup>68</sup>

The report refuted H. Dosti's accusations that the culprit for obstructing the expansion of KSHL was the constant refusal of the Central of BK. He tried to argue that in 1951 the National Front made the following proposals for expansion by "friends": to enter the Executive of the KSHL Ihsan Toptani and Muharrem Bajraktari, permanently excluding the people of the Bloc ". Balli Kombëtar did not object "fundamentally" but insisted that such an extension be accepted by Mr. Abas Kupi who not only did not accept, but signed with his proposal an agreement with the National Ball to oppose any enlargement<sup>69</sup>.

Later, in 1952 and 1953, when the expansion of the KSHL was requested, with Ihsan Toptan, Muharrem Bajraktar, Ndue Gjonmarkaj and Koço Muka, the entire Executive Committee, with the exception of Seit Kryeziu, signed a document that strongly opposed this expansion. Further some forms of organization were proposed, such as the merger of the two Committees into a General Committee but the Legality Movement and Seit Kryeziu strongly opposed<sup>70</sup>.

<sup>64</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

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<sup>68</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>69</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>70</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni



The report also had a separate chapter on the position of B.K. versus the Anglo-Americans. H Dosti had criticized BK's position in this regard and had identified as reasons for Balli's loss of prestige to the Anglo-Americans:

1. The firm stance of the Central not to accept in the Committee "the people of April 7" nor their representatives;
2. The extremism of the Central of the National Front 71.

According to the report, probably due to the time and some circumstances, some American circles had formed the conviction that the "Independent Bloc" should be included in the union of Albanians and that "it was our duty to clarify this harmful situation". It was emphasized that there was no doubt that Dosti had performed this task well. But his claim that the Americans had taken the National Ball with a bad eye, why he refused the participation of the Bloc in KSHL, was considered as a maneuver "to mislead the Americans in front of the Albanian public opinion, as people seeking the dam of our country. ". The report claimed that the Anglo-Americans were the ones who were most interested in and honored the National Front, "the only party representing the anti-communist resistance"; who had raised the Albanian issue in the place of world interest; who had tried to protect Albania from the danger of an invasion from the north or from the south; that they had not ceased efforts to persuade the Greek government to give up absurd demands; who had sought to come to the aid of the Albanian people "surrounded and oppressed by the red militias"; had been the ones who had helped KSHL to make this a representative and respected body by its neighbors and the western world; had been the highest American authorities who were anxiously interested in the fate of the liberation of Albania<sup>72</sup>.

The report stressed that to reduce all these efforts to the level of a banal "extension" it is worth throwing water on all these goods or throwing salt in the eyes of all those Albanians who hope, not only in helping and liberating the Homeland, but also with the help of great democracies to ensure the freedom of the people, the independence of the State and the independence of our Nation?<sup>73</sup>

Rejecting the accusations of the extremism of Balli's Central, the report stated: Had it been so, hundreds of comrades would have followed in Mr.'s footsteps. Dosit and Mr. Dosti would have found so many friends that by completing the list of 9 people qi is left half empty. If it was a case of an extremist group, Mr. Hundreds of signed telegrams and protest letters would not reach Dost<sup>74</sup>. The report asserted that the dignified and inflexible attitude of BK on the basis of certain principles was not extremism; the courageous stand on the vital affairs of the Nation and the decision of the KB not to fall into the rank of ordinary servants, especially when it comes to a Liberation Committee<sup>75</sup>. "And if any Free Albania Committee is not capable of having a relative freedom, other than the freedom to point the finger, what will be the claim or claim of that Committee for the liberation of the country and for the other freedoms that must follow ?! " BK emphasized that neither the Americans, nor the British, nor other states were responsible for breaking the principles and other servility. Responsible were those Albanians who, when they did not lack godliness, lacked courage, lacked endurance. Responsible were those Albanians who, by spreading the slogan "as it is said No to this or that" had created the conditions of unconditional submission<sup>76</sup>.

The report considered the acceptance of the National Front in the International Village League based in Washington and with branches all over the world a success, because the

<sup>71</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>72</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>73</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>74</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>75</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>76</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

party was known abroad and had created new efforts and friendships in the interest of Albania. Thus, Balli Kombëtar now participated in international roundtables and defended the interest of our country with the new roads that have opened with this participation.<sup>77</sup>

It was pointed out that one of the successes that Balli Kombëtar had achieved at the Congress of the International Peasant League held in Washington in April 1952, had been the acceptance of the formula for the Self-Determination of Peoples. It was said that the acceptance of this decision by the parties that were part of the Katundare League and especially by the agrarian parties of Yugoslavia, put in a straight path, for the future, the problem of self-determination of Kosovo and other Albanian areas of robnueme and added "opportunities to one day join the common Motherland". The International Village League was said to have honored the National Ball by leaving it to run its branch in Italy.<sup>78</sup>

A chapter of the report also constituted "The Albanian issue in the efforts of BK". and explain that the freedom, independence and inviolability of Albania are inseparable".<sup>79</sup> It was claimed that BK had made the greatest efforts with the Allies of the West and it was stated that now "we can say that the Albanian issue has begun to be viewed with a better understanding". It was also emphasized that "a change in the situation in Albania with the violation of land and national independence, can never be accepted by the National Front. And a real liberation, with respect for the rights of Albanians is the objective of our effort"<sup>80</sup>.

The report noted that the main point where BK had aimed and acted as a party and as an important member of the National Committee "Free Albania" had been the encouragement of major Western democracies to intervene with Albania's neighbors to give up plans their darkness and to provide security for the independence and territorial integrity of Albania. Some success in this regard was considered the statement of the Italian government several times through its Prime Minister as well as through the press that it was in favor of the independence and inviolability of Albania. It was pointed out that Greece had somewhat softened its stance, stating that it did not intend to forcefully implement its demands to Albania, while Yugoslavia, although still pursuing a policy with it, in some cases had stated that it did not intervene in Albania's internal affairs<sup>81</sup>.

Above all, an important success was said to have been achieved by Balli Kombëtar in Turkey. "Journalists, politicians and the Turkish government itself are studying the way to come to the aid of Albanian rights, asking their neighbors to ensure the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of Albania."<sup>82</sup>

Perhaps another more important task for BK was to encourage the Western Allies to protect Albania from future dangers. The report stated that work would always be done in this direction<sup>83</sup>.

The BK report stated: "Despite dealing with the problems of liberation and facing the dangers that threaten the Homeland, not a moment, we have not lacked our duty regarding the problem of Ethnic Kosovo and the unification of Kosovo with the Homeland. The work we have done so far - and it should be noted that we are the only Albanian political party that makes organized and systematic efforts in this direction - has the power to make the issue of Kosovo known in the highest spheres of world politics and to emphasize the injustices that have been done to our Nation. Governments, journalists, personalities and other interested

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<sup>77</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

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<sup>79</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>80</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>81</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>82</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>83</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

circles are aware of the just Albanian claims today, among which some foreign institutes and organizations are interested in the unification of a divided Albania.”<sup>84</sup>

BK's determined insistence on the issue of Southern Albania, which the Greeks called "Northern Epirus" was said to have been and was an important sector of his activity. On this issue BK had opposed Greek politics and propaganda step by step and case by case. That is why the Greek press wrote that the National Ball organized all over the world was creating a lot of trouble in Greek politics.<sup>85</sup>

The report claimed that two anti-national committees operated in Yugoslavia and Greece: 1. The Union of Albanian Emigrants in Yugoslavia, which did not have the confidence of the vast majority of Albanians who fled the country; 2. The Vilio-Epirot syllogism which worked for the secession of Albanian lands. Against those of the Committees, Balli Kombëtar had developed a fruitful propaganda "so much so that their position has been shaken a lot lately". The recent changes in the Committee in Yugoslavia proved this even more. On the other hand, the report said that BK wanted a sincere friendship with its neighbors, as Albania should not be at the mercy of anyone. The report stated that Balli Kombëtar "has tried and will always try to cultivate the best possible relations with its neighbors within the framework of independence and integrity of the Albanian Land"<sup>86</sup>.

The report stated that taking into account the votes of the provincial congresses of BK, this motion for the political direction of the National Front was presented to this Congress:

1. An intensification of anti-communist efforts and propaganda to maintain the primacy of labor and war in this blood field where our party has won the gold medals of thousands of martyrs;
2. A good get-together with the Albanian national parties;
3. A more lively and beneficial contact with the people of the Albanian colonies in exile and with their actions in favor of freedom and Albanian problems;
4. A study and summary of the position of the National Front during this unpleasant test that KSHL is doing without us.
5. To continue our relations with the International Village League, where our party plays a part in its role and to increase the number of baking and friendships with important parties and people who participate in it..
6. To continue the friendship and work started with the Anglo-Americans and to clarify and deepen the understanding between our party and the parties of the democratic states <sup>87</sup>.

The report stressed that special care should be taken to befriend the neighbors who had declared themselves in favor of freedom, independence and territorial integrity of Albania and BK insisted that others be convinced that "our country is more neuralgic for the balance of the Balkans and of the Adriatic ”.

The report states that "Inside or outside the Committee, we must be grateful for all the moral and national assistance of the great Allies, and we must shed light on the fact that we, as living members of this world crusade, need to be. Even the democracies, especially America, which leads this defense from an undeclared war, need to start well and fairly the aid for the liberation of Albania, not only because it did so, it follows the traditional path of honor and respect for the small nations, but even though a liberation of our country, satisfying your hopes and preserving Albanian rights, will be a good first example for all the oppressed nations of the Balkans from Russian imperialism"<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>84</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>85</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>86</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>87</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>88</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

The minimum conditions for the eventual participation of BK in KSHL at an opportune time were also defined, and the way and plan for an independent action in cooperation with the Albanians of the colonies, of the Democratic Movement of America, of the independent groups of Albanians in Turkey, France, England were marked. , America, Australia, Canada etc. In this regard, it was suggested to consider the proposals from abroad that had come to BK during this time in order for the new Steering Committee to be sent to work without delay.

BK's ideas (apparently of the part that supported H. Dostin) on the formation of the National Committee "Free Albania" were:<sup>89</sup>

- Given the fact that the National Committees of the nations enslaved by communism were formed with the aim of:
  - a) Coordination of all forces in the anti-communist war
  - b) Keeping alive the spirit of resistance of the enslaved peoples
  - c) The overthrow of dictatorial regimes, to give these peoples the fundamental freedoms declared by the United States, which only a democratic regime can guarantee. Anyone can easily understand that these promises set out, in their general outline, the path to the formation of these committees.
- 1. Recent events, especially those that have taken place from 1939 until now, have brought to the fore the Albanian people: the current and the party, some have nurtured and supported the national aspirations of the people, others history has proven, have prevented these aspirations. In particular, the people who have on their side the currents and the parties and leaders of the national anti-communist war, they have seen in the past and now, the sure flag bearers of their hopes. For the same reason, we believe and suggest that FANC be formed by these persons of tendency and party. It will be a disaster to deny and overburden the spirit of the Albanian resistance, by placing in the new Committee persons who have denied and suppressed the patriotism of our people.
- 2. One of the figures that the people consider as the flag bearer of freedom is in the first place Hasan Dosti. He who in childhood has shown the spirit of self-sacrifice every time he has faced national problems. In all the difficult periods of our national history of his time, he has always been on the side of the people, on the path of honor and Albanianess. He is a determined democrat, a reformer and a well-known patriot, enjoying the trust of the people more than anyone else. He has intellectual formation, long political experience and knows well our national problems. Also in these proposals it is stated that "we, as a Party and as individuals, do not support Hasan Dosti in the spirit of friendship and partisanship, but as a representative of the political line, of Albanian politics. For these reasons other tendencies or parties should gather around this person."<sup>90</sup> They stressed that during the 1955 elections for the presidency of the KSHL, the majority had voted in favor of Dosti's political line, "and among them were many of his fierce enemies." While the other candidate for the post of mayor had received only 6 votes. Even two members of the Party who belonged to H. Dosti's opponent for the post of chairman, had not voted for their party candidate.<sup>91</sup>
- 3. As we all know, during 1953, on the occasion of the reorganization of FANC, our party ABK faced a split. This split was made because some Party leaders did not fully agree to participate in any combination of the Committee along with the BKI, while the rest, us (Mr. Dosti's line) for the sake of anti-communist union, from the councils of American supporters and primarily because we were convinced, as we still are, that the well-being of our country requires following the U.S. political line, considering it an opportunity to

<sup>89</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>90</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>91</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

participate. We did this persistently in 1953 and we still do today because we are confident in interpreting the will of all the people.

It was further stated that the division of BK was done due to the reasons mentioned above among the Party leaders and that the members were not aware of the development of events and views that supported the entry into the KSHL, so some of these elements were said to for this reason he remained with the "intrasigents". They expressed that they believed that time would justify their position and that their opponents, ie the rest of the National Agrarian Front, would understand that "only by being in the same order as the other National Committees of the enslaved peoples and only by receiving the unselfish support of the American nation will we achieve the goal of liberating our country. " The conviction was also expressed that work should be done for the implementation of this political line and for this it was necessary for BK to be properly represented (and in the proportion of 1953) in the new Committee. This is also because this Party did not lack elements that were intellectually and politically prepared.<sup>92</sup>

### ***3.2.2. The motion presented to you by the Congress of Naples***

To the Congress of the National Front in 1954 I presented a motion which contained these basic principles:<sup>93</sup>

"The unity of the Party must be preserved as much as possible within the limits of the principles, program and discipline of the Party, based on the decisions of the majority. To increase and strengthen the organization and propaganda against communism and for the benefit of National Rights both inside and outside the Homeland.

- NATIONAL FRONT seeks to contribute to the liberation, security, tranquility, freedom, good and progress of Ethnic Albania and Albanian society, to be democratically organized in all branches of activity, and to work and participate in the governance of the country, according to the position qi will be appointed by the plebiscite of the Albanian people, with free elections.
- THE NATIONAL FRONT demands cooperation with all national parties and groups and individuals, who, without violating the freedom of the Homeland and the Albanians, strive wholeheartedly, in various ways, for the security, well-being and development of our people. THE NATIONAL FRONT opposes with all its powers, parties, tendencies and individuals who are to the detriment of national interests, or who use violence and corruption as means to seize power.
- The Standing Committee should try to establish a Committee "Free Albania" on a national basis, with resistance parties and people who have all the guarantees that they have tried and strive to ensure freedom, independence and national identity of the Homeland.
- THE NATIONAL FRONT demands that the interim form of regime in Albania be the High Council, which will give the necessary time to the people to prepare the determination of the form of the best and most suitable regime.
- THE NATIONAL FRONT demands that within one year after returning to Albania, free elections be held with general, direct, direct votes. The Constituent Assembly will determine the final form of the regime.
- NATIONAL FRONT, as a regular member of the International Village League based in America, to make the greatest contribution to the triumph of ideas and principles that will ensure freedom, land, work, welfare and progress to the rural peoples it represents this connection.

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<sup>92</sup> Report at the National Front Congress in Naples held by the Secretary General prof. Vasil Andoni

<sup>93</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 49-51, 31 March 1954, Motion of Congress

- THE NATIONAL FRONT is a member of a friendship, cooperation and close connection with the Anglo-Americans, whom it sees as guarantors of freedom and as defenders of Albanian Rights and true Democracy. It also wants to have good relations with all freedom-loving states.
- THE NATIONAL FRONT seeks for relations with Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia a sincere friendship and cooperation, as well as mutual understanding, both in the political and economic spheres. In addition, it seeks to examine and respect the rights of Albania sacrificed to this day.
- NATIONAL FRONT, faithful to the principles that inspire the United Nations, to try, based on the principle of "Self-Determination of the Peoples", so that the liberated Albania becomes worthy of this international areopagus.

BK also noted that "work should be done to realize the idea of the European Federation, from which all countries, and especially small nations like Albania, expect security, prosperity and freedom".<sup>94</sup>

As can be seen this program was characterized by some basic principles which were advanced for the time. First, Balli Kombëtar would fight for Ethnic Albania within the spaces and opportunities allowed by the international situation and international law. This national union was conceived to be realized only by peaceful means and by moving further on the path of good relations with the neighbors. Secondly, Balli Kombëtar was determined to establish a pro-Western democratic regime in Albania after the fall of communism. While the form of this democratic government would be determined by a popular plebiscite carried out with the free, direct and secret vote of the Albanian people. This program in this regard was the first program with the highest democratic level and a precursor to the establishment of democracy in Albania. Therefore this document in this perspective deserves a high scientific and political appreciation. Third, reflecting the then trends of European and Euro-Atlantic developments, Balli Kombëtar realized that the future of Europe was a union of democratic countries which BK thought of on a federal basis. BK expressed from this time the determination for the post-communist democratic Albania to become one of these federal states of the United Europe. Thus, this political organization could be considered without fear as a pioneer in expressing the aspirations of Albanians to integrate into the United Europe. These aspirations are popular today in Albania and among all Albanians in the Balkans.

### 3.3. New efforts for reorganization and union- 1956 committee

Relations between the KSHL and the Free Europe Committee (KEL) had been tense since the establishment of the KSHL in 1949. Six months after the opening of the KSHL office, KEL officials proposed to H. Dosti to expand the Committee as soon as possible. with BKI members. By mid-1951 Jackson, President of the KEL, had told Dost that the problems of the KSHL were not being solved either in Rome or in London but in New York. On October 2, 1952, H. Dosti and Nuçi Kota were informed of the severance of diplomatic relations between the KEI and the KSHL, which abolished the budget set for the KSHL. The reasoning was that the KEI could not maintain a connection with a Committee which did not include all Albanian emigration groups in the free world and did not know how to unite the groups.

After a few days, Dosti was summoned to Washington where he was asked that the new Committee be established not on the basis of political parties but of the ability of persons and their influence in Albanian circles inside and outside the country. In May 1953 KEL discontinued the \$ 1200 per month grant to BK as of April 1951.

<sup>94</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 49-51, 31 March 1954, Motion of Congress

In July 1953 KEL submits to Dost a new plan for the expansion of the Committee. Dosti went to Rome to consult with his BK friends but they opposed the plan. Dosti with his efforts postponed for several months the existence of the Committee. As a measure against the extremism of Balli Agrar KEL on September 24, 1953 closed the Albanian show of the radio "Free Europe".

Finally H Dosti realizes that there was no other way but only the expansion of KSHL had to be done. He accepted the proposal of KEL for a larger expansion of the Committee which was expanded with 39 members. The situation degraded to complete anarchy.<sup>95</sup> This led to the dissolution of the Committee, the closure of the office and the confiscation of the sensitive archive. From the middle of 1955 KEL closes the offices of KSHL and cuts the budget. But the Committee continues to work through Dost in the ACEN office, where he had many friends and the Albanian cause. The newspaper "Albania" continued to be published until 1956, when the new KSHL headed by R. Krasniqi was recognized by the State Department<sup>96</sup>.

In the elections of December 1955, Dosti won the post of chairman of KSHL again with the help of the Americans, but the Independent Bloc and Balli i Ali Këlcyrë came out openly against him and put Eqerem Vlora as their candidate. The condition of this Committee was weakening day by day as a result of H. Dosti who did not enjoy the sympathy of the groups.

But, according to the Legation, there were disagreements within the groups as well. During 1955 there had been divisions in S. Kryeziu's Village League and in the Legality of the Cup. Thus was created the Katundare Party led by Elezi. Both Elez's Village Party and Kryeziu's League were said to be under British influence, but Elez also had ties to the Italian authorities.

The next rift had occurred in the third quarter of 1955 with A. Kupi's group. This was the second crack after Gaqo Goga's group. Selim Damani, Nuçi Kota, Reuf Fratari and E. Vlora now came out against the Cup. They did not accept the bayraktar methods used by Kupi to lead the group. But apparently, Legata added, this was not the only cause. They had recently been summoned by Zogu, who had pressured them to support H. Dosti and vote for his candidacy. Daman and the others had disagreed with this and, for this reason, had left<sup>97</sup>.

The Legation informed that the Americans were making efforts to unite all their groups and factions. In November, d.m.th. Before the elections for the SACC, the American Enderson, who was dealing with Albanian emigration, had come to Rome and, in the meeting he had with the SACC, had raised the need to eliminate contradictions and reunite the various currents. He had noted that Americans do not support Dost against the will of the immigrants themselves, but they will support what the immigrants themselves would choose.

Legata had information that A. Zogu, recently, had started efforts to unite different factions in the ranks of Legality, to create a compact and strong Legality. He had called A. Kupin in the city of Cannes, France, (where Zogu was staying), to talk about this purpose<sup>98</sup>.

Albanian emigration continued its efforts to unite in new circumstances of the war against the communist regime. In the years 1956-60 new attempts were made, but again A. Zogu and Balli Agrar became the main obstacles, especially during 1957 when the connections between the New York SSC were established.

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<sup>95</sup>Idriz Lamaj, National Committee of Free Albania, 1949-1956, New York, 2000, p.108

<sup>96</sup>Idriz Lamaj, National Committee of Free Albania, 1949-1956, New York, 2000, p.109

<sup>97</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 401, Report from the Albanian legation in Italy on the situation of "Albanian reactionary" emigration during 1955, December 30, 1955

<sup>98</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 401, Report from the Albanian legation in Italy on the situation of "Albanian reactionary" emigration during 1955, December 30, 1955

As the Legation informed, the bad economic situation of the emigrant had also lowered his morale. The economic situation of emigration had worsened further as Western governments had reduced aid.

Also, the changes in the international situation in favor of peace, the strengthening of Albania's international position, had made, in the mass of emigration, the hopes to return as triumphant to the homeland faded. For this reason their emigration to America and other distant lands was being encouraged. According to the Legation, this move was being made to ensure a better economic life; to remove the emigrants from the communist counter-propaganda to return to their homeland and to preserve this contingent in the hands of the Western Powers and to use it in opportune cases for their own purposes<sup>99</sup>.

The communist government was of the opinion that Albanian emigration had reduced activity against Albania. After the announcement of the amnesty from Albania and other communist countries, it was said that the leaders of the Albanian emigration and the Americans were worried that the emigration base would not leave. All the newspapers attacked the amnesty and presented it as a trap of the communists<sup>100</sup>.

After the disintegration of 1954, the SSC of Rome continued to function with difficulty until April 28, 1956, when the Americans dispersed its members, who represented several organizations and groups.

*The actions of the Americans for the reform of the "Free Albania" Committee in New York*

In April 1956 the Americans, through their representative Enderson, disbanded the "Free Albania" Committee chaired by H. Dosti.

In October 1956, 10 people from the leaders of political emigration were summoned to New York by the "Free Europe" Committee for consultations to reform the "Free Albania" Committee.

- Ndue Gjon Markaj - Vice President of the Independent Bloc
- Vasil Gërmenji - leaning from the Bloc
- Rexhep Krasniqi - was part of the II League of Prizren
- Zef Nikaj - member of the leadership of the Bloc
- Eqrem Telhaj - Katundare Party
- Sotir Avrami - anonte nga Blloku
- Raif Maliqi - anonte from Blloku
- Nuçi Koto - Legality Party
- Gani Hamiti - V.Andoni Agrarian Party
- Qemal Butka - sided with the agrarians

Agrarians and other groups instructed their people who were called for consultations to oppose the formation of the committee on these grounds.

After several meetings, under the leadership of the American Huston, who in 1937-1939 had been the secretary of the American legation in Tirana, and now a functionary of the State Department, on November 23, 1956, the "Free Albania" Committee was reformed, composed of Vasil Gërmenji, Rexhep Krasniqi, Ndue Gjon Markaj, Sotir Avrami and Nexhat Peshkëpia. These were chosen by Huston himself.

Different views emerged during the discussions. In his discussion, Gani Hamiti stressed that the committee was formed in Paris and there was no need to form another committee. He added that the Paris Committee could be expanded and reorganized but not

<sup>99</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 401, Report from the Albanian legation in Italy on the situation of "Albanian reactionary" emigration during 1955, December 30, 1955

<sup>100</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, Report on the activity of Albanian emigration during 1955 until today



create another committee. Gani's proposal was put to a vote and rejected by a majority vote. In protest, Ganiu left the meeting.

Vasal Germenji in his discussion said that he was for the formation of the Committee on an individual basis. Naçi Kota and Eqrem Telkaj stressed that the Committee should be formed on the basis of parties. Ndue John Mark said the Committee should be set up on an individual basis, however he would join those who would get more votes, even on a party basis.

Rexhep Krasniqi, Rauf Maliqi and Zef Nekaj supported V. Germenji's thesis that the Committee be composed on an individual basis.

After the vote, this proposal won with 5 votes in favor and 2 against. Nuçi and Eqrem Telhaj left the talks. After that, the organization "Free Europe" formed a skeleton Committee with three co-chairs Ndue Gjon Marku, Rexhep Krasniqi and Vasil Germenji. According to the Albanian intelligence, the position of Ndue Gjon Marku was approved by both the Independent Bloc and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. The purpose of his opportunistic stance was that, on whatever basis, the Committee be formed. The block was inside it as well as the Italian people<sup>101</sup>.

After that, "Free Europe" asked the Americans to allow Sotir Avram to enter America, who was prevented by the Americans from attending this meeting, and they allowed him. Efforts were made to bring in Qemal Butka and Nexhat Peshkopi, who after some hesitation, agreed to become a member of this Committee. Thus N. Peshkopia, contrary to the decision of his Party (Balli i H. Dosit), participated in the Committee. Free Europe was also making unofficial offers to Ali Këlcyra to participate in the Committee. It, according to the Albanian intelligence, aimed to divide the other groups that were against the decision of "Free Europe" to form the Committee, not on the basis of parties<sup>102</sup>.

Ali was shaking. In order to divide the parties, "Free Europe" has called on people to participate secretly, without first notifying their party. In addition, in order to bring together some group leaders, Free Europe has promised to pay \$ 150 as a salary to group leaders: H. Dosti, A. Kupi, M. Bajraktari, S. Kryeziu, A. Këlcyrë, H. Dosit has refused this help ", informed the Ministry of Interior<sup>103</sup>.

Also, according to the Ministry of Interior, with the aim of rapprochement, "Free Europe" had proposed to A. Kupi, M. Bajraktari and A.Këlcyra that, immediately after the announcement of the Committee, they would form the Military Committee which, according to the promise, will be on a par with the Executive Committee. These had not accepted and stood by the previous views. The other groups saw the formation of the Committee on an individual basis as a tail of the Independent Bloc and as an issue that was directly in the interest of the Italians. In this way, they were waging a great propaganda war against him, and, as a result, their work had had a great effect on the emigration districts, which were increasing every day the discontent against the new Committee<sup>104</sup>.

According to the Ministry of Interior, in the various slogans of these groups, it was said that the Committee was in the hands of the communists V.Gërmenji and R. Krasniqi; that this committee could not help emigration, and that the Americans did not care about Albania and Albanian emigration.

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<sup>101</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 33, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the efforts to reform the Committee "Free Albania"

<sup>102</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 33, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the efforts to reform the Committee "Free Albania"

<sup>103</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 33, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the efforts to reform the Committee "Free Albania"

<sup>104</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 33, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the efforts to reform the Committee "Free Albania"

The group leaders had stated that they would start work on forming a third committee. The Bloc's divergences with other groups and the dissatisfaction of group leaders with the Americans were increasing. The mass of emigration in this situation was disoriented<sup>105</sup>.

The official proclamation of the Committee in March 1957 stated that it would work for the liberation of Albania, the assurance of its territorial integrity and the establishment of a true democracy in the homeland.

In the election of the Albanians who constituted the "Free Albania" Committee, it was considered appropriate to leave aside the political party affiliation, demanding that the members of any party be stripped of their clothes and party uniforms within the Committee. The committee was not against political parties, which it valued and asked for their cooperation and support. It was emphasized that only the need to unite the Albanians in the Committee for the Salvation of the Albanians from communism and any other dictatorship, had made this principle to be maintained without a party. The task of the "Free Albania" Committee would end as soon as the Albanian nation had regained its freedom and expressed its will through free elections. This committee published the newspaper "Albania"<sup>106</sup>.

The New York SCTL tried to unite Albanian political emigrants in exile in America, where it wanted to include the Albanian colony. But this committee, in fact, had no connection and was not sufficiently supported by immigration groups. He had close ties with BKI, so from the first days, there was a crisis. Ballisti Gani Hamiti, a supporter of PADSH, opposed its composition and stated that "there was no need to form such a committee, because it existed in Paris and was headed by A. Ermenji". This view, which was also that of ballistic groups, was not accepted. He left the meeting, and the remaining 7 people started consultations. A. Kupi and N. Kota, according to Zog's order, and S. Kryeziu and M. Bajraktari demanded that the committee be established on a party basis, but V. Germenji opposed this idea and asked for it to be formed on an individual basis, because that would contradictions between groups were avoided.

This was the formula of the Americans to avoid divisions in the Albanian emigration. Most supported this, but N. Kota and Eqrem Telhaj also left.

Following the dispute, the Free Europe Committee adjourned and finally decided to invite other individuals or ask the groups to send delegates.<sup>107</sup>

The Americans decided to include people without party influence and without compromising, in order to avoid quarrels between groups and leaders. So Rexhep Krasniqi, Ndue Gjonmarkaj and Vasil Germenji were elected<sup>108</sup>. This committee was funded by the US together with 12 former members of the Rome SCTL. Some groups demanded that this decision be reconsidered, but no agreement was reached. PADSH initially stated that it did not agree with this committee, as Balli Agrar had its committee in Paris<sup>109</sup>. The Americans, wanting to remove the main obstacle to unification, A. Zogun, charged H. Dostin to mediate. He proposed to Zogu to abdicate in favor of his son Lekë, but Zogu refused<sup>110</sup>. He stated that he was "the only boss and political figure in exile"<sup>111</sup>.

The MFA had information that the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" no longer really existed. He was only A. Ermenji who had stated that "there is a committee but

<sup>105</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 33, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the efforts to reform the Committee "Free Albania"

<sup>106</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 33, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the efforts to reform the Committee "Free Albania"

<sup>107</sup> AMPB, year 1956, file 510, p. 54

<sup>108</sup> AMPB, year 1956, file 510/11, p. 29.58

<sup>109</sup> AMPB, year 1957, file 545, p. 1

<sup>110</sup> AMPB, year 1956, file 1 / 2 f. 68

<sup>111</sup> AMPB, year 1956 file 1 / 2 f. 98

he can not say the names of its members as they are in Greece, Yugoslavia, etc. and can arrest them”<sup>112</sup>.

According to the information of the regime, the Organization "Albanian Patriotic Movement" did not look favorably on the committee of A. Ermenji, as the people who were part of the Albanian Patriotic Movement had previously been on the Committee of H. Dosti. H. Dost's committee continued to have contradictions with that of A. Ermeni.

There were great quarrels between the agrarian ballistas, on the one hand, and the Zogists and the people of Ali Këlcyra, on the other, in the Albanian company that was in Munich, Germany. Thus, one of the agrarian ballistas had killed a supporter of Ali Këlcyra. The American commission that went there for this reason had expelled from the company all the Zogists and a part of Ali Këlcyra's people, replacing them with agrarian ballistas<sup>113</sup>.

H. Dosti was represented in the Assembly of Captive Nations. The Americans did not like A. Ermeni. However, the Abazi committee, through the Agrarian Party, was represented in a number of other organizations, such as the Agrarian International, the Office of Free Journalists, etc.<sup>114</sup>.

Despite the anathema he made to political emigration in any case the regime and its representations informed about patriotic attitudes of political emigration. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed that the newspaper "Besa" had published a news item entitled "Fascists do not forget us and shout we will return to Albania". On the occasion of the administrative elections that took place in Italy, orators of the party "Italian Social Movement" (Fascist Party) had shouted in the public squares of Rome "We will return to Albania." The National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" ordered the Albanians to roll their eyes in front of the toys of Rome”<sup>115</sup>.

In the summer of 1957, the anti-communist press on political emigration continued to be published. The "Free Albania" Committee in America had published its bulletin numbers 2, 3. This was also distributed in Italy. But this Committee, with the exception of the Blocists, had no influence on other political bodies<sup>116</sup>.

The National Independent Bloc had published the newspaper "L'Albanie Libre" only once during this quarter. Its editorial office was headed by E. Koliqi and Viktor Koliqi, Gjin Gjonaj, Petro Vuçani, Dom Zef Droshi, Karl Gurakuqi worked for the newspaper.

The "Albanian Resistance" was also published - the Bulletin of the Democratic Agrarian Committee "Free Albania" in Paris. This organ was held by ballistas.

The newspaper "Besa" had published only one issue. This newspaper was run by Ali Koprencka and Rexhep Mitrovica. She was the right wing of the agrarian ballistae. Many of her articles were by the Ballistas of Rome, V. Andoni and Mr. Paul.

The newspaper "Kosovar Effort". The first issue of this bulletin was published on May 31, 1957. It was published by the Committee "Kosovo League" based in Turkey<sup>117</sup>.

According to the information that the Albanian government had at the beginning of 1957, the "Free Albania" Committee of New York had not gained influence in emigration. Except for the Independent Bloc, he supported no political organization. The agrarians, Balli i Këlcyrë, Balli i Dostit, the villagers of Kryeziu, the Zogists and M. Bajraktari stood firm against”<sup>118</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, Report on the activity of Albanian emigration during 1955 until today

<sup>113</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, Report on the activity of Albanian emigration during 1955 until today

<sup>114</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, Report on the activity of Albanian emigration during 1955 until today

<sup>115</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 392, MFA report on the emigration press in relation to Albania

<sup>116</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Albanian legation in Italy on political emigration, Rome, July 10, 1957

<sup>117</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Albanian legation in Italy on political emigration, Rome, July 10, 1957.

<sup>118</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Rome Legation on "reactionary" emigration, Rome, March 13, 1957.

According to her, the morale of emigration was falling from: the increasing strengthening of the socialist camp and the Albanian communist government in the international arena; from the dissolution of the "Free Albania" Committee and from the defeat for the formation of another committee; from the cutting of financial aid by the Americans; from large divergences between group leaders; and from the very poor condition in the camps where the emigrants were<sup>119</sup>.

In April 1957 a bulletin was published in Rome announcing the formation of a new group called the Voice of Reason. He had set himself the task of reconciling antagonistic groups in Albanian emigration. The Albanian Legation thought that this group included some intellectuals who came from Yugoslavia, among whom prof. Martin Camaj and Father Daniel Gjeçaj<sup>120</sup>.

Meanwhile, Ernest Koliqi in May was appointed vice president of the Independent Bloc instead of Ndue Marakgjoni, who was fired as part of the "Free Albania" Committee.

The Rome Legation also provided detailed and interesting information on the situation of the fugitives in the camps which was as follows<sup>121</sup>:

- The camp in Capua (Caseta) had 58 Albanian families.
- Camp in St. Antonio-Pontecagano near Salerno, 31 Albanian families
- Camp in Trieste - San Sabba, 42 Albanian families
- Camp in Restinco - Brindisi, 24 Albanian families. The situation in this camp was very bad
- Camp in Aversa near Naples, 15 Albanian families
- Camp Farfa Sabbina - 50 km away from Rome, 4 Albanian families. The situation here was very bad. Here were brought the Albanian fugitives whom the Italian authorities had suspicions about.
- Camp in Fraschetti, 4-5 Albanian families the same situation as the camp in Farfa Sabbinas.

After the decision on the forced emigration of Albanian emigrants to Italy to other Western countries, especially in Belgium, the dissatisfaction of emigrants had increased. They knew that hard work awaited them in Belgium<sup>122</sup>.

From the information that Legata had, A. Ermenji's intransigent attitude towards other organizations, especially in France, "not only deepened these divergences, but was also causing members of Balli Agrar to be cold and inactive".

Also, according to her, in the organization of Legality there were two currents, one consisting of young people, led by Gaqo Goga who were for the abdication of Zog in favor of his son. These were called the Monarchist Party. Next, with the elders, with A. Kupi at the helm, who disagreed with the former. According to the Legation, the confrontation between the American and British agencies also affected the Bird Party. The Americans were to leave the old to the young, because among the old there were many who were in the service of English espionage. For this reason, Zog, not only did not agree with the Americans about the people who were appointed to the New York Committee, but did not even recognize this Committee. Legata claimed that "Zogu makes a policy on parties. He preaches the unification of Albanians wherever they are"<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>119</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Rome Legation on "reactionary" emigration, Rome, March 13, 1957.

<sup>120</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Information of Skënder Konica for MFA, Rome, April 26, 1957

<sup>121</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Albanian legation in Italy on political emigration, Rome, July 10, 1957

<sup>122</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Albanian legation in Italy on political emigration, Rome, July 10, 1957

<sup>123</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Information of the Legation in France prepared by Demetrius sent to the MFA, Paris, on May 9, 1957

During 1957, Balli Agrar continued to have contradictions with the "Free Albania" Committee (New York) because it wanted to have a dominant position in this Committee. Traditional contradictions with the Independent Bloc also continued. But the event to be noted was the approach at this time of Zog with John Mark John in Rome. Efforts were made to reorganize Legality. The Rome Legation claimed that "Zog was under American influence, approached the Italians if they recognized the desired rights and did not relinquish English influence"<sup>124</sup>.

### **3.4. The political line of the national front defined at the 1957 congress**

In 1957 the Congress of the National Front was convened, the materials of which were widely published in his newspaper *Flamuri*<sup>125</sup>. The report of this Congress began by honorably mentioning the "Spiritual President" of BK, Mit'hat Frashëri, and by commemorating the thousands of our members who gave their lives in the mountains and plains of the enslaved Homeland, to keep in their hearts the sorrow and longing and those who suffer in the mountains, in prisons and in concentration camps, because they stand bravely like the faithful of the same Flag that knows no bowing". The report said that the last Congress was held in very difficult conditions. The central conversation of that Congress had been the "rape" of the National Committee "Free Albania" and it was added that the situation had to be faced "with the greatest wisdom, wisdom, unity and courage." They praised the resistance of the members of Balli, young and old, soldiers and leaders, "who became one and caused the bankruptcy of those who put their interest above that of the Nation. Thus, the opponents were surprised that they were waiting for the surrender of the National Front, which did not surrender, nor does it surrender before the difficulties, before the hunger, before the blood"<sup>126</sup>.

The report analyzed the political direction and work of the Standing Committee after the Naples Congress. It was pointed out that immediately after the Naples Congress, the Central Committee had taken the decision to continue the great political work of Mit'hat Frashëri. "You stood up and filled the National Democratic Committee" Free Albania ". All the good Albanians were thanked, who had joined BK in the path of honesty and democracy, and thus had contributed to the victories achieved.

It was pointed out that the upheaval of the Committee chaired by H. Dosti had begun immediately: by the power of the Congress of Naples; from the announcement of the continuation of the Committee of Mit'hat Frashëri, under the chairmanship of prof. Abas Ermenjit, and from the publication of the bulletin "Qindresa Shqiptare"; from the organization and work done by other Democrats, especially those from Turkey; from the reaction of all good Albanians; from the memoranda, talks and efforts made by Balli Kombëtar and the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania"<sup>127</sup>.

It was alleged that during the past three years the work done by BK, was realized only with Albanian assistance. It had been much bigger and more fruitful than the work of the "rebuilt" Committee "which took so much money in the weather to do nothing but cause strife, slander and indictment." According to the report, the work and "manly and honorable attitude" of the National Front had caused the demoralization of the opponents, who had started "fighting each other" and even spoke "with admiration" about the Front; the elevation of the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" with the work of the leader and with

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<sup>124</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome on immigration

<sup>125</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>126</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>127</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

the speeches given by the President, prof. Abas Ermenji, and with his activity in the Assembly of Robnueme Nations in Strasbourg, two years in a row; On the other hand, from the publication of the "anti-national" report entitled "The Albanian issue today", printed in the newspaper "Flamuri" it was understood in the light of day that the people of April 7, not only did not repent, but also boasted ahead foreigners even make plans to repeat those times again! There is no doubt that the discovery and publication of this document was the biggest scandal of this emigration and all the arguments of those who defended the Albanians of foreign service were removed from the mouth"; The arrival of Albanians from Yugoslavia and their declaration in large numbers with the National Front and the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" was considered as another blow to the "reconstructed" Committee<sup>128</sup>.

This was how things turned out by the end of 1955. The report stated that during this time, our work of the "Reconstructed" Committee was focused, as we had envisioned, not against the Communists, but against the National Front and the Democratic National Committee of Free Albania". From these failures of the "rebuilt" Committee even the friends had seen that it was no longer valuable but harmful. Thus, on April 28, 1956, the "friends" convened the "reconstructed" Committee in Rroma and informed it that they considered it disbanded and would no longer provide assistance until then. Inevitably, with the withdrawal of aid, the "rebuilt" Committee fell suddenly, because it could no longer stand. BK described this as a proof that had confirmed his predictions and that the truth that BK had revealed these three years had come to light.<sup>129</sup>

Under Okelian "Another Test: Another Committee" was said to be currently another phase of the Committee's case. It was said that there were foreign friendly circles that wanted to give all their support to the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" under the chairmanship of prof. Abas Ermenjit, because "they knew and understood how much he represents in the field of sound ideas, how many followers he has in the Albanian world and how much work he has done for the Albanian cause and for the anti-communist issue of democracy"<sup>130</sup>. However, the report emphasizes, it was not easy for everyone to recognize and recognize the mistakes and damages caused and thus to overcome immediately and with a rush from the "reconstructed" Committee to the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania". In addition, there was "the bad interest of some neighbors who do not want to see the Albanian issue well and thus indirectly hinder any good path that the issue of the Albanian Committee can take". And so, "foreign friends seem to have recently leaned towards a solution to get the job done, but qi has no value, and it will be harmful: they intend to form a kind of" Working Committee "'s supposedly unknown people and named from Free Europe. These will only be as clerks and will do the work they are commanded to do. There may be compromised people there, but these will be called non-partisan"<sup>131</sup>.

Balli Kombëtar declared that it could no longer stand idly by, when it saw that the Albanian issue was being treated in this way. According to him, "a National Committee is and should be the power of the will of a people to whom it should lead towards liberation and independence." And this Committee had to be built on the basis of groups or parties that had organized the "resistance to freedom". Albania should also have a representative committee, like all other nations, represented in exile and not just a "working committee" as a name<sup>132</sup>.

The report stated that "Balli Kombëtar belongs to Albanian history: without Balli the soul and content of all Albanian anti-communist resistance are taken away. There is no need to emphasize here that from Kosovo to the end of the South of Albania, in Albanian

<sup>128</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>129</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>130</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>131</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>132</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

Chameria, is the Flag of the National Front, the only opponent of the red flag”<sup>133</sup>. Of course, without questioning BK's nationalism, this was a one-sided presentation of the truth and in a partisan prism.

BK stated that he had performed his duty, had explained to "friends" that Balli Kombëtar did not know any other Committee, except the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania", which he considered to be the same committee founded by Midhat Frashëri in 1949 "and that he would work around this committee. He would continue this path without hesitation and thus, for the National Ball, there was not and was not a problem for the formation of a new Committee. For him there was "only one political representation honored and valued by the Albanian people and this representation is the National Democratic Committee" Free Albania”<sup>134</sup>. BK expressed confidence that even this new test that "our friends" wanted to do would end sooner than the first and would not have a long life. According to BK, it took many years "to persuade foreign friends to declare themselves against communism; it will take some time to convince them that only established, sound and nationally organized forces can work against slavery”<sup>135</sup>.

According to the report, many foreign friends had so far reached satisfactory conclusions for BK and this was "more important than the establishment and reduction of such committees". The findings of these friends and their thoughts in the report were summarized as follows:

- "Balli Kombëtar is the Albanian party that seeks to westernize Albania with sound principles and reforms;
- The opponents of the National Front are people who are offered to anyone;
- The accusations against Balli Kombëtar are not believed by a wise man.”<sup>136</sup>

BK underlined that the right political path was certainly the most difficult path. But Balli Kombëtar was born in a time of serious problems and could not go any other way "except to seek to develop and decipher with wisdom and courage the problems that come before the path of freedom of the Nation, do not be afraid from the difficulties and do not deviate from the path of honor, the path of the Homeland ”.

The report also analyzed the internal situation of the National Front, and its activity and organization. It was emphasized that Balli Kombëtar in exile was the strongest, most organized, most determined and coherent party in what it preaches. From the previous Congress to the current one, Balli's powers had increased and BK had 200 more members. There was no doubt that all those who came from Yugoslavia and had not become tools of the Yugoslav police were members or friends of the National Front. BK had 28 committees and provincial representations scattered throughout the Free World. Everyone gathered and stood strong, "with mind and heart" around the Flag of Mit'hat Frashëri. It was argued that the work of the Provincial Committees lay neither in the election of these Committees nor in the payment of the voluntary tax. Each member worked and had to work in his circle to spread and explain the ideas of the National Front and the right path for the good of Albania. to increase the interest of foreigners in our affairs and to increase the care and courage among Albanians for sound deeds for the benefit of the Homeland ”.

One of the most important tasks of the Provincial Committee was the regular collection of voluntary donations from members. In the Free World parties these aids were regulated and the one who did not contribute was not called a regular member. The report said that Balli Kombëtar had not set such rules, because it knew that its members had a conscience

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<sup>133</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>134</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>135</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>136</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

of duty and that "the members have done this task and have come out with a blank page". In addition to the regular monthly assistance, it was emphasized that many members had given a salary of a week or more for Balli and thus "would be an honor in the history of Albanian parties, when it is written that in exile qi caused us communist dictatorship, the only one was Balli Kombëtar who stood alone with the help and sweat of his members and worked with this help for the good of Albania, to be completely independent and to always aim at the interest of the country"<sup>137</sup>.

The problem of Albanians fleeing Albania, the report said, had always preoccupied the BK Central Committee. Especially the situation of Albanians fleeing Yugoslavia was treated with the utmost care. The food and clothing aid packages sent by BK members to the refugees in Yugoslavia had made a great impression and brought to light the Albanian solidarity. It was also said to have been the result of the effort of all Balli members that most Ballistas were able to get out of the camps and emigrate to the US, Australia, Canada and elsewhere. The problem of Albanians fleeing to Yugoslavia had begun to be solved by their transfer to the West (France, Belgium and Italy). BK had high hopes that this work would continue and yield positive results. BK also thanked on this occasion the charitable societies and the American, Italian, French and Belgian authorities for the good reception and generosity they had shown to the anti-communist Albanians.<sup>138</sup>

The increase in members in America and elsewhere was said to have increased the power of the National Front and the possibility of this party remaining materially independent, "as long as this unwanted exile continues." Everywhere BK members were said to have stood out from other groups in their efforts and praise went to everyone. Even with risks and threats, in some European countries, the members of BK had given "the test of determination and inflexibility in terms of the interests of the country and have worked only for Albania, to show with facts that the ballists are agents only of the Homeland"<sup>139</sup>.

The report highlighted the great difficulties of the work of the Central Committee of the KB. Opponents were said to have spread the word that "Central had deposited thousands of dollars! "But you know that on the day we refused to take part in the 'reconstructed' Committee, we did not have the 'capital' to accumulate in the coffers, because the money has always been used for Balli's multifaceted activity." This situation was said to have been dealt with with the help of BK members. "The Standing Committee had decided not to drop the Flag in the face of any situation and resistance, not only did it win, but put in place the national honor to be shaken by irresponsible politicians."<sup>140</sup>

Duke analizuar shtypin e Ballit Kombëtar, në raport thuhej se kishte vazhduar botimi i gazetës The flag, which he described as "the best newspaper in exile, well received and read with interest by foreigners, in addition to Albanian, also had articles and writings in English, French and Italian." The publication of the Bulletin "Lettre d'Albanie" started by Mithat Frashëri, "as the first candle that illuminated the Albanian situation and interested the foreign world in the events of enslaved Albania". This newsletter was published in English, French and Italian and was also published as a supplement to the newspaper "Flamuri". BK had assisted in the publication of the bulletin "Albanian Centuries" of the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" which was published in three languages (Albanian, English and French) and, as stated in the report, "we have become the honored body of Albanian democracy"<sup>141</sup>.

<sup>137</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>138</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>139</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>140</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>141</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.



The Provincial Committee of BK in Turkey had given its valuable contribution to the life and activity of the Albanian colony of Istanbul, to the organization of the Turkish-Albanian Society and to the publication of the newspaper "Besa".

On the other hand, the Detroit Provincial Committee had started again the publication of the temporary "Servant of Albania" which was the only magazine in exile of the Albanian youth. The publication of the magazine was aided by articles and financial assistance from Balli members<sup>142</sup>.

Thus more than 12,000 copies of newspapers and magazines, published or assisted by BK, were periodically published and distributed in foreign offices, libraries, societies, foreign authorities, as well as Albanians everywhere<sup>143</sup>. All this work was done and was done only with the support and assistance of the Albanians, because the Albanians, "not only those who have fled the enslaved homeland, but also those who want the country for many years, have well understood that the war of the press is the most important struggle is to remember the duties of our compatriots and the rights of the foreign world".

Analyzing the situation in Albania, it was said that the ranks of the National Front in the homeland had increased a lot with new elements and this had greatly preoccupied the "red leaders". "Tracts have continued and continue to be distributed with great courage even though those who are dictated know that they have at least severe imprisonment!" It was alleged that the SNP had tried to stop the spread of Balli's ideas in schools, "to bring communist students to the dormitories to persuade them to investigate the Ballists and to fight and threaten them". "But the work of young people continues stronger. Also, if one day a bloody demonstration like the one in Poznan and Budapest is repeated in Albania, which will mark the beginning of the end of communist terrorism, that day will be wet and it will see the Flag of the National Front at the top."<sup>144</sup>

Pohohej se gjendja e partisë komuniste mbas Kongresit të Moskës e sidomos mbas The Hungarian uprising had become even more insecure. Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu had the situation in hand, because the communists, upset by Russia, were more afraid of Yugoslavia, which they had experienced before 1948. It was stressed that the political and economic bankruptcy of the communist government was obvious and the criticism had "shot even within the party". The two red dictators were always holding power with punches, imprisonment and persecution. "They try to please Moscow in every way and without any interest in the present and future ladies. "From the uncertainty and the bad internal situation, the communists are looking for relations with Greece and Italy."

The report stated that "it is a big mistake to think that Hoxha and Shehu, in case of danger, will return from the West".

It was emphasized that the amnesty of Tirana, which was announced with the bad intention to demoralize the ranks of emigration, had completely failed due to the work and propaganda of the National Front and the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania". The report noted that the clash between communism and democracy was an international issue. A new period had begun in the last three years characterized by these events:

- The death of Stalin and the quarrel of his descendants
- The suicide of the Soviet dictatorship with the discovery of unprecedented barbarism in history, made by Khrushchev at the Moscow Congress.
- The uprising of the Robnuem Nations with the heroic example of Hungary, communism against the workers.

<sup>142</sup>G FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>143</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>144</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

BK assessed with negative marks the detente policy of Western countries towards the USSR and the Communist Bloc. According to him, throughout this period, the great Democracies had not known how to benefit. BK stressed that a tendency in the west was: "Let them wait until communism falls from within, after the extinction of the revolutionary spirit, the opening of bureaucracy and the spread of the red empire will bring with it the destruction of Soviet Russia." Others seek to defeat Russia in the industrial and manufacturing race, the report said. "There are some who still deal with crap and say that peaceful coexistence and active or passive neutrality are needed"<sup>145</sup>.

After that BK announced his point of view and purpose. "It seems that few people are clear about what communism is and what we did against it. Among the few, George Meany, president of the American Trade Unions, uses the sharpest language and seeks the strongest means to eradicate the plague of mankind. It is the workers and not the politicians and capitalists who have waged the strongest coup against communism"<sup>146</sup>.

It was said, on the other hand, that it was certainly not an easy thing to take responsibility for a war, and the great Democracies were boasting that they were not and never had been the ones who had fired the first rifle among the world wars. "Politicians like to believe the good words that the masters of lies and smiles pour. We are not the ones who will teach the greats of the world what to do, but on the other hand, we have a duty to seek help for our peoples who want to liberate themselves. It is wrong to insist that a stronger Russia will endure Tito's or Gomulka's communism longer"<sup>147</sup>. "Qi defends the cause, if it turns out ugly, it gets ridiculous images for qi people do not have time to laugh, said BK."<sup>148</sup>

### ***3.4.1. BK's attitude towards the "Free Albania" Committees***

In the tense political situation created as a result of the efforts for the reorganization of KSHL Balli Kombëtar, through his newspaper Flamuri, presented his views, making a broad analysis of the Committees that had been created on behalf of the Albanian cause since World War II. It was emphasized that the Liberation Committees could be called political groups created in times of emergency, danger or rescue, for Albanian interests or for foreign interests. But time had proved that every unnatural grouping or union had been destroyed in the first or second steps, because even the nature of a committee "is connected with flesh and soul with. This article first analyzed the Committee for the Salvation of Albania created in Mukaj by the representatives of the National Front and the National Liberation Movement. Explaining the circumstances of the establishment of this Committee, it was emphasized that it was established at a time when fascism had just fallen and all the people demanded unity for the expected liberation. Allied missions also insisted on unification. Balli Kombëtar, like the Christian Democrats later in Italy, presented its principles to the "national-liberators", took the presidency and the responsible positions. This agreement was stated in the article to be broken by Dushan's order and it was emphasized that "we do not know if there was a ballist house that despised Dushan! We only know that the hand of a Kosovar ballist who laid Dusan's friend, Miladin Popovic, on the ground in Prishtina!). It went on to say, "The civil war broke out in September 1943. Balli Kombëtar stood and fought alone, for more than a year, leaving over 6,000 martyrs in the field of men. A part of the exponents of Balli, led by Midhat Frashëri, left Albania at the end of November 1944, in a blue boat in Shkodra, overcoming the threats and obstructions of those who were connected with Mihajlovi serb's Serbs and the Germans. The rest, with Professor Abas Ermenji at the head, with the Kazaz, Sadikkjat,

<sup>145</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>146</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>147</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>148</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees"

Noshaj, Dusharët, Koshenat, Nuret, etc. all to be sacrificed, continued the war in the country. They had the opportunity to leave. Qindruen".<sup>149</sup>

As an antithesis of the above-mentioned committee was presented the Prizren Committee which was established a year after the proclamation of the National Committee "Free Albania", when the Yugoslav communists, who had broken with Moscow and thus with Tirana, in 1948, gathered the Albanians of fled to historic Prizren, and announced a "Committee for the liberation of Albania from the yoke of Enver Hoxha"! This Committee was said to be attended by some dissident Albanian communists, who were called "xoxists" by the name of Koçi Xoxe. Other migrants housed in Yugoslavia were also forced to attend. All this organization was done by Dushan Mugosha, Tito's Commissar once with Enver Hoxha, who had appointed the "drunkard" Apostol Tanefi as chairman. The imposed and proclaimed goals of this committee were "to bring Albania into the Yugoslav framework, as it was before 1948, and to bring to power a Titoist communist party".<sup>150</sup>

The committee was said to have been organized, "according to the red system, meetings, squads, publications." Many troops had entered Albania to carry out the propaganda of the uprising. Apostle Tanefi himself had once stated to a French correspondent that under his orders were almost 50,000 warriors ready to march on Tirana. "Our national tragedies, the article emphasized, did not lack comedians!" But neither Tanefi's fantasy, nor the efforts of Belgrade and Athens were enough to overthrow Enver Hoxha "even strengthened him".

It was emphasized that Balli Kombëtar had tried in every way to clarify the Albanians in Yugoslavia and in Albania. On the other hand, the "Free Albania" Committee had become a major attraction for the Albanians sheltered in Yugoslavia. The work of the Prizren Committee was paralyzed. Dushani was forced to attack Balli Kombëtar more in meetings and speeches than against Enver Hoxha's Stalinism. Belgrade radio and newspapers did the same thing against BK. Even in exile, Tito's representatives had tried to bring Albanians closer to their committee. They had gone to Turkey, to Syria, to Rome and elsewhere. Cedo Mijovic went to Rome, where he met with the leaders of the Bloc. "In Tivoli, mahogany was laid." It was emphasized that the people of the Bloc had approached Chedo "asking him to hand over the power of the liberated Albania to them". In Pristina, later, it was said that Cedo Mijovic was "a mockery of the claimants to the throne!" But it was also added that "despite all this, Tito's representative did not convince the Bloc's pride that he had sought them out as the weakest of Albanian emigration. On the contrary, it filled them with the illusion that Tito also knew their power! Even from Turkey, two Zogists secretly took the road to Yugoslavia. They returned ashamed."<sup>151</sup> It was further emphasized that the work and noise of the Prizren Committee had decreased and in this lethargic state he had found Stalin's death and the change of Russian tactics and policy towards Yugoslavia.<sup>152</sup>

The Reconstruction Committee in Rome was also the subject of this analysis. It was said that in 1953 the National Committee "Free Albania" fell into crisis. This crisis was said to have started from the absolute meaning that the representatives of the two great democracies had in the committee for the word "union". The crisis had also begun with enlargement initiatives taken by some shallow member of the Committee executive. She was also aggravated by "disgusting spying".<sup>153</sup> Thus things had rolled to such an extent that in November 1953 "foreign friends", at a general meeting in Rome, "imposed a committee where almost all the representatives of dictatorships met." In addition, they laid down some

<sup>149</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>150</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>151</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>152</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>153</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

rules and principles that the National Front could not accept at all, without denying itself and the cause of freedom”<sup>154</sup>.

It was emphasized that at that time there were opinions that these insistences on "unification" were antecedents of important plans and actions in Albania. "We are able to emphasize that all this work was done, is being done, because there is no plan for liberation and democracy for our country," said the BK newspaper. Thus, according to her, all the work that the "Reconstructed" Committee had done for three years, had been the war against the National Front and against the Democratic National Committee. "War and against each other. Communism thus had three years of calm and easy play from the parasitic offspring with the rubber back”<sup>155</sup>.

It was said that the war against the National Front this time had begun with accusations of being extremist and anti-American. "These two slanders always continue. Maybe because the plaintiffs did not find out that an American commission has disparagingly rejected these ridiculous slanders. This is how the times came: Those who during the Second World War accused us and imprisoned us as agents of the Americans today present us as their opponents! The reconstructed committee fell inside the bomb of the National Front. He collapsed as soon as he was touched by the kick of a foreign friend. This shameful fall once again proved the power of the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania”<sup>156</sup>.

Evaluating positively the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" it was said that BK had no other choice, "but to keep the Midhat Frashëri Committee on its feet.”<sup>157</sup> The National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" under the chairmanship of the fighter prof. Abas Ermenjiti, was described as "the manifestation of Albanian independence and freedom in exile, the pillar on which the flag of the centurion was raised and held high". It was emphasized that he had been understood in Albania and had been assisted in exile. "Friends and enemies boasted about it. Since it is the only liberation organization that guarantees Albanian democracy for a free, accurate and honorable development”<sup>158</sup>.

The article stated that "foreign interventions are not difficult to convince that Balli Kombëtar qi fought in Albania despite the harmful allied councils, continues in a wider circle with the National Democratic Committee" Free Albania "the right path, without having any desire to spoil the honor of our esteemed friends. Those who lead it, those who follow the Albanian Democratic Committee are convinced that the political evidence of these years will clarify the situation more and more. The qi goal, which is not achieved by squata reviews, will be achieved through spontaneous eliminations. With the failure of the weak and futile efforts, it will be understood how simple and measured was the way of Midhat Frashëri, our way, and how much confusion and trouble was caused by those who, if they wanted a committee with eyebrows, opened their eyes.”<sup>159</sup>

The article described as "another committee" Free Albania "non-national" the one created in New York after the "Reconstructed" Committee was ousted with one third of the votes of a meeting of 9 people, "who were asked to represent only vehten. They have the courage to represent Albania and guarantee us liberation (!), Freedom and democracy! This is despite the fact that the statute of the Assembly of Nations of Robinhoem does not accept committees that are not formed on the basis of political parties.”<sup>160</sup>

<sup>154</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>155</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>156</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>157</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>158</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>159</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>160</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

The article stated that "there are reasons why Albanians ridicule these Committees. "It's ridiculous that this could not be the anti-communist effort." The creation of a National Committee in exile based on parishes that had come out of Albania, "for better or for worse, has been a beginning of democracy, a mirror, a promise for the Albania of tomorrow that the times of dictatorships will not be repeated, the times of a foreign party, not even the times of adventurers ". It was also stated that "Albanian anti-communist resistance has left Albania after bloody wars. It was not formed in exile as a tumor outside the national body. The people and especially the youth know, appreciate, follow. The ideas that this centenary has planted in Albania have grown and circulated through the roads and paths of the Homeland. "Do not understand the rapprochement of ideas, the importance of sacrifices, do not turn the flags into the fortress of national resistance without toys and not a war against communism."

The article ended with the rhetorical question: How can a centurion in the Homeland judge a strange "instability" in exile?"<sup>161</sup>

On the tenth anniversary of the "Free Albania" Committee, the newspaper *Flamuri* published a long headline in which it made its history and analyzed this important organization of Albanian emigration. Recalling August 26, 1949, the newspaper wrote that "that unforgettable day, the honorable President Midhat Frashëri, led the authoritative voice of the Albanians to unite, against the communist tyranny"<sup>162</sup>.

An interesting analysis was made of the situation of that time. The newspaper wrote that at that time Albania was in danger. The communist government of Tirana was left alone and exposed in front of the Greek army, which had broken Markos's army and was seeking to cross the Albanian border. Tito, who until 1948 had pushed Enver Hoxha on dangerous adventures, had broken away from Moscow. It was then said that the Greek General Staff had convinced General Van Fleet that in order to suppress the communist uprising they had to pursue the rebels on Albanian soil, not to let them reorganize. Marshal Papagos's plan cleverly hid the evil intention to enter southern Albania and not leave. The newspaper added that "fortunately, there were American journalists and diplomats with authority, as if Lipman qi discovered and fought this Greek slash, while President Truman refused to create further injustices to the detriment of Albania"<sup>163</sup>.

It is interesting that *Flamuri* highly praised the resistance of the Albanian army in August 1949. "The resistance shown by the Albanian army against the Greek attack in the summer and autumn of 1949 was a clear proof of the national will to protect the borders and we truncated it so many times", wrote *Flamuri*<sup>164</sup>. But he correctly wrote that the communists made good use of this feeling, "although Stalin at that time had not promised his agents in Tirana any help in case of danger from the south."

It was also said that there were rumors in the north that Tito had mobilized a part of the Albanians under the leadership of Gani Kryeziu to overthrow the regime in Tirana and this intensive propaganda had created a great uncertainty for the fate of the country<sup>165</sup>.

Thus, the creation of the "Free Albania" Committee "came to the aid of the Albanian cause at the most critical time, when the enemies were not only on the communist side, and a change of the geographical map meant: the end of Albania!" For this reason, Mit'hat Frashëri's Committee "made a strong distinction between the communists and the national will in terms

<sup>161</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper no. 90-91, 15 August 1957, article "Liberation Committees".

<sup>162</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" *Free Albania* "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>163</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" *Free Albania* "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>164</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" *Free Albania* "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>165</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" *Free Albania* "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

of liberation, freedom, independence and partisanship, the value of taking responsibility for the riots from Tirana to Moscow".

According to Flamur, with the intervention of the diplomacy of the Great Powers, the Greek Prime Minister Diomidis "was more prudent towards the Committee and in terms of the absurd demands of the Greeks". Tensions on the southern border were said to have fallen with the collapse of Marcos's army, while in the North "the case of Gani Kryeziu, inspired more by the communists, reached a tragic end"<sup>166</sup>.

The newspaper was noticing this difficult time for the regime of Enver Hoxha, who inside the country was at war with the group of Koçi Xoxa and abroad was in a critical situation "passed without decisive actions for liberation, after, by the Albanian resistance, the fear of the neighbors paralyzed the will of the courageous ventures, while on the side of the Allies lacked positive initiatives in due time to curb the greed and plans of fragmentation or annexation of the two neighbors of the land"<sup>167</sup>.

This was an interesting analysis of this situation seen in the light of the feelings and interests of Albanian nationalism. Although it had many valid arguments it was nevertheless incomplete and did not include all the survival factors of the regime.

The author of this article, Zef Pali, who had been one of the main leaders of the Committee, also gave some impressions and memories of that time. He claimed that on the afternoon of August 26, the French government gave a reception in honor of the Committee and during this honor the leaders of the Committee were asked many questions such as: "If Albania is liberated and free elections are held, what percentage of votes can to win the National Ball?" Mr. Paul had replied that he would win "Certainly more than half"; "Which regime would the Albanians prefer, the Republic or the Monarchy?" Mr. Paul had replied that "I need to clarify in advance which monarchy and which republic we are talking about. Because, if we examine the past monarchy, Albanians do not look for crown dictators; if we talk about the communist republic, no Albanian accepts it. Balli Kombëtar is for a republic that must emerge from free elections"<sup>168</sup>.

That same night, the leaders of the Committee had left by plane for London, where they were warmly welcomed by the friends of Albania, diplomats, journalists. "I was close whenever Midhat Frashëri talked to politicians and press representatives. He defended the cause of Albania so beautifully, he gave such thorough explanations about the shadows that others had cast on poor Albania, that until the diplomatic correspondent of "Times" remained open-mouthed!"<sup>169</sup>

Zef Pali emphasized that the friends in the organized reception, put us in contact with many representatives of British thought and politics, who asked us and listened to us carefully. "Surprisingly, we investigated then, Greece had too much sympathy in England because of the bravery it showed against the fascist occupation, while Albania, because of the communists, was considered very little, even where it was right!" A journalist, after the Albanian leaders had rejected with arguments all the Hellenic demands, had stated that "The Greeks have a certain right when they seek Southern Albania, after they have left many soldiers against fascism in this area!"<sup>170</sup>. "We replied that Albania and no other nation can

<sup>166</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>167</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>168</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>169</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>170</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

pay with their own land the patriotism that they claimed and the duty that the Greeks did towards their country to be attacked."

The next day, Radio London invited Mit'hat Frashëri to speak to Albanians on the radio. "Lumoja had the text ready immediately and had submitted it for registration. One of the members of the Committee asked to review it in advance and to change the text of the Chairman's speech"<sup>171</sup>. The same day all the members of the Committee were invited to the BBC. "Everyone was stunned and almost in tears from the grandeur of the words and the touch of the moment. Njani asked me anxiously: "Has the President changed his speech?". "No, I answered, but you have changed!"<sup>172</sup>.

Hapi i parë që bëri Komiteti ishte përgatitja e një "karte", ku të përmbledheshin parimet and the basic directions of his activity. The Albanian intellectuals of London also worked for this, with whom a large press conference was prepared.

After the calls were distributed, Mr. Paul wrote "surprisingly we were advised to leave this conference once again, which was not held anymore!"

These days, the Foreign Minister of Greece had come to London, who, in Paris, "had falsely expelled all Albanian traitors! He used our words against the communists. He used the slanders of the communists against us !! " From many meetings and explanations, Mr. Paul recalled the words of Julian Emery at a luncheon near London: "I can not say these words to the mayor, but to say them to you as a young man. You probably expect everything from strangers; ask what we are doing. You have to take the initiatives yourself, you have to show your will and your way, you have to attract great friends where the interests of your noble country beg"<sup>173</sup>.

From London the members of the Committee departed in two groups by plane to New York and from there went to Washington. Here, too, he wrote, "The honor we received was great. The doors of baking were opened for us with politicians and journalists. We visited senators and deputies, and we were warmly welcomed everywhere. The President presented the Albanian issue with the ability of a diplomat to try and won a lot of sympathy"<sup>174</sup>.

A great reception was given to them in Washington by the other Liberation Committees. The meeting was chaired by Peter ekekoslovak, who introduced the Albanian representatives with many vocal people and representatives of the State Department. The committee distributed to the press an announcement informing the American world about the Albanian issue. "We were told that President Truman himself is personally interested in Albania."

Mr. Pali wrote that "the greatest enthusiasm that aroused the establishment of the Committee was seen in enslaved Albania. Ever since the proclamation of Paris and especially since the conquest of London, a tremor, a revival was felt in the Albanian body. The world kissed on the street with joy and asked each other: "When are they coming?". In Durrës, in Vlona along the sea shore, eyes were fixed on the ships that would seek freedom!"<sup>175</sup>. Secret letters began to be published in Tirana, in Korça, in Berat. "The gangs started to feel the mountains. Along with this feverish movement were heard the firing of bullets on the first martyrs of the Committee. The conspiracy theorists called traitors those who were slaughtered

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<sup>171</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>172</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>173</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>174</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>175</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

for Albania, for freedom, for the red and black flag. The men died bravely with guns in their hands, like Hysni Lepenica, like Kole Tromara, like Ndoc Jakova. The death row inmates replied to the Red Cats: "We do not ask for it, nor do we want your forgiveness." The prisoners were returning from their forced labor to sing loudly in the middle of the cities: "Enough in captivity, poor Albania!"<sup>176</sup>

### **3.5. An interesting and controversial BKI political platform**

In July 1957, a group of Albanian political emigrants to Italy (in fact, these were the supporters of BI) drafted a memorandum which was distributed to a number of Italian, Christian Democrat and right-wing MPs. This copy was sent to him by the Albanian legation in Rome on 30.07.1957<sup>177</sup>.

The aforementioned document was divided into several chapters dealing with specific issues. He began with the chapter The Issue of Albania, and first analyzed the mutual positions of Italy and Albania.

It was emphasized that the Adriatic coast of Southern Italy always remained endangered by an enemy ruler of Italy who would own the Albanian coast. Therefore, one of the most important strategic ways to secure Italian territory passed today through Albania. "Those who know these obvious truths remain astonished in the face of the indifference of the rulers of today's Italy, as far as the Albanian issue is concerned, which, since 1945 onwards, has not been given due importance."<sup>178</sup>

It was underlined that any of those in charge of current Italian politics who considered the Albanian question as a compromising legacy of fascist imperialism, "fell into the foxy arguments used by Italy's enemies, who want to delay Italy's rise to the place it deserves in the Bay of Powers. European ". The document stated that "fascism did nothing but break a long tradition of Italian-Albanian politics. This policy began around 1880, when after national unification took place, Italy began to participate in international politics. Crispi, Guiciardini and other mentioned Italian people, up to Gioliti and Sonnino, followed a stable and efficient political line, based on Di San Giuliano's short propaganda expression: "In Albania, none, otherwise, we"<sup>179</sup>. Albanian emigrants underlined that from this opinion came the support of Albania, especially through the work of the passionate Albanians of Italy at the beginning of the moral and spiritual renaissance and, later, the political of the small friendly state beyond the Adriatic.

It was pointed out that fascism continued for several years the wise and far-sighted policy, so well summarized by San Giuliano, but then interrupted it with the unpopular aggression of April 7, 1939. Interesting in this document was also the attempt to justify cooperation with the Italian occupiers during the war. . The document stated: "The Albanian friends of Italy, protesting against this violation of a tradition of fraternal solidarity, reinforced by common interests, accepted the fact committed as the least evil, in a stormy time of European history. The friends of Italy themselves, aware that they serve the common Italian-Albanian cause, had the courage to seek and achieve the goal of Mussolini himself, to

<sup>176</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 109-112, Main article "The tenth anniversary of the Committee" Free Albania "Committee of Midhat Frashëri" written by Zef Pali.

<sup>177</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>178</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>179</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.



abolish the Albanian Fascist Party which ceased to operate in March 1943. The indictment which was done to the friends of Italy as supporters of the fascist aggression of Albania, did nothing but impoverish the Italian policy of traditional and centuries-old cooperation, which even today puts Italy in conditions that, if it is known to use the opportunities offered, will be able to cope with the events of any time"<sup>180</sup>.

As critically as it can be seen and commented on, this definition, which seems to have largely reflected the essence of the Independent Bloc's policy, is worth noting for putting such a fundamental issue in a different light.

The above-mentioned document analyzed another issue: Albania's relations with other neighboring countries<sup>181</sup>. It was emphasized that Yugoslavia had ambitions to replace Habsburg Austria in terms of the Albanian state. She knew deeply the mentality and spirit of the Albanian people, she had the advantage that she surrounded Albania with 430 km of border line, in addition to the great opportunities offered by the fact that, within its borders there were over one million Albanians under the yoke, among whom could be found easily agents of its expansionist policy.

According to Albanian political emigrants, the main goal of Titoite politics today was the unification of the Albanian state with 1 million and more Kosovars under the yoke, in a Federal People's Republic with other Yugoslav republics. The incredible development that has been given recently to the Albanian language and literature in Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro proved the Titoist goal, to make the subjugated Albanian population a center of attraction for the "old Albania". Until 1941, "Old Albania" with the support of Italy, had sought to attract (and for a short time succeeded) the Albanians of Yugoslavia in its bosom. Now Tito skillfully seeks to reverse roles"<sup>182</sup>.

The document claimed that at this time, Yugoslavia was holding about 7,000 Albanian refugees, giving them the same rights as Yugoslav citizens. More than 200 Albanian students of non-captive Albania were enrolled in schools of any type and category. The most capable among the refugees had joined the military, ready to operate inland, under the command of General Dushan Mugosha<sup>183</sup>.

This document also analyzed Greek politics and said that Greece, always based on religious hatred and, combining the religious issue with the ethnic and national, forced the Orthodox Albanians to register in the northern Epirus associations, which also had trained wards. militarily. The document claimed that the British favored Tito's intentions and would be willing to make concessions in Albania to the Greeks if they did not show much disagreement on the Cyprus issue<sup>184</sup>.

Analyzing the current situation of Albania and the Albanians, the memorandum stated that in order to successfully address the Albanian issue, the three sides that constituted it had to be taken into account: Albania as a state, Albania as a captive and Albanian emigration. Neither of these three sides could be influenced if the other two were not taken into account. Of course in each one of them, one had to intervene appropriately<sup>185</sup>.

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<sup>180</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

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<sup>182</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

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<sup>184</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>185</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

The Stalinist leaders of Albania, declared so for the simple fact that Stalinism expressed anti-Titism, lived with the anxiety that the Soviet Union's rapprochement with Yugoslavia, as it had been until 1948, could shake the current regime and compromise its future. Albania.

The enslaved Albanians, deceived by the development that Tito gave to the Albanian culture, were forced to prefer the current situation, which they considered the best in all aspects, from the one that existed in the People's Republic of Albania.

The document stated that the Albanian political emigration had not yet found a center of gravity between it to gather and organize. The immaturity of US policy, the indifference of Italy, the intense Soviet propaganda, the intrigues of some Albanian groups paid by the powers that have interests to keep the Albanian issue confused and in a vague confusion, to eventually use Albania as a "currency" "exchange", have so far prevented Albanians who think well to work with in favor of a fair solution to the issue of their homeland"<sup>186</sup>.

The memorandum analyzed even more concretely the situation of Albanian political emigration. It was pointed out that Albanians abroad were divided, especially into many parties and groups that, bloatedly, called themselves parties. The most important of them were:

- "The Independent National Bloc, led by the friends of Italy. It has almost the same programmatic bases of the center-right democratic parties. It is based on the binomial "tradition and culture" and is simply pro-Western.
- Z Zogist Party, divided into three factions, in disagreement between them.
- Balli Kombëtar, divided into three groups.
- Other political groups exist only as a name"<sup>187</sup>.

Among the aforementioned political parties it was said that the Zogists had a tendency for an agreement with Italy, an agreement that had to be checked, as their goal was to return to the unfortunate positions of fascist politics of 1925-1939. A. Ermenji's Balli group was said to be Italianophobic and for 4 years, was also anti-American. He was backed by Intelligence Service agents and held with the money of the Union of Protestant Churches. "The undeserved support given to this group by the Napoleonic Committee of Christian Democracy, through the Secretary, prof. Barbie, for whom they had certainly taken advantage of the ignorance of successive Albanian events, had astonished Italy's friends and amused many enemies"<sup>188</sup>.

The document also analyzed the possibility of an Italian action. It was emphasized that all Albanians, even those who were not very lenient with Italian politics, accepted that Italy today was the only country that, officially, in international affairs, defended with a naked sword the territorial integrity and independence of Albania. In addition, they knew that Italy had always helped the strength of the Albanian spirit"<sup>189</sup>.

It was emphasized that Albanian literature was reborn in Italy through the work of the great De Rada. Even from the period of various Italian occupations, "Albanians kept the memory of the great humanism and generosity of the Italians. "They were also convinced that Italy would save them from the aggressive intentions of Yugoslavia and Greece, so they were ready to accept Italian support, convinced that it would not deviate from the main path of

<sup>186</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>187</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>188</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>189</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

national interests." On the other hand, it was pointed out that "undoubtedly, the friends that Italy has between Albania, are the largest, most influential, most expert and, above all, those who take the side of other powers interested in the cause of their homeland. . But Italy, so far, has done nothing to implement its valuable friendship and to put its opportunities in the international political arena"<sup>190</sup>.

The memorandum ended with these recommendations and requests, which he called "conclusions". She stressed that, in order to start a fruitful action in the concrete field of the current situation, it was necessary:

"To enable the Independent Bloc to expand and strengthen its apparatus, especially in the propaganda sector, also to give the opportunity to its press body to appear regularly and to publish parts of a historical-political character, to establish representations in USA, Paris, Brussels, Munich, Istanbul, Athens and in the main refugee camps scattered in Italy;

Support the Independent National Bloc to bring together prominent exponents and groups with tendencies in favor of Italian politics, especially after the events of 1945 onwards;

To activate and support all cultural initiatives, which aim at preserving sound Albanian traditions and developing a sincere Italian-Albanian friendship;

To study the way to prepare with capable elements for any more or less unexpected need of an armed intervention in Albania (through NATO);

To select the most capable young people in the refugee camps and to send them to study in Italian schools;

Find a way to put in Italian jobs and professions those Albanians (their number is small) who prefer to stay in Italy, giving up emigration to other countries. Thus e.g. Serb refugees have privileged positions in France<sup>191</sup>.

The Albanian MFA was aware of this document drafted by the pro-Italian emigrants. She was waiting for the position that the Italian government would take towards this document<sup>192</sup>.

### **3.6. The state of political emigration in the years 1958-1959 in the assessments of the communist regime.**

Unlike the previous completely negative reports on the force of KSHL, in January 1958 the legate in Rome made a somewhat more balanced assessment of his activity. She underlined that the "Free Albania" Committee in New York relied on the Italians through the Independent Bloc and the Americans through the "Free Europe" organization. KSHL was created to collect emigration, but its goal had not yet been achieved and much work was being done in this direction. According to the Legation, although the members of this committee were "submissive" to the Americans, the fact that they came from different tendencies was a source of contradiction between them and there was a mutual distrust.

The latest data collected by Legata showed that there were contradictions between Vasil Gërmenji and Ndue Gjon Markaj. As chairman of the committee, the Americans supported V. Gjermanji because, as an "independent", he could influence the reconciliation of

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<sup>190</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>191</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

<sup>192</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Memorandum of Albanian political emigration to Italy sent to Italian deputies, July 1957.

different currents in emigration. The Italians support R. Krasniqi because they considered him their man<sup>193</sup>.

However she claimed that the Bulletin of the new Committee was more qualified than the press of the previous Committee. He did not attack the Paris Committee and the Agrarian Ball. The committee had not succeeded in the direction of Balli Agrar, but had managed to bring with it a good part of the legalists and monarchists, isolating almost completely the chairman A. Kupi. Negotiations in this regard were held in Rome, with Kurt Shyti, in France, with Zog and in the US with Selim Damani and Myftar Spahina<sup>194</sup>.

Komiteti i kishte kushtuar vëmendje dhe emigracionit ekonomik në SHBA. Nën patronazhin e tij, ishte krijuar atje kohët e fundit Shoqëria Kulturore Shqiptaro-Amerikane e cila nxirrte edhe një gazetë periodike. Qëllimi ishte që të afroreshin emigrantët ekonomikë me Komitetin<sup>195</sup>.

The committee had expanded its activity through branches in Rome, with Daniel Gjeçaj in charge. The branches had started from the function and in Paris, Belgium and Turkey. It was planned to set up a branch in Greece, but this did not happen because the Greek government did not allow it. The legacy of the communist government claimed that "this is a positive attitude on the part of Greece and perhaps, to some extent, has to do with the recent contacts between our government and the Greek government to regulate the state of relations." But he added that however "the main reason is that the dominance in this Committee is held by the Blocists and the Italians, whom Greece does not look favorably, because it sees them as an obstacle to its claims on southern Albania and because, on the other hand, The committee is not on good terms with the northern epirotes"<sup>196</sup>.

A detailed analysis was made of the Democratic Committee "Free Albania" in Paris<sup>197</sup>. It was pointed out that there were divergences within the Committee. Abaz Ermenji was "anti-popular", arrogant and arrogant. Nevertheless he stood at the head of the Committee because he was respected for his capacity, bravery and determination. He was described as the most ardent opponent of joining the Bloc. This Committee was also held as the champion of "Greater Albania" and had helped the "League of Kosovar Minorities", a group which was already a member of the European Committee for the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities.

A. Ermenji also took part in the committee of the "Union of Kosovars"., France and less in the US, Canada, London and Australia.

While the fiercest fighting between the groups took place between the Independent Bloc and the Agrarian Front. The Independent Bloc was described as the most organized, active, strongest and most aggressive group against E Hoxha's communist regime. It was also stated that "Blloku and Balli Agrar were the two arbitrators of emigration"<sup>198</sup>.

The bloc, for its own purposes, had created and led the Florentine Democratic Peasant Party and cooperated with the League of Prizren. Recently, the Zogist exponents who were in Rome were seen approaching the people of the Bloc<sup>199</sup>.

Balli Agrar remained under the influence of the English from whom it was financed. He had been able to create with the elements of the Independent Bloc, the Independent Democratic Bloc and to oppose this to the leaders of the Independent Bloc<sup>200</sup>.

<sup>193</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>194</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>195</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>196</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>197</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>198</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>199</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

<sup>200</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on political emigration from the Legation to Rome, 3 January 1958

While the political situation in the ranks of political emigration was honorable, so was the economic and social situation. The situation of emigrants in neighboring Balkan countries was particularly difficult. The legation in Cairo, received information from an Albanian in Greece, Vasil Bitri, that the situation of Albanian refugees in Greece was very bad. All were in concentration camps, where they lived in very difficult conditions. They enjoyed no human rights and had no freedom. Especially after Vangjel Duçi was thrown as a saboteur in Albania on January 22, 1957, the control of refugees had become even stricter<sup>201</sup>.

V. Bitri also claimed that the "Free Albania" Committee and the North Epirus association were cooperating with each other sometimes in favor of one and sometimes in favor of the other<sup>202</sup>. But it seems that there was a contradiction in these statements because in the vast majority of cases the information that the government of Tirana had, claimed that there were contradictions and open hostility between the parties, as the Greeks had territorial intentions towards Albania. He also informed that the political emigrants have already "understood the reality and want to be repatriated". But their demands were not taken into account, and even penalties were added to them. For their return home, the political emigrants also turned to the International Red Cross, but even this had not solved anything for you. They finally turned to the Soviet embassy to ask for her help, but even this conveyed telling them that it is not her job and that she is not competent for this.<sup>203</sup>

According to this information, the Albanian fugitives were:

- In Ioannina 206 families with 1000 people
- In Konica 32 families, with 108 people
- Thesprotia 53 families with 184 people
- Rizani 40 families with 220 people
- Perdhika 40 families with 295 people
- Athens 350 families with 1600 people
- Thessaloniki 40 families with 117 people
- Macedonia 45 families with 125 people
- Corfu 97 families with 356 people
- Patra 28 families with 89 people
- In other countries 100 people

A total of 4194 people<sup>204</sup>.

At the beginning of 1958, the Albanian Legation in Rome informed that the branches of the "Free Albania" Committee in France, Belgium and Turkey had been dissolved. It was said that the reasons were economic issues<sup>205</sup>. While in the summer of 1958 other interesting changes took place. As the Albanian Legation in Rome informed, with the intervention of the Americans, the Paris Committee was expelled from the "Union of Captive Nations" and, in its place, the New York Committee was appointed<sup>206</sup>. The Paris Committee continued to have great support from the Agrarian Ballists of Rome and the Kosovar emigration to Turkey, which it led through the organization "Kosovo League", with exponent Rexhep Mitrovica. It

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<sup>201</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 493, fl.1-3, Information of the Albanian legation in Cairo on the situation of Albanian emigration in Greece, January 16, 1958

<sup>202</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 493, fl.1-3, Information of the Albanian legation in Cairo on the situation of Albanian emigration in Greece, January 16, 1958

<sup>203</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 493, fl.1-3, Information of the Albanian legation in Cairo on the situation of Albanian emigration in Greece, January 16, 1958

<sup>204</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 493, fl.1-3, Information of the Albanian legation in Cairo on the situation of Albanian emigration in Greece, January 16, 1958

<sup>205</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Information of Edip Çuçi from Rome for MFA, 28 February 1958

<sup>206</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on the situation of Albanian emigration from the Rome Legation, July 5, 1958

also informed that the contradictions in Ballin Agrar had started to increase after the provocation hatched by the blockers through Bilal Topulli, who stabbed Vasil Andoni<sup>207</sup>.

In April 1958, although the New York Committee was not admitted to the meeting of the "Assembly of Captive Nations", Vasil Germenji, along with Isuf Begena, Odhise Dhima, Thanas Gega and Rexhep Mitrovica, left for Strasbourg, while Abaz Ermenji, a former member of the Agrarian International, at the Assembly of Captive Nations, resigned, on the pretext that there was no real Albanian representation in the Assembly<sup>208</sup>.

In 1958, there was a political emigration of 100 people to France, most of whom came from Yugoslavia in 1956-1957. The main force here was Abaz Ermenji's KKDSHL. The committee "Free Albania" of A. Ermenji included Ramazan Shpati, Zef Pali (representative of this committee in Italy); Halil Mëniku, Nexhat Mitrovica - chairman of the Kosovo League and Ali Koprencka of the "Independent Democrat" group of Albanians in Turkey. He did not carry out activities organized as a committee but all the work was done by Abazi and others individually, attributing to this committee<sup>209</sup>.

Immigration was reactivated greatly in this critical period for the communist regime. "The secret war, instructed BK, must be strengthened through concrete agreements of all groups that act separately, because the decisive struggle for the liberation of Albania from communism can not be carried out separately"<sup>210</sup>.

Zogu also sent Kol Bib Mirakaj to leaders like M. Bajraktari, F. Dine etc. to join<sup>211</sup>, but M. Bajraktari instigated by the English refused. He stated that "there could be no unification in this state of emigration"<sup>212</sup>.

Thus the New York SCT remained a fait accompli and the CIA charged the spy John Le with the task of reorganizing Albanian emigration around this committee, which included the BKI and the traditional BK. Although the committee was filled with new members such as ballist Nexhat Peshkëpia, etc., always on an individual basis, the divergences were not overcome. Since its establishment, this committee has carried out activities against the communist regime, and has extended its activity to economic and Kosovar emigration, expanding its activity to the issue of Kosovo. CIA and FBI officers also worked on this committee, who followed the activities related to Albania and Kosovo. He supported immigrants to the United States and the growing number of refugees from Albania, Kosovo, and other Albanian areas in Yugoslavia; settled with the work and residence of the emigrants, etc., He made efforts to unite with other groups, besides Ballit Agrar. This committee was active in the Committee of Captive Nations (ACEN). He carried out intensive activities against the communist government, especially from the '70s, collaborated with L. Zogu, etc., made anti-communist and nationalist propaganda mainly through the newspaper "Shqiptari i Lirë". He was the main organization representing Albanian political emigration, and also had direct links with the US State Department.

Making a conclusive summary of the political emigration activity for 1959, the Albanian Legation in France stated that "today the political activity of the Albanian emigration does not take place in its special context. Leaders exercise more activity among themselves, participating in the activities of international organizations, than with the mass of fugitives"<sup>213</sup>.

<sup>207</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Report on the situation of Albanian emigration from the Rome Legation, July 5, 1958

<sup>208</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 496, Information of Llambi (Dishnica) from New York sent to MFA, April 25, 1958

<sup>209</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 504, Report on the activity of reactionary emigration during 1958 in France

<sup>210</sup> AMPJ, year 1947, file 100, Information of Thomas (Sinica) 16 October 1948

<sup>211</sup> AMPB, 1959, file 2, p. 118

<sup>212</sup> AMPB, year 1959, file 648, p. 90

<sup>213</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Summary report on the activity of Albanian reactionary emigration, Paris, 5 January 1960

Through a long analytical report on the state of anti-communist political emigration during 1958, the Legation in Rome underlined that it was characterized by these tendencies<sup>214</sup>: Continuation of efforts for organization and reunification, both by the two committees, and different groups, as well as by foreign agencies; the increase of contradictions and from a pronounced disintegration within different groups; from the increase of discontent and demoralization in their ranks and, especially in the fugitives who were in other camps; The greatest efforts for unification were made especially by the two existing immigration committees: the Free Albania Committee of New York and the Democratic Committee of Free Albania of Paris, but without forgetting their intentions for each committee to gain supremacy in the ranks of Albanian emigration. More active in this regard was the "Free Albania" Committee of New York, which, under the leadership of the Americans, not only was able to withstand the pressure and the fight against his opponents, but was able to create divisions. in the ranks of the agrarians and in the Paris Committee itself.

In addition, he had marked the following other results: Neutralization and rapprochement of some well-known opponents such as A. Këlcyra, A. Kupi, M. Bajraktari, Ragip Frashëri, etc .; had been able to take with him a good part of the Legal-Monarchists; had increased its authority and influence, had been able to join two international immigration organizations - the "Union of Captive Nations", and the "Free Europe", thus excluding from these organizations the Paris Committee.

While the Paris Committee and, in general, the agrarians had begun to lose their authority and positions they had previously held in the organizations mentioned above.

Efforts for unification and organization were made by various emigration groups such as Ballists, Zogists, A. Këlcyra, etc. but to no avail, and their condition was what it had been before.

So the result of these efforts was the further aggravation of the internal contradictions of each group and, in general, in emigration, especially in the ranks of the Agrarian Front, between them and the Independent Bloc. The MFA thought that, if the latest data it had were to be verified, these would cause Balli Agrar to split. But she added that "in the fight against us they are united."

The demoralization of emigration was noticeable, especially in the camps, caused by the loss of confidence in the force of emigration as a result of the "successes and strengthening" of the communist government and the Socialist Camp and the deterioration of the economic situation and life of immigrants in the camps.

The Rome Legation thought that the international situation was influenced by immigrant activity. When she became angry (as had been the case with American aggression in Jordan and Lebanon), Albanian emigration "began to raise its ears", hoping that "American imperialism would not take open action against our country." After this event, it was said that immigration was set in motion also organizationally, based on the directives of the Americans who had advised that, without a better organization and coordination of unity, no enterprise could succeed in any form that to be done<sup>215</sup>.

So some time ago, thanks to a fund of \$ 100,000 per month, allocated to the Committee "Free Albania" by the Americans, this committee had reopened its branch in Rome headed by committee member Ndue John Markajoni.

The report said that the Americans had advised the expansion of the Committee with other members, especially those from the Albanian colony in the US. According to the

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<sup>214</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>215</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the aim was to capture the colony and activate it against our country, but so far it is not known that they have done anything except the formation of the Council of Elders"<sup>216</sup>. The communist delegation claimed that it had reliable information that "the Americans have recently advised the Committee and, through it, the Independent Bloc on the formation of volunteer groups and a military detachment with selected fugitives. For this reason, Gjon Gjinaj was set in motion, who, recently, had visited emigration to Germany, Belgium, France and various camps in Italy, as well as in Austria and the USA<sup>217</sup>. It was alleged that he had gone to these camps to get in touch with various immigrants especially with the Blockers to find the right element.

Another finding of the communist authorities was that during this period, the activity of Albanian emigration was focused on the great work against amnesty, especially after the extension of its term by the Albanian government. A large propaganda campaign was carried out against the Albanian legation in Rome and the Italian-Albanian Friendship Association. This campaign was conducted through the bulletin "Voice of Reason" led by Alber Akçija. He was now trying to prepare the ground for the formation of a so-called Italian-Albanian cultural association, the activity of which would be directed against the Italian-Albanian friendship association, under the influence of the communists; against PKI and the Albanian Legation<sup>218</sup>.

The report of the Rome Legation also reflected the situation of political immigration organizations. The analysis began with the "Free Albania" New York Committee. It was pointed out that the Committee, due to divergences, had not yet been able to elect its chairman, and was chaired in turn at certain times by each member. As a new event during this period, the formation of the Council of Elders of this committee, with members A. Këlcyrë, Ragip Frashëri and Karl Gurakuqi, stood out. There was talk that the council would expand with new members. The formation of this council and its expansion with members who had been opponents of the Committee, carried out one of the main tasks assigned to it by "its American masters" i.e. neutralizing disunity and bringing other groups closer together. This could be considered a new form of work of the Committee. This was the aim of reuniting all emigration. Recently it turned out that efforts are being made to include in this council and Hasan Dostin, who until now had not accepted<sup>219</sup>.

The Committee's offices in other countries were closed earlier this year for lack of funding because the Americans had cut funding at the time, and later, as the situation changed as a result of the Anglo-American intervention in Jordan and Lebanon, they were tuned in. another \$ 100,000. With this fund the Committee had reopened its office in Rome, considering this as one of its branches in Europe. The committee had regularly published the newspaper "Shqiptari i Lirë" which was more qualified than all other newspapers.<sup>220</sup>

The Legation had received information, but not certain, that the Committee, at the behest of the Americans, was trying to form some groups of saboteurs to send to Albania. Among others, Kol Bib Mirakaj had met in December with Zog in Cannes (France), who had agreed to organize volunteer groups. According to these rumors, in these groups there were: in Belgium 500 people, in France 500, in Germany 300, in England 150, in Italy 200, in

<sup>216</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>217</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>218</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>219</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>220</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959



Greece 500, in Yugoslavia 6,500, in Turkey 450. But these figures, rightly, The Legation considered them inflated and that they should be accepted with reservations.

The Democratic Committee "Free Albania" (Paris) was said to be under English influence. This committee was considered as the offspring of Balli Agrar on which it relied. Most recently, there were some signals of some contradictions between the agrarian ballistas of Rome (V. Andoni) and the Paris Committee (chaired by A. Ermenji). Probably a factor as to why they're doing so poorly. However, V. Andoni and A. Ermenji did not expose the contradictions and tried to maintain discipline<sup>221</sup>.

Recently with the intervention of the Americans this Committee was expelled from the Union of Captive Nations. Legata thought that between the Paris and New York Committees were openly reflected both the contradictions between Balli and B. Independent and those between the Americans and the British to dominate Albanian political emigration.

It was alleged that the Paris Committee also had good support from Kosovar emigrants in Turkey, led by the Kosovo League led by Rexhep Mitrovica. They published in Paris the bulletin "Kosovo Effort" which was mainly run by this committee.

It also turned out that V. Andoni and A. Ermenji had begun the efforts to unite the three national fronts of A. Këlcyra, H. Dosti in order to join the Paris Committee, to strengthen it to become the most representative force, both before foreigners and before emigration itself. So far they had not reached an agreement because the other two parts of Balli demanded the moderation of the Balli line led by V. Andoni (Balli Agrar) which they considered extremist on the left, in the issue of reforms and totalitarian in the leadership of the party. But Legata thought that the possibility of achieving this union in the future was not ruled out. This would be the first phase of the realization, even after many difficulties, of a unification of all political emigration under one direction. Further, according to the Legation, in a joint agreement between the Americans and the British, all groups would first be included in two separate committees, then, always under their auspices, the two committees would be merged into one, based on a compromise. . Legata reiterated that the composition of immigration, foreign and opposing rivalries and controversies with each other and many other factors made the realization of this union very difficult. But on the other hand she stressed that nevertheless "we should not underestimate such an eventuality"<sup>222</sup>.

According to the Legation, the activity of the Paris Committee took place almost entirely through the activity of the Agrarian Ball of Rome. During this period, the committee had regularly published the magazine "Albanian Resistance".

The political groups of the Albanian emigration remained what they had been before, the Independent Bloc, Balli Agrar, Legality, Katundarja, Katundarja Demokratike, Democratic Bloc Independent, Balli Kombëtar i A. Këlcyrë, The Kosovar Effort. According to the Legation, with the exception of the first two groups, the others either represented nothing or were the tails of the first two groups. The fiercest fighting took place between the Independent Bloc and V. Andon's Agrarian Front, groups that played a leading role in emigration.<sup>223</sup>.

The Legation reported that the Independent Bloc had recently plunged into economic hardship after the Italians cut off economic aid. For these reasons he had not put his newspaper in order. According to her, in those moments the greatest danger posed both groups B.I. and of Balli Agrar by V. Andoni. B.I. was funded and supported by two states that

<sup>221</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>222</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>223</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

were most interested in the communist regime (Italians and Americans)<sup>224</sup>. B.I. under the leadership of Italy and the Vatican, had issued the Bulletin "Voice of Reason" directed against the communist regime.

It was also alleged that B. I. for his own purposes fully led the Peasant Party of Florence and cooperated with the League of Prizren which, "though insignificant, may be considered an ally of B.I."<sup>225</sup> Balli Agrar, was said to have more and more disciplined members. From the economic situation it was better than all the other groups. Little help was given by the English and most of the help was given by its members. He had published, although not in order, the newspaper "Flamuri", and under the direction of its leaders, the newspaper Besa was prepared in Turkey<sup>226</sup>. Quite the opposite happened with Legality, for which it was emphasized that there was no organization. It had many members, but continued to be one of the most disorganized groups. He was divided into several groups and the unification attempts had failed. Legata wrote: "currently the activity of this group against us is zero". It was further stated that Legality did not have a single center and did not publish any newspaper. Recently, some rapprochement with B.I. and the New York Committee<sup>227</sup>.

The Rome Legation also dealt with the situation of political immigrants in the camps. According to her, currently the Albanian refugees in Italy were scattered in 6 camps: Trieste; S. Antonio; Aversa; Capua; Frascati; Farfa Sabina. Recently their emigration to the USA etc. was noticed, so the number of fugitives in Italy was greatly reduced. There were 122 refugee families in the Italian camps. The Italians intended to close all the camps. The US, which previously did not accept Albanian immigrants, is now stimulating Albanian emigration to America and gathering immigrants in New York to use against the communist regime<sup>228</sup>.

### 3.7. The impact of Khrushchev's visit to Albania on the state of political emigration

Khrushchev's visit to Albania seems to have caused particular concern in Albanian political emigration. Reiz Malile reported from New York that it "fell like a bomb on the criminals here and on the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. "The criminals here now say that missiles will be placed in Albania and we will wash the dishes and we have no hope"<sup>229</sup>.

It is interesting that R. Malile informed that in addition to the demoralization that Khrushchev's visit had had in the ranks of political emigration, "in some of them there was some satisfaction for the strong position of Albania. With a little pride they say let the Greeks touch it now if they want"<sup>230</sup>.

The Legation in Rome also informed about disillusionment. She had received information that in a conversation with his intimate people, Zogu had said that "the hopes to return to Albania are over, not only because the Albanian government is strengthening but also because the Allies, where we had supported the hopes that he would they helped, they and especially England, had made projects that they managed to liberate Albania, they will

<sup>224</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>225</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>226</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>227</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>228</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>229</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 523, Information of Reis Maliles for MFA, New York, May 21, 1959

<sup>230</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 523, Reis Maliles Information for the MFA, New York June 10, 1959

not leave it with Independent but we will divide it between Greece and Yugoslavia”<sup>231</sup>. Zogu also said that the Americans and the British were organizing and reorganizing in order to use the Albanian emigration as their need arose, not linking it (emigration) with his national interest and this comes in the ranks of "There are some organizations of honest nationalists that do nothing but disrupt immigration and, inadvertently, help the government of Tirana, and that is exactly why I hate them and do not agree with their existence"<sup>232</sup>.

According to the Legation in Rome, Zogu also said that the hopes of emigration were absolutely cut during the visit of the Soviet delegation to Albania<sup>233</sup>.

The same information was informed by this Legation a few days later, where it added that since February the demoralization in the ranks of emigration continued. This situation also existed in the heads of emigration. It was emphasized that there was no comment from the Albanian emigration during Khrushchev's visit, but later the emigration leaders started saying that “this is Albania that the Allies did not pay attention to and are not giving it”<sup>234</sup>.

Meanwhile controversy between different groups continued. In mid-1959, the *Besa* newspaper wrote several articles against members of the Free Albania Committee, accusing them of using communist arguments after publishing materials taken from the regime newspaper *New Albania*<sup>235</sup>. These divergences were encouraged by the communist regime and in some cases even damaged the national and religious harmony among Albanians. The Legation informed that “there are divergences in emigration between Catholics and Muslims. It is our job to discover what that is and to bring it about”<sup>236</sup>. This was a logical conclusion of the communist policy which, in order to suppress political opponents and maintain power, did not hesitate to inflate religious division, which was a dangerous act of national division.

Immigration to France was also divided into three streams: the agrarian with 40 people, the Legality group with 25 people (excluding Zog's suite in Cannes with 20 people), the Independent Bloc with 15 people. The rest were party-free. The Independent Bloc tended to expand<sup>237</sup>. According to Albanian diplomats, the Americans, since they failed to achieve the goal of capturing all immigration through the New York committee, recently no longer considered this committee as support for their work in this direction. The existence of many political groups hindered the unification of emigration. Thus they were now forced to change tactics, starting from the ground up. For this reason the Americans were working to unite, in the first place in a single party all the groups and mainly those of the Legality, the Independent Bloc, that of Ali Këlcyra and if they could also the Agrarians of V. Andoni<sup>238</sup>.

Zogu, Blloku and a part of Legality had given their consent for such a union. Bile Zogu, for his part, had recommended that, in order to achieve this, in the first place, the leaders of the groups should approach and unite with each other, and then make this unification clear to the mass of emigration, and, finally, to proceed with the creation of a single committee. In the political platform of this committee, according to Zogu, for now, one should not be involved or even think about the form of tomorrow's regime for Albania because this caused quarrels and divisions. This problem he said, let it remain for the future<sup>239</sup>.

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<sup>231</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Information of Koço Prifti for MFA, Rome, June 18, 1959

<sup>232</sup> AMPJ, viit 1959, file 533, Information of Koço Prifti for MFA, Rome, June 18, 1959

<sup>233</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Information of Koço Prifti for MFA, Rome, June 18, 1959

<sup>234</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Roma Legation for MFA, "Data on reactionary emigration". June 18, 1959.

<sup>235</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 523, Report on "reactionary" immigration, June 8, 1959

<sup>236</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Roma Legation for MFA, "Data on reactionary emigration". June 18, 1959.

<sup>237</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>238</sup> AMPJ, viti 1959, dosje 524, Relacion i Legatës së Parisit “ mbi gjendjen e emigracionit reaksionar në Francë”, 20 korrik 1959

<sup>239</sup> AMPJ, 1959, D.524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the state of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

Legata informed that, based on these predictions, the initiative was taken by the leaders of the Independent Bloc. Col. Bib Mirakaj had meetings in Italy, France, Belgium. He had talks with Fiqiri Dinen and M. Bajraktari, to whom he had made it necessary to unite all the emigration around King Zog. Fiqiri Dine liked this opinion while M. Bajraktari had opposed it<sup>240</sup>.

On the other hand, the Legation had data that the organizations of political emigration during the first 6 months of 1959 had exercised their activity in the ranks of emigration in a broader political form, i.e. that the activity of any emigration should not extend only on a national scale but internationally. This was imposed by international circumstances and fully conditioned by "aggressive US policy". At the same time, this new political orientation, according to the Legation, was closely related to the activity of the "Yugoslav revisionists"<sup>241</sup>.

After Khrushchev's visit, A. Ermenji had drawn attention to the articles of the Greek and Italian press against the Albanians, to which he had promised that he would give an answer to the bodies "Flamuri" and "Qendra Shqiptare". Abazi had stated that "we have already launched an action campaign in the political field for the protection of national interests." Immediately after that, in the last bulletin of his Committee were published two articles in response to the Greek press and the Italian agency "Arbis" for their anti-Albanian writings, on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit<sup>242</sup>.

While in the district of Zog it was said that "Khrushchev's visit made clear the danger posed by Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece to Albania. Zog's sister said: it is better for the communists to stay in Albania than to be occupied by the Greeks and Yugoslavs"<sup>243</sup>.

### 3.8. The state of political emigration in 1959-1960

At the end of 1959, according to the information of the UN Mission, it turned out that Vasil Andoni Agrarian Group in America had two or three well-organized groups in New York and Detroit. The main agrarian figures here were Halil Maçi, Lufto Totua and Luan Gashi. Ali Koprencka was the director of the newspaper "Besa" and was active in the agrarian area. The penetration of agrarians in the colony was greater than that of other groups. The mission was highlighted as an event to mark the fact that "Dielli" had published several articles recently, where it tries to justify the ballistas for their betrayal during the war and to make them victims of the situation"<sup>244</sup>.

H. Dosti's ballistic group was said to be small and operating only with America. While from the Zogist groups the most active was that of G. Goga<sup>245</sup>.

In Turkey, the Ballist Group was considered the largest group in Albanian emigration. The chairman was Qazim Prodani - a former member of the Albanian fascist government. Other leaders of the group were Hysen Prishtina, Rexhep Mitrovica. The group had its own newspaper "Besa" run by Q. Prodani<sup>246</sup>.

<sup>240</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>241</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>242</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>243</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>244</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 523, Report of the UN Mission on Political Immigration to America, 23 December 1959

<sup>245</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 523, Report of the UN Mission on Political Immigration to America, 23 December 1959

<sup>246</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Notification of the Legation in Ankara on some data and facts from the life of the Albanian emigration in Turkey

The Zogist group was considered the second most important group. Until November 1958 its leader had been Avni Derralla, after his death, the leadership had been taken by General Aranitasi<sup>247</sup>.

There was also the Group of Officers which consisted of persons who had come at the end of World War II from the military schools of Italy, Yugoslavia and Germany. These were about 200 people<sup>248</sup>.

The Albanian-Turkish aid organization, which was known as the Albanian-Turkish friendship organization, played the role of the center of unity of all groups. The representative of the Turkish authorities was also elected to this organization. One of the Turkish representatives was Kemal Alltogan, whom the Legation described as a Turkish intelligence colonel. The Turkish authorities helped this organization a lot, mainly through Alltogan and through the Italian and English organization<sup>249</sup>.

The Legation informed that among the Albanian emigration to Turkey also worked the representatives of Yugoslavia and the leaders of the royal Yugoslav emigration in Istanbul, such as Colonel Peric. The secretary of this organization, his name was Anesti Gogoli, it had 800 people, 150 of whom were Albanian citizens.

Another group was the Reserve Officers Organization, established in late 1958 based in Izmir. Its members received salaries of 250-500 Turkish lira. The organization was created by the Americans and led by Matik Sadik and former General Mitrovica.

According to the Legation, the total number of Albanian political emigrants to Turkey was 1200-2000. "These immigrants lived in misery. "Most of them are subject to humiliation," the report said. Characteristic was that in Turkey, the various groups did not wage political war between themselves and there were no disputes. According to the Albanian Legation, the relations between political and economic emigration were always good. The attitude of economic emigration towards Albania, "for the most part was positive. Their national feelings were very much manifested"<sup>250</sup>.

In 1959 the first information of the communist representations on political emigration in the R.F.GJ appeared. They reported that about 200 political immigrants lived here, most of them in the city of Kaiserslautern. There was the political immigrant labor company of 100 men tasked with guarding American weapons depots. The commander of the company was Çausht Basha. By 1957 the company had been in Munich. From her were selected people who had parachuted into Albania as saboteurs. Most of the members of the company were said to be illiterate and old. The American intelligence kept these in order to use them in case of need against the communist regime. The rest of the emigrants were engaged in manual labor. Their economic situation was better than that of those in Italy, France and Belgium. Some of the migrants were sick with TB and were in various hospitals. The emigrants who were in the company, a part belonged to Balli Agrar, while another group consisted of M. Bajraktar's rivers. There were many Kosovars in the company and in Munich. They were hostile to Tito and his regime. According to the above information, emigration had dropped quite morally and some wanted to return home. Regime spy Gaqo Paze, stated that he had sent them propaganda materials in favor of the communist regime<sup>251</sup>.

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<sup>247</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Notification of the Legation in Ankara on some data and facts from the life of the Albanian emigration in Turkey

<sup>248</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Notification of the Legation in Ankara on some data and facts from the life of the Albanian emigration in Turkey

<sup>249</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Notification of the Legation in Ankara on some data and facts from the life of the Albanian emigration in Turkey

<sup>250</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Notification of the Legation in Ankara on some data and facts from the life of the Albanian emigration in Turkey

<sup>251</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 532, Report prepared by Gaqo Paze on political emigration in West Germany

In the US most of the political emigration was to New York (250 people), to Detroit etc. By January 1959, the "Free Albania" Committee had 5 members. Rexhep Krasniqi, Ndue Gjon Markaj, Vasil Germenji, Nexhat Peshkopi and Sotir Avrami. In January of this year, the Committee Council was established with members Mehdi Frashëri, Ali Këlcyrë and Karl Gurakuqi<sup>252</sup>. According to the UN Mission, the goals of the Americans for the establishment of this committee were:<sup>253</sup>

- To have an Albanian committee in the Committee "Free Europe";
- To unite the different groups of Albanian emigration and to activate them more against the communist regime. Recently, seeing that the committee had no support, the Americans were trying to expand it with people who indirectly or directly supported the committee;
- To make propaganda in the Albanian colony of America;
- To prepare persons for espionage and diversion purposes..

The committee published the newspaper "Free Albanian" and its English version "Digest of Free Albanian" which was distributed to various American personalities and organizations and foreign missions to the UN<sup>254</sup>.

But the Mission found that nevertheless the committee had little to do with the mass of fugitives. This was because Balli Agrar was openly fighting this Committee. This was the main contradiction currently in Albanian emigration. In addition, there were contradictions between the open and secret supporters of the Committee. Some of the leading figures of these groups supported the Committee "to carry out the orders of their masters, but on the other hand speak against the persons who make it up, describing them as people compromised with fascism."<sup>255</sup>

In support of the Committee were said to be the Zogist group of G. Goga, the group of A. Kupi, a small group of supporters of A. Këlcyra and a group of members of the Independent Bloc. Hasan Dosti also had indirect connections with this committee, but the data of the Mission showed that Hasan would not openly support this and would not become a member of it, as he was hindered by his son<sup>256</sup>.

The people of the committee, certainly at the behest of the Americans, made efforts to settle disputes between the groups. The mission predicted that the Americans would not succeed in uniting groups around the "Free Albania" committee. The committee had fought and would fight against the agrarians who wanted to increase their authority and that of the "Free Albania" committee in Paris.

Agrarians living in America dismissed themselves as not affiliated with US intelligence agencies and reprimanded other groups for links to foreigners. "Indeed," the Mission said, "like those here in America, like their leaders in Europe, they are involved in American intelligence and they are doing espionage services against each other, against our colony and against us"<sup>257</sup>.

In recent years, most of the most active people of the Legality groups, G. Goga, N. Kota and A. Kupi, had come to the USA. The Legality Party was divided into 3 groups:

- The Monarchist Party led by G. Goga.
- Legality Group headed by A.Kupin.
- Detached Zogists led by Nuçi Kota.

<sup>252</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>253</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>254</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>255</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>256</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>257</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

All three of these groups maintained links with Zog. Zog's efforts to unite the groups were not lacking, but without success. The three groups of Legality indirectly supported the committee "Free Albania" but until now, had not openly joined it in this organization.

The Independent Bloc had its headquarters in Rome, while in America, in various cities, it had a number of its supporters and members<sup>258</sup>. Eduard Liço, who had previously been the editor of the Bloc newspaper "L'Albanie Libre", was also in the US. This group in Boston published the newspaper "Albanian-American" by Vasil Alarupi. From the data available to the Mission, it resulted that V. Alarupi, Ligor Buzi and Teodor Ropi had connections with the agent of the Greeks and the Istanbul Patriarchate, Marko Lipa. The blockers supported the "Free Albania" committee. They were now connected even more with the Committee through Mehdi Frashëri and Karl Gurakuqi<sup>259</sup>.

It is interesting that one of the leaders of this organization, Ernest Koliqi, although he was desperate and disappointed by the events and the long forced emigration, had not lost the determination to continue the fight against the communist regime. In a letter sent to his friend Karl Gurakuqi, on December 3, 1960, he wrote: the Albanian people. Instead of a well-deserved reward, after the toil of sweat shed, we had slander, shame and contempt. In the end, we were left without a homeland, for which we exhausted our brains and suffocated our souls. Ani: the work we do has its reward in itself and in the sense of some few lovers. I do not expect anything good from the mass of today's Albanians, but I hope that the literary heritage I left behind will be known as leaven for the rebirths of future generations."<sup>260</sup>

A well-known personality was also Luan Gashi who was a member of Balli Agrar and at the same time secretary of the Kosovo Committee.<sup>261</sup>

During 1960 it was reported that political emigration to the R.A.B. had not developed any marked activity. The fugitives here were few and except for 2-3 people, the others saw their troubles. Active were Ymer Beshiri in Alexandria and Nexhmedin Qaraliu in Cairo. Neshat Kolonja had also started some activity in Damascus. The IROS organization had begun to help the fugitives and make a propaganda to flee to South Africa where they were promised a better life. The influence of political emigrants in the colony of this country according to the Albanian Legation was insensitive<sup>262</sup>.

In January 1960 Reis Malile informed Tirana that the Americans were making efforts to establish a new "Free Albania" committee based in Rome. The aim was to pull the Agrarian Ball into the committee. They were said to be sending an American organizer to Rome, Athens, Istanbul and Paris for this purpose. It was also said that the Americans, some time ago, had decided to establish relations with Albania, but recently they had changed their position and will not establish relations soon<sup>263</sup>.

In 1960 the Albanian Legation announced that in April-May propaganda against the communist regime in the United Arab Republic had increased when Abdyl Sulë's wife came here, who, having contacts with a large part of the Albanians, had told them the more they left the contacts with the embassy the better it would be, either for the attitude of the government of this country towards communism, or for a future that did not know what it would be like.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>259</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>260</sup> Romeo Gurakuqi, Ernest Koliqi and the Independent National Bloc, in the publication *Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, Prizren, 2005; f. 167.

<sup>261</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Information of the UN Mission on Political Immigration in the USA

<sup>262</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/2, Report of Ambassador Delo Balili on the activity of political emigration in the R.A.B., January 22, 1961

<sup>263</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 53/1, Information of Reis Maliles for MFA, New York, January 26, 1960

<sup>264</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/2, Report of the Albanian Legation prepared by Delo Balili on the situation of our colony in RAB.

But the Albanian government was most interested in cracking down on political emigration. The Albanian Legation proposed to address a request to the Turkish government for the surrender of "war criminals" living in Turkey such as Qazim Prodani, Rexhep Mitrovica, Petraq Andoni. The Legation foresaw to intervene with the Turkish MFA and to demand the banning of the activity of political emigrants such as Q. Prodani etc.<sup>265</sup>

The Legation informed that the epicenters of political emigration were Istanbul and Izmir and this emigration was included in the organization Balli Kombëtar of V. Andoni and in the organization Legality. V. Andoni Balli here was said to present himself as the Independent Group and that he was the largest and most organized group.<sup>266</sup>

According to the information of the Albanian representation during the second half of 1960, the political emigration to R.A.B. had not developed any marked activity. The fugitives here were few and, with the exception of 2-3 people, who "removed themselves as the main ones", the others saw their troubles. Activists were said to be Ymer Beshiri in Alexandria and Nexhmedin Qeraliu in Cairo. Neshat Kolonja had also started some activity in Damascus. The influence of political immigrants in the colony of this country was said to be insensitive<sup>267</sup>.

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<sup>265</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/5, Informative report of the Legation in Ankara on the situation of Albanian emigration in Turkey

<sup>266</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/5, Report of the Legation in Ankara on the situation and activity of political emigration in Turkey in the first half of 1960.

<sup>267</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/2, Report of Ambassador Delo Balili on the activity of political emigration in the R.A.B., January 22, 1961



## CHAPTER IV

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### ACTIVITY OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME AGAINST POLITICAL IMMIGRATION (1954-1960)

Since december 1944 the communist government made the decision to confiscate the political refugees of the political refugees, returning them to state property. this measure was later supplemented by the confiscation of the assets of those who had collaborated with nationalist organizations. Even with other economic reforms and stressing political measures, the political opponents of the regime were shocked, which increased the political immigration, because they were against him.

In addition to these measures, the diversionary activity that political emigration organized after the war took place. According to the data of the communist government, naturally exaggerated, it is said that from the years 1945 - 1960 by the bodies of the ministry of internal affairs 950 groups were liquidated with 4 arats more than 300 anti-communist organizations with 3,000 participants detected and shocked; 35 receiver and receiver; 6.000 weapons and materials clandestine. Border forces, in cooperation with other mup forces, only during the years 1945 - 65 caught 4,421 opponent elements, 1426 killed and caught. in the years 1946 - 1986 2242 opponents of the regime were caught or killed.

Anti-communist political immigration was organized in different groups and organizations according to ideological approach but also personal relations between immigrants. throughout the cold war period, there were about 100 political immigration organizations, groups and fractions. 9 fractions from the ballist's rows, 5 from legality, 7 from bki, 10 from kosovo emigration, 3 from qeva, 4 from anti-communist economic emigration, some two groups, 8 groups of vo.

Albanian political immigration had a limited political experience and, although created KSHL, did not manage to create an anti-communist government abroad. District to chovinist neighbors has been great to the mass of this emigration. The neighborhood claims of the neighbors have been a great obstacle to his battle against the communist regime of hoxha

The communist regime used to dissolute anti-communist immigration friends and people recruited by the regime from albanian colonies. These have acted directly or networkingly, collectively or individually, to promote divisions in the range of political immigration. Especially engaged in this battle from the communist regime foreign communist marxist-leninist elements from different countries.

Collection, invention and propaganda of compromising materials for the leaders of political immigration groups were used by the regime to promote dissolution of this emig. Publishing these materials in print or providing through radio given positive results to the regime. This is how documents were propagated about the "buying" of ahmet zogu and many other anti-communist leaders from the italians, yugoslavs, the british and the american; materials for bk cooperation with italian and german authorities, bk legality "links", mouth with the greek reaction, vatican, english - american etc. Such materials were mainly published in the newspaper "the truth about the traitors" and "new albania" which continued to be published until the fall of the regime.

The communist government attempted to use these materials also to denounce the albanian anti-communist organizations before the state authorities, these efforts were most intensive especially in neutral states or related to the communist government. With this activity, the regime attempted to promote also the rivalry and quarters between foreign discoveries.

The national sedra of miscellaneous immigrants was initiated by the regime, to neutralize them and encourage them to give up activity against the regime. The regime used the territorial claims and anti-albanian intentions of neighbor nationalist countries and regions, to charge the responsibility of k urgency for the armenian political and political emigration. The region propagated the national liberation war in the diaspora, just like a pure patriotic war, hiddening the promotion and organization of the prison of the civil and the civil supporter of the civil.

The strong violence used by the communist government against the families and relatives of political immigrants who had remained in albania as sentences and measures for the internation of from organization prohibition of correspondence, packages and money; pressures and threats to family members to require their people in emigration to abandon anti-regime actions, writing letters or through telephone conversations, has played a role in neutralizing and dividing a part of anti-communist political emigration.

Restrictive measures were also taken against former traders who had financed the opposition of the regime.

The amnesty declared by the political immigration regime intended to demonstrate the strength of the communist regime and its stability domestic and in the international area; to strike the aspirations of the majority of political immigration to overturn the regime; to deepen disputes; to create an honorable situation in anti-communist political immigration.

Publication and distribution of specialized press for Albanians outside the homeland, which began in the 1950s with the newspaper "Truth on Homeland Traitors", then from 1952, with the newspaper "New Albania", where specialized scriptures were made to hit the politics of the western powers and the organizations and leaders of political immigration was one of the powerful tools of the fight against political immigration.

The activity of pro-communist elements in albanian colonies and those foreigners who supported the regime has been a great help for communist against emigral propaganda.

The use of the postal channel has been a method fully followed by the regime to influence in the ranks of political immigration, through letters of families, families.

The population was so terrified that they were reluctant to accept the landed immigrants. According to Zenel Shehu, one of the members of his group was not even accepted by his wife, who received him coldly and ordered him to surrender; nor did his brother-in-law receive him, so he returned to Greece without completing his mission<sup>1</sup>.

Another immigrant testified before the communist authorities that his sons had told him that things had gone very badly, that three people had been killed and that the police knew everything about them. It was horrible and they were very scared<sup>2</sup>. In this climate of terror, they reported that their attempts to recruit followers were unsuccessful.

Not only were the defeats of the anti-communist groups severe, but the regime also took care to present them and its victories in the most grotesque and spectacular way possible. Regarding this, N Bethel writes: "The facts that emerged after the great court appearance, in April 1954 in Tirana, caused one of the most terrible catastrophes for the American intelligence. It turned out that Mr. Shehu had been captured as soon as he arrived in Mat, two years ago Hamit Matjani, the person who had often escaped them, had fallen into their hands directly from the American plane ... For a whole week, the Albanian diaspora in Rome, Athens, Munik and Aleksandri heard in horror, while Radio Tirana reported to the world the chronicle of their political and military activity.

The State Security had done its job well"<sup>3</sup>. Foreign discoveries and saboteurs had underestimated the first defeats, that "Albanians who trained in Malta, Munich and

<sup>1</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, April 1954, p. 2

<sup>2</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.111

<sup>3</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p..268

Heidelberg and elsewhere had heard loud and clear the saboteurs' depositions in the October 1951, 1952 trial, or 1953, not to mention earlier. After these defeats, the immigrants "felt betrayed by those who organized them and no longer wanted to continue fighting."<sup>4</sup> but wanted to emigrate from neighboring countries to other countries, most to the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England, France, Belgium, FRY, Sweden etc.

On April 25, 1955, an exhibition was opened, where all the weapons, equipment, documentation, codes, figures, radio transmitters, radiograms of reconnaissance centers, plans and tasks for action in Albania, etc., that had been seized from the saboteurs, were presented to the Albanian public. Even later quite a few trials took place.

In 1955, wanting to extend its influence in the Albanian colonies and counterbalance the growing influence of political emigration, the MFA, in analyzing its work in April, acknowledged that there had been a lack of interest in repatriation and administrative assistance to Albanian emigrants. She proposed taking these measures:

- Autor To authorize the limited repatriation of Albanians from the colonies of America, Argentina, France, Austria. The assignment of the element to be repatriated was done by the MIA in cooperation with the MFA.
- To provide with a citizenship passport all expatriate Albanians who regularly appeared as Albanian citizens in the registers of Albanian representations abroad. Përfaqësitë diplomatike tu lëshonin certifikata shtetësie, lindje etj shqiptarëve të mërguar që të vërtetonin shtetësinë e tyre në bazë dokumentash.
- Ink Encourage, through party bodies in the districts, families with a "good" political stance, to write letters to their relatives in exile, telling them that they were living well and thus inciting them against "reactionary" leaders."<sup>5</sup>

In September 1955 the regime thought that the propaganda for repatriation and amnesty for a category of political emigration had made him lose hope of overthrowing the communist regime. B Shtylla claimed that Enver Hoxha's speech at the Front Congress had further fueled the split in the ranks of the emigrants, as he had called for repatriation. "We, he wrote, are interested in taking advantage of this favorable situation, therefore we must act. We can also repatriate reactionary elements who have not committed serious crimes and do not carry out activities against the RPSH. You need to propagate repatriation, deepen divisions between them, and so on"<sup>6</sup>.

In the context of the political opening undertaken by the regime in the late 1950s, as a result of the detente in international relations brought about by Khrushchev's coming to power in the Soviet Union, the communist government took measures to increase its political action in Albanian emigration. This new policy aimed, through a more flexible attitude and action, to expand the influence on the Albanian economic emigration but, always, by challenging as strongly as possible the anti-communist activity of the political emigration.

At the end of 1957 in terms of economic emigration, the regime set these objectives aimed at striking at the growing influence of political emigration in the old and new Albanian diaspora:<sup>7</sup>

- To help the associations with different tools and ways. In some cases, gifts were sent to their leaders, which they could use and sell in order to earn a living. They would also be

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<sup>4</sup>N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p.271

<sup>5</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, Proposal of the MFA - Politburo for some measures in favor of the Albanians in exile. Tirana 22 April 1955

<sup>6</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, B. Pillar Instructions for E. Çuçi, September 29, 1955

<sup>7</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 494, Some tasks derived from the meeting of the Collegium of the ministry regarding the review of work with associations, economic and political emigration, 28 December 1957

supplied with various propaganda materials such as the magazine "Albanie Nouvel" or other publications on Albania.

- Let Letters were sent to the leaders of the associations by different people in Albania (specialists in science, literature, artists) to tell the "truth" about Albania and to encourage them to act against the reactionary propaganda that slanders our country".
- Instruct the Legations to invite to Albania selected people who would then be able to write or speak "about the successes achieved" in Albania.
- Studio To study the publications of the associations, to help the editorial offices by the Legations to control their subject (as in magazines, etc.).
- To study by the Committee for Cultural Relations with the outside world what could be done with the Arbëresh, in order for them to keep alive the interest in the history and works of the Albanian people.
- To establish the Association of Friendship with Arab Countries and for this the Committee should make a letter to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the ALP.
- The Committee should prepare an article on the activity of associations which will be published in the internal and external press.
- Send to America the magazine "l'Albania Nouvèle" in English from China via Burma.
- To look at the newspaper "29 Nëntori" and to help with materials for publication.

Objectives and tasks that directly affected political emigration were also set:

- First, review the list of "reactionary leaders" who did not benefit from the amnesty and add it with new names. For this, write to the Legations to make their proposals.
- To issue a list of young people living in the Albanian colonies who "were falling into the hands of political emigration". After that, work was done to free them from the "clutches of reactionary leaders".
- To hit the newspaper "Dielli", for its hostile attitude towards the regime and to tell the Albanians of America "the truth about our country".
- Studio To study every three months in the Press Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the work with associations, the state of economic and political emigration.

The successes of the communist amnesty policy were generally slim. Thus, in 1959, the Albanian Legation in Rome reported on the failures in the repatriation process and stated that "even during this year there were no fugitives to apply for repatriation"<sup>8</sup>.

The communist intelligence also tried to extract valuable information about international relations from its own agency infiltrating the ranks of Albanian political emigration. Thus, such a source provided interesting information about the US position on Khrushchev's visit to Albania. The informant of the communist regime had learned that "Gaqo Gogo, who works at the US State Department, translating and extracting information from various Albanian newspapers, in a conversation he had with a source told us:" The Americans had chosen the ambassador they would send to Albania in the case of establishing diplomatic relations who holds the rank of colonel and is a person who knows Albania well. But with Khrushchev's visit to Albania, the State Department temporarily suspended the issue"<sup>9</sup>. Albanian intelligence did not consider this information complete, as the source did not provide any other information.

Legations and diplomatic missions were key bodies in the fight against political emigration. The UN Mission, which operated in the USA with which Albania had no

<sup>8</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>9</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 72, Information of the Ministry of Interior (Directorate of Political Intelligence) sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Shtylla, July 24, 1959

diplomatic relations, was no exception, and consequently the Mission operated freely only in a limited territory in New York. Thus, the Mission informed that it would continue to counteract by intensifying the propaganda against the members of the "Free Albania" committee and especially against the new members of the council for whom it stated that it had "compromising documents". "The strike of the" Free Albania "committee should be the first task of our propaganda now", it was said in its informative report<sup>10</sup>. The leaders of Balli Agrar, A. Ermenji and V. Andoni, as well as the late M. Frashëri "for whom the agrarians make great propaganda" would also be unmasked.

Documents would be published against the "Free Albania" committee, its members, so that they could be used by the Agrarians, through "Besa", which would receive these from "New Albania". The mission thought that in this way the committee leaders would respond and the rift would deepen. The mission thought that it should be borne in mind that Balli Agrar was the most powerful and organized group which had to be fought harder by communist counter-propaganda. "Another thing is that, for tactics, sometimes the committee" Free Albania "will be hit, sometimes Balli Agrar" was said in this document. Legality, in particular, would hit Gago Goga who was considered "one of the most dangerous and active"<sup>11</sup>.

In a report on the development of relations with Italy during 1960, the Legation in Rome informed that the Italian government continued to shelter and finance "the enemies of the Albanian people". Legata claimed that "our work has been mainly to deepen the rift in the ranks of treacherous emigration." She informed that during 1960 22 people were repatriated.<sup>12</sup> In order to crack down on and unmask political emigration, as well as opposing states, the regime did not hesitate to devise a grand conspiracy against Albania in 1960. The communist government strongly propagated a conspiracy to liquidate it in 1960. E. Hoxha, described it as a plan combined with an outside intervention, in which Titoist Yugoslavia, along with its ally Greece, in coordination with NATO and the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, acted against freedom, independence and sovereignty. of Albania<sup>13</sup>. He already expressed concern that the Yugoslav leadership was doing its best to turn Kosovo into a base against Albania, a base to unite Albania through Kosovo with Yugoslavia<sup>14</sup>.

In fact, this was a fabrication of the communist regime itself, which blamed all the responsibility for it on one of the senior Albanian soldiers, Teme Sejko, who, under the brutal violence of the communist investigation, allegedly claimed that after the uprising of armed and to win the enemies, the enemy plan foresaw that Northern Albania would pass under Yugoslav influence, both materially and morally, southern Albania under that of Greece, while Chameria would be given autonomy within the Greek government.

It was claimed by the communist authorities that in these plots, the enemy revelations widely included the Albanian political diaspora, which became more active again after the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1955-56. This conspiracy allegedly begins with the creation of the secret of T. Sejko in 1952 in Jermë<sup>14</sup>. According to the version of the communist government, at the instigation of the CIA and the QIP, the fugitive Haki Rushiti instructed T. Sejkon to establish this organization inside the country, for intelligence purposes. From 1951 to 1955 he carried out espionage tasks (intelligence, liaison and recruitment), and from 1955 to 1960 he carried out tasks for organizing the armed uprising. Allegedly H. Rushiti also made the connection between T. Sejko and Panajot Plakut d.m.th.

<sup>10</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Information of the UN Mission on Political Immigration in the USA

<sup>11</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration in the USA

<sup>12</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 464, Report of the Albanian Legation in Italy on the development of relations with Italy during 1960, Rome, 5 December 1960

<sup>13</sup> E. Hoxha, *vepra* 14, p. 283

<sup>14</sup> AMPB, year 1952, file 27, p. 50

QIP cooperation with UDB on CIA instructions. H. Rushiti (allegedly a member of the CIA and QIP), who would lead the implementation of the plan, Muharem Mane<sup>15</sup>, Sabri Hamzai, Izet Osmani, etc., played a major role, under the direction of enemy intelligence, in recruiting new elements, expanding the conspiratorial network and organizing and preparing this conspiracy. "This activity of our group, said T. Sejko, not only in 1956, but starting from mid-1955, is the effect of the Greek intelligence directive, given by Haki Rushiti"<sup>16</sup>.

Now Hoxha's government, according to the interest, implicated the Soviet government as well. According to her, Soviet revisionists instigated the plot in an agency way. This conspiracy would also be used as a means of pressure and blackmail against the ALP and the government of the Republic of Albania, in order for them, in order to escape the "danger", to seek the help of the Soviet military fleet, thus thinking, to submit to the military occupation of Albania. . This plan was combined with that of the CIA, which as well as the UDB encouraged P. Plaku, T. Jakova, Gomulka, etc., to turn to Khrushchev against the PPSH, and Gomulka even wanted to set up a control commission to verify the files. of our investigation<sup>17</sup>. P. Plaku, a fugitive UDB agent, also asked Khrushchev, with his authority, to intervene to liquidate the leadership of the ALP led by Enver Hoxha. Khrushchev even asked to get this "superspy" in BS"<sup>18</sup>. According to the government of Tirana, P. Plaku had also gone to Moscow and would play an important role in the plot that was being prepared. Khrushchev defended P. Elder, who had been active in the plot since 1955, and Khrushchev's request for P. Palk's repatriation<sup>19</sup> was part of the conspiracy which culminated in two phases: first, in 1956 at the Tirana Conference and second, on the eve of the blow of Soviet "revisionism" by the ALP in 1960. At this time, Soviet advisers, especially in the MIA, increased interest in Albanian political emigration, providing the necessary materials.

The state security had come to the conclusion that for the beginning of the uprising, fugitives from Albania and other Albanian mercenaries who would be trained by neighboring countries would be used. According to him, the CIA and QIP established an espionage center in Athens in 1960 called "Torinof"<sup>20</sup>, where about 100 people worked to coordinate the plot. The QIP instructed the conspirators that the alleged purpose of the organization was "the protection of the rights of Chameria, including Konispoli, which together with Vorio - Epirus. Under the violence of the investigation, Tahir Demi was forced to testify that, according to plan, "There would be internal clashes, through the saboteurs coming from abroad and the units we would set up; then the fugitives who had been prepared in the camps would act immediately"<sup>21</sup>.

According to the plan, the plot would be implemented in the second half of 1960 on the eve of the IV Congress of the ALP, mainly with outside armed interventions of the US VI Fleet and the Greek and Yugoslav military forces from the ground. The Greeks would act with mercenary units, with provocations at the border, occupying Konispol, etc., would set up the radio station to call on the outside world, etc. T. Sejko was forced by torture to "claim" that the plan of the armed uprising had begun to be concretized in 1956, in the framework of the general plan of the Americans, Greeks and Yugoslavs for the forcible overthrow of power in Albania<sup>22</sup>. According to him, also, in the beginning, diversionist groups would enter Albania by land and sea, because from the air they had a bitter experience, they would be sheltered in the bases of internal intelligence groups, etc., and would deal with acts of terror,

<sup>15</sup> AMPB files of the years 1957 - 1960

<sup>16</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 885, investigative process of T. Sejko, p. 342

<sup>17</sup> E. Hoxha, *vepra* 19, p. 52 - 53

<sup>18</sup> E. Hoxha, *vepra* 19, p. 52 - 53

<sup>19</sup> E. Hoxha, *work* 19, p.52

<sup>20</sup> AMPB, year 1957, file 600, p. 41

<sup>21</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 885, the trial of T. Sejko

<sup>22</sup> The trial of T. Sejko, in the newspaper *Shqipëria e re*, May 1961, p. 4

diversion, repression, occupation of important centers, etc., to create unrest in the country, to cause fratricide in Albania, to give these the cause of the intervention of foreign forces and to paralyze the national forces in the generations of defense of the RPSH<sup>23</sup>. These operations would be led by the headquarters consisting of generals Novas, Bocaris, Zotaj, etc., based in Athens, while in Yugoslavia the main headquarters would be in Belgrade or Nis as well as other centers in Greece and Yugoslavia.

Thus, the uprising would be led by a special staff created primarily by emissaries who would come from abroad such as P. Plaku, who was the main specialist who knew the theater of military operations in Albania, Haki Rushiti and others from the ranks of emigration abroad as well as American, British, Greek, Yugoslav and other domestic specialists. Once the uprising began, "enemy" states would intervene to quell the unrest and restore order in Albania.

The member states of the Balkan Pact would prevent from sea or land the aid that could come to the RPSH from the Warsaw Pact and, if passed by force, then this would be a plus cause for an international incident. T. Sejko had the task to occupy the island of Sazan, to close the Albanian fleet in the bay of Vlora, not to go out to sea.

Also, the Khrushchevites worked for the realization of this conspiracy, calculating to use it for their own purposes.

This was a conspiracy fantasized by the communist regime and made public for political purposes. The trial of the victims who qualified as its members took place in 1961.

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<sup>23</sup> The trial of T. Sejko, in the newspaper *Shqipëria e re*, May 1961, p. 4

## CHAPTER V

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**RELATIONS OF WESTERN POWERS WITH POLITICAL  
IMMIGRATION (1954-1960)****5.1. Cooperation of political emigration with international organizations in the years  
1954 - 1960**

After the defeats of the 1940s and early 1950s, Western governments decided to peacefully influence Eastern European countries and, to that end, they supported the creation of left-wing organizations in emigration, supported reorganizations, and regrouped or the formation of new groups. in the ranks of political emigration.

Albanian political emigration was also linked to international political organizations. Especially in the 1950s, with US support, a world-wide network was set up to support anti-communist political emigration, originating especially from European communist countries. A number of international anti-communist organizations were set up, with anti-communist exiles, to oppose the activities of communist states at the UN and in their countries of origin. This global network was financially supported by the US and Western allies, through official or private funds. Essential in this regard was the CIA– State Department program<sup>1</sup>.

Among the first organizations, which included Albanian political emigrants were: UNRRA (1943 - 1947); The International Organization for Refugees (IRO) operated from 1945 to 1951. These organizations provided them with first aid and the status of political refugees.

The IRO was an organization created with American and British support. It had the character of a charity for refugees, it had a duty to find and support them.<sup>2</sup> KIRO missions compiled lists of migrants, studying the situation and circumstances of their departure from their country.

In 1951 the IRO was replaced by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, which in July 1951 ratified the Convention on the Status of Refugees.<sup>3</sup>

Kjo Konventë u plotësua më tej në vitin 1967, duke përmirësuar dukshëm garantimet e të drejtave të politikë-immigrantëve.

Balli Kombëtar was involved in the "Green International" (Agrarian) created in 1947 in Washington with exiles of agrarian parties from communist countries.

In 1949, Albanian political emigration was included in the "Free Europe Committee", which became the main body for directing the entire activity of European anti-communist political emigration. Under this Committee, according to the 1953 declaration of Williamsburg (USA), political immigrants were committed to overthrowing communist regimes. Radio "Free Europe" and other bodies of this Committee also employed and activated Albanian emigrants.

The Voice of America did the same with headquarters in the USA, the FRG, Vienna, Cyprus, etc.

Among the Albanian political organizations, Balli Kombëtar Agrar strengthened the cooperation and ties with the Agrarian International, bringing to this international organization the problem of the Albanian village under the communist regime, as well as its efforts and experience in the fight against communism in Albania.

<sup>1</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos, ... p. 155

<sup>2</sup> AMPB - Internship on IRO activity

<sup>3</sup> AMPJ, Year 1945, file. 57, UN Convention (French)



At the congress of the International Agrarian League held in September 1954, BK kept a report on its nature and activity since its inception and on the current policy it was pursuing. The report said that the National Front was born as a strong reaction against fascist captivity. In "Eight points" written by Midhat Frashëri and published in 1939, a pure patriotism was expressed to gather all the enslaved Albanians around a single flag around the ideal of freedom and independence of the nation, putting hopes to our powers. It was said that, with the development of the National Front and its extension to all parts of the Homeland, there was a need for a more distinct definition in the ideological field. "The war had not only a national character, but also a social character," the report said. In 1942, the Decalogue of the National Front was published, "where the idea of agrarian democracy was clearly engraved", as Albania consisted of 90% of farmers<sup>4</sup>.

It was further stated that the First Congress of the National Front had convened in Albania, in the wave of civil war with the communists, in early January 1944, in the city of Berat, which had been liberated by the Balli forces. It was attended by 54 representatives elected by the Provincial Committees throughout Albania. It studied the state of the civil war that put the National Front at war on two fronts (with the Germans and the Communists) and determined the path to be followed. The Second Congress was convened in exile, in Reggio Emilio, Italy, on December 31, 1945, emphasizing the democratic nature of the BK and the struggle against totalitarianism. The Third Congress was held in Rome, in 1948, where the ways of a wider political action of Balli for a general gathering of Albanians were discussed.

The Fourth Congress was convened on November 29, 1949, in Naples. The interpretation and extension of the principles of the Decalogue of the National Front were discussed here, and the program and the agrarian direction of the party were established. This is how the party was called: "Balli Kombëtar, Agrarian Democratic Party".

The Fifth Congress (Fourth of the Exile) convened in Naples, on February 24, 1954. This Congress condemned the expansion and profanation of the National Committee "Free Albania"; fired Hasan Dosti from all official offices because he had not participated in Midhat Frashëri's National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" to continue his work, collaborating with other Democratic groups<sup>5</sup>.

According to the report in Albania, BK, despite the severe persecution, had been able to create a secret organization that spread throughout the country, so communist propaganda had directed the main war, these last ten years, against Balli Kombëtar and the regime called it Ballin Kombëtar as the strongest and most organized party. While with the organization and assistance of BK members, the needs of the party were met as well as many difficult situations that had proven the moral and political qualities of the party and its members<sup>6</sup>.

The activity of the press was said to have been a very important part of the National Front's struggle for the liberation of the country. From the beginning, Balli Kombëtar had secretly distributed tracts and other publications, and thus the spiritual uprising against the fascist occupation had begun.

In exile were published the temporary "Flag" (in Italy) and "Servant of Albania" (in the United States), as well as the newspapers "Albania" and "Flag" (in Italy). In addition, a news bulletin from Albania called "Lettre d'Albanie" was published. The newspaper "Flamuri", which was the official organ of the party, was published with 6,000 copies and was judged to be the best newspaper of the Albanian emigration.

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<sup>4</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK to the Congress of the International Village League, September 1954.

<sup>5</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

<sup>6</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League.

Since its establishment, Balli Kombëtar was said to have tried hard to unite all Albanians in the fight for the freedom of the Homeland and the freedom of ideas. The last meeting he had held in the mountains of Albania for this purpose, also pushed by the insistence of the Allies, was the one that took place in Mukaj (near Kruja) on August 1 and 2, 1943. But the communists, ordered from abroad, destroyed it. the agreement even declared civil war. It was said that the documents that Balli Kombëtar had seized in September 1943, proved very well that there was no hope for cooperation between the two parties.<sup>7</sup>

"Later, it was said that the Mayor of Balli, Midhat Frashëri, tried to take an interest in the fight against communism, and the rest did not enter the organized war".<sup>8</sup>

The report claimed that in exile, the National Front had again become the impetus for the unification of national anti-communist parties and groups. In April 1949, Midhat Frashëri had begun talks with the Monarchist Party (Legality) and with some small groups. Thus, in August 1949 it became possible to declare from Paris the National Committee "Free Albania" which had undertaken the liberation and democratization of Albania, was accepted and applauded by all Albanians, except those who had fascist and communist views".<sup>9</sup>

But with the death of Midhat Frashëri, the report said, his successor did not rely on the principles of the Committee and the political line of the National Front. He created another Committee, in which unwanted people participated. In the face of this situation, Mit'hat Frashëri's followers and other Albanian "democrats" everywhere strongly opposed. They decided to set up the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" and on August 12, 1954, its completion was announced by Paris.

The participation of Balli Kombëtar in the International Village League was considered as one of the most important actions of BK, both in the ideological and political field. "Buttocks and latifundists try to misinterpret Balli's principles in the eyes of the people. But these slanders have not acted at all on the Albanian people, who know very well the oppressors of yesterday and those of today".<sup>10</sup>

The report stated that "The attitude and work of the International Village League is judged by the Albanians as the first step towards a future Federation of Southeast Europe, which will work hard to create a Federal Europe".<sup>11</sup>

While in politics with neighboring countries, it was said that Balli Kombëtar had tried "to clarify what were the rights of Albania and to protect these rights whenever signs of danger for the freedom, independence and integrity of our Nation have been seen."<sup>12</sup>

With the Great Democracies BK had tried to place the anti-communist war in the context of a positive crusade, giving for this purpose the best members and the healthiest energies and fighting any "mercenarism or anti-communism profession".<sup>13</sup>

It was pointed out that the National Front's resistance against fascist captivity had begun as passive resistance and later turned into armed insurgency. "Numerous demonstrations organized with a force of close to 15,000 men, in 1943, showed very well the

<sup>7</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

<sup>8</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League.

<sup>9</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

<sup>10</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

<sup>11</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

<sup>12</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League.

<sup>13</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

power of the National Front in hundreds of efforts and wars. In one of these efforts, the General Commander of the National Front, Hysni Lepenica, was also present, with 38 gang leaders ". It was said that after the fall of fascism and Nazism came to Albania, "Balli Kombëtar stood for 15 months in a row, alone, giving thousands of martyrs for freedom." It was said that "with the help given by the Allies to communism in Albania" some of the leaders and soldiers of Balli were forced to come to the West to continue the war. In Albania, until November 1943, the report said, Balli Kombëtar had left in the field of honor, against the fascists and communists, about 6,000 people.<sup>14</sup>

BK was presented in the report as a pillar of anti-communist resistance after the war. The strongest attempt was said to have been made by Balli Kombëtar, in 1946, in Northern Albania, under the leadership of the Kazazi Brothers, who attacked Shkodra, the capital of the north, with great power. The success was said to be temporary "because the uprising did not spread, even so, the leaders of the movement killed themselves, after a strict resistance, in order not to fall alive into the hands of the communists". In southern Albania, it was said that the armed resistance was led in 1945 in the Korça region, by Maliq Dushari, in Vlora by Mali Koshena, and Lahe Nure, while in Mallakastër the Balli Kombëtar squads were led by Faik Margëlleçi, Shaqo Kulla and Alush Fetahu, with sabotage and matches until 1950<sup>15</sup>. . Later, another organization of the National Front, led by Professor Bego Gjonzeneli, was dictated by the regime and its 20 organizers were shot. It was emphasized that the leader of this movement, the red dictator Enver Hoxha, had proposed to spare his life if he signed a statement stating that Balli Kombëtar in exile worked with the traitors of the fascist occupation. Professor Bego Gjonzeneli had refused and accepted the shooting with honor.<sup>16</sup>

The boys of the schools in Shkodra, Tirana, Vlora and Korca, as well as the workshop of kerosene wells in Kuçova, Patos and Selenica, had committed very courageous acts of sabotage against the regime.

The resistance of the National Front in Albania was said to have been affirmed by all the speeches and publications of the communist leaders, who had made the greatest attacks against the National Front.

It was further stated that the Albanian peasants had made a strong passive resistance, strictly opposing the exploitation by the red regime. They had opposed the payment of heavy taxes demanded by the government and had even begun to protest. After some false promises, the government had started persecutions and repressions against them, and this persecution continued. In March of this year, three farmers from Shkodra, who had opposed with weapons the police who had come to collect taxes, were caught and hanged in front of the people, without any trial. Five villagers who had been caught crossing the border had been shot in the eyes of the terrified population. Last April, a military tribunal tried and sentenced seven people to death. The report said that in recent years more than 500 BK exponents had been killed, "and since the beginning of the armed resistance, our party has left about 20,000 martyrs." It was pointed out that the vast majority of these losses were from the peasantry class, which was fighting communism very bravely. Apparently in this submission there were exaggerations and exaggerations which were made to justify the support that BK requested from the Agrarian International.

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<sup>14</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League.

<sup>15</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League.

<sup>16</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League.

Balli claimed that he was “the true leader of the Albanian peasantry and the only party with ideas and reform programs that suit the Albanian people, and thus is the soundest guarantee for the future”<sup>17</sup>.

Several resolutions were adopted in this Congress. One of them was the Resolution on International Affairs.<sup>18</sup> In its introduction it was stated that taking into account the factors influencing international relations and the balance of power and knowing the ever-increasing danger of communist conspiracy, the Committee on International Affairs proposed to the Fourth Congress of the International Village Union to adopt this resolution:

- In today's life-or-death struggle against communist tyranny, only a very determined policy of democratic powers can have positive results.
- No peaceful "coexistence" between free countries and the communist group is possible. Any attempt to achieve this goal, such as trade agreements or scientific exchanges, will ultimately have devastating consequences for the Free World. These relations are used by communist governments to exploit the enslaved peoples economically as much as possible and to strengthen their regimes economically and militarily, preparing them as best they can for the latest attack on the Free World.
- International recognition of communist governments of any form should be withdrawn and they should be denied participation in the United Nations as well as in other international institutes. Vendeve All countries under communist rule must regain their lost independence, giving them the opportunity for free elections, by which they can determine the form of government and the foreign and domestic policy they desire.

While the Resolution of the Committee on Internal and Agrarian Affairs stated.<sup>19</sup> During the period between the III and IV Congresses of the International Rural League, the situation of the peasants under the communist regime deteriorated greatly, both economically and politically and socially. When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were liberated from Soviet rule and communist control, the nations of Western Europe must first provide all the necessary assistance to accelerate the economic reconstruction of the liberated countries. The secession of Eastern Europe from Western Europe would have caused the economic upheaval of the West had it not been for the help of the Marshall Plan. With all this, the standard of living has dropped nonetheless.

After the Liberation, the economic reconstruction of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had to be done in a hurry to provide agricultural products for both domestic and Western European needs, the needs of which were increasing. In order to achieve economic recovery and progress, it was stressed that the full cooperation of all the nations of Europe was necessary.

It was pointed out that the collectivization of agriculture by force, the tactic of intimidation, the requisition of produce in large quantities at low prices, carried out by communist regimes, had endangered the life of the peasant and caused a critical situation in agriculture of the whole communist sphere. .

The resolution stated that experience had proved that, from a political, economic and social point of view, individual agriculture, in which the peasant is the owner of the land and the owner of the goods, was the healthiest basis of agricultural production, of raising the standard of living of the strata. rural and the provision of freedom and democracy.

<sup>17</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report of the BK at the congress of the International Village League

<sup>18</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report on the Development of the Proceedings of the Congress of the International Agrarian League, September 1954.

<sup>19</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 58-60, 28 November 1957, Report on the Development of the Proceedings of the Congress of the International Agrarian League, September 1954.

The kolkhozes and sovkozs, created by the communist regimes, had to be dispersed and the land had to be divided among the peasants. Insufficient land to support the population and other farmer shortages could be addressed through free cooperatives and other free economic enterprises.

The resolution also stated that, given the economic and social crisis that had been created by communist control in the enslaved countries, the fundamental problems after the liberation would be those of democratic reconstruction. In terms of agriculture, this would rely on individual agriculture and free cooperatives, including agricultural industries, which had to be developed according to the needs of the people and using the power of the arm correctly.

The appropriate dismantling of the problem and the spirit of social justice was seen as the basis of cultural relations and of European unity, and the International Village League was working to achieve this goal.

The so-called "New Way", in the economic policy of the communist-ruled countries, was considered only a change of systematic attempt to lie to the free world; the enslaved peoples knew this well. "It is not at all true that the system of collectivization has been abandoned. On the contrary, the State exercises full control over the imposition process, which aims to deprive the peasants of even the few remaining rights, reducing them to the rank of a state slave and red feudalism. ”.

Even propaganda for a trade exchange between East and West was seen as an attempt by the communist dictatorship to use the economic resources of the Free World in order to cope with the existing economic crisis of the communist sphere and then put them to work. these resources for the offensive plan against civilization and humanity.

The Committee on Internal Affairs and Agrarian Affairs proposed the formation of a permanent Working Committee, composed of an agricultural specialist from each member party, to prepare the necessary material and to discuss all the problems in the spirit of the resolution adopted by the Fourth Congress of International Village League on Internal Agrarian Affairs.

In 1954, Albanian emigration was included in the "Assembly of Captive Nations" of Eastern Europe, which, according to the Philadelphia Declaration, aimed at "the liberation of Eastern and Central Europe." It worked closely with the US government and other Western governments, representing 21 anti-communist fugitive organizations from communist countries, which coordinated their anti-communist political activity, according to the respective groups. The New York National Assembly was represented here. Its heads were elected by rotation. Its leadership directed anti-communist propaganda around the world. Its members were like "ambassadors" and acted especially in the main centers: in Paris, Rome, Bonn, London, which have been very active.

In August 1955, the Albanian Legation in Paris informed that the "Assembly of the Captive European Nations" was already the hearth that gathered all the "enemies of the Soviet people". This organization was encouraged by the Americans and its first meeting was held in New York in October 1954. From the Albanian emigrants participated: Hasan Dosti, N. Kota, Reshat Agaj, Hiqmet Delvina, Qazim Emro, Ismet Hoxha , Hysni Jenisheri, Petro Ktona, Qani Lesko, Faik Miraku, Rrok Nallbani, Maliq Petrela, Mazar Pustina, Qemal Vokopola, Teki Xhindi, Tomor Zavalani.

In July 1955 a conference was held in Strasbourg attended by representatives of anti-communist political emigration organizations from European countries. From Albania participated, Hasan Dosti, Selim Damani, Gjon Markagjoni, Ali Këlcyra, Abaz Ermenji. At its second session on 1 July in Strasbourg, the Assembly adopted the following resolutions:

1. On European integration. This committed all members to actively and dynamically cooperating with the European Council.

2. Resolution on the "Subjugated Nations", by which she asked the four great:
  - a) To put on the agenda the problem of liberation of the peoples of the participating countries
  - b) To hold free elections in the participating countries for the government they want
  - c) To envisage measures to ensure the implementation of the will expressed by the peoples of these countries. Rezolucioni mbi mbrojtjen e të drejtave e traditave kulturave të vendeve të robëruara "me botën e lirë"
3. Resolution on the problem of youth.
4. Resolution on the assistance to be given to the refugees of the enslaved European nations, who demanded the right to work, education, etc..<sup>20</sup>.

According to the information that the Albanian government had, in this conference was planned the preparation of a joint army of anti-communist emigrants. This objective was said to have not been achieved due to internal divergences that existed between political emigration groups and that this failure "was further exacerbated by Albanians and Bulgarians who had disagreements over the establishment of the committee to lead the army"<sup>21</sup>.

L. Zogu participated in the "Anti-Communist League of Asian Countries" and the "International Conference on the Resistance of the Occupied Territories" (CIPRO) established in 1984. Balli Agrar participated in the "International Resistance". Albanian emigration was also included in the "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations" (ABN), in the "World Anti-Communist League", in the "Union for the Protection of Oppressed Peoples" which in 1958 was called the "Free International", etc.

The Council of Europe also paid special attention to the anti-communist activity of Eastern European emigration, holding meetings with its representatives, rallies, memoranda, etc .. as a non-governmental organization for European cooperation. The New York City Council was also part of this.

Part of the immigrants were trained at the "College of Free Europe" in Strasbourg (France) in the '50s and '60s.

This emigration was also included in the "European Federalist Union", in the "European Council for Freedom", etc. The Kosovar League was part of the "Federalist Union of European Minorities". Balli Agrar also had connections with the Croatian Peasant Party in exile, while the Kosovar League with the "Organization of Free Croats" in the US and the "Croatian National Council" etc. Legality established links with European and Asian monarchist parties, with the assembly of representatives of European monarchist parties, etc. Also, special groups of Albanian emigration were associated with right-wing authoritarian and dictatorial regimes such as the chess of Iran and Frankish Spain.

The Albanian Legation in Paris informed that from April 26, 1957 to May 1, the Assembly of the Captive Nations of Europe met again in one of its sessions. A. Ermenji was a delegate of the Agrarian International. From the new Committee "Free Albania" were V. Gemenji, Sotir Avrami, and Ndue Gjon Marku as observers. They had the support of the Americans to be known as the Committee, but Gremeto Dimitrov of Bulgaria, who had sympathy for A. Ermeni, did not formally recognize the Committee at this meeting<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 401, Quarterly report of the Albanian Legation in Paris on the Albanian emigration prepared by Llambi Peçini, Paris, 18.08.1955

<sup>21</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Intervention and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

<sup>22</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Information of the Legation in France prepared by Demetrius sent to the MFA, Paris, on May 9, 1957

In September 1958 the representative of the KSHL, Vasil Germenji, raised the issue of Kosovo in a special UN session, the Yugoslav representative left the session in protest. The New York Post wrote about this event on September 18, 1958.<sup>23</sup>

Lidhja Kosovare aderoi në organizatat ndërkombëtare që kishin si objekt mbrojtjen e ethnic minorities in communist countries. Flamuri newspaper, in a report titled "At the VIII Congress of the Union of Ethnic European Committees", under the heading "Kosovo - Metohija is Albanian", informed about a report presented a year ago on the occasion of the Seventh Congress of the Federalist Union of European Ethnic Communities from the Kosovo League representation, which had informed this international organization about the situation in the province of Kosovo which was "under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav state, only by the will of European diplomacy: the Treaty of St. Stephen, the Congress of Berlin at the Conference of Ambassadors of London".

In this report it was emphasized that this province was Albanian, not only from the language of race, in the etymological sense of the word race, but it was Albanian with feelings and heart.

It was further alleged that the Albanians, drawn by the socio-political promises of the Yugoslav National Liberation Front, had joined the resistance in the hope that their suffering would end. Albanians had believed that brotherhood and agreement would replace yesterday's hatred and quarrels. Albanians had believed that a new life would begin for the peoples of the Balkans. But for the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija, unfortunately, this had resulted in nothing but an illusion, a dream that quickly turned into a very bitter reality.

The first complaint against the Belgrade government, the report states, was that, shortly after the liberation, almost 50,000 Albanians were killed without trial or trial for allegedly being militias and collaborators of the occupier<sup>24</sup>. The second complaint was that, the new Constitution had recognized Montenegro, whose population was not even one third of the population of Kosovo and Metohija, the right to be a republic in itself; Kosovo and Metohija had become an "autonomous" province, dependent on Serbia. It was further alleged that the Secretary General of the League of Communists in Kosovo was Montenegrin Dushan Mugosha. In the legislative elections last March, the population of Kosovo, with an absolute Albanian majority, "elected" the Serb Petar Stambolic who was the only candidate. According to recent news, from Albanians from the districts of Skopje, Gostivar and Tetovo, who had been forced to emigrate to Turkey, only hard work and mining were for Albanians. Easy jobs and positions of command and command were in the hands of the Serbo-Montenegrins.

The third complaint was that the Belgrade authorities sought to reduce the number of Albanians in favor of Serbo-Montenegrins. For this purpose, they use two ways: Through various contempts and oppressions, they forced the Albanians to leave their homes and emigrate, and instead brought Serb-Montenegrins, as the previous regime did. The report of the Kosovo League referred to the Turkish newspaper "CUMHURIET" dated April 6, 1957, which wrote: "200,000 emigrants from Yugoslavia have entered Turkey".

The document further stated that they were counting Albanians as if they were Turks. The proof was said to be given by the statistics of Belgrade of 1953 and 1955. In the statistics of 1955 the number of Turks reached 250,000, while that of the Albanians only 752,000. the Albanians had added 2,000 souls while the Turks 200,000 !. This maneuver was said to be aimed, through repression and contempt and a possible future agreement with the Turkish government, to expel another 200,000 Albanians from Kosovo-Metohija.

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<sup>23</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "The efforts of XH. Deva and R. Krasniqi on the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US" in the publication: *The Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, vol. 2. Prizren, 2005. p. 156.

<sup>24</sup> Flamuri newspaper, August 7, 1958, report "In the VIII Congress of the Union of Ethnic European Committees -" Kosovo - Metohija is Albanian "

The fourth complaint - was that the Belgrade authorities persecuted the Albanian school and its educational staff. After the liberation, according to the right given to them by the Constitution, "Albanians eager for education, to get out of the ignorance in which they had been forced to remain, the previous regime, rushed to schools, which, day by day, your line was multiplied in Kosovo and Metohija". But the Serbs countered, as soon as the "good" relations with the communist government of Tirana were broken. Thus, allegedly, due to lack of premises and teachers, they closed Albanian schools or merged them with Serbian schools; closed classical gymnasiums, on the pretext that the province allegedly needed techniques for its economic development; imprisoned, teachers, professors and students for "excessive nationalism" !; The campaign against the Albanian school, launched by the newspaper "RILINDJA" published in Pristina, was clear. This newspaper constantly drew attention to the "fact" that the Albanian language and literature were not taught on a materialistic scientific basis.<sup>25</sup>

In 1958, the CIA domination of the world anti-communist political emigration significantly increased, which ensured supremacy in the Albanian emigration groups abroad. That same year, the CIA set up a coordination center called the Center for a Free Europe<sup>26</sup>, who propagated against E Hoxha's communist regime.

Meanwhile, the New York Committee and that of A. Ermenji were each trying to take the position as the only body of Albanian emigration in the organization "Assembly of European Captive Nations" led by the State Department. The Paris Legation informed that in this organization the wishes of the New York Committee were occasionally defended by the Americans, while those of A. Ermenji's committee were defended by the chairman of the Bulgarian agrarians, G. Dimitrov. At a meeting of the organization's committee, held in late 1958, in New York, the representative of "Free Europe", the American Jarov had demanded that the organization in question, should orient its policy towards a compromise with national communism. In Poland, Hungary and other European countries. At the same time, he had recommended that in this organization, the Albanian side be represented by the committee of V. Germenji. These proposals were opposed by the Bulgarian representative Dimitrov, he spoke out against the participation in the Assembly of Captive Nations of the Committee of V. Germenj, but his views were not accepted. As a result, Dimitrov and the Romanian representative left the meeting and, in protest, withdrew their national committees from the organization. Thus, for a brief moment, the Assembly of Captive Nations was divided<sup>27</sup>.

Later, in January-February and March 1959, efforts were made to bring the Bulgarians and Romanians together, accepting one of Dimitrov's proposals - the expulsion of V. Germenj's Committee and the cessation of its funding. A. Ermenji was immediately informed about this issue by Halil Maçi, who suggested not to be too rigid and sharp with the Americans now. On the other hand, the Bulgarian agrarians advised A. Ermeni that their work, in the largest percentage, depended on the Americans and, as a result, the best way to participate (to return) to the Assembly had to be chosen. of the Captive Nations, because, by staying out of it, they would have great political losses, not only in the international arena, but also in the mass of emigration. To this end, the Bulgarians recommended the formation of a new committee on Albanian emigration, which would be granted the right to join the Assembly of Captive Nations<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Flamuri newspaper, August 7, 1958, report "In the VIII Congress of the Union of Ethnic European Committees -" Kosovo - Metohija is Albanian ".

<sup>26</sup> AMPB, internship on the activity of the organization "Free Europe"

<sup>27</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>28</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959



This committee had to be composed of people who would be elected by A. Ermenji himself. But the latter was pessimistic about such a thing and had hinted that his position towards this organization, ha ha, remained what it had been, i.e. he would still stand outside its ranks<sup>29</sup>.

According to the Paris Legation, this attitude naturally alienated A. Ermeni from the American-led international anti-communist organizations and, for this reason, the heads of the Bulgarian emigration Dimitrov, etc., were pressuring him in the form of advice to change his attitude towards the Americans. They had proposed to Abazi to draft the project as he wished for the formation of the new committee, to represent all the force or the vast majority of Albanian emigration. It was left to him to select the right people to be members of the Committee<sup>30</sup>.

Legata informed that this proposal A. Ermenji, with a little hesitation, had accepted and was committed to try to draft the project in question, which he would then discuss with Dimitrov. Legata thought that these facts showed that the Americans were trying to capture A. Ermeni and, through him, the agrarians, using the heads of the Bulgarian emigration<sup>31</sup>.

Exclusion of the committee of V. Germenji. A. Kupi had hailed him, calling him a contribution of his Bulgarian colleagues and as an action that opened prospects for strengthening his position in the Assembly of Captive Nations, while as a reason for the expulsion of the New York committee, he considered the entry into his ranks of corrupt elements such as H. Dosti, A. Këlcyra etc. Kupi, according to the Legation, had said that this was to lead him in the near future towards his distribution<sup>32</sup>.

The VI Congress of the Agrarian International convened in Washington on May 30-31. A. Ermenji's committee was represented by 45 people chaired by Halil Maçi, Ali Koprenska and Luan Gashi.

On July 17, 1959, the US Congress passed Resolution 111, which passed "Exiled Nations Week." This directly engaged the US government in the subversive anti-communist war, which lasted until the overthrow of communism in the US and Eastern Europe.

Balli Kombëtar also participated in the VI Congress of the Agrarian International in Washington. BK, in his report, emphasized that, since the Congress of the International Rural Union, of Paris, in the second autumn of 1956 and until 1960, the state of the peasantry that constituted the majority of the Albanian people, had always been becoming more difficult. After the heroic uprising of Hungary, the communist party and government in Albania, in order to face dangerous surprises, had accelerated collectivization, increased oppression and tried to stay in power, using the patriotism of Albanians, "to keep it in we went bankrupt communism".<sup>33</sup> It was noted that by the end of 1958, collectivization of agriculture accounted for 76% of arable land and 63.3% of agricultural holdings. The party's goal was to end collectivization within this year, but from the difficulties that had arisen, the communist party and government were concerned because:

- Agricultural cooperatives, created by all kinds of repression and oppression, have become centers of unemployment or little work, after the villagers have followed the path of sabotage, they could not oppose otherwise;

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<sup>29</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>30</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>31</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>32</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 524, Report of the Paris Legation "on the situation of reactionary emigration in France", July 20, 1959

<sup>33</sup> Report of the National Front at the 6th Congress of the International Union of Peasants in Washington, 1960

- Production through cooperatives, despite government assistance, is less than production at uncollectivized lands.

This document stated that, in order to close this typical communist misery, "they present to the people the countries of the West, and especially America, as the nations where suffering, misery and exploitation have reached their peak!"

Even the new price reduction, which came into force on May 1, 1960, the BK Report described as proof of how difficult the economic situation in Albania was enslaved by the communists.

The report stressed that the regime was using patriotism to stay in power. It was emphasized that the attitude of the communists in power, without great shocks, in these years, "has its source, you do not have the triumph of ideas or the red system, but on the other hand, you have the masterful use of the patriotism of the people. This is the biggest paradox"<sup>34</sup>. First of all, BK blamed this on the Greek expansionist policy. BK claimed that, from the South, "the Greeks have recently opened, with the mouth of King Paul (on 21.2.1959) the most absurd claims to the detriment of Albania, to develop a ridiculous micro-imperialism and to claim that the orthodox of Southern Albania (qi they call it "Northern Epirus") are Greeks, because they are of the same religion as the Greeks! In addition, Greece is always held to be at war with Albania, because the Italian fascist regime, which occupied our country in 1939, declared war on Athens in 1940, and attacked it from Albanian soil! Thus, the Hellenic government, which has regulated relations with Italy, always considers itself at war with Albania for the work of the fascist attack! These demands came after the Greeks invaded in 1912 and took over the province of Chameria with 130,000 Albanians, and after the League of Nations put an end to further claims by the Greeks and set the borders of present-day Albania"<sup>35</sup>.

The BK report stated that this political situation was being exploited by the communists, "you put in front of the Albanians the partition of Albania as an alternative to liberation from the red regime and you presented the Soviet Union as the only defender of Albania's integrity!"

The report stated that the communist regime was also making great use of the Kosovo issue, "not because they intend to unite this land with Albania, but to intimidate the inhabitants terrorized by Moscow agents, that a worse fate awaits them if they enter in the plans and in the Belgrade federation". And the Albanians, who have in their heart the work of Kosovo, stressed BK, were very impressed by a propaganda that "contains in itself red intentions and Albanian truth"<sup>36</sup>.

Before International Agrarian BK reported that his press had been successful and widespread. The above-mentioned report stated that BK's press was always the newspaper FLAMURI, which was published in 6,000 copies, with articles in Albanian, English, French and Italian; The newsletter "LETTRE D'ALBANIE" was published in Albanian, French and English; BK Youth Magazine "SERVANT OF ALBANIA" which was published in Detroit, in Albanian and English, with 2,000 copies.

The report also analyzed the contribution of BK in the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania". He emphasized that Balli Kombëtar was always the axis of the National Democratic Committee "Shqipnija e Lirë", which was chaired by Professor Abas Ermenji and in addition to Balli Kombëtar, the Independent Democratic Group of Turkey, which published the newspaper "BESA" with 2 500 copies, the democratic groups of France, England, Australia and America, as well as the KOSOVO LEADERSHIP, which published

<sup>34</sup> Report of the National Front at the 6th Congress of the International Union of Peasants in Washington, 1960

<sup>35</sup> Report of the National Front at the 6th Congress of the International Union of Peasants in Washington, 1960

<sup>36</sup> Report of the National Front at the 6th Congress of the International Union of Peasants in Washington, 1960

the bulletin "Kosovo Effort" in Albanian, English and French, with 3,000 copies. The committee itself published the bulletin "QINDRESA SHQIPTARE", with 3000 copies, in Albanian, English and French. The report stated that all this gathering of Albanians, around the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania", worked and helped with all Albanian means the various actions of the Committee for Freedom and Democratization of Albania.<sup>37</sup>

Throughout this period, Albanian political emigration was financially supported by international humanitarian organizations.

The International Relief Committee (IRC) dealt with refugee stabilization issues and had branches around the world.

Amnesty International<sup>38</sup> defended human rights in the world, including the rights of political fugitives or immigrants, by advocating for them.

Albanian emigration was involved in the activity of some Vatican organizations, which provided assistance, organized this emigration with work. This activity was carried out by several organizations such as the "Vatican Relief Commission", "Catholic Action", "Caritas Organization", "Center for Catholic Studies", "Pax Romana", "World Council of Churches", etc.

The US Immigration Program (USEP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also provided political assistance and support to the diaspora. of this new organization called "USEP" which was based in Rome. All immigrants gathered in a camp. This organization organized professional courses with immigrants<sup>39</sup>.

In the United Arab Emirates, during 1960, the IROS Organization had begun to help the fugitives and to make propaganda to flee to South Africa where they were promised a better life.<sup>40</sup>

## **5.2. Relations of Western governments with Albanian political emigration**

After the failures of the operations of 1949-1953, the relations between the Albanian political emigration and the western governments suffered obvious flaws. Thus, some of the British spies, unjustly, blamed the Albanian emigrants, claiming that they "hid in caves, instead of blowing up Hoxha's supply system"<sup>41</sup>.

Yet all the foreigners who helped in the battle against the communist regime have noted the personal desire of Albanian emigrants to fight communism, even though they knew the dangers. They made decisions with their conscience, and that they had taken into account that there would be casualties in this in the war.

But also the American and British missionaries debated among themselves, blaming each other for the failures of the missions in Albania <sup>42</sup>. However, the betrayal of Kim Philby to date has been identified as one of the root causes of this defeat. D. Smajli claims that the emigrants sent to Albania "seemed completely convinced, that their enemies had waited for them, after some groups had been ambushed and lost almost as soon as they left the shore. Thus we encountered the very unpleasant fact , that there has been a security breach or a betrayal"<sup>43</sup>, who later turned out to be Philby.

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<sup>37</sup> Report of the National Front at the 6th Congress of the International Union of Peasants in Washington, 1960

<sup>38</sup> Brochure "Albania-1984" and Amnesty International

<sup>39</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Intervention and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

<sup>40</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/2, Report of Ambassador Delo Balili on the activity of political emigration in the R.A.B., January 22, 1961

<sup>41</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 208

<sup>42</sup> A. Gerin, *Cold War Commandos* ..., p. 196

<sup>43</sup> D. Smajli, *Albanian task* ..., p. 261

The Americans in coordination with the British trained many immigrants in Germany. The Italians trained in Naples and Bari. Immigrants were also trained by the Yugoslavs and the Greeks. Bethel points out that "the only problem was who would go to Albania first"<sup>44</sup>.

As a result of failures in the 1950s there was a decline in morale among immigrants. Xhemal Laçi wrote that "some people have realized that the missions are going badly, that there have been casualties and that their families in Albania have also been executed."<sup>45</sup>

But there were also some leaders who tried to read the new situation correctly and serve their nation. Work on the Kosovo issue began to take precedence, and to this end, the US was seen as the center of future battles. Thus e.g. Xh Deva wrote to R. Krasniqi: "It is likely that the American efforts to liberate Albania from communism have ended. We can serve Kosovo better from America than from Europe. For many reasons, we have to go there."<sup>46</sup> After this time, a new chapter begins for the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US. In this context, Deva sent Krasniqi a secret plan of Yugoslavia to realize a new wave of displacement of Albanians from Kosovo. The President of the KSHL, Krasniqi, immediately went to Washington and raised the issue directly with the American authorities. Scholar Idriz Lamaj wrote that the "Albanian Desk", the US MFA office for the Albanian issue, informed Krasniqi on August 21, 1957: "One of our MFA officials informed Belgrade that Washington is fully aware of the secret planning. Yugoslavia for another wave of displacement of Albanians from Kosovo to Turkey. Our office will not leave this issue in silence."<sup>47</sup>

There were also serious problems between particular heads of political immigration and some foreign governments. Typical was the conflict between A. Zogu and the head of the Egyptian revolutionary government Nasser, after the overthrow of King Farouk with whom Zogu had had early friendships. The Americans were forced to intervene to resolve this conflict. US Embassy official in Cairo Jefferson Cafery informed Washington that the Egyptian government had sentenced Zog to up to 3 years in prison and a fine of up to 1,000 Egyptian lira for non-payment of certain taxes<sup>48</sup>. A US embassy official, at the behest of the State Department, discussed the issue with Colonel Nasser on October 16. The American diplomat noted Zog's position as an anti-communist leader who had collaborated with the US in anti-communist activities and was given permission to enter the US. The US embassy official suggested that, if the Egyptian government had fiscal claims against Zog, they could be settled without public prosecution or without causing unnecessary damage<sup>49</sup>.

Nasser responded that the government had ordered legal action against Zog because he had refused to pay taxes. He added that Zog was involved in suspicious activities and said he could not understand why the US supported such a person. The American official then asked him if, if Zog paid the taxes, he would be allowed to deposit his gold outside Egypt. Nasser replied that his government would confiscate his gold after he had smuggled it in illegally. The American diplomat told Nasser that the circumstances when Zog came as a political refugee to Egypt and the protection he then gave you from the King of Egypt had to be taken

<sup>44</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 193

<sup>45</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 251

<sup>46</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "The efforts of XH. Deva and R. Krasniqi on the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US" in the publication: *The Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, vol. 2. Prizren, 2005. p. 156.

<sup>47</sup> Idriz Lamaj, "The efforts of XH. Deva and R. Krasniqi on the internationalization of the Kosovo issue in the US" in the publication: *The Albanian Right in Defense of Ethnic Albania*, vol. 2. Prizren, 2005. p. 156.

<sup>48</sup> USNA, DS 767.11 / 10 - 1953; Jefferson Cafery Telegram at the US Embassy in Cairo to the State Department, October 19, 1953

<sup>49</sup> USNA, DS 767.11 / 10 - 1953; Jefferson Cafery Telegram at the US Embassy in Cairo to the State Department, October 19, 1953

into account. Nasser then said the US government could take the gold from Zog and pay him its value in the US<sup>50</sup>.

The US Embassy claimed that it would continue to pursue the matter to resolve the difficulties created, but it added that there was a significant limit to the intervention we could make in its favor<sup>51</sup>.

Rumors circulated among the emigrants in 1949 that secrets had come out from the Albanian community in Rome, where the Albanian embassy was very active, and from Athens<sup>52</sup>. The Persians themselves who came from Albania found that the communists had strong control and they were very well organized<sup>53</sup>. The English explorer Northrop, had realized that the fear of communist terror was a very big obstacle. According to him, October 1949 and September 1950 showed that Western intelligence had underestimated the Albanian government. The tradition of hospitality no longer went to the saboteurs, the villagers did not welcome the saboteurs who came with illusory promises for the liberation of the country and for free elections<sup>54</sup>. According to him, his people were very motivated and willing to risk their lives, but they were not suicide pilots, they were not people willing to die.

### ***5.2.1. Changing the foundations of the NACC in 1953-1954 - the impact on relations between several political immigration groups and American missionaries***

In June 1954, the Albanian Legation in Rome, which, as always, was closely following the events in the ranks of political emigration, identified new disagreements between the leaders of the Albanian political emigration and the American missionaries. She singled out as a marked event the protest made by A. Kupi and S. Kryeziu who had refused to be part of the reorganized KSHL. This protest was made against this Committee and, in particular, against the American missionary whom they accused of being the man who had brought all the turmoil into their ranks<sup>55</sup>. In this protest, addressed to the high American authorities, they demanded the departure of the American mission and new elections of KSHL, in order to exclude some elements such as Ismail Verlaci, Kol Bib Mirakaj etc. Thus, new elections were held in early June but the outcome was the same. The same people who made up the Committee were elected.

The protest of A. Kupi and S. Kryeziu resulted in the departure of the American missionary and, after that, the KSHL would maintain contacts with the Americans directly with officials of the American embassy in Rome. The Albanian Democratic Agrarian Group also protested against the American missionary<sup>56</sup>.

The activity of the Albanian political emigration continued to be covered by the Italian press which, as informed by Legata, had treated the trial of the group of "spies and saboteurs" in Tirana. The Italian press had tried to minimize the action of the "spies". Legata featured an article by Erik Frank in *Il Tempo*.

The relations between the leaders of political immigration and the American missionaries in this critical time more accurately reflect the American diplomatic documents.

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<sup>50</sup> USNA, DS 767.11 / 10 - 1953; Jefferson Cafery Telegram at the US Embassy in Cairo to the State Department, October 19, 1953

<sup>51</sup> USNA, DS 767.11 / 10 - 1953; Jefferson Cafery Telegram at the US Embassy in Cairo to the State Department, October 19, 1953

<sup>52</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 135

<sup>53</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 135

<sup>54</sup> N. Bethel, *The Great Betrayal* ..., p. 206

<sup>55</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, Report of the Albanian Roma legation prepared by E. Çuçi sent to the MFA, June 20, 1954

<sup>56</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 305, Report of the Albanian Roma legation prepared by E. Çuçi sent to the MFA, June 20, 1954

On February 15, 1954, the US Embassy in Rome sent a letter to the State Department asking A. Kupi and S. Kryeziu to submit it to Secretary Dalles<sup>57</sup>. The letter stated that on November 23, 1953, the American representatives in Rome had sent them an invitation to participate in a reorganized committee in London by the USA and Britain. Along with the invitation was the constitution formulated by the American representatives according to the decision taken in London by a new committee for "Free Albania".

They complained that the regulations formulated by the American representatives removed all competencies from an organization such as the KSHL which, "only with the inspiration of Autonomy and Independence, can contribute to the goals it has created"<sup>58</sup>.

The new regulations and constitution were opposed to removing the definition that the Executive Committee should consist of only 7 people. But according to the decision taken on December 11, 1953, arbitrarily by the American representatives in the KSHL in Rome, John Lee and Archibald Lyall, the Executive Committee was expanded by 14 persons. The manner in which the American representatives acted on the new structures of the KSHL was said to have had the opposite effect to what the Allies wanted to give with the reorganization of the KSHL.

It was pointed out that the operation procedure for the organization of the NACC, designed and regularly signed by the American representatives in Rome, Lee and Lyall, pointed out that in the reorganized committee, essential autonomy for the provision of national rights and for the success of the work of his. By these procedures, the simplest democratic principles, constantly proclaimed and defended by the United States and Great Britain, were flagrantly betrayed.

Kupi and S Kryeziu, underlining that they had cooperated in the past with the US and fought for the cause of their country and the Western Democracies and, at the same time as proven friends of these democracies, suggested to the US Secretary of State that he be sent to Rome. a commission to better study the issues and, "with his efforts and ours, to build a valuable committee to represent our national interests and those of our great Allies, who are giving all their moral and material assistance for the liberation of oppressed peoples"<sup>59</sup>.

The document was signed by Abaz Kupi (chairman of the Legality Movement and member of KSHL) and Said Kryeziu (Secretary General of the Peasant League, executive member of KSHL)

The US Embassy claimed that it had been notified that the British Embassy had received a similar letter<sup>60</sup>. A similar letter was sent to the US Ambassador to Rome, Clare Luce, and to Vasil Andoni, Secretary General of the National Front<sup>61</sup>. It initially made a brief history of the creation of Mithat Frashëri's KSHL. It was pointed out that in the spring of 1949 Lage, the consul of the US embassy in Rome, was informed by the Central Committee of the National Front that its president Mit'hat Frashëri had taken the initiative to form an Albanian Committee of anti-communist resistance. Later, Minor and Low were in contact with M. Frashëri, on behalf of the State Department, and had offered him all their assistance in forming an Albanian national committee.

In collaboration with the British representative, Colonel MacLean, Colonel Amery and Major Hare, and after discussions with Albanian national parties, national resistance groups

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<sup>57</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>58</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>59</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>60</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>61</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

and individuals, the KSHL was proclaimed in Paris in August 1949. It was formed by the two major Albanian parties, Balli National and the Monarchist Movement which had widespread support in Albania and had been able to organize a resistance movement against foreign invaders and, later, also against communism. Other independent forces had taken part in the Committee, he added, which had also contributed to the national resistance. According to him, there were no other organized national forces outside this committee, neither outside nor inside Albania<sup>62</sup>.

V. Andoni highly appreciated the contribution of KSHL and stated that he did a lot for the liberation of our country in the field of anti-communist propaganda and guerrilla warfare inside Albania and added that, "the sacrifices made by those who cooperated with the committee are a proof of the readiness and will of our people"<sup>63</sup>.

But like all other democratic groups, Andoni pointed out, the KSHL had two main opponents: One of them, of course, was the communist regime, with all its propaganda abroad and with its brutal repression at home. He wrote that, as usual, the strikes were directed against the National Front, which, based on an advanced ideology, waged a systematic and positive war against Soviet satellites in Tirana. And it often happened that the communist regime in Tirana persecuted only the people of Balli Kombëtar, whom he considered his worst enemies.

The other opponent of the KSHL, according to V Andoni, was the so-called Independent National Bloc, which "was a group of discredited and backward people, known to the Albanian people as tools of foreigners. They had always fought against our national resistance and against the legitimate aspirations of the Albanian people"<sup>64</sup>.

The Secretary of BK pointed out that, for 4 years, with his war, KSHL had increased its authority to the Albanian people. But, "unfortunately, the representatives of our supporters in Rome, Mr. John Lee (USA) and Mr. Archibold Lyall (UK), ignoring them and being misled by outside intrigues, formed a misconception about our national problems. They supported the idea that the National Committee "Free Albania" should be reconstructed, in order to include the authors of the Independent Bloc, instead of trying to advance the work of the SACC and increase its prestige"<sup>65</sup>.

These efforts were strongly opposed by the National Front and the Monarchist Movement for a long time. He complained that the decisions of "our supporters" were taken in mid-September 1953 and communicated to the Committee in the form of arbitrary "dictation" and did not allow discussions. Our supporters in Rome imposed the reconstruction of the KSHL, which was unreasonable, unnecessary and fruitless and, thus, undesirable for the Albanians. "What is worse," he wrote, "(Albanian emigration) was forced to have a constitution and regulations, which was a flagrant opposition to the ideals of freedom, for which a freedom committee is fighting."<sup>66</sup> The members of the new KSHL were also appointed by the American and British representatives in Rome.

Andoni wrote that the reconstructed KSHL had the following shortcomings:

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<sup>62</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>63</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>64</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>65</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>66</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

- He was deprived of the basis of the parties on which the previous committee was formed and thus, they were denied their political mission;
- The committee was formed entirely on the personal basis of individuals;
- In this reconstructed committee participated undesirable elements, whose presence damaged the national resistance and the Albanian people would be discouraged in its liberation war, as at the head would be the above-mentioned elements;
- The imposed constitution and regulations, deprived the committee of all autonomy and initiative and made it a group of irresponsible officials;
- This constitution, regulations and the imposition of the reconstruction of the committee were made contrary to the principles of democracy, defended by the Free West and provided evidence that the committees for the liberation of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain are regulated, appointed and mandated by the various offices of to our friends in the West and this idea was to the detriment of the anti-communist war because it gave the enemy a great weapon for propaganda<sup>67</sup>.

The Central Committee of the National Front, the letter said, had raised the issue at the Party's regional conferences in the Free World and had taken the final decisions at the national congress held in Naples on February 24, 1954. Out of 514 votes, 495 were against the participation of Ballit Kombëtar in the new KSHL, 9 abstentions and 10 were in favor of participation<sup>68</sup>. Thus, the membership of BK, in the majority, had not only disapproved of the participation in KSHL, but also the action of Hasan Dosti who, contrary to the decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the will of the members, had participated in the new committee.

Andoni added that this reaction against the new KSHL had not only come from Balli Kombëtar but also from other Albanian emigration parties, which were surprised and had expressed regret that the committee was falling so low that it would become a group of who would not be able to effectively lead the battle for liberation from communism.

Apart from Balli, who refused to participate in the new KSHL, there were also Ihsan Toptani (independent), dr. Nuçi Kota, monarchist, Qazim Kastrati (independent).

Vasil Andoni also expressed regret that a lot of pressure was exerted on the members of Balli Kombëtar, in order to accept the reconstructed KSHL. In Germany, for example, ballistic volunteers at the 4,000 Labor Services Company in Hohenbrunn, Munich, were asked by Lee to swear allegiance to the new committee, under threat of expulsion from the company. In Greece, they fired the 5 best employees of "Voice of Free Albania", because they had refused to take the oath of allegiance. Officials or volunteers had never been asked to take such an oath before. Others were arrested, interned and isolated in Greece. In various camps, refugees were threatened with refusal of immigration visas, in case they expressed their dissatisfaction, regarding the new committee.

Andoni underlined: "Concerned that the Communists will take advantage of the situation created and, having great faith in the ideals preached by your government, we humbly suggest the following:

- Reconstruct the ANC on a party basis, with anti-totalitarian parties and such national resistance groups, through free consultation with them and based on their free will. Parties represent more than particular individuals, because they are old institutions and not artificial creatures of Albanian emigration.

<sup>67</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>68</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954



- Add other people who do not belong to any party, but known as honest and democratic people, to the KSHL.
- To have in the NACC representatives of the Albanian colonies of the USA, Turkey, etc.
- The original charter of the KSHL of 1949 as well as the political statement made by the committee in London, in September 1949 must be respected "<sup>69</sup>.

As mentioned above, the issue was extensively considered by the Congress of the Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party Balli Kombëtar, which met on February 25 in Naples. Congress sent a telegram to the American government, thanking, among other things, the American government and the honest American people for the interest they had shown in favor of the Albanian cause and for the assistance they had given to the anti-communist movement<sup>70</sup>.

The US government responded to a memorandum that Jani Dilo had previously sent, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Albanian Agrarian Party "Balli Kombëtar", which also criticized the reconstruction of the KSHL.

The American response stated that KSHL was an Albanian immigration organization and had no official connection with the US government. The State Department felt that the reorganization of the KSHL was done in order to expand the representation of Albanian political emigration. In general, the Department saw as favorable the tendencies of particular elements in the emigration of countries under Soviet rule, to subject their personal and party differences and to unify their efforts in favor of the overriding interests of their national cause<sup>71</sup>.

The memorandum of the Central Committee of the BK sent to the State Department entitled: "Reconstruction of KSHL and the position of the National Front" generally contained the ideas put forward by V. Andoni to the US Ambassador to Rome but there were a number of other very interesting details<sup>72</sup>:

He underlined that the formation of KSHL in 1949 was based on the parties that existed in Albania during the period of anti-fascist and anti-communist resistance in 1939-1944 (B. Kombëtar and the Legality Movement) as there were no other parties besides these two. However, it was Seit Kryeziu, M. Bajraktari and Ihsan Toptani who existed as members of the "Free Albania" Committee.

The issue of Ndue Gjonmarkaj's inclusion in the Consultative Committee was then discussed at length. Balli Kombëtar had then opposed his involvement in his family's role in the Yugoslav-sponsored 1920 declaration of the Autonomous Republic of Mirdita, in order to undermine the new Albanian state; for the appeal he had made to Mussolini in the beginning of 1939, to come to invade Albania, but also because Ndue Gjonmarkaj was then vice-president of the Independent Bloc, who wanted to include in the KSHL his party, which had at its center the people who aided the fascist occupation in 1939.

However Low and Abaz Kupi then invited Gjonmarkaj to participate in the Consultative Committee as an individual, without representing any party. He had categorically rejected the invitation, stating that he was the leader of the party and had demanded that the Independent Bloc be a participant in the KSHL. As a result, Low had accepted the National Front view and the whole affair was closed.

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<sup>69</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2 -1954, Letter from A. Kup and Kryeziu to Secretary Dalles sent by the US Embassy in Rome (Secretary of Edward L. Freers) to the Department of State, February 15, 1954

<sup>70</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 2-2454; Telegram of the BK Congress sent to the US Congress and Government, 25 February 1954.

<sup>71</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3.154, Reply by Henry P. Leverich - Director of the Department for Eastern Europe at the State Department sent to Jani Dilos, March 1, 1954.

<sup>72</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3.154, Memorandum of the Central Committee of the KB sent to the State Department entitled: "Reconstruction of the NACC and the position of the National Front"

After that, the issue of KSHL enlargement was raised several times, but Balli Kombëtar had always been of the opinion that the inclusion in the committee of "agents of neighboring countries" would mean damage to the independence and territorial integrity of the country and would be an effective weapon of communist propaganda to combat the activities of the KSHL.

Lee and Lyall had sought the opinion of the Executive Committee of the KSHL on this issue on 15 October 1953. A.Kupi had replied that he was not against a democratic solution to the problem, but he opposed foreign influence. Seit Kryeziu was in favor of KSHL. Zef Pali had stated that Balli Kombëtar was in favor of the expansion of KSHL, only with honest and qualified Albanians. But, when asked if N. Gjonmarkaj and Koço Muka would be accepted as individuals, Zef Pali replied that, if they stated that, in reality, they would join the committee as individuals, this problem would be taken into consideration. .

On November 23, 1953, the Executive Committee and the Advisory Committee of the SACC met at Lee's home, in the presence of Lee and Lyall. They were told that the meeting of the SACC supporters in London had decided to reconstruct the Committee on a new basis and a statement was read by both Committees in which it was made clear that:

- The reconstruction of the SACC was done in an arbitrary manner, without consulting the SACC and that the new constitution was imposed on the members of the SACC without their consent. Kushtetuta origjinale e vitit 1949 u abrogua.
- The basics of the NACC were changed from party-based representation to individual representation. Nuk përmendej integriteti territorial i vendit, dhe nuk përmendej se çështja e regjimit do të zgjidhej lirisht nga populli pas çlirimit.
- Ura Censorship of speeches and the press against the criminal activities of the Albanian government was adopted.
- KSHL, through the new rules, has become only an organization of individuals who only adopt or accept orders without their own initiative.
- KSHL includes the leaders of the Independent Bloc and other undesirable elements, who will naturally raise the demand for the recognition of the Bloc as a national party.

The situation was considered serious by them, as the invitation was signed by the supporters of the representatives in Rome and sent individually to all members of the reconstructed NACC; no discussions were held by the SACC and the deadline for response was only three days.

The Balli Kombëtar Central Committee had informed the chairman H. Dosti and stated that he could not give a definitive answer, without first discussing the problem with his president and without consulting the party members through a referendum, after the Balli Kombëtar Central Committee could not accept participation in a committee which was clearly against its principles.

Upon H. Dost's arrival in Rome, the members of the KSHL had learned that he had met with members of the National Front in New York, Detroit, and Canada, and had discussed the situation with them, and they had concluded that:

- Balli Kombëtar would not participate in the new KSHL, n.q.s. The Central Committee was not unanimous. H. Dosti had prayed for a unanimous decision of the Central Committee.
- If the Balli Central Committee was not unanimous, then Dosti could participate in the KSHL temporarily, until the result of the referendum became known. After that, H. Dosti and the Central Committee would implement the result of the referendum whoever he was.

From the beginning and during the discussions, it became clear that H. Dosti was in favor of participating in the KSHL, although he had stated that "this was against the national conscience and his conscience." H. Dosti had also informed his party comrades that American friends were badly predisposed to the National Front.

After long discussions in the Central Committee of the National Front, the Committee presented to H. Dost the following solutions:

- Not to participate in the reconstructed Committee, as long as they maintained the attitude of a constructive opposition to the SACC
- Wait for the result of the referendum, before making any decision.
- Not to recognize the London Declaration, but Dosti could take initiatives to expand the NACC on a national and democratic basis; Three members of the Executive Committee (Dosti as chairman, Paul and Kota) were not in favor of the imposed reconstruction of the NACC.
- H. Dosti could participate permanently in the KSHL individually without engaging the National Ball in any way.
- H. Dosti would participate in KSHL temporarily for a period of 2-3 months until the result of the referendum would decide on this issue.

The latter solution was also supported by representatives Lee and Lyall who also stated that Dosti had the right to 10 votes, until the final decision of the National Front was made.

On the afternoon of December 12, 1953, the Central Committee of the National Front accepted this proposal and sent two of its members, Halil Meniku and Vasil Dhimitraj, to formulate an agreement with Lee and Lyall.

But, as it was said in the memoir of Jani Dilos, "unfortunately at this moment Mr. Dosti intervened dramatically, asking the two Central Committee representatives to leave the room and, after a private conversation with the representatives who supported him, asked Menik and Dhimitraj to stay and told them in the presence of Lee and Lyall that the proposal had been made. "This afternoon it would not be taken into account." H. Dosti then informed the supporters that he would attend the KSHL and presented a list of those he claimed to be with. Thus he completely ignored the opinion of the Central Committee of Balli and all members of the party.

Faced with this situation, the Balli Central Committee informed all Party members to hold conferences of all branches, which would vote on whether or not the Balli Kombëtar would participate in the KSHL and elect a new central committee for National Ball. J Dilo announced that "so far 9/10 of the voting have been completed and the view of Mr. "Dosti had the support of only 2% of voters."

Moreover, added J. Dilo, the reaction against the reconstructed KSHL was strong everywhere. Hundreds of letters were sent to H. Dosti by Albanians in all 4 corners of the world not to participate in the reorganized KSHL in this way and this reaction would be greater when the names of the members of the KSHL were published.

The memorandum stated that "the erosion has also affected the soldiers of the National Front in the German company. The offer for positions in the ANC and for sums of money to help the members of the National Front to accept Dost's decision was rejected. "The attempt to seize Balli's newspaper" Flamurin "by force and, through it, Balli's authorship failed".

It was emphasized that the official position of Balli Kombëtar towards KSHL would be determined at the Congress to be convened in February, in order to study the results of the

referendum and elections and to determine the policy to be followed. But, in advance, it was announced that Balli Kombëtar could not participate in KSHL for these reasons<sup>73</sup>:

- The reconstruction of the SACC has been an unacceptable dictate, imposed without any prior consultation and agreement.
- KS The foundations of the NACC have been changed from parties of a national character to individuals, whose aim is to gain personal influence and power.
- Although other statements, the territorial integrity of the country and the regime have recently been added to the new NACC constitution, it still has significant shortcomings which we will make known to you in due course.
- Many individuals who participate in KSHL and know from the movement groups in it, do not inspire confidence in the Albanian people. This raises serious doubts as to whether the KSHL intends to fight for the freedom, independence and integrity of the country. It should be emphasized again that people who have served dictatorships in the past can not be a guarantee for the implementation of democracy, even if they are wearing the title of member of the NACC.

The document stated that "Article VI of the Constitution of the new KSHL, states that" KSHL deprives itself of the right to sign agreements which prejudice the will of the Albanian people. " J. Dilo asked the question: Why this guarantee that KSHL will not harm Albania? Does this have to do with the fact that in KSHL participate people who in the past worked for the partition of Albania and can do so in the future? And so you need a guarantee that this will not happen again?

He further concluded that in the present circumstances, the reorganization of the KSHL strengthened the communist propaganda and undermined the anti-communist resistance; the vast majority of Balli Kombëtar members were against participating in the KSHL.

As a result of its reconstruction, the KSHL had accepted the Independent Bloc which had served the Italian and Yugoslav news agencies and had written a black chapter in the history of Albania. As a result, the reconstructed KSHL forced the National Ball to leave.

Jani Dilo emphasized: "Balli Kombëtar was founded against foreign slavery and fought and opposed communism in his country in the years 1942-1944 and continues to fight in this direction, as a democratic party for a positive goal.

KSHL has lost in this process prominent and freedom-loving individuals who will not participate in it in the current conditions.

Dilo claimed that Balli Kombëtar had gone so far in its attempts to sabotage, unable to curb the Yugoslav intervention in Albania, that it had given our American friends, individuals and secrets of the Yugoslav organization. And in doing so, it had increased the prestige of the KSHL and strengthened the people's trust in American aid and democracy.

In his letter to the US government he wrote: "It is clear that communism can not be fought with people who have been compromised in the past, working to the detriment of their country. It can not be fought even with negative and outdated systems. And in this new NACC, the leaders of the political, social and economic slavery of Albania are included. This is valuable only for communist propaganda.

He argued that until now the Albanian people had believed that the KSHL, keeping an equal and dignified distance towards its neighbors, had been favored by the great democracies and that it had been helped only by them. But with the expansion of the reconstructed KSHL, the impression was created and the suspicion arose that Albania's neighbors, having their

<sup>73</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3.154, Memorandum of the Central Committee of the KB sent to the State Department entitled: "Reconstruction of the NACC and the position of the National Front"

agents in KSHL, were again trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Albania for their own interests.

The memorandum of the BK Central Committee ended, expressing the hope that the Americans would change their position. "Nevertheless, we are convinced that after this experiment, our American friends, who are practical people and have good intentions towards Albania, will one day see a party like Balli Kombëtar, based on American ideals and not on material opportunism. , who has a long anti-communist experience, is not driven by passion or selfishness, when she makes this decision to avoid heavy responsibility by not participating in the KSHL.

We are convinced that the time will come when it will be understood that Balli Kombëtar has fought, is fighting and will fight, always based on the new generation which has approached and is still ready to sacrifice for the cause of freedom, convinced that the best days are ahead.

Balli Kombëtar is convinced that the time lost with the reconstruction of KSHL will pave the way for a more honest and fruitful organization, for which the need is imperative. The active participation of the USA in today's world problems is seen with enthusiasm by small nations and especially by Albanians who have suffered constant injustices. Our party, interpreting the will of the Albanian people, sees in the US the champion of freedom and democracy and the only guarantee and hope that a free, independent Albania can be created in the near future."<sup>74</sup>

American diplomats, concerned that the reorganization of the KSHL did not bring the long-awaited results for the unification and increase of the cohesion rate of the Albanian political emigration, conducted their own investigations and surveys in the ranks of political emigration in different countries. US Consul in Istanbul Katherine W. Bracken drafted a report on the attitudes and views of political refugees in Turkey towards the reorganized KSHL, which was based on interviews and information obtained from many prominent immigrants in Istanbul<sup>75</sup>. This report contained these ideas:

The reorganized KSHL enjoyed greater influence than the KSHL before 1953, both in Albania and among Albanian emigrants in Turkey and other countries. This was due to the fact that the new committee was composed of exactly all the persons who made up the old one; also from a prominent number of Independent Bloc persons and from non-partisan persons who had enhanced the prestige of the committee.

Although it was true that there were some people in the Independent Bloc who had cooperated with Italy and Germany, it was difficult to say that they were considered guilty by the Albanian people and nation, because, "in terms of the services they rendered during the occupation, they have given a great help to their compatriots and have been able to save many lives. So it would not be wise to exclude from KSHL people with influence and culture belonging to this Bloc"<sup>76</sup>.

She claimed that people such as Gjon Marku, Verlaci, Vlora, E. Koliqi and the independent M. Bajraktari were ranked among the highest Albanian personalities. Hasan Dosti of the National Agrarian Front, Vasil Andoni of the "extremist group", Abaza Ermenji, Zef Pali and their friends "are supposed to be not so valuable compared to the aforementioned personalities".

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<sup>74</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3.154, Memorandum of the Central Committee of the KB sent to the State Department entitled: "Reconstruction of the NACC and the position of the National Front"

<sup>75</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>76</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

The American consul also explained the motives of BK's opposition. According to her, "knowing this fact well, Vasil Andoni and his friends realized that they would be overtaken by the powerful members of the new committee and would lose the majority of the votes they had in the old committee and turned against the committees. young people, trying to sabotage it, arguing that they would not cooperate with the fascists and Nazis. "Failing this effort, they withdrew from the KSHL." She specified that Balli Kombëtar Agrar, with the help of two members of the Peasant Parish and farmers, always had 3/5 of the votes against 2/5 that the ballista members had in KSHL before 1953<sup>77</sup>.

Commenting on H. Dosti's action, she stressed that the President of their Party Hasan Dosti acted more reasonably than the others and announced his intention to participate in the new committee. He further added that "V. Andoni's faction, in a congress of 40-50 people, which gathered in Naples, took decisions on the basis of 500-600 votes, expelled from the party President H. Dosti and his followers, who had previously been called the greatest patriot. Further, they used the organ of the "Flag" party for publications against the new committee and against the group they expelled"<sup>78</sup>.

Bracken informed that this position of BKA was being denounced by most of the large Albanian colony in Turkey, who reasoned that, "when today efforts are being made to rearm Germany against the common enemy, the people who are deserting from KSHL, arguing that they can not cooperate in a company with Albanians who cooperated with the Germans during the war, or are blind to the existing reality or are consciously serving the enemy"<sup>79</sup>.

She added that, seeing that the expulsion of Hasan Dosti and his followers did not work, Vasil Andoni and his group had decided to continue their efforts, creating a new special committee - the National Democratic Committee "Free Albania" (KKDSHL), whose formation, under the leadership of Abaz Ermenji, was announced in Paris on August 12, 1954. They had also decided to expel the chairman of BK, H. Dosti. The other members of this committee had not yet been announced. KKDSHL referred to their Anglo-American supporters in the first appeal to the Albanians. He also pointed out that he relied on the Besa group in Istanbul, on a few Albanians living in France, on 4 BBC-affiliated people in London, and on a few people in New York, whom they called the Liberal Group (Bracken thought that this did not existed)<sup>80</sup>.

The American consul claimed that only a limited number of people in the immigration mass seemed to know V. Andoni and A. Ermeni. Thus it was doubtful that they would be able to find many supporters to support the Paris Committee (KKDSHLL). She thought that their political objective was to control the fate of Albania, in one way or another, and to take advantage of every situation and, then, to impose on the nation the regime they liked. "They believe so much in their final success, that it is said that they have divided among themselves the positions they will take in Albania"<sup>81</sup>.

Bracken also confirmed something interesting and, precisely, the inclination of the KKDSHL from Great Britain, which had been pointed out by the intelligence bodies of the Albanian communist government. She writes: "They are, in any case, making it clear that in the realm of international relations, they are pursuing a policy of Great Britain awakening,

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<sup>77</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>78</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>79</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>80</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>81</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

which they recognize as a leading Power of Europe. They are spreading propaganda through Vasil Andoni's brother Alfred, a BBC speaker, and also the well-known Moscow-trained communist, Tajar Zavalani, now a member of the BKA<sup>82</sup>.

The US Consul informed that, according to unconfirmed reports, material assistance to the Paris Committee was being provided by the UK government<sup>83</sup>.

It also confirmed the split in three parts of the National Front, the group of A.Këlcyrë, the group of H. Dosti, both participants in KSHL and Vasil Andoni.

She explained that the Besa Group, which was formed in Istanbul around May 1953, consisted of only 6 people, all members of the BKA. These were: Rexhep Mitrovica, former Prime Minister of 1943-1944, Qazim Prodani, Ali Koprencka, Shaqir Hajrullahu, Peter Andoni and Lefter Sava<sup>84</sup>.

Not a single group of immigrants with liberal and leftist leanings in London was left out of the debate, consisting of D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani who, on August 24, 1954, sent a letter to the State Department and the Foreign Office. Memorandum on this content<sup>85</sup>:

The memorandum initially praised the KSHL formed in 1949, for which it emphasized that it won the sympathy of Albanians. They added that communist propaganda, much concerned by him, had tried to label him as made up of occupiers' collaborators, citing the names of members of the Independent Bloc who were not on the committee. "The communists, the document said, knew that by doing so, they would destroy the growing hopes of the Albanian people, who could not easily forget the Italian invasion of April 7 and those who sided with the occupier. But with the committee's efforts and its outside support, the detrimental effect of this propaganda was successfully counterbalanced"<sup>86</sup>.

Memorandumi pohonte se vdekja e Mithat Frashërit kishte krijuar një krizë të leadership, which could not be resolved satisfactorily. The hasty election of Hasan Dosti as president of the National Front and the KSHL had led to the dissolution of Ali Këlcyrë and a group of his supporters. As a leader of the National Front, during the leadership of M. Frashëri, he had placed himself in the position of a dissident, following a policy of his own. Finally, at the beginning of 1953, Ali Këlcyrë's group had joined hands with the Independent Bloc, forming the "Albanian Democratic Union". Thus, the campaign to expand the National Committee, involving all parties to immigration, had reached its culmination. They acknowledged that the idea of enlarging the Committee had indeed found support among some of its members<sup>87</sup>.

But the London Liberals pointed out that the expansion of the Committee was done without achieving unanimity, which was its main goal. Moreover, A. Këlcyrë's group and the Independent Bloc had joined the Committee, leaving out the National Front. This group

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<sup>82</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>83</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>84</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>85</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

<sup>86</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

<sup>87</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

claimed that "by not being directly connected with the parties involved in this issue, but only as Albanians, they opposed this conclusion".

They declared that "the leading members of the KSHL, who will fight for a free, independent and democratic Albania, cannot be those who voluntarily served the government of the fascist occupier"<sup>88</sup>.

They praised the congress of the National Front, which, by a majority, had voted against the policy of H. Dosti and his followers who joined the reorganized KSHL, expelling them from the Party. This attitude, according to the memorandum, "clearly showed the negative feelings against the previous collaborators". "Furthermore, it was emphasized in this document, all those who voted against this reorganized committee, are people who fought during the war and then were forced to flee and represent a key part of the Albanian people, whose feelings and ideals its to be considered"<sup>89</sup>.

It was further pointed out that communist propaganda had rushed to seize the moment to launch a campaign against the committee formed "with bad advice". The Communists had continued to repeat the previous campaign that the new Committee had been formed by collaborators of fascism, but this time they had plenty of excuses for their attack<sup>90</sup>.

The memorandum underlined that the continuation of the current division in the ranks of Albanian political emigration was fatal and would prevent the fight for an independent and democratic Albania, if it were entrusted to those people who, to say the least, had held responsible positions during the occupation. fascist. With only the high interests of their country in mind, they prayed to the American and British governments to reconsider the issue of the SAC as soon as possible, in light of the unpleasant situation created by its reorganization. They demanded that the principle of free choice of leaders be recognized through a majority of votes and expressed the view that political refugees should have a voice in appointing those who would lead them in the struggle for the liberation of Albania. They supported the principle that the parties and groups participating in the KSHL would be represented in proportion to the number of their followers, emphasizing that they did not want to exclude anyone who defended the same cause as them. "But we consider it essential that the principle of free choice, and with a majority of votes, which we propagate as our ideal, should now be applied to emigration as a path to be followed nationally when the country is liberated"<sup>91</sup>.

The negative reaction of the American government against the opposition of KSHL, by cutting off the aid to the Albanian political emigrants, caused the concern of the Italian government as well. A senior official of the Directorate of Political Affairs in Farnesina, Michele Lanza discussed the issue with the First Secretary of the US Embassy in Rome, E. L. Freers<sup>92</sup> to whom he explained that Lee had convened the members of the new KSHL Executive Committee a few days ago and had informed them that all US aid would be cut off

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<sup>88</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

<sup>89</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

<sup>90</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

<sup>91</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 8-2754; Memorandum sent to the US Embassy in London to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, by D. Duma, Peter Bodgo, Qazim Kastrati, Anton Logoreci and Tajar Zavalani, August 24, 1954 (A copy of this memorandum sent to you and F.O).

<sup>92</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3-2254, Notice by Edward L. Freers - First Secretary of the US Embassy in Rome, to the Department of State over a conversation with Michele Lanza, Head of Office No. 4 of the General Directorate of Political Affairs MFA of Italy, March 18, 1954



on June 1 this year. Lanza added that the Albanians immediately went to the Italian Foreign Ministry and had expressed great concern about the turn of events.

Lanza claimed that the Italian government had the same objectives as the US regarding Albania and would continue to do so. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy had cooperated with Mr. Lee in discussing the Albanian problem and in supplying it with information, but was now confused and unclear about what the Americans now intended and wanted to do with it"<sup>93</sup>. If aid to Albanian refugees in Italy, through the SAC, were to be cut off, the Italian government would have to find a way to help it, as long as it considered the group a kind of government in exile, the Italian official added<sup>94</sup>.

Freers maintained the same line, as we have stated above, in the communications of the Americans with the Albanian political emigration. He told Lanza he did not know Lee; that KSHL, as he knew, had been a private organization and, as far as he knew, there had been no change in American policy towards Albania. Freers promised that he would recommend to his embassy that these remarks be reported to the State Department and would inform the Italian official of any comments he might wish to forward to the Italian MFA<sup>95</sup>.

### ***5.2.2. US diplomats' assessments of Albanian emigration to Yugoslavia***

The American consul in Istanbul, Bracken, also reported on the Prizren Committee and the Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia. She claimed that, according to Albanians coming to Turkey from Yugoslavia, the number of Albanians coming out of Albania as refugees to Yugoslavia had recently dropped significantly. In the first 9 months of 1954, only less than 100 people had fled. The Yugoslav government continued to increase assistance to Albanian refugees. The committee trained and educated the youth, taught Albanian to the children and provided jobs for the workers. The propaganda organ was the monthly organ "Rilindja". However, without the approval of Dusan Mugoësa - the Yugoslav government delegate to the Committee, the Committee was not authorized to take any action.

With the establishment of Albanian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations, Yugoslav pressure on Albanian emigrants in Yugoslavia was growing and restrictive measures were taken to prevent Albanians from causing incidents at the border. Although it was reported that there would be an exchange of refugees between the two countries, this did not happen. Although 90% of those fleeing the Hoxha regime in Yugoslavia were not communists, they were forced to declare that they were pro-communists, just for the sake of being allowed to stay in Yugoslavia<sup>96</sup>.

The May 1954 Congress of the Committee had elected Hajrulla Ishmin from Shijak as chairman. The committee, which was formed with the approval of the Yugoslav government and operated according to the program set by it, in its declaration of May 1950 had declared as an objective the liberation of Albania from the yoke of E. Hoxha, the creation of the Albanian-Yugoslav Union and the incorporation of Albania in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<sup>97</sup>. The consul stated that, "according to the information that reaches us here, this

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<sup>93</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3-2254, Notice by Edward L. Freers - First Secretary of the US Embassy in Rome, to the Department of State over a conversation with Michele Lanza, Head of Office No. 4 of the General Directorate of Political Affairs MFA of Italy, March 18, 1954

<sup>94</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3-2254, Notice by Edward L. Freers - First Secretary of the US Embassy in Rome, to the Department of State over a conversation with Michele Lanza, Head of Office No. 4 of the General Directorate of Political Affairs MFA of Italy, March 18, 1954

<sup>95</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3-2254, Notice by Edward L. Freers - First Secretary of the US Embassy in Rome, to the Department of State over a conversation with Michele Lanza, Head of Office No. 4 of the General Directorate of Political Affairs MFA of Italy, March 18, 1954

<sup>96</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>97</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

step is not supported either by the Albanians in the homeland, or by those who have settled in the region of Kosovo. Despite the softness of the communist regime in Yugoslavia, compared to that of Albania, and the more favorable living conditions, as well as the existence of representatives of democratic states which seem attractive to Albanians, they do not want to accept Tito as their leader, in instead of E. Hoxha. Kosovo Albanians, knowing that only after the liberation of Albania, they will break their chains, it is clear that they never sincerely support the Committee's effort to incorporate Albania into Yugoslavia"<sup>98</sup>.

Bracken added that the Albanian nation, while the Prizren Committee aimed to bring Albania into the Yugoslav Federation, for the most part disapproves of the activity of this committee, condemning it because it wants its national freedom. It can be concluded, she added, that Albanians, both at home and abroad, have refused to support the activity of the Prizren Committee<sup>99</sup>.

Information on Albanian political emigration to Yugoslavia was also gathered by Randolph Higgs - US Political Adviser in Trieste who conducted an interview with Nihat Bakalli, a fugitive from Albania in 1950.<sup>100</sup> Bakalli told him that there were 6,000 Albanian emigrants in Yugoslavia. They were afraid that Yugoslavia and Greece, in the framework of the Balkan Pact, would agree among themselves on the partition of Albania. He said they thought that if the Albanians were assured that there would be no foreign interference, there would be a greater chance of a popular uprising against the communist regime. Bakalli also told the US official that there was great fear among Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia that talks were taking place between the Albanian and Yugoslav governments over their forcible repatriation.<sup>101</sup>

The American consul in Istanbul Bracken also compiled an information file for Hajrulla Ishmi, chairman of the Prizren Committee, whose data he had received from Avni Dërralla. According to her, H. Ishmi was a resident of Podgorica. He emigrated with his family to Albania in 1923 and settled in the village of Ishëm. Hajrullai after the occupation had participated in the Fascist Party, in its Executive Committee. In 1942 he represented the party in Prizren.

Although his arrest was expected by E. Hoxha's government, he was instead given a clerk. Although he had worked on the surface for Italy and Germany, Hajrullai secretly aided the forces of E. Hoxha and Tito and was a member of the Communist Party. He stayed until 1948, when he realized that, as a lawyer for Yugoslav politics, he would be purged as Koçi Xoxe, and went as an immigrant to Yugoslavia. In the Committee organized by Yugoslavia in 1950 he was General Secretary. Hajrullahu's mother tongue is Serbian and he learned Albanian after coming to Albania. He enjoys the trust of the Yugoslav leadership, but is disliked by most members of his Committee and by the Albanian Communists in Yugoslavia"<sup>102</sup>.

### ***5.2.3. Information of American diplomats on Zog's reactions to their policy with KSHL***

As a result of the opposition of Balli Kombëtar to the reorganization of KSHL, A. Zogu undertook a new political movement. The US Consul in Istanbul, Donald B. Calder, informed

<sup>98</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>99</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 10-1254, Report on the Albanian Political Emigration of Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul, sent to the State Department, October 12, 1954,

<sup>100</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3-2954; Telegram from Randolph Higgs - US Political Adviser in Trieste, sent to the State Department over an interview with Nihat Bakalli, who fled Albania in 1950, Trieste on March 29, 1954

<sup>101</sup> USNA, DS, 767.00 / 3-2954; Telegram from Randolph Higgs - US Political Adviser in Trieste, sent to the State Department over an interview with Nihat Bakalli, who fled Albania in 1950, Trieste on March 29, 1954

<sup>102</sup> USNA, DS.767.00 / 11-554, Biographical file for Hajrulla Ishmin, chairman of the Prizren Committee prepared by Katherine W. Bracken, US Consul in Istanbul according to data obtained by Avni Dërralla.

the State Department that a decision had been made to form a royal party in Turkey. This decision was initially initiated by Gani Han Bessolt and Avni Derralla, Zog's two representatives in Istanbul. They had received a letter from Zog written on March 12 approving their initiative. The letter was signed by Hysen Selmani<sup>103</sup>.

Bessolt and Deralla told the US consul that the formation of the Royal Party in Turkey was initiated out of a desire to counterbalance the activities of the anti-Dosti group in the Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party Balli Kombëtar, against the recognition of the reorganized KSHL<sup>104</sup>.

Calder was further briefed by Bessolt and Avni Derralla<sup>105</sup>, both members of the monarchist group, that Albanians living in Turkey could be divided into three groups:

1. The first group of Albanians who had come to Turkey before the Second World War. Most of them had obtained Turkish citizenship. Only a small part had retained their Albanian citizenship. They claimed that at this time, at least, there were 500,000 Albanians in Turkey. As 95% of Albanians in Turkey belonged to the Islamic religion, they were completely assimilated and considered Turkey as their homeland. A small part preserved their traditions and Albanian language. There were 10,000 Albanians in Istanbul. Albanians, even those who had obtained Turkish citizenship, had maintained the love for their homeland and this was manifested in 1939 and 1941. Then "Albanian consulates in Turkey were visited by tens of thousands of Albanians, men and women seeking to go home for it fight the invader voluntarily. "Only for political reasons did they not take part in the fight against fascism, firstly because the Turkish government opposed this movement, and secondly because the Greeks did not want the Albanians to fight on Greek soil."
2. Group II consisted of about 60 people who had left Albania together with Zog in 1939.
3. Group III consisted of 480 Albanians who had been allowed to stay in Turkey and who had been helped to come here by the Turkish Refugee Bureau, as they had fled communist-ruled Albania. About 100 people in groups II and III had obtained Turkish citizenship.

The regional group in Turkey had 274 members and its leader was Avni Derralla, former Major of the Royal Guard. Derralla and Bessolt were Zog's two most trusted people in Turkey. They inspired friendship with the US and believed that only the US could liberate Albania from the communists.

Balli Kombëtar, the Agrarian Party, was represented by Qazim Prodani and Ali Koprencka, both of whom had now obtained Turkish citizenship. This party had 16 members in Turkey. According to Bessolt and Deralla, "many blunders made by guerrilla groups belonging to this party in 1941-1944 had weakened the party's position, not only in Turkey, America and Australia, where it was most strongly represented. but also among Albanian emigration groups"<sup>106</sup>. This party, they stressed, could not increase the number of its members. The leaders of this party had tried to cooperate with other agrarian parties and had gained a noticeable advantage. They had shown distrust of the US in their activities in Rome and at the Naples Congress in March 1953. The fact that they used the BBC too often for their

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<sup>103</sup> USNA, DS; 767.00 / 4-754, Telegram of the US Consul General in Istanbul - Donald B. Calder to the State Department, April 7, 1954

<sup>104</sup> USNA, DS; 767.00 / 4-754, Telegram of the US Consul General in Istanbul - Donald B. Calder to the State Department, April 7, 1954

<sup>105</sup> USNA, DS; 767.00 / 4-2654; Report by Donald B. Calder, US Consul General in Istanbul, on Albanian political refugees in Turkey sent to the State Department, April 26, 1954.

<sup>106</sup> USNA, DS; 767.00 / 4-2654; Report by Donald B. Calder US Consul General in Istanbul on Albanian political refugees in Turkey sent to the State Department, April 26, 1954

own purposes had attracted attention and they had been exposed to whose policies they were pursuing.

The Peasant and Farmers Party, which was formed in Rome by S. Kryeziu and 5-6 of his friends, was represented in Turkey by Hasan Kaleshi. In 1951, when this party started operating, it joined 4 other parties.

Even in the US and Australia where the Raiders had not worked hard and Balli had done much to increase his influence, King Zog's supporters were outnumbered<sup>107</sup>.

After the reorganization of the KSHL in 1954, it seems that the British also reacted. In July 1955, the Albanian government was informed that British Colonel Hill had gone to Rome from Greece and convened the "Free Albania" Committee and informed them that the committee was not recognized by the British.<sup>108</sup>

At the end of 1954, the organization "Assembly of Captive Nations" was created directly by the Americans. In the meetings of this Assembly was discussed the situation in all communist countries and the struggle that had to be made to overthrow communism.

#### ***5.2.4. New American Efforts to Change the NACC in 1956 and Further Relations with Anti-Communist Immigration***

In 1956, the Americans, dissatisfied with the state of the SAC, took action. During April 1956, according to the information that Tirana had, Anderson had traveled from Greece to Italy, where he was in charge of the "Free Albania" Committee. He communicated to the immigrants the order of Washington that the Committee be dissolved and the American government would further maintain no contact with this Committee or with the other to be established. He had expressed dissatisfaction with the Committee's activity so far, calling it dead. He criticized the divergences between the influential groups in the ranks of the Committee and stressed that the Committee did not know how to represent Albanian emigrants in international conferences. Enderson had mentioned the case of the last meeting in Strasbourg (among others, the committee is also represented by A. Kupi) where A. Kupi did not know how to say anything. He stressed that most of the members of the Committee were without any capacity and were arguing with each other.

In this case, Enderson communicated to the Albanian leaders that, further, the direction of emigration, as for all emigrations of other countries, would be taken by the "Free Europe" Committee. This Committee from June-July of this year would delegate one of its representatives to America, France and Rome to reach an agreement with the Albanian emigrants and then, under his leadership, would organize a new, more lively committee and with capacity of intellectuals with capacity. Anderson assured the participants that the Americans had agreed with the "Free Europe" committee not to accept in the next committee the "agrarians" and the committee of A. Ermeni. He hinted that the next committee would be narrower than the current one and would not be built on a group basis like the current committee<sup>109</sup>.

By organizing immigrants on the Free Europe Committee, which was not a government organization but was run by them, the Americans aimed to avoid criticism of the US government and better organize immigration, eliminating existing divergences<sup>110</sup>.

<sup>107</sup> USNA, DS; 767.00 / 4-2654; Report by Donald B. Calder US Consul General in Istanbul on Albanian political refugees in Turkey sent to the State Department, April 26, 1954

<sup>108</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Intervention and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

<sup>109</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Interference and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

<sup>110</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Interference and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

In early 1956 a State Department official went to Australia and met with R. Krasniqi, while in April Krasniqi was invited to Washington for talks on reorganizing the KSHL. Krasniqi helped organize the new KSHL<sup>111</sup>. Anderson in August 1956 completed consultations with group exponents on the formation of the new committee. R. Krasniqi was appointed at his head, who held this post for about 35 years until the overthrow of communism. From the old Committee he held only four persons.

The Americans inspected the refugee camps and selected some volunteers for the US military<sup>112</sup>.

The Americans asked the leaders of the Albanian emigrants to fill the Munich company with 300 people or, otherwise, they would dissolve it altogether. Agrarians were trying to register in this company new elements from those who had gone to Yugoslavia and Italy<sup>113</sup>.

Relations with the governments of Western countries were not stable even after the establishment of the new Committee in 1956. In April 1957, the Albanian Legation in Rome informed Tirana that, after so long, the "Free Albania" Committee of New York continued to be very weak, while the Italians were always staying in the first positions in the attitude towards him, the Americans seemed to be changing their attitude, being convinced that indeed this Committee had no prospects. Their purpose in forming the committee, not on a party basis, had been to eliminate or further mitigate the contradictions in the ranks of the emigrants. Since this was not achieved but the opposite happened, the Americans were now trying in every way to make the agrarian ballistas their own. Legata was informed that, for this purpose, they have charged their loyal agent Asim Jakova to contact the agrarians and to conduct surveys in this regard<sup>114</sup>.

His polls apparently did not yield satisfactory results, as the agrarians, although declaring in favor of extensive cooperation with American bodies, had set as the first condition the expulsion from the Committee of current members, because they "were compromised fascists and volatile elements". They stated that even in the future they would not cooperate in the framework of the Committee with the compromised elements of the Bloc because this "violated the democracy and the national feelings of the Albanian people"<sup>115</sup>.

According to the Albanian Legation, although the Americans did not welcome this response of the agrarians, they were still trying to make the agrarians their own, without categorically denying the Independent Bloc and, on the other hand, convincing the Italians to do some concessions to the agrarians, isolating those elements that were more compromised and, in the first place, Ernest Koliqi, Kol Biba, etc.<sup>116</sup>.

Legata thought that the non-approval of visas to enter America to the three members of the Committee who were in Rome, should be related to the outcome of these negotiations. On the other hand, as a significant event, Legata singled out the participation of the Italian Christian Democrats in the Congress of the Agrarian Ballistas, where the secretary of the Christian

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<sup>111</sup> Idriz Lamaj, *The Efforts of Xhafer Deva ...*, in *The Albanian Right ...*, vol 2., p. 155

<sup>112</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Interference and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

<sup>113</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, MFA report entitled: "Interference and incitement of Albanian emigration by the Americans against us."

<sup>114</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome, prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of "reactionary" emigrants, Rome, April 20, 1957

<sup>115</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome, prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of "reactionary" emigrants, Rome, April 20, 1957

<sup>116</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome, prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of "reactionary" emigrants, Rome, April 20, 1957

Democratic Party for Naples had given a very congratulatory speech for Ballin<sup>117</sup>. As important facts, she singled out the attitude of the Agrarian Ballists, who, lately, were quite willing to recognize the crucial role of the Americans in terms of political emigration in general and, in addition, a certain rapprochement with the Italians; the participation of the American consul and vice-consul of Naples in the Congress of Agrarian Ballists in Naples<sup>118</sup>.

Despite these signs that the conditions for a rapprochement would be created between the opposing parties of the Committee and those in its favor, Legata thought that, for the time being, even for the foreseeable future, the unification of the all forces or most of them around a single committee. According to her, many factors led to this conclusion. Among them she listed:

- To achieve this it was necessary for all groups and their leaders to accept the supremacy of the Agrarian Ballists and their conditions which were: To have the chairmanship of the Committee forever; have a majority of the members of such a committee; not to represent in the committee the fascist and compromised elements (who for them are only the blockade leaders). These conditions were not acceptable, not only by the Blocists but also by the Italians, because, at least for now, they play their role and will play it only through the Blocists. The Italian government premises had the impression that anti-Italian elements had gathered in the ranks of the Agrarian Ballistas who, at any time, would hinder the development of a pro-Italian policy in the ranks of the emigrants. In addition, they were known as a group under the influence of the British, who would never accept Italy playing a role in the ranks of "traitorous" Albanian emigration.
- There were two currents in the US State Department as well as in those of the "Free Europe": one that, for the time being, was almost stronger, demanded that the agrarian conditions not be accepted and that the Committee remain as it is. was, hoping that all opponents, sooner or later, would gather around him. The other current wanted a compromise to be reached with the Agrarian Ballists. The first current also justified his position with the bitter previous experience of the time of the Committee of M. Frashëri and H. Dost - when the money was paid by the Americans, while the direction was done by the English, precisely through the Ballists.
- Ag Agrarian ballistas, at least for now, had no intention of withdrawing from their positions, posture and conditions.
- In the group of Zogists, which was very divided and disorganized, the influence of the English had penetrated through A. Kup, of the Italians, through Selim Damani, as well as the American influence, through G. Goga.<sup>119</sup>

Politically, the report said BK had not severed ties with "foreign friends" even in the most difficult times of misunderstanding, and he had always listened carefully. The accusations made by the enemies against BK stated that the report had dropped "slowly". Our "extremism" was finally realized that it was not anti-Americanism but Albanian dignity and national interest<sup>120</sup>.

It was also said that a neighbor's intelligence offices "did what they could to reduce it, to bring down our party in the eyes of the Great Democracies." They said that most of the Albanians in exile are fascists. The purpose of this slander was to make the content of the

<sup>117</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome, prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of "reactionary" emigrants, Rome, April 20, 1957

<sup>118</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome, prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of "reactionary" emigrants, Rome, April 20, 1957

<sup>119</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Report of the Legation in Rome, prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of "reactionary" emigrants, Rome, April 20, 1957

<sup>120</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

Albanian issue as ridiculous as possible. They have slandered and said that Balli Kombëtar has only a handful of members who do not exceed 40! All this is done to present us as a party without importance. But you, the hundreds of members who voted in the Provincial Congresses, not counting the friends we have, are the clearest evidence of the power, will and organization of the National Front”<sup>121</sup>.

The attitude of the Italian government towards BK and Albanian emigration was also analyzed. It was emphasized that despite any friendship held by the Italian politicians of the "April 7 group" or with some people of the fascist era here in Italy, the democratic government of Italy had not removed any obstruction from the National Front, which had had complete freedom. acting both in the manifestation of political ideas and in the activity of the press and propaganda. The Congress that was taking place in the hall of Christian Democracy was considered as a proof of this tolerance. BK therefore thanked the Italian authorities and people who had welcomed its members and shown them friendship. A special thanks was made to the Christian Democracy Party which had given all the facilities for the organization of the Congress. "We are convinced that the report states that in Italy the idea has emerged that the friends of Italy can not be the enemies of a truly free and democratic Albania”<sup>122</sup>.

The report also analyzed the relations of Balli Kombëtar with the International Village Union, which were considered very good. It was emphasized that this organization had given a special moral assistance to BK "during these difficult years, to bring to light our work and our honor, to hand over to us every time an important representative in the Assembly of Robnuem Nations" It was claimed that a commission of this organization had been chaired by the representative of BK and precisely the Representation of the Office of the Agrarian Union in Italy. This had assisted in the publication of the Agrarian Bulletin in Italian. The report stated that agrarian party publications often supported Balli Kombëtar's views, "not only ideologically but also in terms of Kosovo's national claims”<sup>123</sup>. It was further alleged that BK had participated "in every international democratic movement", as well as in the Free Youth Council of Central and Eastern Europe, whose vice-president was a member of the National Front.

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<sup>121</sup>FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>122</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

<sup>123</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, March 30, 1957, "The report of the Balli Kombëtar congress in exile.

## CHAPTER VI

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### POLITICAL IMMIGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES (1954-1960)

#### 6.1. The impact of political emigration on the communist government's relations with Italy.

During the years 1954-1960 the issue of political emigration had an impact on Albania's relations with Western countries.

In this context, it had the most visible impact on relations with Italy. At the beginning of 1954, after the failure of the Albanian emigration operations against the communist regime, it seems that a sign was given for the change in the Italian policy. A competent official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Skënder Konica that the Italian side would welcome an amnesty against the Italians and this would give them the opportunity to review their position on the Peace Treaty and, especially, the delegation that the Albanian government had requested for to Italy<sup>1</sup>. Konica was informed that the Italians were preoccupied with the amount of reparations they had to pay to the Albanian side because they had no currency in dollars.

Regarding political emigration, the senior Italian official stated that the Albanian government should have known in honor of Italy that it had kept the Albanian political emigration, because the political emigrants wanted to move to Prizren, from where of course they could confuse the situation more, while now, by joining the new Committee, would stay in Italy without any concrete activity<sup>2</sup>.

In 1954, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted a study on US policy towards Albania, which was closely related to the US attitude towards Albanian political emigration. According to this report, during the years 1953-1954, the US hostile policy towards Albania had continued. It manifested itself in: sheltering "war criminals", organizing, encouraging and throwing them in Albania, in the "defamatory" propaganda of "Voice of America" against the RPSH, in the open opposition of the US to the interests of the RPSH (meaning the communist regime) in the international arena.

The report referred to a speech by Vasil Andoni at the Balli Kombëtar Congress, in which it was stated that "It owes to the interest of the Americans and almost at that time and the British that the path of internationalization was paved for the recognition and support of an Albanian liberation committee". The material further stated that the gang of Hamit Matjani and Zenel Shehu who had been captured had stated that they had been trained by American officers and that the US secret services had instructed them to form gangs in Albania and to arm them.

It was also mentioned that in NATO maneuvers in Greece, its vice president, English Lord Montgomery, had stated in the Greek newspaper "Kathimerini" dt. 28.09.1953 that "in my opinion, Albania can be put out of the fight by means of atomic weapons"<sup>3</sup>. This report recommended that the following requests be made by the RPSH government to the US:

- The US government should appear in favor of Albania's accession to the UN.
- To give up interference in the internal affairs of the RPSH. Interrupt the radio broadcasts of "Voice of America", "Free Europe" and the "defamatory" propaganda of the American press against Albania.

<sup>1</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 245, Skënderi for MFA, Rome, February 4, 1954

<sup>2</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 245, Skënderi for MFA, Rome, February 4, 1954

<sup>3</sup> AMPJ, 1954, file 191, Report entitled: "US aggressive hostile policy against RPSH"



- To dissolve the so-called "Free Albania" Committee and hand over to Albania all the "Albanian war criminals" sheltered in the USA.
- To review its position regarding the Albanian monetary gold, in order to return, as is the right of Albania.
- Albanian citizens residing in the US (with Albanian and American citizenship) should not be prevented from maintaining regular contact with their families in Albania; to be allowed to return home or visit their homeland, to renounce "pressures and persecutions and discrimination against them"<sup>4</sup>.

In another MFA report, the documents that the communist government had for the US intervention in Albania were mentioned, which were <sup>5</sup>:

- Letter from Livingston, assistant secretary by order of Dalles sent to Hasan Dosti, (newspaper "Albania", dated 15.12.1953, no. 6);
- Encouragement for fugitive "criminals" and "traitorous" organizations on the occasion of the anniversary of the flag.
- Statement of the State Department on the occasion of the anniversary of Independence, November 28, 1953, published in "Albania", dt. 15.12.1953, no. 6.
- Les Dalles letter to Hasan Dosti broadcast by "Voice of America", on the same day, where he brings out the US hospitality and the opportunities that have been created for their "treacherous" work.
- The liberation of Albania will be done with the help of the free world. Threat and blackmail in "Voice of America", dt. 22.03.1954
- Les Dalles Statement on the occasion of November 28, 1954.
- US Senator Simon in June 1951 criticized Edward Berret, who is the head of the Strategic Psychological Directorate, for not being able to intimidate Albanians ..., "Voice of America", March 8, 1955.
- Et Radio programs "Free Europe" "slander" against Albanians
- Z Voice of America Shows
- Message from the President of the USA, March 4, 1955 to help Albania, attempts to lower the prestige of Albania in the international arena and to sow hatred in the Albanians who migrated against the popular power. Attempts "devilish and serious interference" in the internal affairs of our country. Document: file.
- In the trial of the saboteur engineers of Maliq, November 8-19, 1946, the cooperation of the Official American Mission with these "criminals" came to light.
- R The trial of Riza Damit, September 18 - December 31, 1947, where American hostile activity took place.
- In the trial of Ethem Çako, 24.05-6.6.1950.
- In the trial of Zenel Shehu, 4-12 April 1954.
- Statement by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

As can be clearly seen, part of these "arguments" had to do with the support of Albanian political emigration by the US government. In fact, the communist trials against political immigrants who came to Albania to fight the communist regime further strained the regime's relations with Western countries. These trials even resonated with the public opinion of Western countries. There were people who believed these propaganda trials but also many who considered them a farce. Thus, the newspaper "Dielli", in an article by Qerim Panariti,

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<sup>4</sup> AMPJ, 1954, file 191, Report entitled: "US aggressive hostile policy against RPSH"

<sup>5</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 191, Documents that the Albanian side has regarding the US intervention in Albania

presented these trials as suspicious, saying that the Americans did not have to send spies to Albania.

The trial against Zenel Shehu's group in Italy was echoed only by the newspaper "Unita" which published a full correspondence from this trial and no other left-wing press body wrote about it. But the Italian press wrote a lot about the visit of the Soviet naval team to Albania that had to do with Tito's visit to Greece.

The Legation judged that relations with Italy were weak and would remain so until the Shelba government was in power.

After establishing diplomatic relations with Italy in the list of issues addressed by the Italian government, the Albanian side ranked first the one on "war criminals". On June 30, 1950, the Albanian government protested against the Italian government for the dropping of two groups of saboteurs in Albania by Italian planes led by E. Çakos and Alush Leshmaku and demanded the surrender of "Albanian war criminals". The Italian Legation had turned the note as unacceptable. The Albanian Legation emphasized that Italy had helped the "Albanian war criminals" by all means and had become their most important center.<sup>6</sup> Now that the operations were over, Tirana did not want to reduce the tension but artificially wanted to keep it at high levels.

The regime's statement in 1955 by US President Eisenhower to help Albania economically caused concern for the regime. The communist government strongly opposed this statement in its propaganda and was concerned that political emigration would use the opportunity to strengthen anti-regime propaganda. From communist sources, we learn that, for the most part, American Albanians remembered that this was a step by the American government to improve relations with Albania. This opinion was also shared by many Albanian patriots who, according to communist diplomats, did not understand the true purpose of this assistance. Even Dh. Trebicka, who was probably the most trusted man of the communists in America, wrote to the Albanian authorities that it would be good for Tirana to accept this help, as "it would be a good slap in the face to the traitorous groups and Q. Panarit". He compared it to US aid to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the R.D.G.<sup>7</sup>

Regarding the attitude of the Albanian government towards the proposal of President Eisenhower, Fan Noli reacted immediately, on behalf of the Albanian faithful and clergy in America. In a telegram sent to M Shehu, he wrote: "The clergy and believers of the Albanian Orthodox Church in America deeply regret (oppose) the decision of the Albanian government to reject the American proposal for food aid to needy peasants. In our opinion, this gift has the full meaning of a gesture of goodwill, as a serious desire to improve relations between the United States of America and Albania and as a no less important step towards establishing peace in the Balkans.

Therefore, please reconsider the issue and accept the American offer in the spirit that has been made, even if it is not an urgent need, as we think, because the rejection will be used by the enemies of Albania."<sup>8</sup>

In 1955, the Albanian government, following the relative political opening that was being made by the entire Communist Bloc, conducted studies to further the fight and control of political emigration in various countries.

In one of these studies it was claimed that in Turkey there were about 70,000 Albanians who were not at all under the influence of the regime, but under that of anti-communist political emigration or the "reaction" as it was said. There were many Albanian

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<sup>6</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 245, Report of the Legation in Rome on the development of Albanian-Italian relations

<sup>7</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, MFA report on how the emigrants received the assistance proposed by Eisenhower (\$ 850,000) for Albania.

<sup>8</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, Albanian copy of the telegram sent by Fan Noli (Boston) to Mehmet Shehu, March 12, 1955

political emigrants in Turkey who were active against the communist government. It was thought that the normalization of relations between the two countries would help in all these directions, to fight political emigration and, in addition, would increase the role of the Albanian state in the Balkans<sup>9</sup>.

As for political emigration to Italy, it was proposed to ask the Italian government to stop their activity against the regime. If there was no conciliatory position from the Italian side on this issue, an article should have been written in the Albanian press about this position. While, in a second phase, based on the Peace Treaty, the Albanian government to demand the surrender of "war criminals" with concrete names. This request also aimed at discrimination and differentiation in the ranks of political emigration<sup>10</sup>.

In the summer of 1956 it seems that an interesting change took place in Italian policy towards political immigration. Due to the new spirit of the East-West detente and the interests of Italy to intensify relations with Albania, the Italian government conducted a survey, proposing to the Albanian side to limit the anti-communist activity of Albanian political emigration in this country. The senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Orlando, asked the Albanian representative Skënder Konica how the Albanian government would appreciate it if the Italian side would limit the activity of the fugitives only with a cultural activity and not a political one. The attitude of the Albanian side was very categorical and intransigent. Skenderi told him that cultural activity could not be represented by fugitives who had left the homeland, it could only take place between two countries<sup>11</sup>.

Regarding the relations with Italy at this stage, the Albanian Legation had reached the following conclusions: 1. The Italians were afraid of Greek neutrality, because it weakened the Atlantic positions. 2. They did not like the activity of the Albania-Italy friendship association, because it was run by PKI. 3. Legata thought that, for this reason, the Italian government was considering establishing an Albanian-Italian friendship association run by political emigrants<sup>12</sup>.

The category of undesirable emigrants for the communist regime also included economic emigrants, but who were capitalists in Italy. Such was the Albanian businessman Xhemal Ferra, who insisted on allowing his children to travel from Albania to Italy, but the communist government did not allow them. Exactly to mediate for this purpose, the official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs De Vitorio went to the Albanian Legation in Rome and said that he was interested in the case of Xhemal Ferra who had asked him to mediate to allow his children to go to Italy<sup>13</sup>.

On the other hand, political emigration was strongly challenging the regime and its people in Calabria. Communist Senator Luka di Laka visited the Albanian Legation on July 12, 1956 and announced that a large-scale movement for the Albanian language had begun in Calabria, where a "Friends of the Albanian Language" committee had been set up. But the Rome Legation thought that this movement had an invisible political aspect: "The enemy element, led by the Albanian language professor at the University of Bologna, Ernest Koliqi and others, assisted by the government" were the promoters of this movement. The senator told the officials of the Albanian Legation that it might not have been good for the political

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<sup>9</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 55, Study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the relations of Albania with the capitalist countries

<sup>10</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 55, Study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the relations of Albania with the capitalist countries

<sup>11</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 321, Report of the Representation of Rome on the meeting of Skënder Konica with Orlandi, July 2, 1956

<sup>12</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 321, Report of the Representation of Rome on the meeting of Skënder Konica with Orlandi, July 2, 1956

<sup>13</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 147/7, Report on the conversation with De Vitorion, 10 July 1956

emigrants to have this initiative as they would use it as a weapon "against you and us", that is, against the Albanian communist government and against the PKI<sup>14</sup>.

But despite this challenge, the Albanian Legation planned to act decisively to extend its influence in the region. In fact, in the quarterly analysis of her work in the summer of 1956, she set as her task "to fight for our propaganda to spread throughout Italy and not just in some provinces", while the problem of amnesty was considered by her as the number one problem. ". It set as its primary task to make more efforts to make clear the importance of the amnesty to those concerned<sup>15</sup>.

Një aksion të tillë qeveria shqiptare planifikonte ta zhvillonte edhe në drejtim të Greqisë. The MFA proposed to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the ALP to ask the Greek government to ban or, at least, restrict the activity of "Albanian criminals" in Greece and the so-called northern Epirus organizations. Also to propose to the Greek government an agreement on voluntary repatriation of political emigrants of both countries<sup>16</sup>. Taking stock of the Italian government's attitude towards political, economic emigration and repatriation during 1956, the Albanian Legation in Rome thought this was too negative. According to her, Italy, not only continued to finance immigration, but had intended, through the Independent Bloc, to take its lead, to use it against the RPSH. For the issue of reforming the Free Albania Committee, Italy had shown the greatest zeal, always directing the work to its participants. Legata informed that, recently, the Italian government was putting pressure on those elements who, for one reason or another, were not friends of Italy and it was working hard through its agents to keep in Italy as many of the "leaders influential"<sup>17</sup>.

Thus, the Legation had come to the conclusion that all these attitudes clearly showed that Italy, not only had not given up, but was working and thinking to realize "its hostile goals towards our country" and that the exponents of crime love for a second April 7th"<sup>18</sup>. Certainly this conclusion was wrong and drawn under the communist optics of the foreign policy look.

The Legation also informed that even against economic emigration, the Italian authorities exerted great pressure to isolate it from contacts with the Legation. "The fact is that none of them, even those with a somewhat good attitude, came to the legation, and no one responded to our call to register as Albanian citizens"<sup>19</sup>.

Italy's attitude towards the repatriation of Albanians, based on the amnesty, was also considered very negative and it was emphasized that the Italian government was greatly influencing the emigrants not to dare to request repatriation. "Not only their Albanian agents, but also the police directly put pressure on no one to return home. "The police, those who suspect that they have requested repatriation, with the exception of an old man or woman, put them in the Frasket concentration camp, from where they can not move." Legata claimed that this conclusion was confirmed by the attitude towards two emigrants, Isuf Luçi and Lluka Behari<sup>20</sup>.

She proposed to the MFA to respond decisively to this position of Italy. Specifically:

<sup>14</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 147/7, Report on the conversation with De Vitorion, 10 July 1956

<sup>15</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 13/6, Minutes of the meeting of the representation of Rome for the analysis of the II quarter

<sup>16</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 17, A-9 / a, Proposals of the MFA for the Politburo on the further development of relations with communist countries and some European countries.

<sup>17</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 397, Information of the Albanian legation in Rome on relations with Italy, Rome, 2 January 1957

<sup>18</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 397, Information of the Albanian legation in Rome on relations with Italy, Rome, 2 January 1957

<sup>19</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 397, Information of the Albanian legation in Rome on relations with Italy, Rome, 2 January 1957

<sup>20</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 397, Information of the Albanian legation in Rome on relations with Italy, Rome, 2 January 1957

- Shqiptare The Albanian government openly stated to the Italian side that its position did not agree with their statements on improving relations;
- Dekla To declare to the Italians that, if they continued like this, the relations would not move forward but, on the contrary, would be limited;
- As a countermeasure to Rome's attitude towards the Peace Treaty accord, not to discuss at all other problems between the two countries raised by the Italian side;
- The two Albanian scientists, planned to go to Italy, canceled the visit altogether, until the Italians had removed the discriminatory restriction (of staying only in Rome).
- Nuk If it did not influence the realization of its state economic plans, the Albanian side to interrupt the talks on trade exchanges during 1957.
- Ohej It was also proposed that the counter-propaganda of the Albanian government, both from Albania and from its Legation in Rome, should be even healthier, and to go on the offensive "through friends" meaning PKI<sup>21</sup>.

The activity of the communist representations in the western countries against the political emigration, caused the dissatisfaction and the reaction of the governments of these countries. Thus, the Albanian Mission in New York was put under pressure by the American authorities to stop the propaganda for the repatriation of political emigration. Jonuz Mersini informed that "the F.B.I. "They are questioning the Albanians who meet with us and ask them if we are pushing them to repatriate." He thought that the American authorities were doing this "to find a reason to pursue any of us as an unwanted person"<sup>22</sup>.

Against Italy, the Albanian government continued to insist on the surrender of political emigrants by it. In June 1957, the Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Shtylla held a meeting with the Italian Ambassador in Tirana, Revedini. This meeting was requested by the Italian ambassador to find out the opinion of the Albanian government on the development of relations between the two countries, after the signing of the Peace Treaty agreement. Revedini demanded the release of those Italians who had not been released, as the Greek military had stated that there were Italians with them in the camps. Behari replied that there were no more Italian prisoners in Albania. He then demanded that Albanian women married to Italians be allowed to go to Italy. The Albanian Minister told him that such small issues could be looked at, taking them concretely, but "we should not deal with small issues, we should look at even more important things of common interest that can help in restoring trust between the two countries. " As such, Foreign Minister B Shtylla stressed the issue of "Albanian criminals who not only take refuge in Italy but are organized, subsidized and assisted in various ways"<sup>23</sup>. B. Shtylla also claimed that the Italian press was slandering against Albania and presented some news as if they had come from their special service in Tirana, thus putting the Italian legation in a difficult position in Tirana. Behari proposed that such cases be refuted by the Italian MFA. He demanded that measures be taken to stop the activity of "Albanian criminals" in Italy<sup>24</sup>.

In January 1958, the representative of the Albanian Legation in Rome, Edip Çuçi, following the pressure on the Italian government, met a senior official in Farnezina, to whom he stated that the Italian MFA should not remain silent about the activity of "Albanian fascist criminals"<sup>25</sup>. The senior Italian official told him that these were not fascists and should not be

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<sup>21</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 397, Information of the Albanian legation in Rome on relations with Italy, Rome, 2 January 1957

<sup>22</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 461, Jonuz Mersini for MFA, March 25, 1957

<sup>23</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 397, Meeting of MFA B. Shtylla with the Italian Ambassador Revedini, Tirana, June 25, 1957

<sup>24</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 397, Meeting of MFA B. Shtylla with the Italian Ambassador Revedini, Tirana, June 25, 1957

<sup>25</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 425, Information on the meeting of E. Çuçi with the official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Straneo, January 27, 1958

considered as such. To argue this view, he briefly mentioned their activity since the time of Prince Wid. "He came to the conclusion that these are deceived by fascists like Mussolini, Starace, Ciano, etc. and, if they carry out a cultural activity today to know the Albanian language and Albanian culture in general, it seems to me that they are not doing anything wrong"<sup>26</sup>.

The Albanian representative stated that he did not agree with his "views and prejudices" and added that the Albanian government had differentiated and announced an amnesty for all those who had been lied to by fascism, calling on them to return to Albania and "Not to suffer in Italy, as you said, working freely like everyone else." He underlined that other immigrants, who had not benefited from this amnesty, "are considered by us as harmful fascists, not only for us but also for you. This is proved by the documents that exist for them that are known not only by the Albanian people but also by the Italian one"<sup>27</sup>.

Edhe më i drejtpërdrejtë u tregua ambasadori italian në Poloni, Jannelli, në opposing attacks and accusations by the Albanian government against anti-communist political emigration to Italy. He told the Albanian ambassador M. Kroj that "Albanian refugees abroad are honest people, patriots and the only guilt they have committed is that they are against the communist regime. He said that in Albania there is no democracy as in all communist countries. The individual is repressed and turned into a state-service machine. There is dictatorship and oppression everywhere. We have freedom and democracy. You do not have democracy and you have economic difficulties. Albania was better off joining Italy. At least unification is better than Russian colonization"<sup>28</sup>.

Kroj, shocked by this direct statement, replied that Albania was not united with Italy but occupied. "I told him that we are an independent state and our foreign policy is independent, but it is based on the same principles as the USSR and the People's Democracies"<sup>29</sup>.

In 1959, in the framework of the Detente, Italy tried to improve relations with the Albanian government. In these negotiations, as a sign of affinity, the Italian side also informed about Belgrade's efforts to use emigrants in Yugoslavia to invade Albania. The Albanian Legation interpreted this affinity as proof that Italy did not want to improve Albania's relations with its neighbors and that it had tried to get the Albanian government to turn its attention away from it and focus on its Balkan neighbors, from whom it should expect danger"<sup>30</sup>. S. Konica claimed that, "through double-agent agents, Italy has tried to dictate its policy to us, saying that Yugoslavia is preparing secret plans against Albania and that Yugoslavia is aiming against our country; that groups of saboteurs have been prepared in Yugoslavia, forces have been concentrated on the border and work is being done along the Albania-Yugoslavia border. In this way, Italy wanted to approach to exercise its influence"<sup>31</sup>. Meanwhile in 1960 there were new incidents with the Albanian Mission in New York. In March 1960, the American Mission to the UN sent a note to the Albanian Mission where it drew attention to an Albanian film that the Mission had given to the organization "Free

<sup>26</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 425, Information on the meeting of E. Çuçi with the official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Straneo, January 27, 1958

<sup>27</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 425, Information on the meeting of E. Çuçi with the official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Straneo, January 27, 1958

<sup>28</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 425, Report of M. Kroj, Ambassador to Poland, on the protocol visit of the Italian Ambassador P. Jannelli, 5 March 1958

<sup>29</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 425, Report of M. Kroj, Ambassador to Poland, on the protocol visit of the Italian Ambassador P. Jannelli, 5 March 1958

<sup>30</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 449, Annual Report of the Legation in Rome (prepared by Skënder Konica) on relations with Italy, October 20, 1959

<sup>31</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 449, Annual Report of the Legation in Rome (prepared by Skënder Konica) on relations with Italy, October 20, 1959

Albania" three years ago. He pointed out that the film had entered without customs clearance and the UN mission was not allowed to distribute films. The Albanian mission claimed that, with this action, the Americans intended to hinder his activity in the direction of the colony. In this situation, Albanian diplomats immediately turned to their great allies. The mission informed the MFA: "We talked to the Soviets. They told us to make a simple answer, stating that our position is correct and in accordance with the established rules"<sup>32</sup>.

In 1960 it seemed that relations with Italy were more relaxed. The Albanian Legation was satisfied that the agreement on the commodity trading lists had already ended with an increase of 26%. The reparations chord was almost fully implemented. The bone chord was being implemented properly and the Italian side had expressed satisfaction with the matter.

But it was precisely these circumstances that were deemed favorable by the communist government for it to resume efforts to plunder the assets of the Albanian emigration. Thus, Legata reported another "success", it had managed to rob a part of the assets of Albanian traders in Italy. "During the year we were able to administer and use the income of Albanian assets, breaking to some extent the resistance and the great obstacles that have been removed from the past. "But we emphasize that what has been achieved is not the result of the policy of goodwill of the Italian side, but of our determination, pressure and our interventions".<sup>33</sup> Legata had also demanded that the Italian government hand over "Zog's money" but "so far we have had no response," she reported.<sup>34</sup>

## **6.2. Efforts of neighboring Balkan states to use political emigration for their own interests**

A fundamental aspect of the impact of political emigration on Albania's international relations was the presence of this emigration in the neighboring Balkan countries and the efforts of these countries to use political emigration in the service of their politics and interests towards the Albanian state and nation.

In fact, there is a variety of relations between political emigration and the officials of these countries, which varied depending on the emigration groups and the Balkan states. Thus, for example, nationalist political emigration had better relations with the Turkish government, but relations with Greek and Yugoslav governments were not. All nationalist groups asked the Turkish government to support the independence, territorial integrity of the Albanian state and saw it as a hope in this regard. But they demanded that Ankara respect the vital Albanian national interests, especially to withdraw from the policy of cooperation with Yugoslavia, to encourage the departure of Albanians from Kosovo. It is worth mentioning a critical memorandum of Xh Deva sent to the Turkish Foreign Minister on September 20, 1953, to prevent the displacement of Albanians in this country. Among other things, the Memorandum stated: "You are undermining your country's centuries-old strategy in the Balkans and in Europe. Where will you support your political strategy tomorrow if this element disappears from the Balkans. Bosniaks, Albanians and Turks are the only peoples who provide Turkey with a breath of fresh air in Europe. These peoples will always be a strong element in blocking pan-Slavism in the Balkans. You should take the historical example of Rome, which stubbornly and rightly defends the element of Western Christianity

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<sup>32</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/1, Reis Information on MFA, New York, March 11, 1960

<sup>33</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 464, Report of the Albanian Legation in Italy on the development of relations with Italy during 1960, Rome, 05.12.1960

<sup>34</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 464, Report of the Albanian Legation in Italy on the development of relations with Italy during 1960, Rome, 05.12.1960

in the Balkans. Rome does not put the noose around its neck, because it is aware of its subsequent consequences with the Slavic world”<sup>35</sup>.

However, in our work, we will focus on the two most delicate problems, the attitude of Greece and Yugoslavia towards political emigration.

### **6.2.1. Greece and Albanian political emigration**

Regarding the efforts of the Greek government to use the Albanian political emigration, Professor Beqir Meta has written a detailed and well-argued study in two volumes<sup>36</sup>, so in this paper we will only dwell briefly on this issue by attempting to add some new data.

As the regime struggled with anti-communist political emigration to the Albanian colonies, Greek and Greek's emigration organizations took advantage. The MFA noted that the influence of the North Epirus organization in the Albanian colony of Australia had been linked since the war, but rather its activity and influence had expanded after it by "Greek reactionary elements, the Orthodox Gjirakastra and Korça", led by the Greek consul in Australia, in order to quarrel the Albanians of the colony, dividing them into Muslims and Christians"<sup>37</sup>. Sipas informacioneve që kishte MPJ aktiviteti i kësaj organizate ishte shtuar në vitet 1945-1946, when Greek claims to southern Albania were intensifying. The committee of this organization was located in Melbourne and was chaired by Vasil Papa Laboviti. One subcommittee was in Sheperton with Arqile Spiro as chairman, from Rehova in Korça, and one in Perth with Athanas Litos (from Frashëri in Gjirakastra) as chairman. This society had been in constant conflict with Albanian societies in these countries.

From the data collected by the Albanian intelligence, it resulted that before the Second World War in Greece (Athens), parallel to the North Epirus Sylog (which was created in the years 1919-1920), the North Epirus Sylog Sellasforos was created. Unlike the first, this new organization included Albanian elements from the provinces of Korça, Kolonjë and Përmet. After the Second World War, in order to better organize this organization, a reorganization was made and the KEVA (Central Committee of Northern Epirus Efforts) was established. Former Gjirakastra bishop Pandejlejmon Kotokos was appointed head of it<sup>38</sup>.

At the same time, the Sillog that had been in Ioannina and Thessaloniki was greatly strengthened, creating other branches in the border towns, such as Konica, Filat and Corfu, which carried out a significant activity against Albania until 1949<sup>39</sup>.

But during 1955, because the mass of northern Epirotes had moved deep into Greece, these branches, with the exception of that of Corfu, had no activity. Some, like Konica's, did not even exist.

Shortly after its organization, KEVA established the North Epirus youth organization ENVI (National Youth of North Epirus) which mobilized young people from North Epirus to implement the goals of KEVA. This organization had its branches wherever KEVA had them.

During and after World War II, attempts were made by KEVA to establish its branches in the Greek minority in Albania, but these failed after being discovered by the Albanian authorities and hit in time.<sup>40</sup>

In order for KEVA to keep close to itself the various elements of the Albanian minority in Greece, in 1953 it organized "Provincial Unions" within it. Such were:

- The union of the Dropullites led by Sofokli Eleftheriu

<sup>35</sup> Idriz Lamaj, Xhafer Deva, ..., New York, 2002, p.102.

<sup>36</sup> Beqir Meta, Greek-Albanian Tension, 1939-1949, Tirana, Geer, 2002; and Albania and Greece, 1949-1990- The difficult peace, Tirana, 2004.

<sup>37</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, p. 33, Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation of the Albanian colony in Australia, Tirana, June 1, 1955

<sup>38</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955

<sup>39</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955

<sup>40</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955



- The union of the Lungerians led by Jani Diamandi
- Imi Union of Pilurjots led by Costa Mercury
- The union of the Himarjots led by Eas Spiromilos<sup>41</sup>.

The Albanian communist intelligence acknowledged that after the war, divergences first appeared between KEVA and ballistic, legalist, etc. groups. as KEVA demanded the annexation of southern Albania. "But these were in a way closed by the Greek and American masters, saying that they are things that are easily regulated after the fall of the communist regime in Albania." Slogans had circulated several times that the minority would be replaced by Chameria. As stated in the State Security report "These divergences in reality exist, but now there is not much talk about them from the common goal that the enemies of Albania have and after the northern Epirotes have confidence that such a thing will not be allowed by the Greeks to be done nor will Greece be denied the right over Northern Epirus. While Albanians are confident that this will be resolved in their favor by the Americans"<sup>42</sup>.

Another finding was that after the liberation of Albania when it was seen that the Greek minority stabilized "just like all the Albanian people because they fought the occupier and did not raise the issue of union with monarcho-fascist Greece", the northern epirus organization resumed its activity against our country, openly assisting the Greek espionage in carrying out its duties in the minority and in Albania in general.

As early as 1945, the branches of this organization that had been in cities along the border with Albania, in cooperation with the Greek espionage bodies, were organized in different provinces along the border and in other districts such as Përmet, Leskovik and Korçë<sup>43</sup>.

There was close cooperation between Sellogos Sellosforos and KEVA at first, but later some disputes arose on which the Albanian intelligence still had no concrete knowledge. The only difference between them that he knew was that Sellosforos included in his bosom Albanian elements from Korça, Përmeti, Kolonja. While KEVA summarized the minority element and that of Himara, but there was also a minority from the provinces of Korça<sup>44</sup>.

The report concluded with the conclusion that Greece had been and remained a bridge through each of which the Albanian intelligence agents of America, England and Italy and other collaborators who crossed into Albania through the people of the North Epirus Committee passed on Albanian soil.<sup>45</sup>

In another information, the Albanian intelligence confirmed that the military organization "Union of volunteers and reserves of northern Epirus" was created with the direct interest of the Greek government and that in a meeting organized on February 24 by this organization attended many Greek military and civilian personalities such as and heads of emigration, among whom were the chiefs of staff of the army, General Leitnant, Dhovas, Gjikas, Kodnopoulos, Mesinoullos, Minister of Justice Petro Levandis, Stiliano Harisiadhis, chairman of Sellosfors Venaqidhis - chairman of KEVA, etc. The Greek government, in order to foster the hostile work of northern Epirus emigration, on the occasion of the new year had given several leaders honorary titles and rewards for their contribution to the liberation of Northern Epirus.

At the beginning of 1956, the Albanian government would notice the increase of propaganda activity against Albania by the northern Epirus organizations in Greece and America since 1954, which, instigated by the Greek government authorities, through the press

<sup>41</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955

<sup>42</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955

<sup>43</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955

<sup>44</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955

<sup>45</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, State Security Report on the activity of Albanian emigration. July 12, 1955.

and other propaganda means, were forcibly raising the problem of the liberation of Northern Epirus. According to the Albanian intelligence, at the time when the Cyprus issue was raised at the IX session of the UN General Assembly, the slogan was spread in Greece that after the unification of Cyprus, the unification of Northern Epirus with Greece would take place. Speeches were made about this topic, the press wrote and spoke on the radio. Several important conferences were organized, among which stood out: The conference held in November 1954 in Athens with all the leaders of North Epirus and the representatives of all the North Epirus organizations of Athens and Piraeus. In this conference was voted the call of Bishop Spiridhon for the unification of the northern Epirotes and their activism in the fight "for their national cause". After that, several other local conferences were organized in Corfu, Thessaloniki, etc. Another large conference was held in October 1954 in Athens where dr. Llambro Spiru from Himara on the topic "Greek origin of Northern Epirus". Conferences on the same topic were organized in all neighborhoods of Athens, attended by Greek personalities such as Hristos Solomonidis - Minister of Social Assistance, Generals Kristalis, Zotos, Qellaidhis, Picikas and Prime Minister Stilinos Gonatas, as well as representatives of the North Epirus organization out of Greece Fane Kokaveshi and Andrea Zoto, of the Egyptian organization, Jani Camberis of the North Epirus organization of America and Paul Llapas of the North Epirus organization of France who were sent to Greece by their organizations to help the North Epirus campaign<sup>46</sup>. At the end of 1954, the former Foreign Minister of the Greek government, Stefanopoulos, declared to Costa Dhimos, President of the Pan-Pyrrhic Federation of America, that "the problem of Epirus for Greece was a right but also a duty". Also, the representative of the Greek government in the UN, Cyrus, together with the president of the Panepirote organization in America, decided that the organizations of Boston and New York to carry out a propaganda campaign during 1955 to raise the issue of the North Epirotes in the UN. Many of the northern Epirote leaders ran in the municipal elections and were elected members of various municipalities. This enabled them to take an active part in the local government, to establish their authority and to have space to propagate more about the issue of North Epirus.

No less active were the North Epirus organizations in America. At the end of 1954, Thanasis Gogonis (one of the leaders of the North Epirus organization of Greece) was called from them, who organized a series of conferences on the topic "Unification of Northern Epirus". On this occasion, a material aid campaign was launched there for North Epirus, which found the support of some Greek immigrant societies and organizations in America<sup>47</sup>.

By early 1955 meetings organized by the leaders of Vorio Epirus had become more frequent. The January 17, 1955 meeting in Athens organized by the Panepirot Brotherhood was also attended by former Prime Minister Gonatas Millonas and former director of the Agricultural Bank<sup>48</sup>.

In the summer of 1955, the Directorate of State Security was informed that, with the direct interest of the Greek government, a military organization had recently been set up called the "Union of Volunteers and Reserves of the North Epirus". The Council of Northern Epirus of Corfu was also re-established, which did not exist for a long time. This council was chaired by Grigor Qendro, chairman Anastas Dhimaleksi from Himara vice-chairman, who was described as an "active saboteur"; Ilia Ikonomu from the Palace of Himara, secretary (saboteur) and 5 members. The Greek government, in order to encourage the activity of the

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<sup>46</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, fl. 37-40, Information report on Albanian "reactionary" emigration to capitalist countries, February 14, 1956.

<sup>47</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, fl. 37-40, Information report on Albanian "reactionary" emigration to capitalist countries, February 14, 1956.

<sup>48</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, p. 66. State Security Report on the activity of northern Epirus organizations prepared by Zoi Themeli. 10 July 1955

North Epirus fugitives, gave some of the leaders titles and rewards for their contribution to the liberation of North Epirus<sup>49</sup>. A no less hostile activity was being carried out against Albania by the North Epirus organizations of America, which had increased their efforts for a healthier organization in their ranks and had joined the efforts for the liberation of North Epirus. For these purposes the Northern Epirus League Dhodhoni - The Liberation of Chicago was abolished and a single Dhodhoni - Liberation organization was created. For the achievement of this union a great help had been given by Kr. Godella, Vangel Godella from Gjirokastra and V. Fotu from Poliçani etc. The purpose of this organization was declared to be the liberation of Northern Epirus. The Union of Policemen was also created in the city of Portland, America<sup>50</sup>.

At the beginning of 1956, a commission of the American Ecclesiastical Society went to Greece, which had the task of withdrawing from Greece all the northern Epirotes who had fled Albania after 1948 and to help them emigrate to America. The North Epirus fugitives, before leaving for America, underwent a medical examination and were interrogated by American intelligence officers. The northern Epirus fugitives who had fled Albania after 1948 and were currently in the city of Ioannina were said to have all fled to America within six months. Those who had fled before 1948 could emigrate to America only by invitations to their relatives there. Albanian authorities claim that northern Epirus fugitives did not trust the Albanian government's amnesty and did not return to Albania.<sup>51</sup>

In the autumn of 1956 the Albanian intelligence was informed that the English intelligence supported and by the Greek intelligence had organized a great campaign in connection with the liberation of Northern Epirus. The purpose of the British intelligence was to "draw the attention of the Greek people to the Cyprus problem, leading it to the issue of North Epirus, because Cyprus compromised the British before the Greeks and the world"<sup>52</sup>.

On dt. July 8-9, 1956 The First Pan-Pyrotechnic Congress was held in Athens, which issued a proclamation. The chauvinist elements, led by Kotoko, called for the liberation of Northern Epirus, even if they used force. It was said that preparations were being made for the beginning of the uprising for the liberation of Northern Epirus, and that for this purpose forces were being armed which were being armed. It is said that 3,000 Albanians were armed in the Llavrio camp, etc. The Albanian intelligence claimed that "we have tried to prove whether such efforts are really being made, but so far it has not turned out to be such a thing"<sup>53</sup>.

The Ministry of Interior stated that "the campaign launched for the liberation of Northern Epirus is the most important issue in the activity of foreign enemies against the RPSH. "So far the enemy has not committed any concrete act and the campaign has remained a propaganda campaign, but in the future the possibility of committing such an act is not ruled out." She further specified the content of the proclamation of the Panepirot Congress of Athens of July 8-9, 1956, which read as follows:

- The first International National Congress PanEpirot sets as its task to fight in any way and means for the unification of Northern Epirus with its mother Greece.
- Bën Calls on all free and not free Epirotes to organize the National Front with the participation of all Greeks.

<sup>49</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, Information of the State Security Directorate, July 10, 1955

<sup>50</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, p. 66. State Security Report on the activity of northern Epirus organizations prepared by Zoi Themeli. 10 July 1955

<sup>51</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, fl. 64-66, Information of the Ministry of Interior on emigration, prepared by Zoi Themeli, sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 24, 1956.

<sup>52</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, fl. 119-120, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the activity of the external enemies of the RPS during the first 6 months of 1956, 10 September 1956

<sup>53</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, fl. 119-120, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the activity of the external enemies of the RPS during the first 6 months of 1956, 10 September 1956

- Free and not free Epirus is put in the liberation war for the implementation of the decisions of the congress ...
- Rov Approves the formation of a national executive body for the implementation of the decisions of the PanEpirot Congress, approved (elected) at the same time by the natural chairman of the efforts (war) His Grace the Metropolitan of Gjirokastra Mr. Pandelejmon and from the presidium of Congress.
- Decided that the proclamation approved by the congress presidency and Mr. Pandemonium should be given to the government, parliament, representatives of other countries and sent to the UN<sup>54</sup>.

After the well-known anti-communist events in the years 1953-1956 in Hungary and Poland, the Albanian emigration organizations became very active in the USA, France, Italy, etc. Nuçi Kota, Secretary of Legality went to the center of Athens, where many legalists worked like Adem Hodo, Faik Bukmiri, Fuat Myftiu etc,

It is worth noting that the Greek intelligence also acted intensively to incite and organize the elements of its enemies and agents, around the border against the communist government. In July 1956 the first panepirot congress was held in Athens<sup>55</sup> in order to create the "National Front for the liberation of Albania", under the slogan of "the liberation of Northern Epirus". In the secret meeting of the syllabus of Ioannina, besides P. Kotokos and other syllogistic fugitives in Greece and the USA, the deputy also participated. Greek Interior Minister Nicholas Athanasios, who said the North Epirotes "will return to the free homeland"<sup>56</sup>. While in several syllogism meetings, KEVA propagated the armed uprising and the throwing of groups and emissaries for its organization. On January 19, 1959 at the Rex cinema (REX) in Athens was held the extended meeting of the northern Epirus syllogism, which was attended by 400 delegates, where the task was "to keep the spirit of Northern Epirus alive and to fight by all means to achieved the goal, which KEVA has set for itself"<sup>57</sup>. In the second half of 1958 the regime's representations had very little information about northern Epirus organizations. It was pointed out that this was created in the first years after the war and at first it could have deceived a part of the colony, but after the unmasking of the Albanian patriots of the American colony, many lying elements left. However, there were still a handful of Albanians in this group who were compromised. The group was led by "the agent of the Greeks, Marko Lipa, who in his religious garb spreads Greek monarcho-fascist slogans and propaganda." According to the Albanian Mission to the UN, his goal was to divide the Albanian colony of America on the basis of religion and to play the toy of Greek chauvinists against our country. For this purpose he aimed to seize the Albanian churches and then, through them, to expand Greek chauvinist propaganda. It was concluded that in general, the activity of this organization had decreased because, not only the Albanians of the colony had unmasked it but also for the fact that the Greek propaganda in this direction had taken a downturn and had failed with shame. This organization also published a leaflet entitled "The True Light". The mission proposed that this group should not be left unchecked and that it be unmasked by radio and press.<sup>58</sup>

In January 1959, the Albanian Mission to the UN drafted a report which provided detailed information on the Pan Epirote Organization of America.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>54</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 391, fl. 119-120, Report of the Ministry of Interior on the activity of the external enemies of the RPS during the first 6 months of 1956, 10 September 1956

<sup>55</sup> AMPB, KEVA Practice

<sup>56</sup> AMPB, year 1956, file 27, p. 50

<sup>57</sup> AMPB, year 1969, file 896, p. 1

<sup>58</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 52, 1 fl. 101-102, Report on the situation of Albanian colonies in France, USA, Australia, Argentina for the second half of 1958

<sup>59</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

It was said to have been created 12 years ago and included in its bosom persons from that area which the Greeks called Epirus; Greeks who had emigrated to the US from the provinces of Epirus in Greece; Orthodox minorities and Albanians emigrated from Albania. The most active element and who had the most important positions in this organization was said to be the one emigrated from Albania. The positions were given to Albanian emigrants on purpose. In their ranks were many of those who had fled the country during and after World War II who were used on a large scale to spread propaganda against the Albanian government.

The organization had its main support in Greek propaganda and especially in the Greek Orthodox Church in the USA. Almost all members of the organization were members of the Greek Orthodox Church. Albanian "reactionary" immigration organizations also had no connection to the "Epirotes". The mission had learned that attempts had previously been made between them to combine actions against the communist regime, but no agreement had been reached. The American authorities and especially some American deputies and senators strongly promote the anti-Albanian activities of this organization. The propaganda of this organization combined with Greek and ecclesiastical propaganda had an effect on minorities in the US and on some Orthodox Albanians who, poisoned by perennial Greek propaganda, disguised themselves as Greeks. The mission claimed that "the progressive element in the ranks of minorities has no influence now. This is primarily because this element has been persecuted by the American authorities as a communist"<sup>60</sup>.

To counter the propaganda of the North Epirus regions in America and beyond, the Mission proposed the following measures:

- Disa To visit Albania as tourists some minorities. For this purpose they had to be encouraged with letters from their family and friends in Albania.
- To make propaganda in their direction through the newspaper "Llaiko Vima", and by sending various books and brochures in Greek that were published in Albania.
- Efforts should be made to make this propaganda as effective as possible
- Radio "Tirana" to broadcast occasional greetings in Greek from minority families. The mission informed that there were many minorities who wanted to listen to the radio "Tirana" but did not know Albanian
- Propaganda Continue propaganda towards them through letters from their family and friends<sup>61</sup>.

According to the Mission, there were signs that the Greeks were trying to reactivate the northern Epirus organization, since the agreement on Cyprus had already been concluded, which by this time had engaged Greek propaganda<sup>62</sup>.

The Albanian intelligence had collected data that on January 30, 1959, in the NATO communiqué for southern Europe between the Greek admiral Cacos, the American admiral Brown and the Italian admiral Rute, Cacos informed them about the military situation in Albania, especially in the south<sup>63</sup>. Also at a secret NATO meeting in 1959, Cacos told his colleagues that certain officers of the Greek Navy were in contact with elements trusted in Albania and that the General Staff of the Greek Navy was sending near the Albanian border (Libohovë, Konispol) propaganda materials, financial means and weapons. Only in the main centers of Epirus did many Greek intelligence cadres act against Albania. Thus in Florina, Kostur, Konica and Corfu worked 40 cadres of Greek intelligence<sup>64</sup>. During this period

<sup>60</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>61</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>62</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 522, UN Mission Information on Political Immigration to the United States

<sup>63</sup> AMPB, 1960, file 254, p. 2

<sup>64</sup> AMPB, year 1960, file 254, p.2, 12

KEVA also worked to reorganize syllables in the USA, Australia, Canada, France, Argentina, Turkey, Egypt and elsewhere.

In July 1959, according to Albanian intelligence documents, a secret meeting of KEVA was held to launch in Albania the diversionist groups that were being prepared. According to this information, all Albanians aged 20-40 in the instruction center in Llavrio would take part in this action and that charged by the CIA and QIP, Haki Rushiti went to Italy, France, Yugoslavia, etc., where he met fugitives in connection with the acceleration of the armed uprising. It was said that KEVA decided to collect all the Albanian emigration from northern Epirus to the USA, Australia, Canada, Argentina, Turkey, France, England, Egypt, etc.<sup>65</sup> and that in this context was also sent the gang of Costa Filit, Th. Vretos, K. Petros and Dh. Gërbos, who were captured and confirmed the existence of the conspiratorial organization. The Albanian Legation in Cairo informed that against the Greek minority emigration to the RAB, its propaganda had been and continued to be weak. In this country there was a large mass of the Greek minority of Albania who were under the indirect influence of the Vorio-Epirote organization. Legata wrote: "We could not enter their districts and influence with our propaganda. "Sending the newspaper Laiko Vima has been insufficient and as a result Greek propaganda has taken deep roots and continues to be strong".<sup>66</sup>

The nationalist political emigration continued the efforts to engage the Greeks in the fight against the communist regime but at the same time to engage them to respect the territorial integrity of the Albanian state. In this spirit, in July 1960 Zog sent a letter to King Paul of Greece, in which he wrote to make an agreement between them, in order to fight against communism. The New York City Council published this news, which was not to the liking of the Greeks who made accusations against this committee. On the other hand the leaders of political emigration and especially Zogu and the leaders of Balli Agrar thwarted the attempt of KEVA, which sent Costa Dimen to coordinate the work and make an agreement in favor of the Greek territorial goals.<sup>67</sup>

### **6.2.2. Yugoslavia's attitude towards Albanian political emigration**

Belgrade, like Athens, was not standing idly by against Albanian emigration. Until 1955, the Yugoslav government funded and headed the Committee of Albanian Political Emigrants to its country. The Albanian Legation in Belgrade reported that the Albanian fugitives in Yugoslavia had had a committee called the "Union of Albanian Emigrants in Yugoslavia" based in Pristina. Its chairman was Hajrulla Ishmi and vice chairman was Nik Sokoli. This committee also had 3 subcommittees based in Ohrid, Prishtina, Ulcinj. The committee was established in 1949 as an agency in the hands of UDB. The Albanian political emigrants in Yugoslavia were about 5000-6000 people. The most active part of emigration was located near the borders with Albania. They were sent to Albania as saboteurs. Some of the fugitives who were not sent as saboteurs to Albania are sent to different parts of Yugoslavia. In order to carry out the most effective propaganda against the government of Tirana, the Yugoslav government had placed most of the Albanian emigrants in the towns and villages with Albanian population and mainly in Kosovo<sup>68</sup>.

Meanwhile, towards the end of 1954, drastic changes took place in the situation of political emigration in Yugoslavia. The Albanian Legation in Belgrade reported that after the improvement of Yugoslavia's relations with the countries of the socialist camp, the Yugoslav

<sup>65</sup> AMPB, File on the activity of KEVA

<sup>66</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/2, Report of the Albanian Legation prepared by Delo Balili on the situation of our colony in RAB.

<sup>67</sup> BK Bulletin, speech of A. Ermenji at the 7th congress of BK, p. 57

<sup>68</sup> AMPJ, 1955, file 401, Albanian Legation Belgrade - MFA, Report on Political Emigration in Yugoslavia, February 1, 1955

government took measures to stop the activity of the fugitives. This closed the newspaper "Flamuri i Lirisë" and on November 15 dissolved the "committee of traitors". The Legation reported that emigration was now scattered throughout various parts of Yugoslavia and lived by doing manual labor. However repatriation requests had been quite low as the migrants had no confidence. They were staying in Yugoslavia, waiting for better situations<sup>69</sup>.

In February 1955, the State Security added and further detailed information on political emigration to Yugoslavia, analyzing the important event of the elimination of the aforementioned Committee of Albanian Emigrants to Yugoslavia. He informed that after the closure of the newspaper "Flamuri i Lirisë" and the dissolution of the "Reaction Committee", from January 1, 1955, UDB cut the aid to most of the emigrants, which were 3,000-6,000 dinars per month. Only a handful continued to give him a little help. Consequently, political emigration was in difficult conditions. He was encouraged to emigrate to western states. The Yugoslavs had told the emigrants that they could return to Albania if they wished, but added that the Yugoslav government could not make any commitment to what might happen to them when they returned. By this time, 700-800 people from this emigration had gone to the West, during the months of July-August 1954.

There were 500-600 fugitives in Macedonia. Albanian communist officials had met with some of these emigrants and were told that a decision had been made that all emigrants were pardoned. But they had expressed doubt why this decision was not published.

The Directorate of State Security came to the conclusion that the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the emigration organization, etc. had caused the latter to fall far short of morality. The majority of emigrants wanted to return to Albania but were afraid<sup>70</sup>.

After the temporary improvement during 1954-1955 under the dictates of Moscow, the Albanian-Yugoslav relations would be strained again. The Albanian communist state security had collected information that in the years 1956-1960, the UDB reactivated the Albanian emigration to Yugoslavia and abroad and that Dushan Mogusha made an agreement in Rome with the Greek official Spiro Drizos for the use of the borders for the crossing of the saboteurs<sup>71</sup>.

Arratisja e P. Plakut në maj 1957, nxiti emigracionin politik për të propaganduar luftën against the communist regime, noting that the situation in Albania was chaotic. P. Palku worked at the Institute of the International Labor Movement in Belgrade, where he translated Marxist literature into Albanian. In 1959 he became a member of the NLP. He died of a heart attack on July 13, 1966, and was buried the next day in the Belgrade Cemetery, to the sounds of the International and with military honors. At the funeral were Fadil Hoxha, a member of the Federal Executive Council; Xhavit Nimani, vice. Speaker of the Assembly of Serbia; Bosko Shilegovi, member of the Central Committee of LKJ; Dushan Mugosha, chairman for Agriculture of the Federal Assembly, etc. The chairman of the veterans' committee, Jevrem Popovic, and his comrades-in-arms, Elhami Nimani, spoke about his life. Secretary of the Executive Council of Serbia<sup>72</sup>.

In 1958, Colonel Cedo Mijoviçi went to France, Italy, Belgium, the FRY, the USA and elsewhere where he met the leaders of political emigration M. Bajraktari, F. Dine, S. Kryeziu, Ibrahim Farka, etc.<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>69</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 401, Notification of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade to the MFA

<sup>70</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 400, p. 1, Directorate of State Security - Summary of information on Albanian emigration to Yugoslavia, prepared by Dhimitër Gjoni. Tirana, 12 February 1955

<sup>71</sup> AMPB, UDB practice

<sup>72</sup> Spasojë akakovi, Conflicts in Kosovo, ATSH, February 14, 1987, p. 1 -2

<sup>73</sup> AMPB, year 1958, file 342, p. 112

In 1958, the newspaper *Flamuri*, referring to an article in the ALP newspaper "*Zeri i Popullit*" on June 22, 1958, on relations with Yugoslavia, stated that he documented the betrayal of Enver Hoxha, not only to freedom and independence, but to himself. the existence of Albania<sup>74</sup>. *Flamuri* wrote that the above-mentioned newspaper confirmed that, when Enver Hoxha was Prime Minister and Secretary of the Communist Party, he signed all the agreements that made Albania a colony of Yugoslavia. The flag quoted: "The economic agreements signed with Yugoslavia - the newspaper says - violated even the most basic rules of sovereign states and were used to turn our country into a colony ...". Then he asked the question: "Who signed these chords? Enver Hoxha! "The Yugoslavs issued documents - says the red notebook - where Albania was the seventh republic of Yugoslavia." *Flamuri* emphasized that then the Prime Minister and the Secretary of the party did not protest and now the communist party of Albania was only after 14 years informing the people "they said shamelessly that if Tito had not been convicted by the Cominform in 1948, if he had continued for a while his non-departure from the hearth of the Bolshevik parties, Albania would no longer exist, but would join Kosovo!"<sup>75</sup>

The newspaper further used this bitter fact of the history of relations with Yugoslavia to test its stance during the war. The newspaper wrote that "at the beginning of August 1943, the resistance parties gathered in Mukaj. Balli Kombëtar and the Communist National Liberator. In that historic meeting, Balli defended the interests of Albania: unity, independence, freedom of the Homeland. The Communist Party insisted on keeping Tito's divisions as "liberators." In that meeting, the thesis of Balli Kombëtar won. But a month later, on the orders of Belgrade agents Dusan Mugosha and Miladin Popovic, Enver Hoxha began a civil war, with no reason other than to defend Yugoslav politics in Albania with blood. The document *qi zuni* then, in Berat, Balli Kombëtar, speaks very clearly!

Those who remember Balli's words and publications at that time should not be surprised that our predictions came true. But those who rushed against us for the sake of Tito and Stalin, let them read well the "*Voice of the People*", number 148. They will see that this issue of the communist newspaper is the clearest document to dismiss Enver Hoxha and his party on trial for high treason. This document puts the pride of communism in the rank of traitors to the Homeland. Today - and only today - cowardly communists condemn themselves worldly and want to condemn Yugoslavia unjustly!"<sup>76</sup>

The flag noted that even today the Albanian communists did not condemn Stalin for handing over the small Albania to Tito, "in order to swallow it as best he could". The communists said in the article that they were shouting against the "revisionism" of Belgrade, because communism and revisionism have more value in it than the present, freedom and independence of Albania. "They want to punish those who went off the road to Moscow, but not those who went astray!" a star on the forehead".

The newspaper concluded "Let the article *qi* we are reproducing be read literally and carefully, on the next page from" *Zeri i Popullit* ". Let us think deeply about the black fate of our small country, which every time *qi* has been ruled by dictatorship, so many times has suffered the shame of VUMJES PENG without the knowledge of the oppressed and ridiculed people!"<sup>77</sup>.

In early 1959 the Tirana government received information that the Yugoslavs had again intensified their actions in political emigration to Western countries. The Legation in Rome informed the MFA: "We learn that the Yugoslavs have recently increased their activity towards our treacherous emigration to Western countries. Yugoslav emissaries have been to

<sup>74</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, August 7, 1958, article "Enver Hoxha on trial for high heels"

<sup>75</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, August 7, 1958, article "Enver Hoxha on trial for high heels"

<sup>76</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, August 7, 1958, article "Enver Hoxha on trial for high heels"

<sup>77</sup> FLAMURI newspaper, August 7, 1958, article "Enver Hoxha on trial for high heels"



Belgium for this purpose. Such meetings are also thought to involve exponents of reactionary emigration to France and Italy. Their purpose is to coordinate the actions of the Albanian emigration in Yugoslavia with that found in the West.”<sup>78</sup>.

Among other factors, it was emphasized that the hostile attitude of Yugoslavia towards the Albanian government and the Socialist Camp had raised hopes among some emigrants for the start of a wider diversionary activity against the communist regime. But according to the information that the Albanian government had, recently from some leaders, in addition to the dissatisfaction they felt for the hostile attitude of the Yugoslavs against Albania, there was a preoccupation not to compromise with the Yugoslavs and they did not even look favorably on the Yugoslav plans "In the incorporation of Albania as a Republic of 7 Yugoslavs".

The Albanian Legation in Rome informed that the Agrarian Ballistas who "remove themselves as patriots" were more concerned about this. But even the Blocists, in line with the position of the Italian government, opposed the incorporation of Albania into the Yugoslav Federation. But the above-mentioned report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs added, "however, they still hope and congratulate the Yugoslav diversion against Albania, hoping that turmoil will be created and then they will benefit with the help of the West, which they trust will not allow Yugoslavia to realize own goals ie. to incorporate Albania”<sup>79</sup>.

The report said that the Italian secret services were closely following the interest and activity of Yugoslavia against Albania. These services, assisted by an element of the Independent Bloc, were aware of the concrete plans that the Yugoslav government had drawn up against all countries of "popular democracy". The Rome Legation stated that for Yugoslavia "Yugoslav revisionism" had drawn up a more concrete and advanced plan than those it had made for "other popular democracies" and the Soviet Union. This plan consisted of:

- The overthrow of the ALP leadership, through an active diversionary and propaganda work
- Replacing it with a leadership composed entirely of pro-Yugoslav elements, "of Kosovar Slavs and Trotskyists and Albanian emigrants"
- The unification of Kosovo with today's Albania and the Incorporation of "Greater Albania" with Yugoslavia as the 7th Federated Republic<sup>80</sup>.

According to the data of the Albanian government, the political-military direction for the implementation of this plan was Vukmanovic Tempo, while the operational direction and coordination of comprehensive actions was in the hands of a newly established special office at the Yugoslav Ministry of Defense called "Office of Albanian operations”.

To prepare for the diversionary activity, "a General Staff has been set up in Pristina, headed by UDB Colonel Cedo Mihovic, Goja Djuranovic, Vlado Popovic, General Dusan Mugosha, Hajrulla Ishmi and his wife Rada Zimjevic." This headquarters was said to have its sub-centers in Yugoslavia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija and Macedonia, which prepared, instructed and sent saboteurs to Albania for propaganda and diversion. To this end, the MFA stated that there were almost 88 elements and an even larger number in preparation<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>78</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Information of the Albanian Legation in Rome (prepared by Koço (Priest) sent by MFA, Rome, February 11, 1959

<sup>79</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>80</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>81</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

For the realization of this plan, all the necessary internal and external means would be used. Tito cadres for the party and state apparatus for Albania were already being prepared in Prishtina, where a special course was functioning with the participation of 900 "Kosovar Titoists" and 180 "communist" Albanian emigrants.

Regarding this plan, Legata thought that recently, the Yugoslavs had intensified their activity towards the Albanian emigration to the West and had set in motion for this purpose all their agency that they had in the ranks of the Albanian emigration. The aim was to coordinate their actions with those of the Albanian emigration to the West for their unification and, in the future, for the formation of a single committee "Free Albania", which would be under Yugoslav influence and under their leadership. The MFA saw as an example proving this goal the fact that the trade adviser, together with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy and the Yugoslav emissary from Belgrade to Rome, had expressed the desire to reach an agreement between the Albanian political emigration to Yugoslavia and that to the countries of the West. In the first place, this desire had been shown to the leaders of the B.I. in order, through them, to learn the reaction of the Italians as well. But the BI leaders, "according to the directives of the Italian government", had not accepted such a thing<sup>82</sup>.

The Albanian Legation also had information that the Yugoslav emissaries had traveled for this purpose and to Belgium, where they had made contact with the heads of the Albanian emigration. Dinen, Athanas Gega, Seit Kryeziu and Ibrahim Farka<sup>83</sup>.

The Legation, however, was unclear about this information. She asserted that her confession had been obtained through torture and that her confession had been obtained through torture. in order to serve the Italian government in order for it to properly assess the risk it poses to the "interests" of Italy itself<sup>84</sup>.

Meanwhile, the embassy in Belgrade informed that, from a conversation with the fugitive Ali Mic Sokoli, he had learned that recently a part of the Albanian emigration to Yugoslavia was going to the Western countries. Ali, among others, had said that there were 280 Albanian refugees from different places in the Gerova camp, who had recently started to leave for Western countries. He had proposed to Albanian diplomats to go to the Gerova camp and make propaganda among the fugitives to repatriate to Albania<sup>85</sup>.

The Albanian Legation in Belgrade visited the Gerova camp. A few days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs positively evaluated this action, emphasizing that "The initiative taken by you to visit the Gerova camp, the meetings and conversations you had there were good and fruitful". She instructed that in case the Yugoslavs did not allow diplomats to go to such camps, they should take care to consult with Tirana first, as they could protest and accuse the Albanian government of violating their rules<sup>86</sup>.

The information received by the Albanian Legation proved the extremely serious situation of the refugees in the Gerova camp. In May 1960, information from the Legation in Belgrade stated that in the Gerova camp, Zef Nikoll Miraka had hanged himself from ill-treatment and torture, Ali Rustemi from Hoti, and Hismet Sallkovic from Fier had attempted suicide. Adem Sadiku, former captain of the Albanian army, was thrown into the river to drown and barely escaped<sup>87</sup>. The Committee of Fugitives in Gerovo consisted of Qazim

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<sup>82</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>83</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>84</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>85</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 483/2, Information of Tahmaz (Single) for MFA, Belgrade, January 30, 1960

<sup>86</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 483/2, MFA Instructions for the RPSH Legation in Belgrade, Tirana, May 3, 1960

<sup>87</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 483/2, Information of Tahmaz (Single) for MFA, Belgrade, May 9, 1960

Bajraktari - chairman (from Luma), Isa Hoxha (from Malësija), Zef Kadrija (from Nikaj Mërturi), Mihal Bardyfi (from Korça), Ibrahim Nela (from Kolavaçiçi)<sup>88</sup>.

On May 24, Agim Gjakova joined the Albanian Legation after being released from the Gerova camp. He informed that from this camp the emigrants were leaving in groups to Italy and Austria. They took them near the border, ostensibly for work, and from there dumped them in Italy and Austria and spread the word that they had escaped. Fugitives from different parts of Kosovo and Macedonia were taken to Gerovo. In total there were about 400 people with the whole family<sup>89</sup>.

After 1960 the Yugoslavs together with the Soviets continued the attempts to penetrate the Albanian political emigration but the results were poor. Attempts to unite this emigration with P. the Elder failed. Of course, this was influenced not only by the strong pro-Western tendency of the vast majority of Albanian political emigration, but also by the influence of Western countries, which were wary of the agent and propaganda activity of the communist bloc.

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<sup>88</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 483/2, Information of Tahmaz (Single) for MFA, Belgrade, May 9, 1960

<sup>89</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 483/2, Tahmaz Information for MFA, Belgrade 25 May 1960

## CHAPTER VII

### CONFLICT BETWEEN POLITICAL IMMIGRATION AND THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN THE ALBANIAN DIASPORA (1954-1960)

The wrong policies of isolation and class and political division pursued by the communist regime against the diaspora influenced the influence of political emigration to grow and strengthen hand in hand in economic emigration.

#### 7.1. Confrontation in Albanian colonies in America

Particularly sharp was the confrontation between the regime's policy and political emigration in the Albanian colonies of America. Since the end of 1954, the tendency of political emigration to the Pan-Albanian Federation Vatra was approaching. Qerim Panariti wrote in an article in the newspaper "Dielli": "We must end the quarrels between us"<sup>1</sup>, and demanded the reconciliation of political immigrants with patriots, inside and outside the Hearth, in the US and elsewhere. But the majority of Vatra members forced him to publish in the newspaper Dielli the statement that Vatra did not support the fugitives Dervish Rexhepi, A. Këlcyra, H. Dosti, etc.

The cooling of Vatra's relations with the communist government, among other factors, was also influenced by the activity of anti-communist political emigration to the USA, which had a high cultural and political formation.<sup>2</sup> But scholar Hamit Kaba has argued that relations between Vatra and the Tirana government had cooled earlier and that for the regime the most preferred was not Vatra but the Free Albania organization.<sup>3</sup>

At the beginning of 1955, the relations between the Albanian representations showed that the war between the Albanian representation in Paris and the pro-elements on the one hand and the anti-communist elements on the other, within the ranks of "Vatra" was continuing fiercely. The Albanian representation reported to Tirana that "recently the war between the patriotic hearths and Q. Panariti has started to become more acute. This representation has sent letters to patriotic hearths such as Dervish Zurbos, Myslim Gosnishti, etc. where it has unmasked Qerim's slanders in the newspaper "Dielli" and his hostile attitude to separate the hearths from the Republic of Albania. This representation was also used by Albanians from the Paris colony who wrote letters to "Vatrë" against the writings of "Diellit". Especially the letter that was sent to the Commission of "Vatra" which was read before the assembly, was said to have given courage to the healthy elements of Vatra who have started to fight Qerim"<sup>4</sup>. So from this information, it seems open the intervention of the communist government in the organization Vatra and the perfidious methods that it used to keep under control this great organization of Albanian emigration.

It was also claimed that, on the occasion of the holidays of November 28-29, the branch of "Vatra" in New York City had organized an evening in which Selim Zverku, Kristo

<sup>1</sup> Dielli Newspaper, December 15, 1954

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Peters, Characteristics, contributions and responsibilities of Albanian-Americans, at the International Seminar of the Pan-Albanian Federation "VATRA", New York, 28-30 November 1969, p. 89.

<sup>3</sup> Hamit Kaba, "Vatra" during the Second World War and the Cold War, in the summary of the acts of international conferences on the topic: The role of the Albanian Diaspora in state formation, Prishtina 2012, p. 147-148.

<sup>4</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, p. 25, Report on the Albanian colonies by Sh. Totozani, Vatra Society, Paris, January 20, 1955

Stavro and Dhimostren Nika spoke, who noted the "successes" of RPSH in these 10 years and criticized Q. Panartiti for "the slander he writes against Albania"<sup>5</sup>.

In 1955 in the ranks of the Pan-Albanian Vatra Federation of the USA, it seemed that the situation was still in a fragile balance between the two currents: the pro-communist and the anti-communist. In the 39th Assembly of Vatra, which was held on July 2 of this year, Noli was elected as honorary president, Georgis Speros, honorary vice president, Elija Michel, president, Adem Vishocica, vice president, Qerim Panariti, secretary of "Vatra" and editor of "Diellit"<sup>6</sup>.

In the first quarter of 1956 the communist government felt that its position in the Albanian colony in America was improving. The activity of the organization "Free Albania" was increasing in favor of the regime. The attitude of the newspaper "Liria" towards the government of Tirana had "taken a better path from the past" and had moved away from the practice of the past when it spread only religious news<sup>7</sup>.

But the situation with Vatra was different. Ulvi Lulo informed that "with the leadership of" Vatra "we have no correspondence and it is impossible to do, as long as it is led by the enemy of the people Qerim Panariti". He even indicated that he had started the diversion against Vatra: "Prompted by us, the society of Perth (Australia) wrote a letter to the leadership of" Vatra ", where he hit the writings and the position of Q. Panariti"<sup>8</sup>.

The mission informed that the "patriotic Albanians", ie pro-communists, of the colony were under various pressures from the FBI, while the Albanians who are communists are constantly persecuted by the FBI, which has made red marks on the doors of houses to be recognized by all people"<sup>9</sup>.

However, the regime apparently had a success when it spurred efforts to unite Vatra and Free Albania during 1956. The aim of this movement was to strike at the positions of anti-communist elements within Vatra and to create a majority of pro-communist elements. According to the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the controversy over the unification of "Vatra" with the organization "Free Albania" continued until in the XV assembly of "Free Albania" it was decided that the newspaper "Freedom" does not continue to propagate this goal, but to was devoted to other important problems. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that the newspaper "Dielli" be supplied with illustrated articles on "the successes of our people in all areas of life" and that these articles be sent to the members of the leadership of the organization "Fire"<sup>10</sup>.

The regime tried to engage Noli again in the battle with opponents in the Vatra Federation. Jonuz Mersini, in a conversation with Jim Vison, learned from him that on April 2, 1957 he was traveling to New York Fan Noli. Jim also arranged to arrange a meeting with the missionary people in the church. J Mersini intended to discuss these three issues with Noli: Vatra and Diellit's attitude towards the Tirana government; on the reactions of "reactionary emigration" to enter the Albanian colonies; on the efforts of the northern Epirotes to take over the Albanian churches<sup>11</sup>.

To lure F. Noli to its side, the communist government intended to seduce him materially. Nesti Nase instructed Jonuz Mersini that, "in the meeting with Fan Noli, say that we are ready

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<sup>5</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, p. 25, Report on the Albanian colonies by Sh. Totozani, Vatra Society, Paris, January 20, 1955

<sup>6</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, MFA report on the situation of the colonies - Albanian Colony USA

<sup>7</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 384, Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prepared by Ulvi Lulo on the situation of the colonies in the first quarter of 1956, March 31, 1956

<sup>8</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 384, Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prepared by U Lulo on the situation of the colonies in the first quarter of 1956, March 31, 1956

<sup>9</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 389, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN sent to the MFA, New York, August 30, 1959

<sup>10</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 382, MFA study on Albanian colonies (undated)

<sup>11</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 461, Jonuz Mersini for B. Shtyllën, March 25, 1957

to buy F. Konica's manuscripts and his, as well as to pay for the translations he has made and can do for Albanian publishing companies. Thus, not to have material preoccupation and not to be tainted in old age"<sup>12</sup>. He instructed you not to talk to him about other matters.

Even during 1957, the newspaper "Liria" continued to hold a pro-communist stance. In previous articles of the newspaper, according to the Albanian Mission in New York, some "principal mistakes" were made, such as the repeated publication of the expression "We have nothing to do with the government, because governments come and go, we are dealing with the Albanian people", or, in another article where the newspaper had asked Radio Tirana, "to stop the anti-American propaganda"<sup>13</sup>.

For these mistakes, the Mission had drawn the attention of its editor and these "mistakes" claimed that they would not be repeated<sup>14</sup>.

According to the Mission, there was a change in the attitude of the newspaper "Dielli", which previously held positions against us (communist regime), but also against criminals, but now it has become impartial and its pages are published in various forms. ballistas' writings"<sup>15</sup>. The Mission also informed that some members of "Vatra" had put pressure on Qerim Panariti for his stance against the communist government, but had no result<sup>16</sup>.

In an effort to achieve the objectives of the regime against the Albanian emigration to America and, in this context also those against the political emigration, the meeting of the Diplomatic Representative of Albania in New York, Jonuz Mersini with Fan Noli was realized<sup>17</sup>. Noli asked the Albanian government to bring to America a bishop and two or three good priests to replace him after his death as there was a risk that KOASH would fall into the hands of the Greeks. He presented two options for resolving this issue:

1. He Church of America made a request to the US Government for this purpose, but this request could hardly be accepted by the State Department.
2. Two or three priests and 1 bishop should be sent from Albania to visit the USA and they should seek political asylum.

The Albanian mission categorically opposed the acceptance of this request <sup>18</sup>.

In the autumn of 1958 it seems that the regime achieved little success in the direction of Vatra. The assembly of "Vatra" that took place in September, removed Qerim Panariti as editor of "Diellit" and replaced him with Petro Prifti<sup>19</sup>.

But it soon became clear that this success was temporary, as something even more undesirable for the communist regime was being prepared. The UN mission was informed that at the last meeting of the Assembly of "Vatra" it was decided that the organization "Vatra" could also accept fugitives, with the exception of 20 people who were not included in the amnesty announced by the government of Tirana<sup>20</sup>.

After a few weeks the regime reacted quickly to hit the opponents inside the Hearth. The MFA instructed the Mission to the UN: "Take advantage of the moment of quarrel between Peter Priest and Qerim Panariti and, with the good element, deepen the rift between them to strike and eliminate the latter"<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 461, Nesti Nase Instructions for Jonuz Mersin, March 28, 1957

<sup>13</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 461, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN for the MFA, New York, June 30, 1957

<sup>14</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 461, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN for the MFA, New York, June 30, 1957

<sup>15</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 461, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN for the MFA, New York, June 30, 1957

<sup>16</sup> AMPJ, 1957, file 461, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN for the MFA, New York, June 30, 1957

<sup>17</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 497, Information of Jonuz Mersin for MFA, New York, June 10, 1958

<sup>18</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 497, Information of Jonuz Mersin for MFA, New York, June 10, 1958

<sup>19</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 496, Reis Maliles Information for the MFA, New York, September 8, 1958

<sup>20</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 496, Reis Maliles Information for the MFA, New York, September 8, 1958

<sup>21</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 496, Vasil Nathanail's Guidelines for the New York Mission, Tirana, November 13, 1958

Foreign Minister Behar Shtylla also instructed that Halimi (Buda) or Dhori, through Dhimitr (Trebecka), tell Peter Prifti that he was also responsible for Qerim's writings as the editor of "Diellit". He had to take a stand and wait for the "enemy elements" otherwise we would take a stand against him"<sup>22</sup>.

Thus, at the behest of the Mission, Trebecka invited Peter Priest to lunch. He told her that he did not agree with Qerimi's articles in the newspaper "Dielli", but for now, as long as Qerimi is in charge, he has nothing to do. He told him that when he takes over the responsibility of the newspaper after two months, "Dielli" will change direction"<sup>23</sup>.

Regjimi vijonte të mbante nën vëzhgim edhe organizatën "Shqipëria e Lirë". Misioni në The UN reported that there had been some disruption in the organization's leadership recently. At the last meeting Jim Viso, followed by Asllan Dragoti, had demanded a revision of the position of the newspaper "Liria", so that it does not speak so openly in favor of the government of Tirana, because this could cause the closure of the newspaper by the US government<sup>24</sup>. According to the Mission, "Liria" had done nothing but inform "on the truth in our country" and expressed the desire for good relations between Albania and America. Therefore, she thought that the claims of Jim Viso and his comrades should have been inspired by other factors, such as fear of the country's authorities, contacts they might have with shaky elements or "enemies"<sup>25</sup>.

Mission in New York announced that the "Fire" Organization, led by Q. Panariti, Kristo Thanasi, Koli Koblara, Sadik Papallashi, Muhamet Zagari, etc. who, encouraged by Fan Noli's silence, had launched a campaign against the communist regime. The mission claimed that some members of "Vatra", with some influence who do not approve of this position, such as Shefqet Bença, Musa Hajro, etc. had withdrawn from this organization and now remained indifferent, but did not have the courage to raise their voice and change the orientation of "Hearth". According to the Mission, "the mass of the hearths, in a good part of it, did not approve of this attitude of the" Hearth "but the bad thing is that it remains passive". He also informed that the new generation is one hundred percent inactive and indifferent, both to "Vatrë" and to the organization "Free Albania" and very few young Albanians find themselves speaking Albanian. The church has done some work with the Albanian youth, but only in the religious issue"<sup>26</sup>.

At this time even the Albanian-American youth organization did not have any patriotic activity. Albanian economic emigration in a very large percentage was said to be indifferent to patriotic and social life. "In most of the emigration," wrote the Mission, the micro-bourgeois mentality of ever-increasing profits was deeply ingrained. Their brains only work for the dollar"<sup>27</sup>.

At this time, the fact was underlined that "Dielli" recently published several chronicles without comment on Albania. The Paris Legation thought that "this makes the patriots not leave the" Fire "" But on the other hand Dielli described the foreign policy of the Tirana government as a copy of that of the Soviet B. imposed by Moscow<sup>28</sup>.

In 1958 Tirana propaganda seems to have taken a step forward in the US. Albanian diplomats thought that broadcasting shows in Albanian had been a success. They were received with great interest by Albanians<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 496, Behar Pillar Mission Guidelines in New York, Tirana, November 22, 1958

<sup>23</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 496, Reis Malile's Notice to the MFA, New York, 6 December 1958

<sup>24</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 498, Report on Albanian emigration to America

<sup>25</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 498, Report on Albanian emigration to America

<sup>26</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 498, Report on Albanian emigration to America

<sup>27</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 498, Report on Albanian emigration to America

<sup>28</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 495, Report of the Albanian Embassy in Paris on the situation of Albanian emigration in France, Argentina, America, Australia during the first 6 months of 1958

<sup>29</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 498, Report on Albanian emigration to America

In the summer of 1959, the Albanian Mission in New York, which closely followed political and economic emigration, informed his superiors in Tirana that from all the data he had collected, it turned out that Qerim Panariti had Noli's support in the ranks of Vatra<sup>30</sup>.

The mission also reported a negative trend in economic emigration. As a result of internal quarrels, the essence of which was already the confrontation between pro-communist and anti-communist elements, the participation in the organization "Free Albania" and "Fire" was very small, in relation to the number of the colony. This came mainly from quarrels between two organizations, one supporting the regime and the other turning into its opponents.

This crisis and political war, seems to have been one of the factors, which had paralyzed the patriotic activities of the colony. The mission informed that Albanian youth in the US held an indifferent attitude towards patriotic issues and that there was no Albanian school. The Albanian colony had bought a building in New York and established the "Albanian Center". For some time, this had played its part, but now, as a result of quarrels, it was paralyzed<sup>31</sup>.

The regime continued to fund the pro-communist organization "Free Albania", led by Dhimitër Trebicka. There was a coordinated co-operation between regime officials and Trebicka, and each aimed to achieve its own goals. While the regime intended to use him for its propaganda against political immigration, Trebicka aimed to gain material and political support from the regime as well as his support in the rivalry with the powerful Hearth. At this time Trebicka demanded the following from the Albanian government:

- That she and her Mission work to attract as many members as possible from "Vatra" and join the organization "Free Albania". Thus, according to him, "Vatra" would either go bankrupt or be forced to change its position. The mission told Trebicka that the Albanian government would not like the destruction of "Vatra", "but that it would remove the reactionary elements from its bosom".
- That the Albanian Mission did not receive Qerim Panariti in the meeting.
- Demanded that the organization "Free Albania", the communist government give a secret fund of \$ 5,000 for 2-3 years. The mission refused to give him money, but promised to supply him with dictionaries, books, discs, movies, etc. of which they would have economic benefits<sup>32</sup>. In August 1959, the UN Mission informed that all the data showed that Qerim Panariti had Noli's support. The participation in the organization "Free Albania" and "Fire" was very small in relation to the number of the colony and this as a result of quarrels between the two organizations. Albanian youth in America held an indifferent attitude to patriotic issues. There was no Albanian school. The Albanian colony had bought a building in New York and established the "Albanian Center". For some time this had played its part, but already as a result of quarrels it was paralyzed<sup>33</sup>.

Mission collaborator Trebicka asked him to work in order to attract as many members as possible from "Vatra" and join the organization "Free Albania". "Thus, Vatra will either go bankrupt or will be forced to change its position," he said. Mission officials told them that we would like the "Fire" not to be destroyed, but that it would erase the reactionary elements from its bosom<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN sent to the MFA, New York, 30 August 1959

<sup>31</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN sent to the MFA, New York, 30 August 1959

<sup>32</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report of the Albanian Mission to the UN sent to the MFA, New York, 30 August 1959

<sup>33</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report on MFA by the Albanian Mission to the UN, New York, 30 August 1959

<sup>34</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report on MFA by the Albanian Mission to the UN, New York, 30 August 1959



Trebicka also asked the Mission not to accept Qerim Panarit in the meeting and to give the organization "Free Albania" a secret fund of \$ 5,000 for 2-3 years. Regime diplomats refused to give him money, but promised him dictionaries, books, records, movies, etc. of which there would be economic benefits<sup>35</sup>.

The mission informed that various pressures were being exerted on the patriotic Albanians of the colony by the FBI, "while the Albanians who are communists are constantly followed by the FBI, which has made red marks on the doors of houses to be recognized by all the people"<sup>36</sup>.

It is clear that in January 1959 the Albanian Mission to the UN was intensively committed to disrupting Vatra. Reis Malile informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the arrests in the leadership of "Vatra" are continuing and increasing. We have instructed Trebicka to work on deepening them. A part of the (editorial office) of "Diellit" have risen against Qerim. Leo Meksi resigned as a member of the council of "Vatrë"<sup>37</sup>.

The regime did not even ignore the now deceased Kosta Çekrez. Reis Malile informed the MFA that "after Çekrez's death, the opinion here is that Çekrez was a patriot. "Freedom" will write an article in this spirit. We talked to Trebicka not to exaggerate, that he was an agent of the Americans"<sup>38</sup>.

But the regime's small successes in the Albanian diaspora were undermined by its own isolationist policies. In this regard, the ban on Albanians visiting their families in Albania in 1959 had the greatest impact. To reflect this phenomenon, it is worth referring to a letter from Dhimitër Trebicka sent to Reiz Maliles. Trebicka was the closest man and the main collaborator of the communist regime in the American diaspora. He wrote in despair to R Malile that, during his visits to the Albanian colonies in the USA and mainly in Boston, "I am watching the Albanians despair very much towards the People's Republic of Albania. Not only those who have decided to come to Albania, but also their friends and Albanians in general. Wherever we go, whoever we unite, we hear criticism. Phone calls are made to our office every day with complaints and despair. The day before yesterday I had phone calls from Canada as well, and they were desperate"<sup>39</sup>.

Earlier, the government of Tirana had authorized Trebicka and also announced that it would allow Albanian Albanians to visit their homeland but, after a while, withdrew from this position. Thus the authority and image of Trebicka, as president of the society Albania Free was severely compromised and, on the other hand, the influence of political emigration was growing. He wrote to Malile that "if the permits are not sent to them this month or in May, the fear is that the ranks of the ballistas and Qerim Panariti with friends will be greatly strengthened and our side will be hit so hard that it will not raise its head. never. In fact, even our loyal friends are very disappointed with the delay of the permits and, if they do not come at all, then, not only the Albanians who will leave and lose faith but also the great work that was done during in recent years in favor of the Republic will disappear altogether. The fault lies with Tirana. When he intended that he would not give the permits, why did he send the applications to the Albanians and tell them in the application that "when do you intend to leave?"<sup>40</sup>. Trebicka wrote that people had made preparations and did not know the reasons for Albania's policy with America, therefore, he thought that in this case the Albanians were being done a great injustice and a strong weapon was being given to the enemies and opponents to strike, both the communist regime and its collaborators in the US, DH. Trebicka

<sup>35</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report on MFA by the Albanian Mission to the UN, New York, 30 August 1959

<sup>36</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 389, Report on MFA by the Albanian Mission to the UN, New York, 30 August 1959

<sup>37</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Information of Reis Maliles for MFA, 19 January 1959

<sup>38</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Reis Malile for MFA, 21 January 1959

<sup>39</sup> Telegram of Dhimitër Trebicka sent to Reiz Maliles, Boston, Mass. April 8, 1959

<sup>40</sup> Telegram of Dhimitër Trebicka sent to Reiz Maliles, Boston, Mass. April 8, 1959

and his friends in the organization Free Albania. He wrote: "You put Dhimitr in the mud with this issue. Here you will bring it out, sending the permits to the Albanians, here you will sink it even more in the mud, by not sending them. At that time, "Liria" did not appear in front of the Albanians, as he had published many articles and speeches on the Radio for months to influence the Albanians to visit Albania. Time is running. In order to speed up this issue, some statements have to be made through Radio Tirana, in favor of the permits or against. Albanians want to know what Tirana will do about the permits. Silence does not help at all. Give light to the Albanians on what Tirana will do about the permits of the Albanians of America"<sup>41</sup>.

At the same time, the UN Mission forwarded to Tirana concrete data on the situation of Albanian emigration to America<sup>42</sup>. According to Professor J.S. Roucek who was based more on the data collected by "Vatra" because there was no official data, the number of Albanians in the US in 1952 was 50-60 000 people, this included both those who had come from Albania and those who were born in the US. More than 5,000 minorities were to be included in this number. A considerable number of Albanians were repatriated in the period 1920-1939. Illiteracy had dropped from 80% in 1900 to 15% in 1952. Albanians were known in America as hardworking and honest people who did not get involved in various thefts and crimes. On December 27-28, 1941, "Free Albania" was created by K. Çekrezi, for whom the Mission emphasized that "it created this organization for its selfish interests". With the liberation of Albania, it was said that this organization "took on a progressive character"<sup>43</sup>.

As for Vatra, it was said that when America went to war, it "changed its position and took the side of the fight against fascism and our NÇ war." It was pointed out that "Vatra" had 50 branches in different cities of the USA and that in the statute of "Vatra", two reactionary clauses were introduced":

- "Vatra" should not have relations with those countries with which the US did not have diplomatic relations, i.e. should not have anything to do with Albania.
- The clause introduced in the statute by the assembly of September 1958, according to which all the sons of the Albanian race could be accepted in the organization "Vatra", so the doors of the fugitives were opened"<sup>44</sup>.

The mission reported that contradictions had erupted between Qerim and Peter Priest. Peter Prifti had said that he would not allow "Dielli" to become an "anti-Albanian" newspaper. "In his writings so far," said Reiz Malile, "Peter has not taken a stand against us. He has his people in Albania and is the cousin of our minister in Italy, Koço Prifti. The possibility that this is the man chosen by the Americans is not ruled out, but the fact that the American agent Qerim Panariti fights hard, weakens our suspicions"<sup>45</sup>.

The newspaper "Dielli" at this time was published in 800 copies. For several years, the controversy between "Vatra" and "Free Albania" had become rarer. Previously, "Vatra" was said to have had connections with the Albanian delegations that had gone to America, while now, the leaders of "Vatra" had no connection with the UN Mission.

The mission informed that, officially, "Vatra" and "Dielli" had no connection with the "reactionary" immigration organizations. Earlier she had held attitude towards them. "But now this attitude has changed, not only because there is no difference between the propaganda of the two sides, but also because a number of hearths have become brothers with the Ballists and Zogists, especially in Detroit and New York."

<sup>41</sup> Telegram of Dhimitër Trebicka sent to Reiz Maliles, Boston, Mass. April 8, 1959

<sup>42</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>43</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>44</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>45</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

The mission proposed: "We must strike Qerim Panariti with convincing arguments, but also put strong and well-organized pressure on Fan Noli, Kristo Thanasi, Grigor Spiro, Qemal Vejseli, Kamber and Faslli Panariti and other members of the leadership of organization.

Another proposal was that the inactive elements inside and outside the "Fireplace", such as Shefqet Bença, etc., should be brought as close as possible. that, according to the Mission, they had a duty not to let the organization continue like this.

The mission thought that, given the contradictions that now existed in "Vatra", it was possible that Q. Panariti could withdraw. This could be achieved, if a work was done combined with contacts with the hearths and with strikes at the policy of Qerim Panariti through the press from Tirana. With such work, some hearths could be convinced that the current policy of accepting the ballistae, not maintaining ties with Albania, supporting the official American policy for the liberation of Albania, and inciting the rebellion of the Albanian people, was treason. . The mission suggested that Qerim Panariti's disagreements with the new editor should be used to the maximum, supporting, for the time being, the latter<sup>46</sup>. As for the Albanians of America as a whole, the Mission found that they had not taken any stand against the communist government, such as organizing demonstrations, etc. as had happened with the colonies of other socialist countries.

It was emphasized that Radio Tirana, especially since August 1956, had become the main means of propaganda of the regime in this colony, because it was well heard in the USA.<sup>47</sup>.

The Mission also claimed that tourists who had visited Albania during 1958 had done a very effective job in the colony, generally they had spoken well of the communist government<sup>48</sup>.

During this period, both the SACC and the Paris Committee paid special attention to economic emigration, especially to the United States. For this purpose, KSHL in 1957 had formed the Albanian-American cultural association to bring together the Albanians of America and the Albanians of other countries and then to throw them "in the lap of the Committee"<sup>49</sup>.

Legata e Romës kishte informacione se ata po mundoheshin të shtinin në dorë dhe the organization "Vatra", at first to be introduced as a member and, later, to take over the leadership of this organization. In this regard they had had some success. Recently, "Vatra" had opened its gates and, despite the resistance it had, had begun to accept members and from the ranks of traitors"<sup>50</sup>.

Thus in 1960, the communist regime's policy toward political and economic immigration to the United States suffered a severe blow. The Vatra Federation opened its doors to every Albanian, including political emigrants. The communist government reacted strongly. At its instigation, the call was published: Away from the ballistic "Hearth" of the traitors of the homeland, the patriotic hearth or the hearth of the traitors of Albania.

In it was initially made a brief history of the Hearth. It was said that the patriotic society "Vatra" of Albanian economic emigrants in the United States of America was founded on April 28, 1912, when the 13th Albanian patriotic societies in the United States of America merged into a single organization called "Vatra" federation with a single statute. The

<sup>46</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>47</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>48</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 522, Report on the Albanian colony in America, New York, January 22, 1959

<sup>49</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

<sup>50</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the situation and activity of emigration "Albanian traitor" during 1958 to February 1959, February 13, 1959

newspaper "Dielli" that has been published since 1909 by the company "Besa Besa" became an organ of "Vatra". The patriotic society "Vatra" became an important center where Albanian patriots in the United States of America, gathered to gather on the news from their beloved homeland and how to work to fulfill their duties to mother Albania. It plays an important role in awakening the national feeling against Turkish rule, in keeping alive the spirit of patriotism, patriotism and in strengthening the ties of the Albanians of America with the motherland. "Vatra" has tried to educate the younger generation to keep alive our beautiful national traditions and customs. She has fought bravely against the enemies of Albania.

The organ of the patriotic society "Vatra", the newspaper "Dielli" in different periods has been a fighting organ, which has rightly reflected the heroic struggle of the Albanian people for freedom and independence. The newspaper "Dielli" has written about the improvement of working and living conditions of the Albanian working class, has unreservedly supported the struggle of the Albanian peasantry to seize the lands of the landowners and to divide this land without any reward. In the pages of "Diellit" we find the right attitudes of "Vatra" and its leaders against criminals and enemies of the Albanian people, collaborators of Italian fascists and German Nazis.

This complaint, which, of course, corresponded to the truth, was made by the regime in order to oppose this experience and tardiness of Vatra's new attitude which, as it was a danger to the regime, the government of Tirana denounced as a danger to the homeland.

The call further stated that in recent years, the organ of the society "Vatra", the newspaper "Dielli", under the leadership of the traitor of the Albanian people Qerim Panariti, is being used for anti-Albanian purposes. The bitterness poured on the organ of "Vatrë" in the newspaper "Dielli" against Albania and the Albanian people, is the same as that of criminals. In the pages of "Diellit" for a long time, the criminals themselves have started to write. In the pillars of the "Sun" is deliberately slandered against the reality that exists today in Albania, the Albanian people are offended, honest Albanians in the United States of America are threatened for their love and ties with their beloved motherland. Today there is no difference between the newspaper "Dielli" and the leaflets issued by Albanian criminals on the run. They resemble each other like two drops of water"<sup>51</sup>.

It was underlined that recently "Vatra" had slipped out of its way. "At the head of society, for known reasons, took positions of responsibility to one of the non-patriotic Albanians living in the United States of America. "These people from Paralina, supported and pushed by foreigners, led the society" Vatra ", against the interests of the homeland and the Albanian people". It was pointed out that two years ago, on September 24, 1958, the assembly of the society "Vatra", in which most of the delegates were elected with the direct encouragement of these people, decided to accept as a member in this organization the traitors and the criminals of the Albanian people ", those who together with the occupiers had killed and cut our people and" burned and destroyed the beautiful cities and villages of our dear homeland ".

According to the communist regime, with this decision, "Vatra" definitively closed its doors to honest Albanians and patriots in the United States of America. Honest Albanians and patriots can not accept in any way that "Vatra", from a patriotic hearth, turns into a hearth of fire, intrigue, provocation and conspiracy, against their brothers who gave their lives for this free, sovereign and lady that we enjoy and build today. They can never accept to sit in a hall with traitors and criminals of the Albanian people who killed their brothers, who dishonored their sisters, who threw and burned in the fire of the houses they burned together with the occupiers, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. of their own, and who sold their homeland

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<sup>51</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536; Call chanted by the communist government: Away from the ballistic "hearth" of traitors of the homeland, patriotic hearth or hearth of traitors of Albania

to foreigners. Behind the true and patriotic homeland, is the whole Albanian people, are the 28,000 martyrs who fell in the field of honor for the liberation of the homeland and the Albanian people, are all the Albanians of other colonies in different countries of the world.

After ending this distorted and hypocritical presentation of the truth about World War II and the situation under communist rule in Albania, the call drafted by the Tirana government tried to present the expansion of Vatra as an event that had severely affected the feelings of the people. Albanian. It said: "The dead end road on which the organization" Vatra "was going and its organ the newspaper" Dielli "have long rightly hurt the hearts of the Albanian people and the Albanians of other colonies abroad. In many cases, they have called and advised that "Vatra" and the newspaper "Dielli" return to the right path, as required by the interests of the homeland and the Albanian people. But despite all this, as well as despite the efforts made by honest Albanians and patriots in the United States of America, despite their statements, their departure from the organization, the leaders, not only do not give up, but on the contrary "They did their best to hand over this previously patriotic organization to the Albanian war criminals to use for their anti-Albanian purposes". Even as evidence for this accusation, the communist government considered the seminar recently organized by "Vatra" where, among other things, spoke the enemies of the Albanian people such as the fugitive criminal Arshi Pipa, who left nothing unsaid against the popular power of the Albanian people". The seminar itself, according to her, was a tribune in the hands of the enemies of the Albanian people against him and the People's Republic of Albania.

The communist government had decided to fundamentally divide Vatra and possibly destroy it completely, only to invalidate the influence that Albanian anti-communist political emigrants had gained upon entering it. The call continued: "Taking into account the situation created in the society" Vatra "and, becoming interpreters of the feelings of the Albanian people, we call on all patriotic and honest Albanians in the United States of America to leave Vatra "Of treacherous ballistas to preserve their honor and dignity. Today the question arises: o with the "Hearth" of betrayal, or outside it and patriot. Honest Albanians and patriots in the United States of America, who have participated in "Fire" will know how to find ways to continue their patriotic work for the benefit of the homeland and the Albanian people, to preserve the historical traditions of our people and to fight against the traitors and criminals of Albania. We are sure that in this Hearth can not give his name Fan Noli and other honest people who have been part of the society "Hearth"<sup>52</sup>.

In conclusion, the communist government tried to embellish the reality in Albania and its extreme policy of class war, which was the only cause of disunity of the entire Albanian people and, in this context, of the Albanian diaspora. She wrote: "Albanians everywhere today are proud of their free and sovereign homeland, whose authority is stronger than ever and whose voice is heard by all progressive humanity. The long and fearless struggle of our people for their freedom and independence is respected everywhere, and has become a great example of heroism and dignity for other oppressed and suffering peoples. In today's Albania, the dreams and desires of our ancestors who fought for an Albania of the people and for the people found their expression and realization."<sup>53</sup>.

Në këtë situatë aspak të favorshme për politikën e regjimit në diasporë, zyrtarët the communists also had suspicions about Fan Noli who had generally maintained a friendly attitude towards the Tirana government, although he already stood somewhat distanced from his openly supportive attitudes in the years 1945-1948. In this regard, a report of the Albanian

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<sup>52</sup> AMPJ, 1960, file 536; Call chanted by the communist government: Away from the ballistic "hearth" of traitors of the homeland, patriotic hearth or hearth of traitors of Albania

<sup>53</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536; Call chanted by the communist government: Away from the ballistic "hearth" of traitors of the homeland, patriotic hearth or hearth of traitors of Albania

Mission to the UN in June 1960 is very interesting.<sup>54</sup> To spy on Noli in early June, Dhimitër Trebicka paid a visit to the Mission. Albanian diplomats at the UN talked about strengthening the work of the "Free Albania" Organization and its newspaper "Freedom". Among other things, Demetrius informed him of a speech that Fan Noli had given at the Church of St. George in Boston, on the occasion of Easter, in April 1960. The talk was entirely religious in nature, and Noli delivered it in both languages. , in Albanian and then spoke in English, in order to give young people a chance to understand it well.

Speaking about religion as a whole, Noli had said briefly that "the condition of the churches in the places behind the Iron Curtain is miserable." According to Trebicka, who was present throughout the speech, Noli repeated the words "iron curtain" 4-5 times in a row, without going into political details.

Reis Malile informed that, from the meetings he had with the Albanians in New York, their opinion about Fan Noli was divided, some speak well of him and claimed that "in general, he saw with sympathy our power and the deeds he has possible to strengthen Albania ", some others spoke ill of him and accused him of being primarily responsible for the "hostile path "of" Vatra ". There were also a very small number who described him as an "enemy" and as a major factor in dividing the Albanians of America. Malile described these people as rare extremists who, from time to time, not only spoke openly against Noli, but insisted that he be unmasked "even from Tirana", hitting him in the press and on Radio Tirana. The main one in this case was Asllan Dragoti. Malile claimed that such persons, the Mission had advised them to be more prudent, to cease the open wars that led to disunity, and to discuss every fact about Fan Noli reasonably and with a fair critique to be able to activate him in the patriotic movement of Albanians in the US.

But for his part, Malile reported that, "In fact, Fan Noli's position is not very clear. Except for the case mentioned above, so far we have not heard that he has held any openly hostile attitude towards us. Twice we have been given the opportunity to meet him, in general he has expressed himself amicably, and has justified his non-activation with old age and the police regime that exists here. But there are other moments when he comes out responsible for the attitude of "Vatra" towards us. Fan Noli is not completely pure, because he is its honorary president and his word weighs a lot, if he influenced the Presidency of "Vatra" there is a possibility that this will stop its hostile activity against us. It should be noted that at a dinner organized by "Vatra" a few months ago, Noli was in charge of dinner at a table with the criminal Dervish Rexhepi. This had made a great impression on the Albanians and they, rightly, expressed their great dissatisfaction with this attitude of Noli. We advised them that Noli's very negative attitude should be pointed out to him on various occasions when he would meet with them or in letters"<sup>55</sup>.

*Malile informed that in any case when Noli came to New York, he would meet with him and discuss in detail the issue of his activation in the colony. In the meantime, he would follow his activity and inform the MFA about everything<sup>56</sup>.*

*The communist regime also prompted the War Veterans Committee to issue a call to Albanian-American members of the Vatra Federation.*

*This call stood out for its even more pathetic and aggressive tone than the previous call. After repeating the same arguments for the alleged deviation of Vatra from the right path, the call continued: "Albanian brothers! We know well the efforts that the patriotic hearths have made and are making to save the "Hearth" and the "Sun" from*

<sup>54</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536; Information of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the UN, (prepared by Reis Malile) no. 66 secrets sent to the MFA; New York, June 6, 1960, On a speech by Fan Noli

<sup>55</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536; Information of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the UN, (prepared by Reis Malile) no. 66 secrets sent to the MFA; New York, June 6, 1960, On a speech by Fan Noli

<sup>56</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536; Information of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the UN, (prepared by Reis Malile) no. 66 secrets sent to the MFA; New York, June 6, 1960, On a speech by Fan Noli

*shame and betrayal, to put them on the right path of the nation and the people, as the patriotic Albanians of America love. Even the voice of the motherland has been raised more than once to advise those who have responsibilities in the affairs of "Vatra" and the newspaper "Dielli" to get out of the wrong way and be put on the right path. But even your noble efforts and the voice of the homeland were not taken into account by the group that took power in the "Hearth" and the "Sun" and that never in the national movement of the colony were distinguished for patriotic attitude. They have denied the milk of mother Albania, they have been sold to foreigners, they have become Jews and they kissed those who killed and burned the homeland, who dream again, with foreign weapons to come and destroy our beautiful and inviolable Albania, you they throw the rope to the Albanian people again. This will never happen. The rope in the throat will be thrown to the traitors, the shame and curse of the people and the homeland will follow the traitors for life.*

*Now the cup is full.*

*Hearths of patriots!*

The time has come to decide once and for all: either "Vatra" will become a truly patriotic Albanian organization, as you love it and as the Albanian people love it, and will immediately expel all war criminals from its ranks. , the Ballisto-Zogist traitors and foreign agents who entered it, or it ended up as an Albanian organization in the American colony. If in the Assembly of September 1961, "Vatra" is not cleaned and is not put on the right path, then it should be hit and punished as a treacherous organization. We call on you: no patriotic hearth to give its name and help to this organization. Get away from the Vatra organization. Put her "Sun" leaf in the basket. O with Albania and the Albanian people, o with "Vatra" and betrayal. Continue your heroic fight against criminals and traitors, for the honor of the homeland and the patriotic traditions of the past. Strengthen your ranks, strengthen your patriotic organizations"<sup>57</sup>.

It was at this time that the regime changed its attitude towards Albanians seeking to visit Albania, allowing relatively more of these visits. The Albanian colonies in America and Canada came to life after the measure was taken to allow Albanians to go as tourists to Albania. This had driven the colony closer to the regime and its "successes." Legata informed that "this fact also made emigration closer to us and the organization" Free Albania"<sup>58</sup>.

Meanwhile, "Vatra" continued to maintain its previous position. The Paris Legation informed that "no sound position" was created to change the direction that this society currently had. "Legata informed that" Vatra ", with various justifications, but that reflected its attitude towards the communist government, did not send its representatives to Albania, based on the invitation made to you by the Committee for Cultural Relations with the Foreign World". It was also underlined that both the newspaper "Lirija" and "Dielli" had taken a good stance regarding the Greek chauvinist propaganda against our country and had hit the northern Epirus agitators who were trying to do hostile work in this colony"<sup>59</sup>.

Malile informed with concern that F. Noli had accepted the entry of the fugitives in "Vatra," but told them that you should apologize that, as a rule, the winning party is right, i.e. gives us the right"<sup>60</sup>.

<sup>57</sup> AMPJ, 1960, file 536; Committee of Veterans of the Albanian People's War - Call on the Albanians of America who are members of the organization "Fire"

<sup>58</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies during 1959 by the Legation of the RPSH in Paris, 22 January 1960

<sup>59</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies during 1959 by the Legation of the RPSH in Paris, 22 January 1960

<sup>60</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 53/1, Information of Reis Maliles for MFA, New York, January 26, 1960

In June 1960, the UN Mission informed that Vatra would organize a seminar on Albania in August. The mission was informed that Fan Noli and the "criminals" Arshi Pipa and Stavro Skëndi would speak there. The mission sent Jim Vison to Boston to "warn Noli about this and Vatra's very hostile attitude, telling him that this would seriously compromise his armmen"<sup>61</sup>.

A few days later, the UN Mission announced that Fan Noli had responded to the letter previously sent by the Mission, stating that "it has been, is and will be with us, but I do not know what to do to preserve it and that in "Vatra" there are many of our enemies"<sup>62</sup>. F. Noli had stated that he did not know anything about the article of "Diellit" against the representation of Albania but he only knew about the entry of important ballistas like V. Gërmenji in "Vatra". The mission thought that political immigrants were entering the organization "unheard of". Fan Noli, in his letter, promised that he would try to do something but was pessimistic<sup>63</sup>.

The mission proposed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, together with an article to be written, Noli's statement against the ballistas be published on the radio, published in the newspaper "Dielli" on December 21, 1949, and that of the former chairman of "Vatrë" on December 28, 1949, for which he thought would have actual value and could have a positive effect<sup>64</sup>.

Regarding the organization "Vatra", the MFA made these proposals <sup>65</sup>:

- Use the cases that showed that this or that "criminal" enters the organization of "Vatra". the danger that "Vatra" was falling into the hands of "criminals of the Albanian people".
- With certain periods, to unmask the people in charge of the newspaper "Dielli" who were turning it into an "organ of Albanian criminals".
- In various articles, state who would support Qerim Panariti in his campaign against R.P. of Albania, he would be considered a traitor to the Albanian people.
- To record and encourage, certainly with a trick, the pro-regime element that resisted against the efforts of Qerim Panariti, to lead the organization "where he wants".
- The mission was to keep close the good elements of "Vatra" and encourage them to prevent the realization of "hostile" plans of Qerim.
- Të Letters were sent to the good elements of "Vatra" from the hearths living in Albania for the purpose of encouragement.
- The rift between "Free Albania" and "Vatra" should not be allowed to deepen, as this could lead to the deterioration of the position of "Free Albania" and the intimidation of the active elements that were in its ranks. On the other hand, to help this organization to expand its "patriotic" activity to increase and even more its sympathy among the Albanians of the colony.
- The newspaper "29 Nëntori" of Argentina to publish articles on the "crooked" road on which "Vatra" was walking and to punish those responsible. For this purpose, its editorial office should be assisted by the center (from the newspaper "Shqipëria e re" with which it has links).
- Radio On Radio Tirana to be given from time to time statements of Albanians who were returning forever, through which to expose the activity of Q. Panariti with friends, "as agents of the State Department."

<sup>61</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file B VII - 9, Top secret, no. 339; Information of Reis Maliles sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tirana, New York, June 25, 1960.

<sup>62</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file B VII - 9, Top secret, decryption, no. 245 UN Mission Information Sent to MFA, 30 June 1960.

<sup>63</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file B VII - 9, Top secret, decryption, no. 245 UN Mission Information Sent to MFA, 30 June 1960.

<sup>64</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file B VII - 9, Top secret, decryption, no. 245 UN Mission Information Sent to MFA, 30 June 1960.

<sup>65</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file B VII - 9, MFA instructions sent to the Mission to the UN, June 30, 1960.



- To encourage the patriotic Albanians of France to write letters to the leadership of Vatra to be published in Dielli, in which "to express regret for his dirty attitude". This could be done with the Albanians of R.A.B. as well as with those of Turkey, if possible.

Balli Kombëtar was directly involved in the battle with the communist regime for influence over the organization "Vatra" In a separate article, the newspaper Flamuri analyzed in detail this report and the history of the Vatra Federation.<sup>66</sup> "Vatra" was described as the Albanian society of America, which had created a glorious history of exile, striving for the liberation, independence and integrity of Albania. But it was said that these efforts were shamelessly denied by Enver Hoxha, "who corrects and distorts history according to the communist will of Russia." The flag blamed those who take the havaz of red Tirana for so long, despise history, democrats and democracy, destroy the good fairy of Vatra with a "Sun" that seeks to incite patriots, freedom-lovers, instead of qi remember that it is the time of clear reckoning. National accounts show that dictatorial regimes in Albania have always endangered and violated freedom, independence and national identity. Tue supports these regimes, VATRA denies itself. Tue gave their hand to the nationalists who fight these, VATRA, continues the historical path"<sup>67</sup>.

The flag read that "American freedom and communist slavery are a miracle in the opinion of the Albanians of America." In America everything was clear: freedom of speech, choice of job, enough profit, comfortable life. This was seen by the thousands of Albanians who have lived freely in the United States for many years. While what they did not see and did not know was the situation of Albania "liberated" from the communists. The propaganda of "Russian agents from our country" for ten years had told them a story that some had believed without thinking for a long time. This was the story that: "all those who fought in exile are traitorous fascists, enemies of the people. "All those who were killed in Albania or put in prisons and concentration camps (more than 25,000) are also traitors !!" After this phase, the period of preaching the freedom and prosperity of communist Albania had begun, comparing it with the "oppression and hunger" of the so-called capitalist countries. Some of the Albanians who emigrated before 1939, who "did not like to think deeply", believed this. "Until the Albanian newspapers of America, the wall of Tirana, without taking the trouble to think, to judge. Are you saying that Albania was not in Europe, but in the middle of the forests of Africa! And they trusted the red propaganda so much that the qi almost got angry and broke with America qi was given freedom, work and bread!"<sup>68</sup>

The newspaper pointed out the fact that Balli Kombëtar, had started with letters and publications since 1945, to show them the bad situation of Albania, the fight against fascism that the nationalists had done before the communists in Albania, but this was not believed. But when they started coming from Albania, along with propaganda letters, and real letters asking for help and medicine, this lying category began to doubt the accuracy of the "communist paradise!" The members of the BK, who had gone to America in large numbers and had spoken openly that the traitors and oppressors were the communists, who were torturing the country, had paved the way for the faith with difficulty. The newspaper also asked an interesting question; "If the old Albanians of America had believed that those who fled Albania in 1924 were anti-Zogists, they were traitors, what would Fan Noli and his friends answer ?!" And further he added: then "why all those who fled Albania from the end of 1944 should be called traitors ?! Or why did they fight and not accept the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, who is the number one agent of Russia in Albania ?! Or why did the fascist occupiers fight and were imprisoned and exiled, not only in Albania but also when they were

<sup>66</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>67</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>68</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

in exile ?! But the Albanian American newspapers did not look at the work so closely. They said: after Enver Hoxha's friends are suing and we should sue! After any of the fugitives have been collaborators, traitors, hostages, everyone should be like that!...<sup>69</sup>.

Flamur accused the editors of "Diellit" that their newspaper, even though it was published in America, where there were no fascist legs, spoke well of Mussolini's black shirts that liberated Albania. The flag added: "It did not occur to the editors of" Diellit ", before attacking Balli Kombëtar, to read in one of the issues of their newspaper in 1943, where it was written that the forces of Balli Kombëtar, under the command of the hero Hysni Fascism and traitors are fighting manfully in the mountains of Lepenica"<sup>70</sup>. It was said that unfortunately the National Front had not been able to hold an open meeting in Boston or in places where there were many Albanians, as it had done in Detroit.

According to Flamur, two recent events had opened the eyes of those Albanians in America who by this time had repeated the words of red Tirana; the refusal of the generous aid given to hungry Albania by President Eisenhower and the speech given by Enver Hoxha at the congress of the Democratic Front. After these two slaps, the whole opinion of the Albanians in exile had risen. The newspaper "Dielli", with the capable pen of Dr. Andrea Elia "properly hit the Moscow reasons that were shamelessly repeated by the Tirana government". The newspaper claimed that this brutal behavior was not enough, but Enver Hoxha, from the tribune of the "Communist Front", called the "Democratic Front" to lie gullible, wanted to teach patriotism to the Albanians of America, had to lead against a country that has accepted him in his gender, he had to tell them a communist history of Albania that started in 1944 !! But, this time, the non-Albanian "Vatra", through "Diellit", answered almost in Ballista language. For the first time, Enver Hoxha's insanity was openly shown to the Albanians of America!"<sup>71</sup>

Por ajo që kishte më rëndësi për BK ishte fakti se gazeta "Dielli", tashmë mbas 12 for years he found that: as long as a person or organization served communism, it was supported, when a person or organization tries to maintain the balance of justice, it is hit as an "enemy of the people", as a "foreign agent", as a "warlord"; "From time to time, communism rewrote history on a case-by-case basis. This is what Comrade Enver tries to do, when he says that Albania has not seen any good from America, and that the Albanians of America have not helped at all in the liberation of Albania "(Dielli, no. 25, year 1955). Now Enver Hoxha had to teach the Vatrans from Tirana the history, the history arranged "according to the dialectical way of Marxism", "Dielli" found it and declared that history is not a party presentation, but a line of facts and events based on documents ". And if the past history of our country was distorted by Enver Hoxha in the light of "Diellit", added Flamuri, why not believe that our history, from 1939 onwards, is not distorted but changed according to the "communist dialectic"?!<sup>72</sup>

The flag, calling them communist avazes, criticized those who had attacked the Vatra congress, recently held in Boston, the Bektashi President in America, Dervish Rexhepi. Dervish Rexhepi, it was said, that during the fascist occupation he put the Gjirokastra tekke in the service of the national uprising, during the civil war he had sided with the Democrats and, if he had remained in Albania unmixed, would have suffered at least the fate of the Bektanish World President in Tirana, who killed himself! ... It was also underlined that, in exile, Dervish Rexhepi had not been involved in politics at all, but had gone to Cairo and devoted himself to religious services, until he settled in America. Flamur questioned whether those who were questioning the patriotism of the Bektashi leader in America were those who listened to

<sup>69</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>70</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>71</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>72</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

Tirana radio or those who trusted Enver Hoxha when he deliberately spoke about Baba Rexhepi and did not believe him when he spoke about "Vatra"<sup>73</sup> ?!

Another "surprise" was the fact that, some time ago, the newspaper "Dielli", talking about the Committees "Shqipnija e Lirë", had tried to put them all in one bag. Dielli did not confirm the truth that the "National Democratic Committee of Free Albania", chaired by Professor Abas Ermenji, was maintained with the contributions of its members, but stressed that either "wants to withdraw money from America, it is maintained by neighboring countries!" And instead of "Dielli" calling on the Albanians of America to help, "the only democratic political authority in exile", as it was doing, the faith of the Albanians of Turkey was filled with vain suspicions and slander, "generalizes the evil, wrapped in a conversation of patriots and traitors, democrats and totalitarians !! " It was underlined that when the newspaper "Flamuri" published a document that proved the anti-national spirit of the people of April 7, "Dielli" with this document sued the entire Albanian emigration that he wanted to make an alliance with the Albanian issue!

"Dielli" was criticized for the misconception he had about the regimes and the national integrity because, speaking about the communist regime of Enver Hoxha, he said that the Albanians of America did not interfere in the internal regimes of Albania, but they were only interested in the integrity of the Homeland. The flag stated that "The issue of regimes, reminiscent of the Sun", has been closely linked to date with the issue of land ownership. " According to Flamur, "the Zogist regime took power, it affected this situation: it released St. Naum and Vermosh to Yugoslavia, it prepared the conditions of April 7 with a weak rule! The fascist regime swallowed this present and that bit of freedom and independence, to put the whole of Albania within the framework of its Empire! The communist regime started the issue of denial of national identity when, through Enver Hoxha, he declared in 1945 that he recognized Albanian Kosovo to Titoist Yugoslavia!!"<sup>74</sup> Hoxha's statement was said to have been made because that is what Moscow wanted. Even hypothetically, it was said that, if the communist party came to power in Greece, E Hoxha, by order of Moscow, would accept territorial concessions, "since Russia would be more interested in pleasing Greece, the issue of Albanian nationality would Do you have Stalin's mustache or Bulganin's beard? We do not speak these words in vain. We have other examples in Europe that show how many national "wholes" were deliberately destroyed by the order of Soviet Russia."<sup>75</sup> The Flamur newspaper cited Poland as an example, which was forced to cede part of its territory to Russia after World War II.

Vatra was called to join all those parties, groups or societies that defend the Albanian integrity and democracy. This work was being done by the Committee of Albanian Democrats in Paris and elsewhere. It was time for Vatra to examine the history of the last period of our country and to take "the side it took in the old days of the Albanian struggle in America"<sup>76</sup>. Then in this article was raised this critical question: "But" you have sold American imperialism "Fan Noli is being sued in Albania in recent times! Should we judge Fan Noli after the whispers that Tirana is opening? "

The report states that "in this political mix that has given birth to World War II, where criminals are called patriots and patriots are imprisoned, killed or prosecuted as traitors, those who live in free countries, those who can not say that" support communists for fear of American dictatorship! they have a duty to find each other, to reach out to those who work and fight manfully through such difficulties, through such misunderstandings, and to preach that the path of the Homeland, the path of national security and honor is not dictatorship; nor

<sup>73</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>74</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>75</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

<sup>76</sup> Flamuri newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha.

is its dependence on foreign doors. Otherwise, the Albanian issue will be weakened even more. And the non-Marxist history of reborn Albania will hold accountable those who did not understand the dangers, those who, willingly or unwillingly, supported the bloodthirsty people of Albania. We do not wish such a responsibility to the historic Hearth".<sup>77</sup>

At the height of the controversy between Vatra and E Hoxha Hoxha's communist regime, Balli Kombëtar also intervened, through its newspaper *Flamuri*, which sided with Vatra. The newspaper severely attacked the propaganda that the communist regime was making through the newspaper "Shqipëria e Re" against the newspaper "Dielli" and the leaders of VATRA. The flag wrote that "for the red pens, VATRA and its newspaper must either glorify the regime of blood and hunger built by Moscow agents, or they must be counted as agents of American imperialism, or, even worse (!) as ballistas!"<sup>78</sup> The newspaper claimed that, in order to fill the minds of Albanians in America, the red newspaper had published some outdated statements by Fan Noli about the National Ball, in which, "without salt and without basis, the biggest movement in Albania against the occupier of foreigners and in favor of Ehtnike Albania, as the party that makes the toy of the beys and that supports the fragmentation of the Homeland, Albania!"<sup>79</sup> *Flamur* added that Fan Noli himself, "will be surprised today how he, as a historian, had the courage to write against the facts such absurd statements that can only stand well in the mouth of the communists, who build and destroy history according to instructions of the Kremlin dictator".<sup>79</sup> But according to *Flamur*, calling those who ran VATRA, agents and salesmen, comparing them with the ballistas, the regime's pimps had done a service not only to the clarification of the Albanians of America, but also to the National Front. "The world understands very well today that Balli Kombëtar was called a treacherous party, because that is how the Serbs who had the plight of Kosovo once loved it, and, later, the Russians who have the plight of Albania. Balli Kombëtar was called reactionary because it did not want the Albanian land, from the fiefdom of the local beys, to become the fiefdom of the Soviet dictators. Balli Kombëtar was attacked with red lies, because with feathers and weapons, he wanted to restore the honor, rights and truths of the country. Whoever, no matter how late, felt this path, can not but recognize our difficult path, that path that is soaked in the blood of thousands of martyrs."<sup>80</sup>

In August 1960 the New York Mission informed that the ranks of political emigration to the USA were increasing, that the "Free Albania" Committee had no influence on emigration and that political emigrants were trying to penetrate the Hearth Federation. This is what Balli Agrar was doing, as well as the small ballistic group of H. Dosti with important people like H. Dosti, Nexhat Peshkëpia, Vasil Germenji etc. They were trying to enter Vatra, propagating that "they no longer intend to overthrow the government in Albania but only to criticize unjust things".<sup>81</sup>

At the same time, the Mission noted a withdrawal also on the part of Fan Noli. The mission informed the MFA: "F. Noli sent word that he is forced to speak at the seminar but only about Skanderbeg, otherwise he will be hit by the enemy element. He understands the seriousness of the issue, but asked us to understand that the situation forces him to. He is afraid of hitting us in the press."<sup>82</sup>

The Mission also informed that under the leadership of Vatra a circle was formed against the communist regime with Q. Panarit, A Athanas, Petër Çekrezi, in the Central

<sup>77</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper no. 68-69, article "Fire, Sun and Enver Hoxha."

<sup>78</sup> *FLAMURI* newspaper, October 31, 1960, article "The hearth of America and the National Front"

<sup>79</sup> *FLAMURI* newspaper, October 31, 1960, article "The hearth of America and the National Front"

<sup>80</sup> *FLAMURI* newspaper, October 31, 1960, article "The hearth of America and the National Front".

<sup>81</sup> AMPJ, 1960, file 536/4, Information of the Albanian Mission to the UN on Political Emigration to the USA, New York, 1 August 1960

<sup>82</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/4, Kleanthi (Dedit) Information for MFA, New York, August 6, 1960

Council of Vatra, Miko Kokalari, Vahit Çika in New York, Fehmi Kokalari and Refat Gurazezi in Detroit, etc. The fugitives were more activated to penetrate the Vatra organization. The mission stated that "for this they seem to have instructions from the Americans".<sup>83</sup>

According to the Mission, the pro-communist element, which he called "patriot", was not activated enough. Many people wavered while some of them were afraid to come out in favor of the Tirana government. The mission was concerned that, "in particular, the position of F. Noli is not clear. On the one hand he has spoken to the people we have sent that he has been, is and will be with us, and on the other hand, he is not saying anything, now that his name is being openly used by Q. Panariti to fight us".<sup>84</sup>

According to the Mission, the meeting of the Vatra branch in New York, for the election of delegates to its assembly, was attended by about 50 fugitives, led by Vasil Germenji. "They dominated the meeting and, violating the rules of Vatra, appointed as delegates their supporters: Edip Shapllon and Myfit Verlanin".<sup>85</sup> The mission informed that the "patriots" of Vatra were writing to the center that this was an illegal action. They would send Musa Hajron as a delegate. The mission pledged to do everything possible against the entry of political immigrants into the ranks of the Hearth.<sup>86</sup>

For the Hearth Seminary, the Mission claimed it clearly appeared to have been organized by the State Department. The representative of the State Department had stated that Albania's policy was hostile to America and any person like S. Malëshova, L. Gega, D. Ndreu, etc., who wanted a more moderate policy towards Washington, were eliminated. The American representative had also stated that the Albanian Mission to the UN interfered in the internal affairs of the USA.<sup>87</sup>

The Albanian colony in America was considered by regime officials as the largest Albanian colony with about 70,000 people. Of these, 60-65% were said to have taken their families with them. 65% were from the districts of Korça, 30% from Gjirokastra, while the others were from different regions of the country.<sup>88</sup> The largest branches of this colony were in: New York, Warcester, Boston, Bridgeport, Philadelphia, Southbridge, Detroit, Cleveland, Ohio, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Akron-Ohio. There were small branches in Jamestown, Manchester, Natick etc. Most Albanians had obtained American citizenship and only 10-20% could still hold Albanian citizenship. The change of citizenship took place en masse especially during World War II, mainly for economic reasons, as by law, non-US citizens could not trade on their own behalf, even by opening a small shop. . Most of those who had not received US citizenship consisted of immigrants who had their families in Albania. This included manual and wage laborers whose economic situation was not good. Most of the emigrants were said to be in poor economic condition<sup>89</sup>. An analysis was also made of the Vatra Federation, which was said to have taken a shaky stance during World War II. For some time he had supported Italy, then again there were signs of rapprochement with Zog, until finally, through some of its leaders, he was put in the service of the US State Department.<sup>90</sup>

After the war it was said that at first "Vatra" supported "our power" but then changed its position. In the organization "Vatra" it was said that there were many people who did not

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<sup>83</sup> AMPJ, 1960, file 536/4, Report of the Mission to the United Nations on the colony in the USA, New York 6 August 1960

<sup>84</sup> AMPJ, 1960, file 536/4, Report of the Mission to the United Nations on the colony in the USA, New York 6 August 1960

<sup>85</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/4, Kleanthi (Dedit) Information for MFA, New York, August 19, 1960

<sup>86</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/4, Kleanthi (Dedit) Information for MFA, New York, August 19, 1960

<sup>87</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/1, Reis Maliles Information for MFA, New York, 22 August 1960

<sup>88</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>89</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>90</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

agree with her and "Diellit"'s attitude towards the communist government. At the 39th Vatra Assembly on July 2, 1955, Musa Hajro of the New York branch, supported by others, had criticized Q. Panarit but could not remove Qerim as editor of "Diellit".<sup>91</sup> The New York branch, it was noted that he had maintained a good attitude towards the regime and had occasionally criticized Q. Panarit. The clearest manifestation in this direction was made on the evening of November 28 and 29, 1955, organized by this branch, where Selim Zverku and Kristo Stavri had spoken "about the successes of Albania" and had criticized the editor of "Diellit". Also in the assembly of "Vatra" in September 1957 there was a quarrel over the path followed by "Vatra" and especially by "Dielli". Koçi Bellovoda, a former member of the Vatra Council, had sharply criticized the Vatra Council for its hostile attitude towards the communist government and Q. Panarit, emphasizing that it harmed the Vatra and that these actions did not serve the patriotic traditions of the Vatra. "But they made this hostile to the homeland."<sup>92</sup>

But K. Bellovoda's objections had not found sound support and he was expelled from both the assembly and the society.

The report stated that "Free Albania", despite its good attitude towards "our power", "has sometimes wavered, has shown signs of intimidation, and has not shown determination in its path".<sup>93</sup> It was said that, especially a few years ago, "Liria" was reserved, had published only short news without political comments, had not used the names of communist organizations and leaders of Albania, had not mentioned its friendship with the BS. She not only did not write anything against the US policy towards Albania, but, although in a more limited form than "Dielli", she presents the issue as if America loves Albania and the Albanians and that Albania will make friends with America. . Even in an article, he demands that Radio Tirana stop its anti-American propaganda".<sup>94</sup> The mission in New York was said to have talked to Dh. "Trebecka and" Liria "have made significant improvements."

For the future, the following measures were proposed: To work to raise the prestige of the organization "Free Albania". For this purpose, from time to time, to mention the activity of this organization "for the benefit of the homeland" and to increase the ties of the Orthodox Church of America with the Orthodox Church in Albania.<sup>95</sup>

The MFA also provided interesting information on the regime's attitude towards repatriations and immigrant visits to Albania, as well as the results of its policy. From the Albanian colonies, for repatriation or for visits to their families, during 1960 there were 592 separate requests as follows:<sup>96</sup>

- 254 were approved for the visit, 221 were rejected
- 84 were approved for repatriation, 10 were rejected

The MFA stated that there had been many delays in approving the visits. The reasons for the refusal of the visits had been:<sup>97</sup>

- When the interested party was considered a "not good" element
- When his family in Albania had a bad political attitude. There had been many cases when the person seeking to visit Albania had been a "good patriotic element", but his circle in Albania was "bad". These, without exception, were denied visas.

MPJ proposed:<sup>98</sup>

<sup>91</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>92</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>93</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>94</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>95</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the Albanian colonies

<sup>96</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, fl. 1-2; MFA report on Albanian emigration, undated.

<sup>97</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, fl. 1-2; MFA report on Albanian emigration, undated.

<sup>98</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, fl. 1-2; MFA report on Albanian emigration, undated.

- Grant citizenship and visas to all those who had applied for repatriation regardless of their citizenship.
- Visas were issued to those seeking to visit and holding Albanian citizenship; Citizens of Albanian nationality and foreign citizenship were granted visas if they met the conditions. Priority should be given to those who were old, to those who had families in Albania, such as mother, father, wife, children, brother, sister.
- Requirements of those who did not have the above conditions, to be looked at rigorously.

The regime intended that visitors not only visit their relatives, as had happened so far, but also see the constructions in Albanian cities. It was therefore suggested that visa authorizations be further granted in groups. Find a trusted person in the US to handle their group launch. With this person, Albaturism to sign a contract and organize excursions through Albania. Payment would be made in foreign currency.<sup>99</sup>

## **7.2. Dealing in Arbëresh areas in Italy**

A direct confrontation of the anti-communist political emigration and the government of Tirana was continuing in the Arbëresh areas in Italy. In 1954 the Albanian Legation provided detailed information, informing its superiors in Tirana that up to this time it had had weak ties with the Arbëresh. The legation had distributed propaganda material and kept in touch with several people. She thought she had achieved some results. Among them were the arousal of Arbëresh interest in the RPSH and the failure of the clergy to attempt to organize an association with opposing aims. This effort was made in 1953 and was initiated by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs of Italy, Kasiani. Legata reported that it had fought the propaganda of "war criminals" in these provinces and that, due to the socio-political situation of these provinces, its propaganda, despite its shortcomings, took up more space<sup>100</sup>.

According to the Legation, the Arbëresh were more closely associated with the Italian KP and the forces of the left, and it was certain that, in most of the Arbëresh villages, especially in Calabria, the left dominated. Their social situation was bad. The lower classes were the ones who were more associated with the left parties and, at the same time, showed more interest in Albania. While in the rich strata of the Arbëresh, especially among the intellectuals, Legata found that he had not seen a serious interest in learning about Albania, that is, to connect and be interested in the propaganda she made. She added that, among Arbëresh intellectuals, there was no such interest in Albania as there had been a century ago.

But on the other hand, the Legation informed that even the "propaganda of criminals" was not very widespread among these intellectuals. In Sicily, Arbëresh clerics, with some Albanian "criminals", conducted a cultural-clerical activity, conducting historical studies and Albanian language courses at an institute in Palermo. The Arbëresh did not have any organized cultural activities to keep them connected to each other. The only form of their organization was their church, which the Legation described as "reactionary but not very active"<sup>101</sup>.

The Legation informed that the Arbëresh had only sentimental connections with our country, but they did not have concrete interests for the situation in Albania, as the colonies in the USA could have, etc.

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<sup>99</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, fl. 1-2; MFA report on Albanian emigration, undated.

<sup>100</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 306, Report of the Albanian legation on the Arbëresh in Italy prepared by Kleanthi Andoni

<sup>101</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 306, Report of the Albanian legation on the Arbëresh in Italy prepared by Kleanthi Andoni

The Italian KP had popularized the Albanian communist government among the Arbëresh, but being very careful not to make any wrongdoing that could be exploited by the "enemy". The PKI had faced the delicate problem of classifying them as a national minority, with their own and other special claims, as attempted a year earlier by the secretary of the Party Committee for Cosenza, Cinnani. He had made a study of the political and economic situation of the Arbëresh and had suggested some proposals, which he presented at the National Conference of the Party, where he argued the need for proportional representation of over 50 thousand Arbëresh of the province of Cosenza in the Provincial Council; the need to open some schools, etc. The PKI leadership, and personally Toliati, considered it wrong and harmful to raise this issue, claiming that the Arbëresh were not a separate minority and should be viewed like all other Italians.

Even the government of Tirana was not interested and did not approve these cultural demands of the Arbëresh. She was, for the most part, interested in extending her political influence to the Arbëresh areas and fighting the influence of anti-communist political emigration there. The Rome Legation argued that such demands should be avoided and that the "popularization of our People's Republic among them" should be focused. She also thought that currently, when the left had the majority in these provinces, the wrong way of raising the issue "would allow provocations and propaganda of the enemy".

On the other hand, adhering to its line to pursue a prudent policy, even the PKI had not agreed to conduct an open communist propaganda, according to the demands of the Albanian government in the Arbëresh areas. Therefore, a year ago, she had advised the head of the Albanian Legation not to visit these villages. This visit was called fruitless, because then it was the election campaign. But even a year later, PKI had left unanswered a request of the Legation to visit the Arbëresh areas. Also, when the Italy-Albania Friendship Association had requested that its members be provided with cards, the PKI leadership opposed it, emphasizing that all Arbëresh would be provided with cards and thus an issue would arise for which there would be speculation by "enemies". This meant that PKI wanted to avoid the reactions of the Albanian political emigration to its actions and influence in the Arbëresh provinces.

Of course, this restraint of PKI did not like the Albanian Legation, which informed the MFA that "this way of raising the issue by friends here, and the very situation of those mentioned above, do not stop our work towards the Arbëresh. They can be worked on through the association or directly, without compromising the way in which the case is raised by the PKI. We are convinced that, if we work in this direction, we will have good results. We have in mind that before (before 1952) PKI had not looked at this problem at all"<sup>102</sup>.

After analyzing the situation in the Arbëresh areas, Legata proposed that in order to propagate Albania, in addition to the materials being prepared for the association, special materials should be prepared, especially for these provinces. Specifically, to send books, magazines to as many addresses as possible; to create the evidence of those few scholars who dealt with the history, language and economy of Albania and to supply them with these materials; to increase the ranks of celebrities and invite them to the feast of November 29th.

Whereas the Friendship Association had to carry out in these provinces more dense activity than in the other provinces of Italy; to carry out activity in these provinces, commemorating some people of their culture, as he had done with De Rada; a folklore manifestation with Arbëresh songs and dances could be organized in any case; to freely screen the film "Skanderbeg" etc.<sup>103</sup>.

<sup>102</sup> AMPJ, year 1954, file 306, Report of the Albanian legation on the Arbëresh in Italy prepared by Kleanthi Andoni

<sup>103</sup> AMPJ, V. 1954, D.306, Report of the Albanian legation on the Arbëresh in Italy prepared by Kleanthi Andoni



PKI continued to try to moderate the policy of the Albanian communist government through the Albania-Italy Friendship Association, demanding that the association not continue further confrontations with the Albanian anti-communist political emigration. During Pajeta's visit to Tirana, the two sides discussed and decided:

The association had to do a bilateral job d.m.th. to also help do something in Albania for Italy. Thus, a change in the attitude of the government districts towards it, etc. would be expected.

Pajeta asked not to be interfered by the Albanian representation, as this would mean that the association was run by the Legation.

For the visit of the representatives of the Legation to the Arbëresh, he was not against, but asked that this not be done to counterbalance the leaders of anti-communist political emigration. He suggested that in the Arbëresh areas, to go on a holiday visit and obtain permission in advance at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, ie to be an officially authorized visit<sup>104</sup>.

An interesting duel between the communist regime and political emigration to Italy took place over the issue of the assets of Albanian merchants residing in Italy. The communist government was trying to plunder their property, and political emigration was immediately put under their protection. S. Konica reported that "from the friends of the legation we are informed that a few weeks ago, at the initiative of E. Koliqi, a meeting was held where A. Këlcyra, Ndue Markaj, Beqir Maloku, Mentor Çuku participated, who discussed the efforts that should be done to prevent the taking of the assets of Albanian traders in Italy by the communist state. For this purpose, they put pressure on the administrators appointed by the Albanian side"<sup>105</sup>.

### **7.3. Confrontation in Turkey**

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Albania and Turkey, immediately began the confrontation between the Albanian Legation and the anti-communist political emigration in this country, regarding the impact on economic emigration.

In 1959, the Albanian Legation in Ankara added information about the Albanian emigration to Turkey, where the degree of its assimilation was worrying. She informed that the number of economic emigrants in this country reached 1 million people. Istanbul was the main center. Emigration was mainly from southern Albania. Albanians who had come here before 1912 were considered Turks. Most economic emigration had changed citizenship. Turkish state bodies considered only 1,500 people Albanians, who still retained Albanian citizenship. The Turkish government before the war, in various forms, had forced Albanians to change their citizenship. While after the war, this attitude had changed to some extent. According to a law in force, the Turkish government could not grant Turkish citizenship to Albanians of the Orthodox faith, while it would grant citizenship to Muslims, but always on a voluntary basis. This was one of the reasons why many Albanians of the Orthodox faith had obtained Greek citizenship. Turkish law did not allow a foreigner who had acquired Turkish citizenship to regain his citizenship. But these laws were expected to change<sup>106</sup>.

The main reasons that forced the Albanian emigration to change its citizenship were:

- In the first place the fact that a foreign national here had no right to buy or sell any of his property.

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<sup>104</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 332, Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Roma legation, On some issues that were discussed with Pajeta when he was in Tirana, January 4, 1956

<sup>105</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 533, Information of the Albanian Legation in Rome for the MFA, December 1, 1959

<sup>106</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

- The foreign national did not have the right to work for most professions, while he was free to open any job on his own. These measures applied only to Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian emigration, while others, based on reciprocal agreements made by other governments with Turkey, were free in this regard and for these issues, had the rights of a Turkish citizen<sup>107</sup>.

Albanians worked as gardeners, in hotels, butchers, etc. The Legation informed that "Turkish influence entered Muslim emigration, Greek influence entered the Orthodox one". Orthodox children attended Greek schools, while Muslim children attended Turkish schools. There was no Albanian school. Both Turks and Greeks worked towards Albanian emigration. Albanians of the Orthodox faith here were considered Greek by the Turkish authorities. Even in the terror caused here, during the Cyprus crisis, in 1955 against the Greek emigration, "in this mold were included the Orthodox Albanians who suffered great damages."<sup>108</sup>

However, noting the situation in general, Legata claimed that it could be said that the Albanian emigration here was in good relations, there was no major difference between them and in general they helped each other<sup>109</sup>.

Legata also analyzed in a special way the attitude of the Turkish government towards the Albanian emigration. She claimed that in the past, the Albanian emigration here, as well as the foreign emigration, had suffered a lot from the previous Turkish regimes who had behaved very harshly towards the Albanian emigration and especially towards the Orthodox one. This, moreover, had occurred from the great hatred they had against Greece. This policy had made the Albanian emigration very afraid in relations with the Albanian Legation.

However, it turned out that Turkey's attitude, in some cases, had been more lenient towards Albanian emigration, in relation to the emigration of other countries. At the time of Atatürk, when the Turkish government had excluded most of the foreign emigrants, this measure was not taken against the Albanian emigration<sup>110</sup>.

After World War II, especially when the Democratic Party had come to power, the attitude towards foreign immigration was more lenient. Albanian emigration still did not have the right to property, as did Greek and Bulgarian emigration. That part of the Albanian emigration that had received Turkish citizenship, did not speak ill of the government of the country, while those who had Albanian citizenship, although with reservations, spoke ill of the treatment given to them by the Turkish government. However, Albanian emigration behaved well and correctly towards state laws and bodies<sup>111</sup>.

The Legation suggested to the MFA that the issue of the rights of Albanian citizens, especially with regard to property and employment, be submitted to the Turkish government. Albanian citizens could not send their money home. This could be resolved only with an agreement that could be reached between the Bank of Albania and that of Turkey<sup>112</sup>.

<sup>107</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>108</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>109</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>110</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>111</sup> AMPJ, 1959, dsoje 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>112</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

The establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey was well received by economic emigration, but he still hesitated for fear of going to the embassy, as rumors had spread that the Turkish government would expel those who came to the embassy<sup>113</sup>.

Legata underlined that the opening of an Albanian school in Istanbul was of great importance, as through it, it would bring closer the Albanian emigration. Its opening would be very well received by the emigration and the Legation hoped to have his support. The Albanian emigrants had proposed to the Legation that, first, they open a church and then a school. Most immigrants from foreign countries had schools in Istanbul. The request could have been made by the Albanians themselves, but the Legation had to formally intervene<sup>114</sup>.

In 1960 the Albanian Legation informed that by 1939 there had been 30,000 Albanian economic emigrants in Turkey. By 1945 their number had dropped to 15,000 while in 1960 there were 1,500 left. This was a big leak and it seemed that the process of assimilation of economic emigration was moving fast in this country.<sup>115</sup>

The Legation could not ignore political emigration and its organizations.

It was said about the Albanian colony in Turkey that it did not have any form of organization and no patriotic work took place. In Istanbul there was a club which could become the center of the colony organization. In Istanbul there was also "the so-called 'independent Albanian group' composed of elements hostile to the RPSH". Now that the Albanian embassy would start operating in Ankara, several tasks were set before it: To immediately start working to gather Albanians around the embassy. At the beginning, the Albanians were registered, in order for the embassy officials to establish the first contacts with them; meet the many consular requests from the embassy so that Albanians can remain satisfied and approach the embassy; to add the addresses of Albanians and the main newspapers from Tirana; to work for the publication of a "progressive" newspaper of the Albanian colony in Turkey<sup>116</sup>.

An important organization of Albanian emigration was considered the Turkish-Albanian Society. This was formed around 1950, at the initiative of political immigrants and in cooperation with the country's authorities. It included all the ballistas in Turkey, some of the Zogists and some of the economic emigration, mostly Orthodox<sup>117</sup>. In total this society had 8,000 members, all from Istanbul. The Administrative Council consisted of an honorary chairman - Tare Libohova and 9 members: Nazhit Akbllut, chairman of the association; Lefter Sava - Vice President; Stathi Goxhabashi - secretary; Idriz Radomira - member; Vangjel Gogoli, Leonidha Cicaku, Sabatin Konduni, Irakli Nodha. The association also had a Disciplinary Council, with Koço Tasin as chairman. Instead of Qemal Atellgan, this association was now run by Turkish captain Ali Yollari. The association did not engage in any political activity<sup>118</sup>.

The composition of this association and, especially of the Council, compared to the past, from the point of view of the Legation, "was better". In the beginning, some leaders of political emigration, such as Qazim Prodani, Xhemal Aranitasi, Rexhep Mitrovica, etc., also took part in it. These were later expelled and remained as ordinary members. Although the

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<sup>113</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>114</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>115</sup> AMPJ, 1960, file 536/5, Information report of the Legation in Ankara on the situation of Albanian emigration in Turkey

<sup>116</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 9, MFA proposals for work in the colonies

<sup>117</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>118</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

Council of this association did not include political immigrants, "they, being members of it, exercised their influence and controlled its activity". He described their removal from the Legation Council as a tactical move, noting that the association was under their leadership and that of the Turkish secret service. The council of this association held a cold attitude towards the Legation, and even prevented others from keeping in touch with it<sup>119</sup>.

Deri në vjeshtën e vitit 1959, Legata kishte mbajtur një qëndrim pasiv ndaj shoqatës Albanian-Turkish. She had condemned the participation of Albanian fugitives in this association, but had not remained open. She considered as the main task, the rapprochement of the association with the Legation and that every effort be made to take its direction, even indirectly. Otherwise, if she did not achieve this goal, she planned to replace it with another association, to openly condemn the participation of the fugitives in this association, the goals they had and the cold attitude she maintained towards the Legation.<sup>120</sup>

According to the Legation, the fugitives had established the Turkish-Albanian association in order to extend their influence and organize economic emigration against the communist regime, but "they are hindered by the patriotism of emigration that refuses to attack the RP of Albania."<sup>121</sup>

The two factions of the National Front, that of A. Këlcyra and H. Dosti, were said to have no sympathizers in Turkey. Almost all the ballistas had obtained Turkish citizenship. They had close ties with the Turkish secret service and for this "it could be said with full mouth what was said about the Independent Bloc as an agency of the Italians"<sup>122</sup>.

The Legation informed that Legality was not presented in an organized form. The weakening of the Zogists in Turkey had also come as a result of the death of some personalities such as Musa Juka, Allaman Çupi, Shefki Shatku, and the departure of some others such as Hysen Selmani<sup>123</sup>.

At this time, apart from Hysen Prishtina, Riza Lekë in Izmir and Tahir Zajmi, the others were ignorant, just like their mayor Aranitasi. They also maintained good relations with the Turkish secret service.

In general, political emigration emphasized that Legata had not been able to exert influence on Kosovar emigration. The Legation had the task of making a great propaganda against the ballistas of Qazim Prodan, to isolate them from everyone and especially from some old Albanians who were known as patriots.

She stressed that "Balli should be unmasked regarding the work he does towards Kosovars. To completely isolate him from the Kosovar element, which in some cases is deceived by their demagoguery and presenting themselves as the only defenders of the cause of Kosovo and Kosovars"<sup>124</sup>.

Në këtë raport i bëhej një analizë edhe gjendjes së emigracionit kosovar. Sipas According to official Turkish statistics, the number of Kosovars and Albanians in Macedonia who emigrated to Turkey in recent years reached 280,000<sup>125</sup>. Këta ishin vendosur kryesisht në

<sup>119</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>120</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>121</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>122</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>123</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>124</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>125</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

qytetet e Stambollit, Izmirit, Ankarasë etj. Në generally, their economic situation was not good. Legata claimed that upon arrival in Turkey, everyone was forced to apply for Turkish citizenship and, until their application was approved (which took 12-18 months), the immigrants were provided with a Muhajir card. They were not allowed to return to Yugoslavia or Albania. According to the Legation, those who had attempted to do so had ended badly<sup>126</sup>.

E vetmja gazetë që dilte nga kosovarët ishte "Përplekja Kosovare", e cila mbështetjen e had in Turkey. There was also no other organization among the Kosovars. Kosovar emigrants to Turkey wrote letters to their relatives in Yugoslavia not to leave the country. Thus, the rate of emigration of Kosovars to Turkey had recently decreased, as a result of poor living conditions, but also as a result of the intervention of Kosovars in Turkey to the Turkish authorities, to stop the emigration of Kosovars in this country. Legata claimed that the Turkish authorities had promised them that they would not accept others in the future.

Legata thought there was a big difference between the attitude of Kosovars and Macedonian Albanians towards it. Kosovars were closer and "live with a great love for our country, while those of Macedonia can be said with full mouth that they love Turkey more than our country." According to her, this was also because the old emigrants here were from Macedonia and were now well regulated. They influenced young emigrants from Albania and Macedonia. While Kosovars had no support and hated Turkey as well as Yugoslavia. Both Kosovars and Albanians of Macedonia, according to the Legation, were very afraid to meet the Legation officials from the local authorities. According to her, this was due to the fact that strict measures were taken against them by the police.

Kosovars had expected the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Albania as a great hope to solve their problems<sup>127</sup>.

The Legation in Ankara also provided interesting information on the waves of Albanian emigration from Greece to Turkey. It was said that the displacement was done in two waves:

Period I, included the years of the Balkan War and the First World War 1912-1916.

Period II, included the years 1923-1930, during which the Albanians of Greece were subjected to forced exchange. Currently the category of Albanians emigrated in the first period consisted of 200-250 thousand people. These were mainly from the provinces of Ioannina, Kostur and the villages of Thessaloniki and Trikala.

The displaced of the II period who were sent as Turks to Turkey, the vast majority were from the border provinces with Albania, inhabited by Albanians such as Kosturi, Konica with their districts and part of Chameria. From the total number of population of 350 thousand people that was subject to displacement in this period, those of Albanian origin constituted the vast majority and were about 150-200 thousand people, which was defined as by the conditions set for exchange d.m.th. areas which were then subject to forced exchange, as well as the number of Albanians left in those provinces<sup>128</sup>.

The displaced upon arrival in Turkey had acquired Turkish citizenship. These were located in different regions of Anatolia. Emigrants from Konica, with its districts, were settled in Aydin, Mugla, Milas; Emigrants from the villages east and south of Gramoz, had settled in Nevsehir and Corum; Emigrants from Ioannina and its districts in: Istanbul, Bursa and their

<sup>126</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959

<sup>127</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 529, Report of the Legation in Turkey on the situation of Albanian and Kosovar emigration in Turkey, Ankara, 14 September 1959.

<sup>128</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of Albanians in Turkey who came from the provinces under Greek rule

districts; emigrants from Chameria to: Izmir, Ajdin, Ajdana, Jozgat, Dertijoll; emigrants from villages deep in Greek territory: - in and around Ankara<sup>129</sup>.

According to the obligations arising from the agreement, the Albanian displaced were given land at that time by the state, but not of good quality. They had helped set up dwellings, mostly huts. They were not allowed to take anything from their possessions and the terms of the exchange were violated. Of these refugees, only those who had settled in the southern provinces had been able to somehow stabilize their economic situation by the better land and climate quality<sup>130</sup>.

There were 9 villages in the districts of Neveshir, in which only Albanians lived. In general, they were poor peasants who fanatically preserved Albanian customs and made marriages only among themselves.

Emigrants to the cities of Istanbul, Bursa and Izmir, in general, were engaged in manual labor as cobblers, street vendors of fruits and vegetables, melons, orchards. In Albanian emigration these were the categories with less culture. They were treated as Turks by the Turkish authorities. They used the Albanian language at home. This had made the children, especially in the villages of the Neveshir area, learn Albanian. They kept their love for their homeland, expressed their hatred for the Greek authorities, for the misfortune they had caused them and for their claims to southern Albania<sup>131</sup>.

During 1960 since the previous elections the state of the association had undergone significant changes which according to the Legation in Ankara were negative. The association had 1,000 members and according to the Legation many of them did not know the "anti-patriotic" (read anti-communist) character of this association and the intentions of the Turkish organs that had created it. The Legation also claimed that most of them did not even know the influence exerted by the "criminals" within it, especially Q. Prodani, R. Mitrovica, etc.<sup>132</sup>.

In July 1960 the Albanian Legation in Turkey made another interesting report on the attitude of the Turkish government towards Albanian emigration<sup>133</sup>. She claimed that the attitude of the current Turkish government towards foreigners and Albanians had not yet become clear. Turkish and Greek orthodox influences had penetrated Muslim emigration. Nevertheless, the Albanian Orthodox emigrants were said to have fought and fought against Greek influence and penetrations and, on the patriotic side, stood at the head of the Albanian emigration to Turkey. Therefore, for their attitude, they were admired by other Albanians. Orthodox children went to Greek schools, Muslim children to local schools. The Orthodox Albanians had made efforts to open the Orthodox Church but had not had the support of Zog's government and legation, and had even been prevented from doing so.

The Legation informed that the Soviets, Greeks, Italians, Bulgarians, etc. had their churches in Turkey. Therefore, she proposed that the Albanians here also open one.<sup>134</sup>

According to inaccurate data that Legata had, there were 15,000 Orthodox Albanians in Turkey and mainly in Istanbul. Her report said that "if we open our church, the existence of the Greek Patriarch in Istanbul will be endangered." This is because, according to the

<sup>129</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of Albanians in Turkey who came from the provinces under Greek rule

<sup>130</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of Albanians in Turkey who came from the provinces under Greek rule

<sup>131</sup> AMPJ, 1959, file 529, Report prepared by Skënder Konica on the situation of Albanians in Turkey who came from the provinces under Greek rule

<sup>132</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/5, Report of the Legation in Ankara entitled: "The state of the Turkish-Albanian association and the recent elections." May 8, 1960

<sup>133</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/5, Report of the Legation in Ankara on the situation of the Albanian colony in Turkey, Ankara, July 31, 1960

<sup>134</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/5, Report of the Legation in Ankara on the situation of the Albanian colony in Turkey, Ankara, July 31, 1960

agreement between Turkey and Greece, he stayed here on the basis of a certain number of Orthodox, fixed in this agreement. This number was supplemented by Albanians whom the Greeks, on purpose, considered to be Greeks. By leaving the Albanians, Patrick would be endangered, because the Greeks did not meet the required number. The Legation also had information that the Turks had demanded the removal of the Greek Patriarch. If this was true, Legata suggested that this circumstance be used to open the Albanian church. Muslim Albanians were also interested in opening the Albanian church and would help materially. Legata added that the Albanian government could also help in an official way.<sup>135</sup>

#### **7.4. Confrontation in other Albanian colonies**

Taking stock of the war against political emigration in 1954, the Foreign Ministry underlined that it was increasing its influence in the Albanian colonies. According to her, the Albanian colonies in the capitalist countries numbered 72,000 of these 50,000 in the US, 15,000 in Turkey, 3,000 in Australia, 1,500 in Egypt, 1,000 in Argentina, 500 in Canada, 500 in France. From these figures, the fact that the communist government and its agencies did not know well the situation and the extent of the Albanian colonies stands out, because this number was much smaller than the real number of Albanian emigration in the world. This is probably because either the Albanian representations did not know the situation well, or because they had narrow concepts to accurately determine the extent of Albanian economic emigration.

The Albanian government was concerned about the apparent influence of Western countries on Albanian economic emigration. Furthermore, she found that this influence was being realized through Albanian anti-communist political emigration. According to the MFA, the American-British discoveries, in order to extend the influence to the Albanian colonies abroad, had taken the following measures:

- In the years 1947-1954 political immigrants and some of the leaders of their groups had gone to those countries, who had made large-scale propaganda.
- Atat Northern Epirus organizations and societies had been activated in the direction of the Albanian colonies and had tried to seize the Albanian churches. Based on its tendentious concepts of ideological warfare with imperialism, the MFA mistakenly thought that the activity of these organizations had been promoted by American and British intelligence.
- Even starting from the same concept and that of the class war, the opening of the Bektashi tekke, led by Dervish Rexhepi and the Mosque in Detroit led by Imam Vehbi Ismaili, he considered works of American intelligence and stressed that these "pose a great danger to the disintegration of the Albanian colony of America".
- It was emphasized that the Rome Committee and, in particular, the Paris Committee were actively working towards the colonies.
- Western powers were said to have increased "persecution" through politics against the "progressive" societies of the colonies and the "good patriots". This meant the war waged by Albanian political emigration to pro-communist elements and groups in the diaspora, which the regime classified as "progressive" and "good patriots".
- The MFA claimed that all these measures, especially during 1954, had weakened the work of "progressive" societies and strengthened the work of "enemy elements". She even added that, in this regard, political emigration had exploited some shortcomings of the regime's representations such as: the lack of sending a press from Albania;

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<sup>135</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536/5, Report of the Legation in Ankara on the situation of the Albanian colony in Turkey, Ankara, July 31, 1960

restricting and cutting family correspondence by party members and "good families"; termination of the repatriation of those who had sought repatriation. She noted that in the years 1949-1954 418 applications for repatriation were made, of which only 100 applications were approved and of these only 30 were repatriated<sup>136</sup>.

Below we present the relationships between the communist government and immigration in some countries, where it was lower than in the countries we presented above.

#### **7.4.1 In Australia**

The Albanian colony in Australia was said to have been divided into 4 societies in Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane and Mareeba. Australian societies had a "good" attitude but work had to be done to unite them<sup>137</sup>. The main ones were: "Free Albania" and "Union" (branch of Free America of America). According to information provided by the communist government, all four societies "work against war criminals."

During the years 1949-1954 the communist government had been concerned that, after the war, the Albanian colonies in Australia had infiltrated much of Balli's influence, which had hit the communist regime's reforms. In 1949 the foundations were laid for the formation of the Balli Kombëtar organization in Australia under the name "League of Albanians of Australia" based in Perth and with branches in Melbourne and Brizbane. The secretary of this organization had been Bahri Bregu.

Zogist influence had penetrated the colony since the war. Zihni Buzo had made a great deal of propaganda, presenting the National Liberation War as a war of rebels. But with the creation of the "Free Albania" branch of America in Australia, Zogist propaganda had fallen and was losing its influence<sup>138</sup>.

The regime achieved a success by extending its influence to the ranks of immigrants to Australia. The French Legation claimed that, as a result of our advice and the letters we sent to the presidency of the Përth society, as well as to the branch group of the organization "Free Albania" in Australia, on October 19, 1954, the union took place. "The new presidency consists of good patriotic elements, in favor of our popular power." She clarified that she had connections with the Melbourne Society and would strengthen them in the future, while she had no connection with the Anestland Society and "they show no interest in keeping in touch with us"<sup>139</sup>.

The regime was extending its influence on Albanian emigration to Australia, facing political emigration. Tirana's policy was said to be favored by several circumstances: Albanian emigration here had begun in 1923-1939. There were 3,000 Albanians. 5% of them had taken their families with them. Albanians were concentrated in the cities of Melbourne, Perth, Sheperton, Sidney, Brisbane. Part lived in the north where the sugar plantations were. 50% of emigration was engaged in agriculture, 30% was engaged in temporary manual labor, 10% in small trade and a very small number were unemployed.

Most of the emigrants were from the Korça-Devoll region, then from Gjirokastra. There were also Greek minorities. Most of the emigrants were illiterate and "very low from the political level"<sup>140</sup>.

<sup>136</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 398, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies in the capitalist countries, January 6, 1955

<sup>137</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 495, Report of the Albanian Embassy in Paris on the situation of Albanian emigration in France, Argentina, America, Australia during the first 6 months of 1958.

<sup>138</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 397, p. 33, Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation of the Albanian colony in Australia, Tirana, June 1, 1955

<sup>139</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, p. 25, Report on the Albanian colonies by Sh. Totozani, colonies in Australia, Paris, 20.01.1955

<sup>140</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 502, Report on the state of immigration in Australia



In the Albanian Colony in Australia some patriotic activity took place, but compared to other colonies it was weaker. The most active, who had kept regular correspondence with the Albanian representation, were the companies of Perth and Brisbane<sup>141</sup>.

#### **7.4.2. In Argentina**

There were 900 Albanians in the Albanian colony of Argentina. They were generally from the Korça and Gjirokastra counties and were more concentrated in the industrial areas of Argentina such as Buenos Aires, where most of them were, in Berisso, Avellanoda, La Plata. They generally worked in factories as workers. Rare were those who had a fortune of more than \$ 3,000. Most of them had fled Albania, single and married in Argentina to Italian, Spanish, etc. women. But there were still those who remained unmarried<sup>142</sup>. In Argentina the positions of the communist regime in emigration there remained strong. The regime had gradually gained dominant positions and also using the help of the Communist Party of Argentina.

Iljaz Toptani had gone to this place since 1942, who made the association "Shpresa" stand by Zog. In 1947, the cultural society "Sons of Albania" was formed. In Argentina there were thus two societies, one illegal and the other legal with pro-communist elements. These two fought against the "Skanderbeg" society. This war continued until 1952, when the "enemy element", ie anti-communist, fought resolutely and the leadership fell into the "good" hands of the pro-Tirana regime.<sup>143</sup>

The positions of the regime were further strengthened when the Albanian telecommunications delegation that went to Argentina intervened and all the different groups joined the "Skanderbeg" society, whose composition has already changed and pro-communist people were elected to lead. In June 1953, the first issue of the newspaper "November 29" was published, which was run by the member of the KP of Argentina, Jano Tarifa.

The confrontation between elements from pro-communist economic emigration and anti-communist political emigration in some cases worsened the relations of economic emigration with the governments of different countries. Thus, the Albanian government was informed that the three best collaborators of the leadership of the "Skanderbeg" society had been imprisoned by the Argentine government. As a result, the work of this society was greatly weakened and a quarrel was created in the association, which was divided into two parts. One part was to soften attitudes towards the Argentine government, the other part to irritate them. At this time, according to the information coming to the regime, the "enemy element" was revived, ie the anti-communist political emigration which accused the leadership of the "Skanderbeg" society as communist, led by the Albanian government to spread communist propaganda<sup>144</sup>.

Anti-communist elements tried to change the leadership of the society in 1953 and 1954, but without success. So they tried to create another society, but even in these efforts they did not succeed. At this time the country's authorities arrested two members of society and the director of the newspaper "November 29" Jano Tarifa for communist propaganda<sup>145</sup>.

The KP of Argentina had a significant impact on Albanian emigration. In 1958 the "Skënderbeu" Association had over 400 members. There was another "reactionary" organization, the "Union of the Albanians of Argentina". But the communist government was informed that now this organization had gone bankrupt and the "reactionary element" was very small, only about 25 people living far from Buenos Aires<sup>146</sup>.

<sup>141</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies during 1959 by the Legation of the RPSH in Paris, 22 January 1960

<sup>142</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 501, Report on the situation in the Albanian colony in Argentina

<sup>143</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 382, MFA study on Albanian colonies (undated)

<sup>144</sup> AMPJ, year 1955, file 389, MFA report on the situation of the colonies - Albanian colony - Argentina

<sup>145</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 382, MFA study on Albanian colonies (undated)

<sup>146</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 501, Report on the situation in the Albanian colony in Argentina.

The colony's stay in Argentina was considered good by the Legation which claimed that the colony remained united and had isolated the group of fugitives who were there. The "Skënderbeu" society had bought a building and thus had become an authoritarian society that included in its bosom all Albanians from Argentina. The news published in the newspaper "29 Nëntori", Legata considered "good" and added that articles were published against Qerim Panarit<sup>147</sup>. Legata informed that the Albanian colony in Argentina, continued to maintain a "good attitude towards our power" thanks to the activity of the Skanderbeg society.<sup>148</sup>

#### 7.4.3. In Egypt

In Egypt the situation of Albanians was not satisfactory in relation to the interests of the regime. The Albanian Legation in Cairo announced that "they have been invaded by indifference, lack of faith in our regime, which they see as a symbol of poverty, misery and imprisonment."<sup>149</sup>

Even in this colony a strong political emigration activity was developing. Legata informed that "A fierce war is being waged here by Abdyl Sulë's wife. Also in the tekke of the father, who has influence in the Albanian emigration, all the conversations are made against us "<sup>150</sup>.

Making a history of the colony in Egypt, Ulvi Lulo wrote that here until 1945, he had a certain sense of patriotism. But influential people did not look very closely at uniting Albanians in one organization. The societies that had been here before the war no longer existed. He singled out as a good work that of Emili Avramushi, Lefter Mbrorje, Qemal Butka, Zavalani and Geço in the years 1945-47.

But the arrival of Zog in Egypt at the end of 1945, he wrote, changed the situation. Zogu approached the Albanian emigration and, the elements that were connected with the communist government, the Albanian community fought with the support of King Faruk. Thus in 1948 the situation was entirely in the hands of Zogu<sup>151</sup>.

Legata informonte se në këtë kohë filluan përpjekjet për ta kthyer Egjiptin në një center of Albanian anti-communist emigration, to activate it against the communist government. Thus began to come from Italy and Turkey many emigration leaders such as M. Frashëri, A. Këlcyra, M. Juka whose goal was to make every effort to unite different parties and to recognize Zogu as king of the Albanians. . The aim was to form an Albanian army, which would serve for actions against the communist regime. But this call was answered by very few people, only 150. Behind these efforts, according to the Legation, hid the American-British intelligence.

As these efforts failed, many who came here remained very poorly economically. Legata informed that "the local press did not have a day not to write about acts of vagabondage of Albanians". After that, Zogu preferred to develop activity towards the countries of the Middle East, based on Egypt. In America he sent his minister to Cairo Abdyl Sula, to influence immigration there. Further, the American-British discovery created the Albanian camp in Germany. (Munich) where emigrants from Egypt also went. Zogu carried out his activity through the Cairo legation which existed until 1952, when the coup took place and Faruk was expelled<sup>152</sup>.

<sup>147</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 495, Report of the Albanian Embassy in Paris on the situation of Albanian emigration in France, Argentina, America, Australia during the first 6 months of 1958

<sup>148</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, D.536, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies during 1959 by the Legation of the RPSH in Paris, 22 January 1960

<sup>149</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 387, Report of the Albanian legation in Cairo, prepared by Ulvi Lulo, on the Albanian colony of Egypt, December 18, 1956

<sup>150</sup> AMPJ, year 1956, file 387, Report of the Albanian legation in Cairo, prepared by Ulvi Lulo, on the Albanian colony of Egypt, December 18, 1956

<sup>151</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 387, Ulvi's report to the MFA, Cairo, 16 December 1956

<sup>152</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 387, Ulvi's report to the MFA, Cairo, 16 December 1956

The discrediting of the old Albanian legation, according to Ulvi Lulos, "reached its peak when Zogu was accused of smuggling". Lulo informed that he was rescued from the court by the Syrian president Shukri Quatli, who "intervened in Nasser and he released him with the conditions to leave Egypt."<sup>153</sup>

Lulo also informed that in Alexandria were concentrated most of the Albanians, about 700-800 people, while in Cairo there were 500-600 Albanians, some of whom were forced to change their citizenship. Legata committed that it would work for the creation of an "Albanian colony" there, that is, an organization influenced by it.<sup>154</sup>

In January 1959 Ylvi Lulo reported on the loss of Albanian identity in Egypt. He claimed that in this country, until 1954, there were 704 Albanians. But from that year until the end of 1958, a good part of them had obtained Greek and Egyptian citizenship and only 300 people remained with Albanian citizenship<sup>155</sup>.

The intervention of the representatives of the Tirana government was strengthened in Cairo as well. In Alexandria there was the "Albanian Community", but it did not play the role for which it was set up and its activity was limited.

After a year of work, collaborating with Sofokli Capin, Arif Stafa, Sharl Dhimitriu, Jani Xhumbën, the Albanian Legation achieved a success in 1958, extending its influence in this colony. She developed an intense propaganda among the Albanians here, claiming that the establishment of society was more than necessary for their good; that the creation of society had nothing to do with politics, but was something humanitarian and to keep patriotism alive<sup>156</sup>. Legata informed that some people had opposed him, "saying what the embassy has to do in this regard". According to her, "there was pressure on those who were shaky that this action was dangerous, as the local government had begun to pursue the communists"<sup>157</sup>. The company was founded on January 11 and Bajram Hamiti, Halil Repishti and Harrallam Dhimitriu were elected to its board. Sofokli Capi was elected chairman.

The regime further intensified efforts to take control of the Albanian colony in Egypt. The Albanian legation in this country claimed that "our goal has been to change the leadership of the community of Alexandria". She also informed that the Presidency of Alexandria held a hostile attitude towards the regime and propagated that they should not be associated with the Albanian legation, "because this country is occupied by communism and is simply a satellite of the Soviet Union"<sup>158</sup>.

The mayor of Alexandria had threatened that, if the Albanian Legation intervened, he would disrupt society and denounce it to the country's authorities. This pressure forced the Legation to step in its action to overthrow the leadership of the society. Thus it was decided that the emigrants of the Cairo branch, to form a separate society according to the laws of the country, and the change of leadership of the colony of Alexandria was left for later, when suitable conditions were created<sup>159</sup>.

In 1960 the MFA gave new instructions for working with the Albanian colonies abroad. She instructed a more systematic work by the Cairo Legation to get closer to the Albanians of the Egyptian and Syrian colonies. To work for the reorganization of the

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<sup>153</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 387, Ulvi's report to the MFA, Cairo, 16 December 1956

<sup>154</sup> AMPJ, 1956, file 387, Ulvi's report to the MFA, Cairo, 16 December 1956

<sup>155</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 503, Notification of Ylvi Lulo to the MFA, January 5, 1959

<sup>156</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 503, Report of the Legation in Cairo on the establishment of the branch of the Albanian colony in Cairo

<sup>157</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 503, Report of the Legation in Cairo on the establishment of the branch of the Albanian colony in Cairo

<sup>158</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 525, Report on the situation of the Albanian community in Alexandria and the Cairo branch, April 4, 1959

<sup>159</sup> AMPJ, year 1959, file 525, Report on the situation of the Albanian community in Alexandria and the Cairo branch, April 4, 1959

"Albanian Community" which was financed by Tirana. Work to open Albanian schools in Cairo, Alexandria and Damascus. Preparations should be made for the publication of an Albanian newspaper by the Albanians of the colony. To admit boys and girls from the "good" Albanian families in the high schools of Albania. To organize a club in Cairo and Damascus.<sup>160</sup>

#### **7.4.4. In Syria**

Political emigration took precedence over the regime's propaganda and influence among the Albanians of Syria. Ulvi Lulo informed from Cairo that there were 4,000-5,000 Albanians in Syria, but only 10-15 of them had Albanian citizenship. The rest had taken Syrian nationality. Lulo claimed that their (political) situation was not satisfactory.

This mass of Albanians had settled in Syria after the First World War. At this time, the vast majority of them served as officers and soldiers in the Turkish army. With the withdrawal of the Turkish army from these countries, they preferred to stay in Syria. There were 2,500 Albanians in Damascus and an Albanian-speaking mosque was erected<sup>161</sup>.

He added that attempts had been made to organize, but had been unsuccessful because of the lack of support and interest of previous Albanian governments.

After the Second World War, even by the communist government, he stressed, "nothing was done at all" while the refugees concentrated here had a negative impact<sup>162</sup>. He added that recently, Syrian Albanians had begun to take an interest in their homeland.

Political emigration to Syria began in 1947, when the President of Syria, Shukri Kuatli, who in 1958 was again president, hosted a commission composed of Sali Myfiu, Koço Muka, Ernest Koliqi, Qemal Jusufati, etc. and talked to them about accepting a majority of Albanians fleeing Syria who were thought to be taking part in the Palestine War<sup>163</sup>. The Syrian president accepted the proposal. The aim was for as many Albanians as possible to leave Italy and settle here, either because of bad conditions, but rather for fear of a possible change in the situation in Italy, in favor of the left-wing forces, which risked handing over the emigrants. policy of the government of Tirana<sup>164</sup>.

After the Albanians left for Syria, the Syrian government gave them a very small pension of 45 liras. Dissatisfaction began and only a handful engaged in the Palestine War. In 1949, the Albanians were helped by the Palestinian society, which called them fighters. In 1950, Geneva-based refugee organizations began to help them find employment in Canada, Australia, etc. Thus most of the political emigrants left and in 1958 in Syria and Lebanon there were only 23 fugitives<sup>165</sup>.

#### **7.4.5. In France**

France was a European country where there was a small Albanian colony. The Albanian colony in France was not organized in any patriotic society. There were two committees in this colony, one in Paris and the other in Saint Etienne, which were stopped and closed by the French police around 1952. The Albanian legation in Paris considered as the main obstacle the lack of permission from the French police to create a society. patriotic, understood with communist profile<sup>166</sup>.

<sup>160</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 9, MFA proposals for work in the colonies

<sup>161</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Ulvi Lulos Information for MFA, Cairo, January 20, 1958

<sup>162</sup> AMPJ, year 1957, file 463/2, Ulvi Lulos Information for MFA, Cairo, January 20, 1958

<sup>163</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 503, Report on fugitives in Syria

<sup>164</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 503, Report on fugitives in Syria

<sup>165</sup> AMPJ, year 1958, file 503, Report on fugitives in Syria

<sup>166</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 495, Report of the Albanian Embassy in Paris on the situation of Albanian emigration in France, Argentina, America, Australia during the first 6 months of 1958

Although unorganized, the Albanian colony in France was said to have a good attitude towards the communist regime and that the fugitives could not turn the colony against the regime but were isolated. The regime had more support among the working class of Albanian emigration. Thus the Legation in France asserted that the Albanians of Saint-Etienne, consisting of 30 families, "are generally connected with us, with our power." She added that they were miners and belonged to the unions run by the French KP<sup>167</sup>.

In the early 1960s the Albanian representation in France claimed that, in general, the situation in the Albanian colonies was improving. The Albanian colony in France continued to be disorganized in a patriotic society and, as a result, the activity that took place was not very visible. The Legation had talked with the member of this colony, Apostol Liçi, who had shown himself ready to organize an Albanian patriotic society in Paris and later throughout France. She was studying the possibility of achieving this goal, taking into account the previous position of the French authorities and the new conditions that had been created. Legata thought that this society would be presented by means of a statute as a philanthropic society, to make it possible to obtain permission from the Prefecture Police. She planned to discuss the issue with members of the colony and promote the creation of society. A. Lychee would be instructed to come up with this as their initiative<sup>168</sup>.

In Saint Etienne, finding the support of some young people, the issue of organizing a school for the Albanian language with Albanian children was considered. For this, Llukan Mërtiri was engaged, who also had the opportunity to teach. The Albanian language school in Paris continued to operate, under the direction of Andon Zuni but this was attended by a small number of students<sup>169</sup>.

#### **7.4.6. Albanian colonies in communist countries**

The Albanian government did not ignore the Albanian colonies in the communist countries, although there was no rival political emigration here at this time.

In Bulgaria it was emphasized that the Albanians were in Sofia, Sliven, Sanahov. The former patriotic movement, in time, had been dying out. Albanians no longer had their regular organization and did not carry out any activity to recognize the successes of their homeland. The Albanian embassy was said to have not paid due attention to working with the colony, "perhaps considering it excessive, as it is located in a socialist country"<sup>170</sup>.

The situation of the Albanian colony in Romania was similar to that of Bulgaria. "Our embassy has not conducted any activity with the Albanians of Romania"<sup>171</sup>.

The MFA suggested that embassies begin work on organizing these colonies. To register the Albanians; to work to open Albanian schools in Sofia and Bucharest; consular requirements were met quickly<sup>172</sup>.

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<sup>167</sup> AMPJ, 1958, file 504, Report of the Legation in France on the Albanians of Saint-Etienne, Paris 25 August 1958

<sup>168</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies during 1959 by the Legation of the RPSH in Paris, 22 January 1960

<sup>169</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 536, Report on the situation of the Albanian colonies during 1959 by the Legation of the RPSH in Paris, 22 January 1960

<sup>170</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 9, MFA proposals for work in the colonies

<sup>171</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 9, MFA proposals for work in the colonies

<sup>172</sup> AMPJ, year 1960, file 9, MFA proposals for work in the colonies

**CHAPTER VIII**

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**POLITICAL IMMIGRATION IN THE LAST PERIOD OF THE COLD WAR (1961-1990)****8.1. Developments within the lines of political immigration during the years 1961-1990**

The long period in emigration and the relative stabilization of communist regimes contributed to the decline in the morale of political emigration. Disagreements were present everywhere. They also extended to Kosovar immigration organizations. I. Berisha, H. Terpeza, M. Vranica had disagreements with Xh. Deva, the main reason for the departure of Kosovars from them and because Xh. Deva cooperated with the New York SCTL, especially R. Krasniqi to organize Kosovars. The communist regime of Albania was concerned that the League of Prizren would act against it and in favor of Kosovo's independence.

On April 9, 1961, King Zog died in Paris. He never abdicated and never accepted the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy. According to the Kingdom Statute, his son, Leka, at the age of 22, was sworn in on April 15 of that year before a "Representative Assembly of the Albanian Nation in Exile". In the first message to the nation, he expressed optimism for the liberation of the Albanian people from the communist regime and for its national unification. The royal family moved from France to Spain and Leka began touring to establish contacts with political immigration organizations.<sup>1</sup>

In 1961 Balli Agrar did not accept Leka Zogu's declaration as king of the Albanians, arguing that even his father A. Zogu was wise enough to accept the principle demanded by BK that the issue of the regime would be decided by the elections of cheap in the homeland.

In the presidency of the BKI, etc., there were many quarrels in the years 1962-65 due to the attitude that had to be maintained towards Yugoslavia. Col. B. Mirakaj was also to cooperate with the Yugoslavs for the overthrow of the communist regime, while other leaders such as I. Vërlaci, E. Koliqi, etc., refused to allow Yugoslav influence in Albanian emigration, because the national interests and those of the BKI were damaged. . In 1962 Athanas Gegaj became a member of the Central Committee of A. Balli of A. Këlcyra when he was reorganized.

In 1968 again BKI was divided into two factions: the one with E. Koliqi who had the majority of members, and the group of Ndue Gjon Gjonmarkaj, who gathered the followers of Kol Bib Mirakaj, who expressed the quarrels between the Mirditors and the fugitives from Pukjan, which continue even today, especially after the assassination of Gjon Gjinaj, etc., N. Gjonmarkaj's current demanded a new platform to study with "realism the national problems", for the unification of emigration as a whole, etc., in the activities of BKI, especially in the years' 70 in New York participated some leaders of other groups such as A. Kupi, Xhafer Deva, Rexhep Krasniqi, Vasil Germenji, Halim Begeja, etc. After 1955, BKI made efforts to improve the organizational structure, holding congresses elected leadership. In September 1968 he held the first congress in the USA, established a steering council with I. Vërlac and an inspectorate with representatives in different countries. In October 1983 a Superior Council was established to bring together the old leaders, and the governing council was supplemented with new elements. The vast majority of blockers were Catholic fugitives.

<sup>1</sup> Sulejman Gjana, The role and contribution of King Leka in exile for the freedom of the Albanian people and for the national cause, in the summary of the Fathers of the International Scientific Conference "The role of the diaspora in state formation" Prishtina, 2012. P. 321-322.

The organization "Albanian Union" carried out a significant activity in the years 1960-1970. It was established in 1946 in Shkodra by the Catholic clergy. Its reorganization took place in 1958 in the US, by political immigrants, after it emerged as a faction from the BKI led by Loro Stojko. In 1963 the three above-mentioned groups formed the "Joint Committee" which in September 1974 was reorganized as the "Albanian Democratic Union" Organization, with a 12-member steering council, which set as its task the unification of emigration as a whole. At the congress of Florence in 1974, where several anti-communist political, clerical, intellectual and Arbëresh groups were represented, it was stated that the form of the regime would be chosen after the liberation of Albania. Leka Zogu was asked not to become an obstacle for the union. However this organization recognized Legality some political advantages. The organization published the newspaper "Koha Jonë".

In the years 1967 - 1968 new attempts were made to strengthen the union of political emigration, using Legality as the axis. These efforts were made under the motto of creating the United Front ". It would include the League of Prizren, Federation" Fire ", BKI, KSHL, Balli i Bashkuar, Tripalëshi, etc. minister of the "royal court", who visited the centers of emigration around the world, to stop quarrels and to promote activity against the communist regime. Legality convened its first congress in exile in November 1962. A. Kupa instructed N. Kote and S. Damani to give this organization a democratic organizational structure, establishing its Central Committee in continuation of the Zogist principles of the congress of 1943 in Zall Herr of Tirana. Thus were created the governing bodies: the National Council with honorary chairman A. Kupa of 50 members as an elder and the "Central Committee" Zogist with S. Damani of 27 members and an office in New York, with secretary Reshat Agaj. The program was drafted, the statute of an internal regulation of the party. Her program spoke of "the Homeland of the King"; "Homeland above all"; "ensuring a free ethnic, democratic and royal Albania, led by the king; strengthening the fight against communism; cleansing Legality from opposing elements"; protests against the Yugoslavs for oppression in Kosovo, etc. From the 1960s OKLL intensified its anti-communist activity, competing with other groups, especially BK, BKI; Legality introduced its people to the Vatra organization, organized Zogist branches in several countries, increased the publication of leaflets "Fatherland", "Boyhood", "Consciousness", etc. It should be noted that OKLL began diversionary actions against the communist regime, especially after the meeting of Madrid of 1972, with the main organizer Leka Zogun.

In the 60s, three factions appeared in OKLL: the first led by Leka Zogu, who had already been proclaimed "king", with followers of the "royal court", the second, led by the leaders Nuçi Kota, Selim Damani, Fuat Myftia etc., which had the majority of the Zogists; the third, headed by G. Gogon. In 1968 S. Damani resigned as general secretary due to numerous quarrels. Teki Xhindi, who had been a ballistic exponent during the war, was elected in his place. In 1966 S. Damani was re-elected, who came with the program of starting a democratization process in the ranks of Legality, which was done at the instigation of the Americans.<sup>2</sup>

In the '60s and '70s in the ranks of Legality there were quarrels between the branches of this organization, especially after the congress of 1974, when some leaders like Adem Hodo left, etc. In 1968 Leka Zogu also went to the USA, who was received by the leaders of Vatra, and those of BKI. He also met with H. Dosti. S. Damani requested that November 28 be celebrated jointly by all groups. In Rome, E. Koliqi gave his consent, but he did not take any commitments without the approval of the BKI leadership. A. Ermenji refused to discuss the issue of unification, claiming that: "Balli Agrar does not want to be tarnished in

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<sup>2</sup> Newspaper "Shqipëria e Re", December 1966, p.4

cooperation with the collaborators of the fascists". S. Damani called A. Ermenji a saboteur of the war against communism and demanded to be expelled from the National Front.

Controversy was added to other issues as well. The BKI declared that it did not recognize the 1928 Statute of the Monarchy. Zogu was freely elected king in 1928 and never recognized the occupation of Albania by Italy nor the 1945 elections in Albania.

Legality accused the blockers of being "history speculators", of "totalitarians",<sup>3</sup> as related to the massacre of 4 February 1944 etc. Legality also accused Balli Agrar of falling into the hands of the Slavs, after participating in the Agrarian International, while Balli responded with counter-accusations that the Zogists had sold Albania in 1924, for the murders of patriots B. Curri, H. Prishtina, etc.<sup>4</sup>

The New York SCTL demanded the unification of the Albanian diaspora, the concentration of everyone's efforts to really fight the communist rule in Albania ".<sup>5</sup> On the issue of union, each group set its own terms. These moments were also influenced by the condition set by Leka Zogu for the union. He demanded the imposition of the monarchy which was unacceptable to others. Thus, this initiative was extinguished without success. S. Damani came to the conclusion that, in order to create a united front, it was necessary that the leaderships of the organizations should be changed, bringing young people from the age of mentality.<sup>6</sup> Ai gave the first example, excluding some persons from the branches of Legality, as elderly and disabled, some even left as suspects that they had connections with the government of Tirana.<sup>7</sup> This action sparked controversy in the ranks of Legality and its factions, and made many dissatisfied. Even the BKI, demoralized, wrote in its leaflet that "24 years are being spent without any hope of salvation ... the will for anti-communist resistance is weakening ... today the quarrel reigns between us, rather than the idea against the common enemy .. "Freedom fighters are leaving the trenches of resistance and are devoting themselves to their own affairs. The political diaspora is turning into an economic diaspora."<sup>8</sup>

In fact, this was a natural and logical process, as the long period would take its toll and this emigration, with all the longing for the homeland and family members left in Albania, as well as the hatred for the communist dictatorship, could not stay forever in trenches of political war.

In the early 1970s Balli Agrar also accused some ballistas such as Can Tahiri, Prek Dushi, Mark Pashku, Ndre Vashaj of collaborating with the UDB for the displacement of Albanians from Yugoslavia.<sup>9</sup>

In the '70s attempts were made again for unification. Immigration was divided into over 25 main groups. On the initiative and under the direction of Leka Zogu and Xh. Deva, from July 31 to August 2, 1972 in Madrid, where the "royal court" was also, the meeting of the main leaders of anti-communist emigration groups took place, with the exception of the Agra Front of the Kosovo League. I. Vërlaci did not participate either, but sent a BKI observer, because he wanted to resolve the disputes on the issue of the king of the monarchy first. There L. Zogu, based on Legality, raised the need for the participants to unite in order to increase the effectiveness of his activities against the communist regime and to face the expected events in the Mediterranean Balkans. From this meeting an act was reached - an agreement to continue the consultations. The matter was entrusted to a steering council composed of participating groups, which met again on 23 November 1972, when the number

<sup>3</sup> Flamuri newspaper, April 23, 1968, p. 6

<sup>4</sup> Flamuri newspaper, April 23, 1968, p. 6

<sup>5</sup> Newspaper "Free Albanian" October-November 1968, p. 4

<sup>6</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 9-10

<sup>7</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 10

<sup>8</sup> Newspaper "Albanie", August 15, 1968

<sup>9</sup> Besa newspaper, September 1969 - January 1970, p. 3; Bulletin and BK. 1970, f. 65



of participants was further limited. Even in the meetings of 1973, 1974 and 1975 of this consultative body no concrete results were achieved.

The New York SCTL tried to lead the union of political emigration when Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact and when China approached the US in 1972.

Efforts to unite continued. After the Madrid meeting, many efforts were made to increase the propaganda against the communist regime and to reorganize new branches, to increase the ranks and especially to include the new generation in this anti-communist and patriotic activity.

To "wake up" the Albanian diaspora, L. Zogu continued his diversionist actions, advertised the "national army", demanded the activation of the new generations, etc. The New York SCTL did not want L. Zogu to appear as a figure of this union. BK did not accept the demands of the monarchy, although different ballistas were for compromise. A. Ermenji called Leka Zogu an adventurer and immature, while I. Vërlaci called him a worthless man who had to be isolated. There were also Zogists, who rose up against him. Legality was getting closer to the Hearth to realize the union.

In May 1970, the president of the New York City Council paid a visit to Europe to study the situation of Albanian political refugees in England, France, Italy, the FRY, etc.<sup>10</sup>. In the same year, Vasil Germenji, a member of the KSHL, was elected chairman of the "Assembly of Captive Nations". For the holiday of November 28, 1970, the SCTL received congratulations from Richard G. Johnson, Director of Foreign Affairs at the State Department for Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania.<sup>11</sup> In 1970 Abaz Ermenji went to visit the USA<sup>12</sup>. There he was awarded the "Eisenhower" medal of the "captive nations" FROM communism as one of the most worthy representatives of the "Albanian resistance", in the capacity of chairman of the Democratic National Committee "Free Albania"<sup>13</sup>. Lidhur me këtë Vasil Andoni theksoonte se A. Ermenji hapi shtegun e bashkpunimit me drejtuesit e politikës amerikane<sup>14</sup>. Also in May of this year, Eqrem Bardha, secretary of BK in Detroit (USA) was elected deputy. president of the "Assembly of Captive Nations".

In 1970 BK tried to strongly underline the patriotic and nationalist character of this organization. The bulletins of BK emphasized that: "BK can not become a tool of imperialism and colonialism, because it fights for the integrity and complete independence of Albania"<sup>15</sup>. She claimed that during her life in exile in the outside world, BK is the voice of the truth and of the Albanian nation, and that this opinion was shared by many American and foreign personalities. It was emphasized that BK and the Kosovar League are actively interested in protecting the rights of Albanians outside the political borders of today's Albania. BK "aims to expand the circle of understanding and cooperation for the salvation of Albania, both in the outside world and in the Albanian world"<sup>16</sup>. BK underlined that "Albania's future will not depend only on the development of international events, but also on the work and struggle of BK". BK had a great influence, inside and outside the country.

Balli Kombëtar expressed its determination for a good policy and relations with its neighbors, but underlined that "With our two neighbors, Yugoslavia and Greece, we are divided by the issue of Kosovo and that of Chameria."<sup>17</sup>.

In OCTOBER 1970 Balli Agrar held its 7th congress, where it decided to continue the resistance against the communist regime. The US State Department sent a congratulatory

<sup>10</sup> Gazeta Shqipëria e Lirë, April - July 1970, p. 4

<sup>11</sup> Gazeta Shqipëria e Lirë, November - December 1970, p. 1

<sup>12</sup> Gazeta Besa, June 10, 1970, p. 1

<sup>13</sup> Gazeta Besa, January 1970, p. 1

<sup>14</sup> Bulletin of BK, 1970, p.51

<sup>15</sup> Bulletin of the BK congress, 1970, p.64

<sup>16</sup> Bulletin of the BK congress, 1970, p.66

<sup>17</sup> Bulletin of the BK congress, 1970, p..54

telegram to the ballistic congress. H. Fulci also sent a congratulatory telegram, where he wrote: "It is very encouraging the way in which BK has maintained its goal over the years as well as its continuous efforts to plan logically and act decisively in it. "Such planning and such actions are a sure guarantee that this organization has a future." The "Eisenhower" medal of the "captive nations" was also decorated, for the anti-communist war, by the ballist's friend, Senator Williams S. Broomfield, a member of the US Congress and the Committee on Foreign Affairs<sup>18</sup>. The celebration organized by BK on November 28, 1971 in the city of Hackensack was also attended by the American Minister of Justice, Frank J. Keily<sup>19</sup>, who kept his word.

In 1970, Leka Zogu went to the USA and was echoed by the "Vatra" organization and its organ Dielli, calling him the king of the Albanians. This did not please the ballistas, who protested<sup>20</sup>.

In November 1971 in New York was held the second congress of the League of Prizren under the chairmanship of Xh. Deva, etc., attended by R. Krasniqi, T. Kolgjini, A. Kupi, Dr. I. Vërlaci, H. Begeja, Fuat Myftia, Sali Myftia, Ndue Gjonmarkaj, V. Germenji etc., of the organizations Legality, BKI, BK etc.<sup>21</sup>. Xh. Deva sought the cooperation of all groups in exile. On this occasion, the President of BKI, I. Vërlaci paid a visit to the US to strengthen the work in the ranks of Albanian emigration and spoke about cooperation with other groups, while Deputy. the president of BKI, Ndue Gjonmarkaj sought unconditional union and left Italy for permanent residence in the USA in 1971. At the same time, the leaders of the New York SSC, V. Germenji and R. Krasniqi made a trip to Europe, and as members of the "Assembly of Captive Nations" met various leaders. Stavro Skëndi, visited London, Vienna, Vatican, West Berlin, where he got in touch with the fugitives and gave lectures on "Albanian national awakening"<sup>22</sup>

In 1972 the US authorities declared that the New York SCTL, as well as other committees of fugitives from communist countries, would no longer be funded by funds provided by the "Free Europe Committee". The SCTL stated that it would act on its own<sup>23</sup>.

In July-August 1972, the Madrid meeting for the unification of the Albanian emigration took place, with the initiative of Leka Zogu and under the chairmanship of Xh. Deva, which was also attended by Western journalists. In the same year, especially in the USA, the Albanian emigration celebrated the 60th anniversary of independence with greatness and unity. The director of the State Department's Eastern Europe office, Richard G. Johnson, congratulated the SSC. Also on December 23, 1972, Pope Paul II spoke about the "silent church" in Albania in front of the college of cardinals.<sup>24</sup>

In 1973 political emigration continued the second phase of the Madrid meeting which again failed to achieve the desired unification on a single front. In 1973, Hafez Jusuf Azemi, the leader of the Kosovo League, was invited to the inauguration ceremony of Nixon's second term<sup>25</sup>. Father Daniel Gjeçaj was appointed by the Vatican as the representative of the Albanian Catholics in exile on May 31 of this year.<sup>26</sup>

The same year the congress of the Kosovo League was held, which was greeted by the special assistant to President Nixon, William J. Baroody Junior, John A. Baker Jr. Director of the Eastern European Office of Foreign Affairs at the State Department; J. V. Fulbright-Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Jacob Th. Moller - Director of the

<sup>18</sup> Gazeta Besa, January 1970, p.1

<sup>19</sup> Gazeta Besa, December 23, 1971, p.6

<sup>20</sup> Gazeta Besa, 10 qershor 1970, f.3

<sup>21</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, nëntor - dhjetor 1971, f. 3

<sup>22</sup> Shqiptari i Lirë Shqiptari i Lirë, shtator - tetor, 1970, f. 3

<sup>23</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, janar-qershor 1972, f. 1

<sup>24</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, December 1972, p. 1

<sup>25</sup> Gazeta Besa, March 1973, p.2

<sup>26</sup> Gazeta Besa, March 1973, p.1

UN Human Rights Section, Harry Fulc, etc.<sup>27</sup>. The congress was also greeted by the head of Croatian emigration, Tomislav Nesic, who called for a joint struggle against the Titoist and Serb centralist regime, which was striving for the subjugation of Croats and Albanians in Yugoslavia.

In 1974, BKI leaders denounced talks held in November 1971 in New York, claiming that Legality had taken arbitrary action.<sup>28</sup>

Halim Begeja was against the participation of the League of Prizren in this union, as it was fighting for Kosovo and that it should take a political position properly and not compromise with Yugoslavia<sup>29</sup>.

The editor of Diellit Athanas Gegaj criticized some people who were against BKI of Legality, etc., There were many anonymous letters denouncing each other. The ballistic, legalist, blockist, etc. press published slander and unmasking facts about each other by their leaders. Reshat Agaj described this climate as evidence that: "our exile has lost its historical perspective and the eyes of the mind and conscience have been darkened ... this feature of ours (quarrel), together with foreign influences among us, tore to pieces a diaspora that has made so many sacrifices..."<sup>30</sup>

Also in 1974, the Vatican promoted the priest of the Albanian-American Catholic Church in New York, Zef Oroshi<sup>31</sup>.

Legality held the 5th Congress in New York, where one of its leaders, Reshat Agaj stated that the regime in Albania has no way of collapsing from within, it will collapse from an external catastrophe, from some special circumstances and events that will to reverse the situation in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. He declared pathos that "our hopes are hanging on the uncompromising Albanian youth"<sup>32</sup>. The concern was also expressed at this congress that UDB was being activated in the Albanian diaspora; that the Yugoslav embassy had become the center of espionage and had established links with some elements of their old servants. It was emphasized that UDB had shown great interest in the political activities of the Legality and the League of Prizren and that it was using some of the economic emigrants to observe the movements of these organizations.<sup>33</sup>

After the sentencing of B. Balluku, political emigration propagated that there was turmoil and conspiracies in Albania. I. Vërlaci, E. Koliqi, etc., talked about the activities of Soviet agencies in Albania. They expressed concern that the BS wanted to restore control in Albania, while the West was interested in Albania's independence, regardless of the regime.

At this time, the idea of creating a government in exile, which was propagated by Leka Zogu, was launched again. I. Vërlaci opposed this slogan, stating that the "Russian-Yugoslavs" would benefit from it, who at the opportune moment would use this government as a pretext for the creation of a liberated region, which would be followed by intervention by out.

In April - May 1975 N. Sokoli traveled from Yugoslavia and visited the USA and Europe. He was trying to set up an immigration organization. According to Albanian intelligence, this organization would be ready for operations in Albania and that the Russians were preparing an invasion of Albania through Yugoslavia.

In 1978, after the breakdown of relations with China, Albanian political emigration increased its activity. At this time the president of the American Legion of New York,

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<sup>27</sup> Bulletin of the congress of the Kosovo League, 1973, p.82 – 83

<sup>28</sup> Bulletin of the BK congress, 1974, p.19

<sup>29</sup> Legalitel Bulletin, 1974, p. 55 - 56

<sup>30</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1974, p. 55 - 56

<sup>31</sup> Gazeta Besa, May 1974, p. 4

<sup>32</sup> Bulletin of the Congress of Legality, 1974, p. 55 - 56

<sup>33</sup> Bulletin of the Congress of Legality, 1974, p. 38

Raimondi, decorated the president of the KSHL, R. Krasniqi, the priest Zef Oroshi, Odhise Dhima, etc., for anti-communist activities<sup>34</sup> In September 1978, the Albanian Catholic Church in the USA was inaugurated, led by Mr. Oroshi.

In May 1980, the municipality of Paris invited and allowed a group of fugitives to inaugurate, on their own initiative, Skanderbeg Square in Paris, attended by V. Germenji of the New York KSHL, ballista, zogist, etc. On this occasion, another wafer in the cathedral of Paris "Notre Dame de Paris".

In 1980, Legality held its 7th congress in New York, where N. Bajraktari declared that "we have never been in such a favorable time alongside the military movements of some states to find a way to liberate our country from the communist yoke. All world turmoil favors full organization and close cooperation among all"<sup>35</sup> Ndue P. Gjonmarkaj stated that there was a deep crisis in Albania and this fact was shown day by day by all those boys who were fleeing from communist terror. In November 1980 from South Africa, L. Zogu sent a message to the branches of Legality calling for the unification of immigration; for the "liberation" of Albania and for the creation of "ethnic Albania". Also in December 1980 - February 1981 he paid a visit to Europe and the USA to seek support and assistance. In the US he attended President Reagan's inauguration ceremony. There he met the Secretary of State, Heig, some senators and MPs, etc.

Leka also participated in the American Veterans Seminar, where he spoke and gave an interview about his plans to overthrow the communist regime in Tirana. In July 1981 he discussed his plans with several English explorers, inside and outside England, about the prospect of his struggle to establish bases in Albania and Kosovo, pending the appropriate situation.

Prior to the breakdown of Tito's relations with Stalin, the National Front had set as a program the liberation of Kosovo with the help of the United States and Western powers. Later, due to the good relations between the USA and Yugoslavia, Balli Kombëtar focused on denouncing discrimination and oppression of Albanians in Yugoslavia, without emphasizing the rapid unification of Kosovo with Albania. The patriotic activity of Balli Kombëtar was evident, even underlined by the Yugoslav government which claimed that in 1968, 1981, etc., BK promoted the events in Kosovo and the Albanian areas in Yugoslavia with ethnic ideas.

Until the 1990s, the Balli Kombëtar Agrar consisted of three factions: that of A. Ermenji with English influence, that of the Kosovar League with American support, and that of A. Andoni with which he was supported by the Americans and the Italians, as a centrist group. In general, Balli Kombëtar, whether traditional or agrarian, after the '70s strengthened ties with the Americans, without giving up cooperation with the British, etc.

In 1977 Legality forcibly denounced "all those persons, entities or states which, arbitrarily, secretly or openly, sign treaties or draw up plans contrary to our legitimate political, political and organizational rights, which violate the integrity, sovereignty and the freedom of our country"<sup>36</sup>.

Cracks and divisions within the ranks of Legality continued in the '80s between the leaders Fuat Myftia, Abedin Mulosmani, etc. Legality also clashed with the Vatra organization when some of its leaders supported legalists in it. At the 1977 congress some minor changes were made to the statute and membership in the governing forums was increased from 50 to 81 members and from 25 to 36 members. In November 1982, the group of Nderim Kupi, son of Abaz Kupi and former secretary general of OKLL, was removed from the presidency of the congress, after the events of 1981 in Kosovo and after the annihilation of the group of Xhevdet Mustafa in Albania. The chairman was Fuat Myftia, with a long

<sup>34</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, 1978, p. 1

<sup>35</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1980, p. 25

<sup>36</sup> Bulletin of the OKLL Congress, 1977, p. 6

activity in the ranks of Legality. Another group with Xhemal Laçi, Isuf Begeja, etc., dissatisfied with the actions of L. Zogu, made efforts to create "True Legality". Legality made numerous efforts to bring Kosovars into exile and inside Kosovo. Some of them became close to this organization, especially Zog in the 1950s, and later the Kosovar political diaspora created its own organization. Thus Legality at the end of the Cold War had few Kosovars in its ranks. However, it maintained ties with the League of Prizren, etc., as well as had activities within Kosovo, other Albanian areas in the former Yugoslavia.

In the 1970s and 1980s, several diversionist groups from the ranks of political emigration were formed. The most important were:

"Albanian Anti-Socialist Resistance Front" (FRASH) created in 1973 in New York, with leaders Vasil Germenji, Rexhep Krasniqi, Idriz Lamaj, Abdyl Banushi, etc. The front had several branches in Italy, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Sweden, FRY, Belgium, Canada, etc. Many fugitives were engaged, especially former saboteurs, who organized themselves into small groups. In 1974, the Front established a youth organization in Milan, called the "Joint Committee of the Albanian Neo-Fascist Youth Branches for Europe", which did not have a long life and no important activity, except for throwing some anti-communist tracts. The groups "Hamit Matjani" and "Mujo Ulqinaku" also operated in the ranks of FRASH in the years 1977 and 1978. "The High Military Council" established in December 1976 in Madrid headed by Leka Zogu; political advisor Selim Damani and military advisor, Xhemal Laçi, secretary of the "Royal Court", Isuf Begeja and member Abedin and Hysen Mulosmani, Idriz Beqen (Basha), Honor of Petrit Kupi, Ramiz Dani, Hasan Hoxha, Mark Doda, etc., anti-communist elements who had acted illegally in Albania, declared to immigrants and journalists in Canada in 1976 that the Military Council had drawn up concrete plans for military action to overthrow the communist regime in Albania, plans which it would carry out because there would be support from outside and inside the country. the "information office" headed by Leka Zogu, for the preparation and distribution of propaganda materials and to echo the actions of the Albanian anti-communist emigration. his plans, L. Zogu in 1976, began efforts to create a "volunteer army", which would be used "in the fight to overthrow the communist regime in Albania" and compiled lists of this army. To this end, he began recruiting various anti-communist elements, opened courses and trained several individuals in special courses and schools in various western countries. But this activity encountered great difficulties and had more the forms of an unattainable adventure.

Also, in the same years, several small groups with a diversionary nature were created, such as: "The Exporter of Freedom in Albania" established in 1971 in Switzerland and the "Committee for Human Rights", established in 1976 in the FRY, which were especially specialized in anti-communist propaganda; the group "Iliria", created in 1977 in Brussels by Durak Duraku and Ramiz Basha; the group "Koçi Xoxe" created by the UDB in 1979 in France and Yugoslavia; the "National Union", created in 1976 in the USA; the group "Besa-Besa", created in 1981 in Belgium; the group "Black Hand", created in 1981 in Belgium and France and in 1982 in the USA;" Albanian Nationalist Secret Organization "(ONSSH), created in 1981 in the USA by followers of Tuk Jakova, etc., who made propaganda against the communist leadership; "Albanian Anti-Communist Organizations in Exile", established in 1982 in the USA; in Greece with branches in the USA, Canada, Australia and the "Military Command for the Liberation of Albania" which self-proclaimed in 1983 and made intense propaganda against the Albanian communist leadership. Likewise, as groups with sensitive activities, inside and outside Albania, in the meantime have also acted Legality, Albanian Heroism, New York SAC, the Catholic League, the Albanian Democratic Union, the Albanian Covenant, the Cham League, Muslim groups, etc.

The participation of political immigrants in various organizations was generally massive but there was also a category of immigrants who stayed away from political activities

and devoted themselves only to their private life and professional career. There is no clear data to understand the level of activism in the organizations and political activities of this emigration.

Even from the Albanian economic diaspora from all regions, only a part of it, cooperated with the Albanian anti-communist emigration. The communist government of Tirana tried by all means to prevent this cooperation in order to keep political emigration as isolated and less influential as possible.

Anti-communist political immigration was organized in different groups and organizations according to ideological approach but also personal relations between immigrants. During the cold period of the cold there were about 100 organizations, groups and fractions of political immigration. 9 fractions from the ballist's rows, 5 from legality, 7 from bki, 10 from kosovo emigration, 3 from qeva, 4 from anti-communist economic emigration, some two groups, 8 groups of vo.

Albanian anti-communist political emigration had a limited political experience and although created KSHL did not manage to create an anti-communist government abroad. District to chovinst neighbors has been great in the mass of this emigration. The neighborhood claims of the neighbors have been a great obstacle to his battle against the communist regime of Hoxha.

## **8.2. Anti-communist activity of political emigration 1961-1990**

The fourth phase of the political emigration war against the communist regime is considered that of the 1960s until the end of the 1980s, when emigrants sent to Albania on missions were few and operated in deeper conspiracy. At this stage there were mostly propaganda activities against the regime but also special cases of armed actions such as sending a special diversionist group or carrying out an attack against the regime's representations abroad.

### ***8.2.1. The regime's paranoia about plans and plots to overthrow it.***

It is important to distinguish the real activity and the real projects of the anti-communist emigration and the Western Powers for the overthrow of the communist regime from those imagined by the regime itself which, it must be said, invented in its consciousness many such plans, which today do not have been corroborated by various historical sources.

Albanian intelligence authorities were convinced that, in addition to attempts to organize conspiracies and uprisings against the regime, foreign secret services had drafted other plans with conspiratorial intentions, which included the participation of Albanian political emigration, but they remained on paper for one or the other reason, especially those after the 1960s, after the breakdown of relations with BS and when the "West-East blockade" was complete. According to the conviction of the communist rulers and their intelligence agencies, in order to secure the support of the Americans, Yugoslavs, Greeks, etc., both politically and in terms of intelligence, BS bargained with them at the expense of Albania, supporting their hostile plans. . According to Tirana, the "enemies of Albania" have already stepped up efforts to carry out conspiratorial plans through Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy and Albanian political emigration.

According to communist intelligence agencies, one of the failed plans has **been** plan for organizing the 1963 armed uprising.

In the years 1961-1963, the regime propagated that a major international conspiracy had been prepared against Albania, including the Albanian anti-communist emigration. In this context, it was said that the CIA also planned to organize an incident with the American

submarine, which would allegedly enter the Gulf of Vlora, and would give them the opportunity for intervention from outside the US.<sup>37</sup>

In the 1960s, according to the MIA, the CIA encouraged the UDB to organize groups of fugitives and Kosovars to present themselves as Albanian internal insurgent forces to justify outside intervention<sup>38</sup>. For these purposes, the UDB sent in the years 1961-63 groups of saboteurs led by Qazim Lusha, the Derti brothers, etc., it carried out the assassination of Hasan Spata and other intelligence operations. On the whole, the activity of Albanian emigration abroad expanded greatly. According to the allegations of the Ministry of Interior, in December A. Këlcyra went to the US State Department, where he presented a plan of action of the fugitives against Albania. "He considered the use of the Greek border as well as the sea for intervention and demanded weapons from the Americans."<sup>39</sup> At this time S. Kryeziu wrote to M. Bajraktar that A. Këlcyra had told him that an agreement should be made with the Yugoslavs<sup>40</sup>. Hoxha wrote that A. Kupa called on the fugitives to unite, explaining that L. Zogu had been assigned tasks by the Americans and the British for the liberation of Albania"<sup>41</sup> For Tirana, this plan was made more credible by the invitation of L. Zogu to London by the Minister of Aviation Xh. Emery, MP Maklin, D. Smajli, P. Kemp et al <sup>42</sup>. There was also information that E. Koliqi was showing great interest in the fugitives and BKI people in Yugoslavia and, according to information held by the Albanian intelligence services, before the diversionist groups were sent to Albania, talks would be held with the Yugoslav authorities. for the use of the border and for free passage on Yugoslav land<sup>43</sup>.

According to the information of the Ministry of Interior, a quarrel started in the BKI at this time, because Kol Bib Mirakaj had made a lot of concessions to the Yugoslavs<sup>44</sup>. Whereas the leadership of BKI accepted the Yugoslav aid for the liberation of Albania, but "not the Yugoslav command". After that K. B. Mirakaj had left the secretariat of BKI and had stated that "I am ready to cooperate with any country, just to fight the Tirana regime"<sup>45</sup>.

He, together with Ago Agaj, had made a statement of thanks to the Yugoslav government for the assistance provided to the Albanian emigration<sup>46</sup>.

The Albanian government found that in the 1960s Tito's emissaries were increasingly circulating in Western countries, where they met with Albanian emigrants such as E. Koliqi, Kol Bib Mirakaj, etc., for joint activities against her. According to the Albanian intelligence, the head of BKI, E. Koliqi, also cooperated with UDB, maintaining close direct relations with officers Dushan Mugosha, Mile Lumomihoviqi, Gjergj Gega, etc., and through Hajrullah Ishmi, Hasan Kaleshi, Hajdar Taipi, etc. They claimed that in 1961, Ernest Koliqi, through his agent Sabri Domi, had prepared a list of fugitives in the West, which he had given to the UDB. While in November - December 1962, I. Vërlaci and E. Koliqi, made a series of visits to France, Belgium, Austria and the FRY, where they met with fugitives and UDB cadres. In Paris, E. Koliqi also went to the Yugoslav embassy and talked about the state of emigration to France, Belgium, etc.<sup>47</sup>. Thus, the Albanian intelligence authorities had come to the conclusion that the plot was real and in preparation.

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<sup>37</sup> AMPB, year 1963, file 883, p. 32

<sup>38</sup> D. Smajli, Albanian task, 1984, p. 251

<sup>39</sup> D. Smajli, Albanian task, 1984, p. 251

<sup>40</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p. 99

<sup>41</sup> E. Hoxha, *The Anglo-American Danger for Albania ...*, p. 414

<sup>42</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p. 94

<sup>43</sup> AMPB, year 1963, file 13, p. 125

<sup>44</sup> AMPB, year 1963, file 13, p. 137

<sup>45</sup> AMPB, year 1963, file 13/3, p. 149

<sup>46</sup> Newspaper *Shqipëria e Re*, July 1963, p. 3

<sup>47</sup> AMPB, year 1965, file 868, p. 121

The key person for the implementation of this conspiracy, the Ministry of Interior considered P. Plaku, who walked "Kosovo together with Fadil Hoxha" and said that "soon Kosovo will become with Albania and, both together, will make the republic of 7 of Yugoslavia"<sup>48</sup>. P. The old man also went to BS. According to the Albanian intelligence, it was said that in the Khrushchev-Tito-Mugosha-Plaku talks in Moscow, a plan was drawn up to overthrow the situation in Albania and that P. Plaku would become prime minister<sup>49</sup>. So in Tirana they believed that the Tito-Khrushchev cooperation was active in the efforts to overthrow the government of Tirana.

The suspicions increased further because in the 60's the Patriarchate also made a large campaign against the Albanian autocephalous church in Turkey. KEVA, led by P. Kotokon, increased the calls for the liberation of Albania and for the autonomy of North Epirus, ensuring that in this regard Greece would have the help of Yugoslavia. In 1962, syllogism meetings were held to discuss CIA funding for the mobilization and preparation of 500-600 young people fleeing Albania and 300 fugitives sent to Ellasona for training.

So great was the disorientation of the Albanian intelligence services that they mistakenly or deliberately thought biasedly that some BK leaders were echoing Greek claims and supporting the "law of war" to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania. . In fact, this was a completely wrong perception and the opposite of the attitudes held by BK towards the independence and integrity of Albania.

Concerns about the regime were also created by the fact that the Paris Ballistic Committee called on emigrants to be ready for the fight for the true independence of Albania. The same call was made by K. B. Mirakaj, who added that it had to be prepared for any situation, since Albania was a link in the international chain that could not be solved separately. According to him, the issue of the monarchy had already been resolved, because in 1961, after the death of A. Zogu, the Americans and the British had approved the continuation of the monarchy and had recognized his son Leka Zogu as king, appointing to him the advisers of himself, namely General Blomberg and Peter Kempin, both experienced detectives in anti-communist activities.

The regime's suspicions were heightened again by another plot following the denunciation of the Warsaw Pact. On September 13, 1968, the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania denounced the Warsaw Pact, signed on May 14, 1955. Western countries welcomed the withdrawal of the Republic of Albania from this treaty. For its part, the BS concentrated large military forces in Bulgaria. The communist regime, instead of approaching the West, felt even more frustrated and toughened its repressive policies within the country as well as its hostility to Albanian political emigration.

E. Hoxha had invented in his head a Soviet-American plan approved in Glasgow in 1968, after the withdrawal of the RPSH from T. Warsaw and after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the BS, which allegedly foresaw various activities against the communist government, pressure, various threats, blackmail and misinformation<sup>50</sup>. The regime was afraid that the RPSH would be attacked by Yugoslavia, creating pretexts and incidents through Kosovars on the border and then the Yugoslav army entering the wide front to take all of Albania within 24 - 48 hours. Equally frightening to him were the rumors that the BS would also incite its agents in Albania, with high positions in the Party and power, to break the popular resistance created by a pro-Soviet government. There was also talk of an attack by Yugoslavia and Greece at the instigation of the United States, with the aim of occupying and dividing Albania between them. It was said that there was another variant for the occupation of Albania by Greece with the consent of the USA. It was said that BS guaranteed the US for

<sup>48</sup> AMPB, year 1965, file 868, p. 122

<sup>49</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 1-2

<sup>50</sup> E. Hoxha, *Titists*, ... p. 580



the first option, as it considered other plans dangerous due to the uneasy situation in Greece. The Soviets had also spread information that China would only make noise and take no action to protect the RPSH.

All movements and actions of political and even economic emigration were viewed with great suspicion and concern by the regime.

The frustration of the regime was so great that even the concerns that the Pan-Albanian Federation "Vatra" had for the independence of the country in the new situation, interpreted them as a preparation and call for conspiracy. The information that Xh. Deva was cooperating with Kosovo leaders on the Kosovo issue<sup>51</sup>. It was alleged that the ballistas were inciting the attack against the communist regime, emphasizing that Albania was already outside T. Warsaw and was no longer guaranteed by the members of the Pact<sup>52</sup>.

After the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, in fact, BK once again raised the alarm that Albania was in danger<sup>53</sup>. In 1968 when Spiros Agnew, of Greek origin, was elected deputy. US President (with Nixon), Hafez Jusuf Azemi, member of the Central Committee of the Kosovo League, wrote a letter to Charlotte Reid, expressing doubt that Agnew could act to the detriment of Albania and Kosovo, supporting Athens for its goals. But as Sh. Both Reid and Nixon made reassuring statements<sup>54</sup>. In Tirana, even these efforts were assessed as dangers and hostile actions against the Albanian communist leadership which, as always, continued to identify its power with the homeland.

Yes at this time, egerem bardha, a member of the bk committee in detroit, was received by president nixon who stated that "all americans, regardless of their national origin, enjoy my special care ... I have a special interest in everyone peoples living under communist oppression"<sup>55</sup>.

On the 60th anniversary of the sun, the cardinals attended in new york<sup>56</sup> the cooks of new york and cushing of boston, who delivered the occasional speeches. On april 25, 1968, pope paul ii received albanian political refugees in the vatican on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of skanderbeg, where from april 24 to 26, several activities took place in rome and 1968 was designated as the year of holidays for skanderbeg. In these manifestations participated e. Koliqi, karl gurakuqi, nexhat peshkëpia, ndue gjonmarkaj, rakip frashëri, martin camaj, dudushe and hava këlcyrë, the leadership of the organization vatra<sup>57</sup> etc. Bk greeted the pope of rome on this holiday, emphasizing that "an eternal gratitude goes to the holy see in rome for the pontifical document that it spread latinly on january 17, 1968, in the spirit of his holiness paul ii. This high document and noble, in expression and content for the albanian nation ... It is an invaluable gift that is given to us on this day doubly mourning"<sup>58</sup>.

The anglo-albanian friendship association and the british league demonstrated against the communist regime in november 1969 in hyde park, london.

Hafiz jusuf azemi and qazim prodani visited ankara, in charge of a mission of the organization of the captive nations, in january 1969, where they were received by ibrahim shefki atasogu, president of the turkish senate, and senator fethi tevetoglu, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. for NATO and for TPE etc., in the presence of local and foreign journalists.

In May 1968, the president of KSHL, R. Krasniqi paid a visit to Europe: in London, Paris, Bonn and Rome, to coordinate the activity with political emigrants.

<sup>51</sup> Besa Newspaper,, 28 November 1968, p.2

<sup>52</sup> Besa Newspaper, February 7, 1968, p. 6

<sup>53</sup> Besa Newspaper, February 7, 1968, p. 6

<sup>54</sup> Gazeta Besa, September 1969 - January 1970, p. 2

<sup>55</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, March - August 1968, p. 1

<sup>56</sup> Gazeta Besa, March 1968, p. 1

<sup>57</sup> Besa newspaper, September 1969-January 1970

<sup>58</sup> Besa newspaper, September 1969-January 1970

In the 1970s, political emigration was activated in various ways. After the fall of Rankovi dhe and the withdrawal of Albania from the Warsaw Pact, when the Yugoslav government gave some freedoms to Kosovo and allowed the expansion of Tirana's contacts with Pristina, Enver Hoxha was afraid that there was a Yugoslav plan to influence liberal forces through Kosovo. in Albania and thus made possible the connection of Albania with Kosovo in the framework of Yugoslavia. Concern was added by a statement by a UDB agent (Qazim Gojani), who said that the Yugoslavs had a plan that they were implementing, using Albanian and Kosovar emigration to overthrow the communist government in Albania.

The Tirana government was concerned that, appreciating the anti-communist activity of ballistas and legalists in the US and elsewhere, the mayor of Hackensack (USA) had declared Albanian-American Independence Week on November 24-30, 1969<sup>59</sup>. The conjectures of the communists went so far as to believe that, at the Glasgow summit and later, the Americans and the Soviets had made plans against the RPSH. In the Soviet version, the creation of incidents by Kosovars and the Yugoslav military attack were foreseen. In this case the Soviets would activate their agents who held high positions in the Party and in power to break the resistance of the regime and form a pro-Soviet government. This plan would be imposed on the Yugoslavs.

In the 1970s, emigration waged a vigorous denunciation campaign at the initiative of the New York SCTL, which described Albania as a major concentration camp. The anti-religious campaign of the regime was also denounced. The most active support for political immigration in this regard came from the Vatican.

Attempts were made by the State Security to argue that due to the failure of the plot, led by B Balluku, Albanian emigration abroad was thrown into terrorist acts, such as the planting of bombs in Albanian embassies. The Albanian intelligence had received information that the fugitive leaders had claimed that the coup plotters had links with a general in Belgrade, through a liaison channel through Montenegro, and had established links with legal leaders abroad. Nik Sokoli, had claimed that B. Balluku had been connected with Moscow, through Belgrade and the plot would be implemented in 1974. He even added that measures had been taken and the bases had been prepared. According to M. Bajraktar, the conspirators were connected with Moscow through the Yugoslavs, while according to R. Krasniqi, the activity of the conspirators had started in 1960. But this was mostly a propaganda of political emigration to increase diversion and pressure in the ranks of the communist ruling clique. in Albania.

Leka Zogu appeared most active in the 70s. The distance did not prevent him from systematically continuing his activities against the communist regime. He frequently visited his loyalists operating in Europe. To echo his actions and increase his authority, in 1976 Leka told Canadian journalists that the Military Council had drawn up concrete plans for military action to overthrow the communist regime in Albania, plans which would be realized because had support from outside and inside the country. According to N. P. Gjonmarkaj, Leka had tasked the Military Council to organize large-scale acts against Tirana's representations abroad, but without making a fuss as before. The actions had to be well studied carefully. Constantly, but especially in the 1970s, L. Zogu made efforts to secure cash and weapons aid from the Shah of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Libya, South Africa, and so on. He made sensational visits to political immigration centers in the USA, Canada, France, Belgium, England, Egypt, Australia, etc., where he gave interviews or statements to state authorities, international institutions, press and radio agencies, etc. Leka organized meetings for the 50th anniversary of the Albanian monarchy and dressed as king. He had gathered around him Albanian and Kosovar emigrants. According to Hoxha, he was activating them especially to

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<sup>59</sup> Gazeta Besa, September 1969, January 1970, p. 2

"prepare a military force the size of a battalion to capture, in a certain situation, neuralgic points in the city of Tirana, then immediately seek the help of the " free world ". for the overthrow of the popular power and the creation of "Greater Albania"<sup>60</sup>. The Albanian authorities were even informed that he had compiled lists of ex-military fugitives or others in exile at gunpoint, that he had established the bases for training saboteurs, etc., in an attempt to give his group's followers the character of a regular army, also giving ranks and titles. For these purposes, Selim Damani wrote letters to many Kosovars fleeing for military training in the years 1976 - 1982. L. Zogu provided funds for this purpose in the form of assistance from his friends, Albanians and foreigners, anti-communists.

After the demonstrations of the spring of 1981 in Kosovo, aid to the Albanian population of Kosovo intensified in the ranks of the Albanian diaspora, not to mention the fight against the Hoxha regime. There were rumors that the US and Italy had agreed with Yugoslavia to overthrow the regime in Albania, and that a conflict between Yugoslavia and Albania was expected. It was also said that BS also had a plan for intervention in Albania.

After the assassination of M. Shehu in December 1981, Enver Hoxha, declared that the enemies "tried to tax our pulse and shock us with a group of mercenaries and bandits paid" with the gang of Xh. Mustafa<sup>61</sup> According to the Albanian intelligence, over 100 fighters were trained in the courses and schools of foreign espionage of L. Zogu and that in the gang of Xh. Mustafa was activated by about 40 other Albanian and Kosovar fugitives, led by Hamit Luka, Nuhi Bajraktari. There were fears that Kosovar fugitives would be used in these intervention forces to justify the armed intervention. These were said to have been carefully selected by foreign spies especially the CIA and UDB.

#### ***8.2.2. Some of the methods and forms of activity against the communist regime***

Armed anti-communist diversionist acts have been extremely rare. The acts of political and military diversion were aimed at inciting unrest. XH's group also had this mission. MUSTAFA<sup>62</sup> which regime authorities said was the Yugoslavs who sent it to the Albanian coast<sup>63</sup>. The most prominent diversionary activity in the last years of the regime belongs to the action of Xhevdet Mustafa's group. Xhevdet Mustafa's group began organizing in 1980 in New Zealand, and landed in September 1982. Arming<sup>64</sup> of this group consisted of automatic pistols with barrels for noiseless shooting, binoculars for long-range shooting even at night with laser beams as well as for observation, interconnection between them. Xh. Mustafa used a US passport with a fake identity. He had left the US without the permission of the US police and judiciary. After this escape, he was also wanted by Interpol. He lived for several months in Rome, where he had connections with Mentor Çoku and in Yugoslavia.

After the landing and destruction of this group in Rrogozhina and Lushnja on September 26, 1982, foreign news agencies such as LFS, etc. gave the news according to the ATS communiqué on September 28. It was pointed out that Xhevdet Mustafa's name was unknown to foreign specialists in Albanian affairs, but it was added that he was a fugitive in 1944 and made a walk from Italy to the USA. Arguments were given that the landing of XH group. Mustafes was an issue plotted in all the details by the Albanian services and that "they do not make a mistake when they point out that this attempt could serve as an argument for overturning the opening policy that was being observed in Tirana". The English newspaper "The Guardian" of Manchester, questioned the official Albanian version of events for this gang, claiming that "the Albanian leadership or any faction within it, has fabricated the so-

<sup>60</sup> E. Hoxha, Titists ..., p. 573 - 574

<sup>61</sup> E. Hoxha, Titists ..., p. 495 - 519

<sup>62</sup> E. Hoxha, Always Vigilance, vol. 2, p. 677

<sup>63</sup> E. Hoxha, Always Vigilance, vol. 2, p. 677

<sup>64</sup> The MIA Museum made the relevant exhibition in 1982.

called invasion for internal political reasons related to the fight for power ". She, referring to an unidentified Western diplomat, added that "something was boiling in Albania and that there is insecurity and tension". Even the Italian press gave the news without comment. Further, the newspapers "Il mesaxhero", "Il popolo" etc, reported that "the whole incident was mounted to cover new and even more serious difficulties of the Albanian regime", that "it was mounted by the Albanian secret police, etc .. Some agencies Foreigners pointed out that Italy was considered an "enemy" of Albania, because the communiqué described the Italian lira as belonging to the group. to sign any agreement between the states regarding international terrorism, etc. "Voice of America" gave news without comment, as well as radio - London.

But on September 29, 1982, the AFP agency reported that Leka Zogu, the contender for the throne of Albania, took responsibility for the attempt by Xh. Mustafa on September 26, 1982. But further, L Zogu stated that "the invasion could be a work fabricated by the Albanian services, to draw world attention from the crisis that has now affected the regime."

The American, British and Greek press in this case stated that Albania is a Stalinist state and there are groups that try to organize resistance against the regime. A. Logoreci stated that he did not believe what was said about this group, while Nderim Kupa stated that XH. Mustafa did not belong to the Legality party.

After the annihilation of Xh Mustafa's group, Enver Hoxha warned that "We know very well that even after this the foreign agencies will not be comfortable and, with them, not even the UDB. But they will never find us asleep"<sup>65</sup>. In fact, in the 1980s, the activity of political emigration increased, in parallel with the deepening of the crisis of the communist regime in Albania and the deepening of the crisis of the Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe.

The Greek and Greek emigration campaign also intensified in the 1980s. Ramiz Alia, very worried, wrote: "It is clear that both the Greek reaction and the CIA and Yugoslavia want to put us between two fires, Greece and Yugoslavia"<sup>66</sup>.

After the death of Enver Hoxha, political emigration increased the hopes for the liberalization of the situation in Albania, but also the activity for its change. Concerns of this emigration about the risk of the country splitting in the situation of the extreme crisis of the communist regime also increased. An American newspaper<sup>67</sup>, under the title "Leka claiming for the Albanian throne", wrote that the king in exile sees the threat of Albania after the death of Enver Hoxha ... the death marks the beginning of a period of instability within the country that will directly affect the Albanians in Yugoslavia and, indirectly "stability in the Balkans, in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean." L. Zogu called on all ethnic Albanians to unite for the creation of a free democratic state on ethnic borders<sup>68</sup>. The American newspaper Richmond News Leader wrote that the best solution for Albania would be the overthrow of the communist regime and the bringing to power of King Leka I. "In Tirana they were worried about this, as these calls were being made in Eastern European countries as well. , as in Hungary for the return of the Habsburgs or for the return of the Balkan kingdoms, etc. Later, well-known Albanian explorers have published memoirs claiming that Albanian emigration took part in encouraging foreign powers in the events of the early 1990s."<sup>69</sup>

In the 1970s and 1980s, another trend of political emigration against the communist regime emerged, which had not appeared before. His special groups and individuals carry out acts of provocation, protest, threats, blackmail, sabotage, theft, arson, damage, etc. against the

<sup>65</sup> R. Alia, *Our Enver*, ... p. 444

<sup>66</sup> Richmond News Leader, Virginia (USA), April 12, 1985

<sup>67</sup> ATSH Special Bulletin, April 24, 1985

<sup>68</sup> Richmond News Leader, Virginia (USA), May 11, 1985

<sup>69</sup> H. Luçi, in his above-mentioned book, claims that he has preserved memories from Hotel Dajti, from conversations, already as a pensioner with former collaborators who showed action plans for the overthrow of communism in Albania and players of this upheavals acting on the orders of foreign intelligence services West - East..

regime's representations and senior communist officials abroad. Some of these actions had a terrorist nature, despite being carried out against a regime which was oppressing and terrorizing the Albanian people. In this period, according to regime scouts, there were about 15 groups operating in this direction. Among the main acts were: bombings in the premises of the RPSSH representations in Rome (1974, 1975), in Paris (1974, 1976), in Athens (1983, 1984); demonstrations in the USA, France, Sweden, Athens, Rome, etc.; provocations and propaganda against artistic ensembles from Albania and in trade fairs; false alarms for dropping or dropping bombs on Albanian representations or during the activity of cultural - artistic - sports groups; protests sent to foreign institutions and representations of the communist state; anonymous letters and phone calls with insults and insults; attempts to enter the Albanian representations by force; pressure letters for the release of prisoners and internees in Albania; distribution of anti-communist propaganda material; efforts to assist the escape of drivers, students and traders from Albania going abroad; attempts to abduct employees in the representations of the Albanian state; surveillance of Albanian embassies and citizens abroad; placing banners on the premises of the offices and apartments of their employees or on their vehicles; unmasking actions of friends and benefactors of the communist regime of Albania, etc.

In the 70s and 80s, propaganda was intensified, with calls for the liberation of Albania and, in particular, incitement to escape; forecasts and calls for the reversal of the situation in Albania, which was presented with realism as turbulent, with economic difficulties, in self-isolation, etc. The meetings of foreign intelligence cadres in the Albanian diaspora and the movements of leaders from western countries to neighboring and eastern countries also increased.

Attempts were made to prepare immigrants to carry out special operations against the communist regime. Thus in Madrid, where L. Zogu was the center, in the years 1970 - 1978 many emigrants were prepared; further continued to Johannesburg, South Africa; in Rhodesia, in the years 1978 - 1979; in New Zealand, especially on Tonga Island in the years 1980 - 1982 some people were trained; in the port of Plimoth, England in the years 1975 - 1977, several pilots were prepared for actions against Albanian steamers, where English instructors worked; in Udine, Rome and Bari, where members of the group of Xh. Mustafa; in Yugoslavia there were several bases, such as Ulcinj (where the group of Xh. Mustafa also prepared), Struga, Plava and Gucia, Prizren, etc.; in Greece as the base of Ioannina, which was used mainly for the supply of weapons, etc., of saboteurs passing through Albania. Such bases in neighboring countries and in France, FRY, Luxembourg, Sweden, USA, Canada, Australia, Belgium and elsewhere, with or without the knowledge of the local authorities, were used for years as bases for training, support and supply. Especially in California and elsewhere in the US, American servicemen have been trained, who also learned the Albanian language, joined the landing troops and the special activity of the CIA and the Albanian political diaspora.

Albanian political emigration gave special importance to the establishment of bases and centers in neighboring countries, especially in Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Chameria, Italy. Immigrants systematically exploited family, friendly and social ties in neighboring countries, where some of them also built houses and public places, such as cafes, hotels, etc., which became gathering places for meetings and anti-communist propaganda.

In particular, after the 1960s, anti-communist immigrants took a series of protective measures to escape detection and crackdown by the communist regime's secret services. As the most convenient way to escape the trail, the organization was found in small groups of 3-4 people or less. The movements of groups and individuals were carried out in deep conspiracy and with disinformation movements. Mostly immigrants in their 30s and 40s.

Anti-communist propaganda in legal and illegal ways, was the main and most massive form of the fight against anti-communist emigration. After 50 years this form of resistance against the regime took priority. In essence, the use of legal roads aimed at merging kosovo albanian political emigration to a single leadership, intensifying with all means and forces of anti-communist propaganda, coordinating this with the emigration of other communist countries, enhancing efforts to clarify politically and to approach the albanian colonies and kosovo migrants and from other albanian territories in southern south; attempts to shock the influence of the regime in the international area, in the albanian diaspora, in the albanians in yugoslavia and greece, in arti, greece; attempt to rise world opinion against communist government.

It called for the mobilization of the anti-communist element. Prominent were the "Resistance Front" (FRASSH), the "Military Council" of L. Zogu, etc., which also distributed anti-communist literature, inside and outside Albania..

Albanian emigration paid attention to the professional preparation of emigrants who hit the regime with legal propaganda means. Legal channels made possible in the new conditions of voltage and human exchanges and expansion of interstate relations.

In 1952 there were 13 organs, in 1969 there were 25 organs and in the 1980s about 30 such. Political emigration tried to bring these bodies to Albania, Kosovo and the Albanian and Kosovar colonies. He partially published them and distributed them in foreign languages such as English, French, Italian, etc., for the outside public. Most of the organs were not regular, but among them some have had continuity and long life. In addition to denouncing the communist regime in the immigration press there has been open controversy between various groups and individuals.

After the 1950s, propaganda began to spread through various anti-communist publications. Many Albanian intellectuals and political emigrants published historical scientific studies, essays, political studies, literary and social studies, studies on the economy of Albania and especially on its international relations. From these publications the most important that we can mention are the books "Albania" of BK, some books by Nikolle Mëlyshi, E. Koliqi, K. Çekrezi, Martin Camaj, A. Pipa, I. Basha, Xh. Staravecka, Z. Shyti, I. Lamaj, A. Leshanaku etc. Efforts were made for these publications to spread to Albania, Kosovo, the Albanian colonies and the Arbëresh, especially publications such as "Shejzat", "Koha Jone ", etc., which are considered as the most achieved publications by political emigration. Some of them have also been published in foreign languages such as Mr. Shyti's book in Italian. Prominent ballista intellectuals also did historical archival research on Skanderbeg and the history of Albanians in foreign archives, such as in Italy, England, Spain, France, FRY, USA, etc. ,where most of them reflected in the publication Albania. Rexhep Krasniqi, A. Ermenji, Adem Hodo, E. Koliqi stood out in the field of history, R. Krasniqi, V. Germenji, I. Lamaj as a specialist in Eastern European affairs in the framework of ACEN. E. Koloqi has made a special contribution to acquaint the Arbëresh in Italy and elsewhere with the Albanian issue. In 1972 Nikola Pano published in the USA a book on Albania ruled by the communists, which supplemented that of prof. Stavro Skëndit published before the year '60. Tahir Zajmi was distinguished for publications on Kosovo such as "Kosovo, the cradle of Albanianism", "Waddings of life". T. Zajmi also published a newspaper "Our Mundi" in the 60s as the first body of Albanian workers in exile within the Belgian unions<sup>70</sup>.

The breakdown of relations with the BS created a new wave and new impetus in anti-communist propaganda. BK legality etc. strongly demanded the liberalization of Albania and called for increased activities against the regime as now the situation was more favorable because Albania was left alone and that China was far away<sup>71</sup>. It was already said that the

<sup>70</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, September - October 1971, p. 2

<sup>71</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p. 65

time had come to return to Albania liberated by the communists<sup>72</sup>. There were constant calls in the propaganda of this emigration for Albania to get closer to the western countries. But there were also political emigrants who interpreted Hoxha's clash with Khrushchev as a courageous attempt to defend the independence of the homeland<sup>73</sup>.

In these dramatic circumstances the whole mass of emigration, for the first time, almost massively, said that first of all the independence of the country should be protected<sup>74</sup> and that, in the event of aggression against Albania, political emigration would return to fight alongside its own people, despite the fact that the communist regime ruled there<sup>75</sup>. Definitions were often encountered such as: "We are not communists, but we do not want to bury the homeland ... we fully agree with the tactics to be followed to triumph our national ideals, without giving Albania a chance to split"<sup>76</sup>.

Political emigration conducted an intensive campaign for the protection of religion and against religious persecution in Albania. Thus, in November 1966, in the USA, Italy and elsewhere, the 20th anniversary of the tragedy of the Albanian Catholic clergy was commemorated with great pomp<sup>77</sup>. A petition was also made by Albanian Catholics to appoint an Albanian cardinal to the Vatican, who would take care of Albanian exiles in Europe, the US and Australia. On this occasion, photo exhibitions were opened in several cities around the world on Catholic clergymen shot and convicted by the communist regime. Especially after 1967, with the collapse of religious cults, the Albanian political diaspora abroad increased its religious propaganda, which reached a peak in 1973, when Dom Shtjefen Kurti was assassinated. This denunciation campaign started after the news given in Vienna, which was echoed by the western press. It was strengthened by the Pope's speeches and by the news of foreign agencies that shocked the Albanian public inside and outside the country. At the head of this denunciation campaign, stood BKI, Legality, "Balli Agrar" etc. On April 8, 1973, hundreds of Albanian emigrants staged a demonstration in front of the UN mission, chanting anti-communist slogans and distributing a memorandum of understanding on religious persecution in Albania. The Albanian Orthodox and Muslim clergy also joined in this campaign with the Catholics, led by the leaders R. Krasniqi, Mr. Oroshi, F. Myftia, N. Kupi, etc.

A similar denunciation campaign took place in 1974 on the occasion of the death of Bishop Damian. These campaigns spurred efforts to unite the Albanian Catholic and Orthodox Church in a single front to raise Albania's religious problem at the UN<sup>78</sup>.

The Vatican appointed Daniel Gjeçaj as its representative for the Albanian Catholics in the free world, Ambroz Martini as the "brother of the Fragile Mountains". In the years 1967 - 1968 the press of the political diaspora rose up against the anti-religious campaign of the communist regime. With shocking notes, the Besa newspaper wrote that "Albania is declared the first country in the world without gods"<sup>79</sup>. Political and economic emigration responded to the anti-religious campaign of the communist regime by setting up and multiplying the objects of religious worship in the settlements of the Albanian diaspora and by increasing efforts to preserve their mystical and national character.

Albanian and Kosovar political emigration used the sending of private letters with political content and any other kind of anti-communist literature through the postal channel, to

<sup>72</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p.87

<sup>73</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p.65

<sup>74</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p.65

<sup>75</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p.65

<sup>76</sup> AMPB, year 1961, file 746, p.85

<sup>77</sup> E. Hoxha, *Always vigilant ...*, v. 2, p. 483

<sup>78</sup> E. Hoxha, *Always vigilant ...*, v. 2, p. 483

<sup>79</sup> *Gazeta Besa*, March 7, 1968, p.1

propagate the free world. In this context, there were also publications addressed to the Greek minority in Albania; Kosovar emigrants, other foreigners such as Italians left in Albania.

Propaganda through meetings, conferences, congresses, meetings, etc. has been widely used. of Albanian and Kosovar emigration and in the international ones of western countries. Thus e.g. R. Krasniqi at the head of a group of immigrants from the US went to Italy on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Skanderbeg in 1968.

In the last years of the regime, political emigration distributed leaflets through legal channels such as through tourists, visitors such as those of the "human rights commission" from the FRY, Sweden and elsewhere, religious materials, etc.

In the '70s and '80s the Albanian emigration made an intensive propaganda campaign against the cultural, artistic and sports manifestations of and the propaganda that the regime made, through them, abroad; against the activity of the communist regime's representations abroad, which the emigration denounced as a spy nursery. The unmasking and denunciation was also made against foreign elements in favor of the Tirana regime and who cooperated with it as well as against the friendship associations in Belgium and Sweden. Leka Zogu also made public denunciations in the press and in press conferences with foreigners against the embassies of Albania.

Political emigration demanded the unconditional normalization of Albania's relations with the USA, England, FRY, BS, etc.

A new impetus was given to anti-communist propaganda in the years 1977-1978 in the framework of the Western propaganda campaign towards Eastern Europe, especially from President Carter's statement for the protection of human rights in Albania. "An Albanian committee was set up, which acted long, leading the campaign for the protection of human rights in Albania. This committee published many documents in several foreign languages and distributed them to the Albanian emigration and to religious organizations in different countries of the world.

Human rights leaders also protested against human rights, sending memos to the Helsinki Conference, the European Security Conference (CSCE), and other international forums or Western and Eastern personalities.<sup>80</sup>

The Legality Party called: "To speak, write and protest constantly, until the liberation of the people and for an ethnic Albania"<sup>81</sup>.

On September 8, 1977, another demonstration took place before the mission to the UN by about 300 fugitives led by R. Krasniqi, F. Mufti, Xh. Laçin, M. Dibrën etc. leaders of groups KSHL, Legality, League of Prizren, Albanian Union, Catholic Church, etc. This was followed on September 24 by a demonstration in front of the Albanian embassy in Sweden. Legality called that now the war should continue with the press, with protests and demonstrations until the liberation of the people and for an ethnic Albania<sup>82</sup>.

In the 1970s, the New York SCTL and the Albanian diaspora launched a denunciation campaign against the communist regime, denouncing it as filling the entire country with prisons and camps and killing and imprisoning and deporting some 60,000 people<sup>83</sup>. The United Nations, Amnesty International, also supported the campaign.

The breakdown of relations with the PR of China prompted another major political emigration campaign. The rumors that Albania was left alone, that Albania was in great danger, etc. were already commonly heard. Political groups strongly propagated that the opportunity had come to work for the forcible overthrow of the communist regime.

<sup>80</sup> Besa Newspaper, November 1973, p. 4

<sup>81</sup> Bulletin of OKLL, 1977, p. 29

<sup>82</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1977, p. 56, 29

<sup>83</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1978, p. 11



Interestingly, there was now no inclination for armed action against the regime, but for its peaceful overthrow, and it was underlined that now was the time to stand firm in nationalist positions to preserve Albania's independence and fight for ethnic Albania, that the attitude of the Western Powers towards the Balkans had to be carefully followed, in order to use it in the interest of Albania's independence and the liberation of Kosovo. Even in this case there was an immigrant who was lied to by communist propaganda which trumpeted that the Albanian government was defending national interests. Calls were added for an end to the quarrels and disputes in the ranks of emigration and for its unification, underlining that the main goal should be the liberation of Albania from communism. Leka Zogu claimed that the severance of relations with China and the severance of aid from it would definitely lead to chaos inside the country and the throwing of the people against the regime.

Denunciations of the regime's agents in the ranks of Albanian political and economic emigration were made. Every case of escape from Albania was widely reported and efforts were made to encourage these escapes in any way possible. In the 1970s, people from Albanian emigration to Turkey denounced the consulate in Istanbul and the pro-communist elements who frequented it. This denunciation was echoed by the Turkish and foreign press, who wrote that the Albanian consulate had robbed the Turkish-Albanian Association of Istanbul. Selim Damani wrote that "Tirana sent provocative agents to the west"<sup>84</sup> and called for the discovery and punishment of them.

Demonstrations were another form of active anti-communist propaganda, especially after the 1970s and 1980s, such as those before the UN mission, in front of embassies in Paris, Athens, Sweden, etc. A series of anti-communist demonstrations took place, denouncing the domestic and foreign policy of E Hoxha's communist regime.

Protests, memoranda, petitions, other calls made to international forums such as the UN, the European Parliament, the Helsinki Conference, official and private Western political personalities, etc. were used, where they informed about the political situation and other issues on Albania.

To make the situation in Albania as tangible as possible, interviews were published by foreign tourists about Albania who brought creepy evidence of communist hell<sup>85</sup>.

There were also some provocations like the one in the Albanian trade pavilion in 1979 in Brussels, or provocations in Athens and Rome. There were also provocations inside the country, such as the one at the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana, made by Hysni Prishtina<sup>86</sup>.

Immigration pressures against the regime were different. In the years 1974-84, bombs were dropped on the premises of the diplomatic headquarters of Albania, phone calls were made, anonymous letters were sent, etc. In a few cases, some embassy equipment were damaged, such as setting fire to the embassy building in Rome and burning cars in Rome, damage in Paris, Athens, etc., of at least TIR trucks.

Serious acts in this war such as terrorist acts such as kidnappings or murders have generally not been found.

Disinformation was another method of political emigration fighting the regime. False news was spread about sending "gangs" to Albania, etc.

Sabotages of communist government activities in the outside world increased in the last years of the regime, hindering the communist propaganda activity of embassies, cultural, artistic, sports, etc. groups. for example. attempts to sabotage the performance of the Albanian ensemble in France in 1981, the performance in Belgium, etc. Emigration considered as a challenge the extension of the regime in the Albanian emigration circles through cultural and artistic activities which were accompanied by high doses of communist propaganda. At the

<sup>84</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1971 congress

<sup>85</sup> Besa Newspaper, November 1973, p. 4

<sup>86</sup> Zëri i Popullit newspaper, June 4, 1981

7th congress of OKLL it was claimed that, in recent years, the Albanian government, in order to further destroy immigration, with its own agents dressed in green clothes, used another method, that of folklorization<sup>87</sup>.

Political emigration organizations often collaborated with the security services of Western countries to monitor and control Marxist-Leninist groups affiliated with the communist regime in Albania. In this regard, there were also provocations, incidents, etc.,<sup>88</sup>.

In the middle of the 80's the opposition against the regime was activated for its persecution against religion and the clergy. In february 1984 another campaign was made against the communist regime when papa polak john pavli ii on a pastoral visit to italy took into protection of the catholic christians and catholics. Protests were protected in the european parliament in 1983 - 1984. A brochure of amnesty international was published in 1984 with refugee deposits on camps and prisons in albania, etc.

Through albanian priests, vatican helped the establishment of new churches in albanian colonies in the usa and everywhere, as church leaded by zef oroshi in the usa. Muslim clergy in cairo, al-azhar religious school, supplied cultures in us, belgium, france, australia, etc. Also the cleared children were also activated as the myfti of shkodra, kosovo, sali myftiu, dervish rexhepi, imami isa hoxha, hafiz isuf azemi etc.

Political emigration has been very active also in the address of visitors who come from albania to other countries near their relatives throughout the europe this activity also extended to different cultural delegations officials sports, tourism etc. To promote escapes<sup>89</sup> etj. Also immigration countries have attempted to send journalists, movies, etc. To albania. With albanian or foreign origins but the communist government, differently from eastern countries, hermetically closed the country and hindered their coming.

A way of action of different individuals of albanian and kosovo political emigration was through their engagement in diplomatic representations of countries to countries. There they performed many concrete tasks towards their relatives and other albanian citizens, using the knowledge they had about the country and the people. There were some albanian women married with foreigners or foreigners of albanian origin, with anti-communist attitude working at foreign embassies in albania<sup>90</sup>.

Albanian political emigration developed an anti-communist activity also through the postal channel sending magazines, newspapers, fletushka, packages, etc. Immigration even in cases when medicines were sent to etc. To his people, either directly or incredible or through international organizations like the red cross this was considered an activities by armiqilh. While the packages and money were considered as an attempt to finance foreign agents and to influence the fluided or unformed element.

### **8.2.3. Immigration actions for national rights**

Immigration leaders sought rapprochement with the US, FRY, France, England, etc. The communist regime continued to pursue with jealousy and fear the intensification of the propaganda of the Albanian emigration regarding Kosovo. In Tirana it was said with concern that Xh. Deva was mobilizing Kosovars to fight against the Serb occupation of Kosovo and against the communist regime in Albania. It was underlined that Haki Taha, the murderer of Miladin Popovic, BK had become a national hero<sup>91</sup>.

Albanian emigration abroad waged a vigorous patriotic campaign in the spring of 1981, when the Yugoslav leadership, using its army and tanks, erupted a fierce terror against

<sup>87</sup> Bulletin of OKLL, 1980, p. 35

<sup>88</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p.215

<sup>89</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p.210 – 211

<sup>90</sup> A. Gerin, Cold War Commandos ..., p.. 214

<sup>91</sup> Gazeta Besa, June 10, 1970, p.2

the people of Kosovo that erupted in powerful demonstrations against injustice, demanding that Kosovo be declared republic within the Yugoslav Federation. Legality took part in the demonstrations organized by Kosovars. A faction of Legality in Europe, led by I. Basha and other Zogists, held demonstrations in Brussels, France, etc. in support of Kosovo, and published the patriotic treaty "to unite against the age-old enemy and all forces for the liberation of the homeland"<sup>92</sup>. Balli Agrar cooperated closely with the "Kosovo League", organizing numerous demonstrations against Serbian oppression in Kosovo<sup>93</sup>. BK started calling for weapons to be sent to Kosovo. The Kosovar League declared March 11, 1981, (the day of the beginning of the demonstrations in Kosovo) as the day of commemoration of the Kosovar martyrs as slaughter for Ethnic Albania<sup>94</sup>.

Political emigration criticized the passive attitude of the communist government of E Hoxha in these tragic moments, emphasizing that "only the joint struggle of nationalists and Kosovars can guarantee Kosovo its demands. Further, the demand for a republic was described as minimalist and It was emphasized that without the disappearance of the communist regime in Tirana, there could be no question of Kosovo's unification with Albania, and the KSHL directed peaceful demonstrations and issued a statement condemning the Serb violence. The articles of "Zeri i Popullit" were not a statement of an official policy, but press materials aimed at deceiving the Albanian youth in Kosovo, which has been under pressure from Tirana's propaganda. etc.

The Kosovo League, with its demonstrations in defense of Kosovo, attracted many emigrants from Albania and Kosovo. Thousands attended in front of the White House in Washington. She addressed statements, papers, tracts, memoranda, etc. international forums and Western personalities, calling for the condemnation of Serbian violence and the support of the Albanian population in Kosovo and the Albanian territories in Yugoslavia; made telegrams of protest to the Kosovo leadership; sent delegations to protest at the State Department, in the US Senate, etc. Some of its leaders called for a national uprising in Kosovo and other Albanian areas.

The League of Prizren organized large demonstrations in front of the UN and the Yugoslav consulates. Legalists, KSHL leaders, etc. also took part in them; she addressed letters, memoranda and telegrams to Western leaders, the Vatican, international forums, etc. ; published leaflets calling for national unification and the creation of Ethnic Albania, underlining that the people of Kosovo would side with the West and the United States.

The "Free Kosovo Committee" and its chairman Mit'hat Vranica called for the creation of an interim government of Kosovo in exile; to collect weapons and mobilize volunteers to fight in Kosovo; to make arrangements with Croatian emigration; staged demonstrations in front of the Canadian parliament of the Yugoslav embassy.

The "Albanian Covenant" called for national unity, to start the war in the mountains and for a general uprising in Kosovo. The Albanian Covenant also directed its propaganda against the communist regime of E Hoxha and called for cooperation with the Croats.

In this situation there were some political and economic emigrants from Kosovo who called for not criticizing the communist regime in this difficult time, because it could damage national interests. Some thought that VOA's articles were a fair analysis of the Kosovo issue. Some immigrants criticized the US for talking about human rights in their home countries, but they did not condemn the crimes of Serbs and did not currently defend the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia.

During 1982, a more organized work was done by the Albanian emigration organizations under the motto of uniting in an anti-Slavic front. Many demonstrations took

<sup>92</sup> Gazeta Besa, June 10, 1970, p.2

<sup>93</sup> Gazeta Besa, June 10, 1970, p.2

<sup>94</sup> Flamuri newspaper, October 3, 1981, p.1

place in Paris, Brussels, New York, Sweden, Canada, etc. There were also emigrants who, under the influence of the Tirana government, distributed ALP materials on these events. However, many political emigrants called on Kosovars not to go to demonstrations with the national flag with a star. Some intellectuals in the US in 1982 organized a seminar on Kosovo at New York University, where about 200 people and 20 Albanian and foreign conference speakers suggested and committed themselves to making the Kosovo problem known to the international public.

Some state bodies such as in the USA, Turkey, Belgium, France, Italy, etc. Kosovars were warned not to act against the Yugoslavs through press, demonstrations, etc., but this was not taken into account by many Kosovars, who were fighting for a just cause. A part of the Kosovar emigration demonstrated the hopes and trust in the United Europe, and for the help that would be given by European institutions such as the European Council in Strasbourg, TPE, the Assembly of European Minorities, etc. for the protection of Kosovo.

U.S. senators like Charles Percy<sup>95</sup> etc. received the delegation of L. Kosovare on January 19, 1983 or accepted the prayers of L. Kosovare addressed to President Regan<sup>96</sup> to protect the rights of Kosovo. At this time the communist regime of Albania encouraged the visits of many Kosovars as tourists to Albania to influence the approach of Kosovar emigration

Learning the albanian language to children was an old patriotic tradition in the albanian colonies. But also to keep the anti-communist spirit alive, the albanian political politics made efforts to open albanian schools, courses, cultural centers, etc. Settlementing anti-communist educational education from albania and ethnic albanian territories. Albanian emigrants (m. Noçka, n. Resuli, e. Koliqi, n. Pano, m. Camaj, z. Nekaj, et. Albanian schools had many difficulties in their functioning. Even in these schools a struggle was developed to get their leadership from the philo-communist elements and them anti-communists in emigration. Even the government of tirana made efforts to place the teachers sent by her, especially from albania, in these schools.

#### **8.2.4. Communist regime's reaction to political emigration**

The severe violence used by the communist government against the families and relatives of the political immigrants who had remained in albania, such as the sentences and measures for the internation of osgelj shp prohibition of correspondence, packages and money. Pressures and threats to family members to seek their people in emigration to abandon anti-regime actions, writing letters or through telephone conversations, has played a role in neutralizing the division of a part of anti-communist political immigration. Restrictive measures were also taken against former traders who had financed the opposition of the regime.

State Security took strong and uninterrupted measures to detect, and counter the activity of Albanian political emigration. Through penetration in the groups of this emigration he managed to annihilate the group of Xh. Mustafa; the "Albanian Anti-Communist Resistance Front" group led by Abdyl Banushi who in 1975 was sent to Albania.

The communist government of albania used to dissolute anti-communist emigration friends and people recruited from the regime from the albanian colonies. These have acted directly or networkingly, collectively or individually, to promote divisions in the range of political immigration. Especially engaged in this battle from the communist regime foreign communist marxist-leninist elements from different countries.

Collection, invention and propaganda of compromising materials for the leaders and groups of political immigration, were used by the regime to promote the dissolution of this emig. Publishing these materials in print or providing through radio, gave positive results to

<sup>95</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 30 October 1983, p. 9

<sup>96</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 10 July 1986, p. 1

the regime. This is how documents were propagated about the "buying" of ahmet zogu and many other anti-communist leaders from the italians, yugoslaves, the british and the american; materials for the cooperation of bk with the italian and german invasars, the "links" of bk of legality with the greek reaction, vatican, english - american etc. Such materials were mainly published in the newspaper "the truth about the traitors" and "new albania" which continued to be published until the fall of the regime.

The Communist government tried to use these materials to denounce Albanian anti-communist organizations to state authorities and police bodies of different countries and to encourage them to take austerity towards them. These efforts were most intensive, especially in the neutral states or in those states that were related to the communist government. With this activity, the regime attempted to promote also the rivalry and quarters between foreign discoveries.

The regime encouraged the national sedra of different immigrants, to neutralize them and encourage them to resist the action against him. The regime used the territorial claims and anti-albanian intentions of neighbor nationalist countries and regions, to charge the responsibility for k urban and komundian pomistic and political emigration. The national liberation war, the regime propagated in the diaspora just as a pure patriotic war, hiddening the initiation and organization of the empire and the civilian prisoners of the civil and governors.

The communist government and its bodies used some ways to strike political emigration propaganda such as distributing the press, literature and films to the propagant especially after the "60 years" the diplomatic representations of the regime were expanded and the organizational opportunities and tools of propaganda were increased, some were returned vatra<sup>97</sup> They were encouraged to appeal to Albanians of America who were members of the fire to expel Q. Panariti and Ballists and Zogists who had allegedly put the fire under the influence of the US State Department, entering a dangerous road against Fatherland.

Propaganda against political emigration continued with intensity within the country. In the 80s, an exhibition was opened with the materials of the group of Xh. Mustafa. Also for these purposes was set up the museum of the Ministry of Interior that remained open for many years. In the mid-1980s, the People's Jewet newspaper published a series of Sophocles of Lazar and Javer Malos with repatriated Yugoslavia where they were described, of course with strong tendencies, the methods used by UDB to Albanian fugitives. The basic suggestion of these articles was: "the way of salvation is return to the homeland" because there was democracy only in albania and only the albanian people were from it.<sup>98</sup>

Some migrants were tired and despaired by the lack of relations with their country and their families. One of them said: "it has been 16 years old that we have not received any news from our love. We please god to die. We have all abandoned"<sup>99</sup>. This despair was considered by the regime as a good opportunity to discurs the political immigration fight against him.

The regime considered as a risk to the political immigration activity even tourists coming to albania. Therefore the government attempted to maximum to stop the arrival of unwanted people. The behavior of gifts and money from them to their relatives, was seen with much doubt as a compromising and subversive activist and the regime controlled and happened to him. The doubt was that, through tourism, political immigrants and agents of foreign states would be introduced. Therefore the place was closed hermetically closed.

There were cases when also the border violent removed from albania, returned to their houses which were prisoned. These were rare cases. There were also many cases when

<sup>97</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, August 1961

<sup>98</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, August 1961, p.4

<sup>99</sup> The newspaper "Il Regno" October 27, 1960

albanians leaved from kosovo, after running from there and came to albania, they were refracted again, leaving for the country.

In the last throes of his life, stuck in a deep financial and political crisis, the regime made new attempts to rob rich Albanian emigrants.

In 1982, at the height of its economic and political crisis, the regime planned to take advantage of the assets of economic and political emigrants outside Albania by using their relatives in Albania as hostages.

On April 30, 1982, Qirjako Mihali sent information to Hekuran Isai and Nesti Nases stating that there were many Albanian economic and political emigrants (fugitives) in Italy, who had valuable assets. Most of them were old and sick. Based on the previous experience, that the property after death had been "appropriated or misused" by others, he proposed that the Commission Society and their families in Albania, work with them (certainly in dignified forms) to ensure hereditary wealth as long as they are alive".<sup>100</sup> For this purpose Q. Mihali thought to send during this year a working group to Italy which, in addition to following some other problems, to work with the aforementioned persons. He also sought the opinion of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on addressing these issues. The Consular Society also prepared a work program for immigration to Italy.<sup>101</sup>

The program contained in detail the names and assets of Albanian emigrants as well as the actions that had to be taken to obtain them from the Albanian state, acting on behalf of their relatives in Albania.

The following owners were treated for economic emigration:

- Xhemal Ferra - Milan - There was a considerable fortune, consisting of bank deposits and buildings, which in 1979 were estimated at 10-15 billion lire or about 20 million dollars. He regularly sent money to children amounting to about \$ 20,000 a year. Upon the return of the working group from Italy in 1980, he had sent \$ 50,000. For many years he lived without a crown with an Italian woman, who was said to know wealth and had a lot of influence on Xhemali. Recently, taking advantage of Xhemal's old age and poor health, she, not without purpose, had managed to make as a partner of the firm a person of her own, who in fact directed all the work. In these circumstances, after Xhemal's death, the Consular Society thought that there were risks and there would be enough trouble to benefit the property of his legal heirs. Therefore, she proposed that, in addition to the continuous work to be done by the Albanian embassy in Rome, the following measures be taken:
  - a) Continue to prevent children from going as visitors to Italy, until they assure us that their departure will have the effect of sending a good amount of money immediately and fixing the inheritance problem.
  - b) To work with children here in Albania on the risk posed by the issue of their inheritance after the death of Xhemal Ferra. So find ways to resolve the issues while their father is alive.
  - c) To continue direct contacts with Xhemal Ferra to convince him both for sending a quantity of money to our bank and for arranging the inheritance on favorable terms for children.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>100</sup> AMPJ, 1982, file 159; Information by Qirjako Mihali sent to Hekuran Isai and Nesti Nases, April 30, 1982.

<sup>101</sup> AMPJ year 1982, file 159. Work program prepared by the Commissioner Company, for the assets of political and economic emigrants in Italy, Tirana, April 30, 1982.

<sup>102</sup> AMPJ year 1982, file 159. Work program prepared by the Commissioner Company, for the assets of political and economic emigrants in Italy, Tirana, April 30, 1982.

- Hamdi Kamata - Milan. He was engaged in trade and made a good fortune. He had a brother in Shkodra and, in addition to the usual deliveries, was shown to be willing to send an immediate amount.
- Demir Egro - Milan. He was engaged in trade and was in very good economic condition. He had his people in Tirana and Vlora and he could send them immediate sums.
- Lamp Tavanxhiu - Bari. He was 90 years old, paralyzed and blind. He was engaged in trade and had created some wealth. There were women and children in Albania. He lived in Italy with a woman who wanted to take all his wealth. He sent them, through Switzerland, to the children. The Commissariat thought that he should meet while he was alive to secure the delivery of an immediate sum, as nothing could be taken from him after his death.
- Miti Tase - Bari. He was engaged in trade and had created some capital. He was not married. He could send his grandchildren to Albania an immediate sum. It was also suggested that you work with him to secure the inheritance.
- Vangjel Ranxha - Florence. He was married there and had no children. He was over 76 years old and ill and could have died in front of his wife. Therefore, it was proposed to work with him, as he had said several times indirectly that he could arrange a part of the inheritance for the two brothers he had in Albania. He traded and, in addition to money, had two apartments, a shop and a villa outside the city.

The following persons were treated from the category of political emigration (fugitives):

- Ismail Sefa - Çivitanova. He was a great merchant and in Italy he had made a very good fortune. It had a shipyard, money in the bank, a 7-8 storey tourist hotel, etc. He had a wife and children in Albania. He was old and could not see well. The report said: "With this man we must work in two directions: how to send an immediate sum and to secure the inheritance after death. For both it should be used as family in Albania and direct contacts with it".<sup>103</sup>
- Ahmet Kalja - Milan. He was engaged in wholesale trade and was in good economic condition. He was married in Italy and had children. He sent \$ 200-500 to his brothers and sisters in Albania and, if he worked with them, he could send large sums of money immediately..
- Pjetër Ndoc Pistuli - Milan. He was old and living alone. He had created a good fortune. He had a brother in Shkodra and he sent him money. He had to work for bigger shipments and for the inheritance after death.
- Isa Ndreu - Florence. There were jewelry factories, buildings, money, etc. There were 30 of his relatives interned in the villages of Vlora and he sent them money from time to time. He had shown willingness to send relatively large sums, in case they asked for it.
- Xhevdet Mustafa - New York - Rome. In addition to stock and bank deposits, it had a large office and a hotel (outside the city). In Durrës he had a mother, three dancers and a sister. In addition to the usual deliveries, he was predisposed to send large immediate amounts for home remodeling.
- Shaqir Mejdani - Boston - Rome. He was in good condition and regularly sent money to his brothers and sisters in Durrës. He was predisposed to send large sums immediately.
- Haki Shehu - Detroit - Rome. He had created a good fortune. He was unmarried, very old and sick. He was very attached to his sister in Vlora and was willing to send her

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<sup>103</sup> AMPJ year 1982, file 159. Work program prepared by the Commissioner Company, for the assets of political and economic emigrants in Italy, Tirana, April 30, 1982..

money in considerable amounts. Work also had to be done to regulate the inheritance after death.

- Dr. Vasil Dhimitriu - Rome. He lived with his wife, but had all three children in Vlora. He had left a valuable fortune and both spouses were in old age.

### **8.3. Political emigration relations with Western powers and neighboring countries**

#### **8.3.1. Political emigration relations with western countries**

After 1960, the communist regime continued to be frustrated by the support that Western countries and neighboring Balkan countries gave to Albanian political emigration. But on the other hand, it should be noted that, in fact, the cooperation of non-communist countries with political emigration was declining and this emigration was losing its former importance as a force to strike at the regime of E. Hoxha.

However, the Albanian government found that the main Western country that was cooperating and assisting political emigration was Italy.

In 1964, tensions continued in the relations between the Albanian communist government and Italy. The attitude of the Italian government towards the Albanian political emigration remained one of the sources of this tension. The Albanian government considered this attitude a kind of pressure, with which the Italian side wanted to say: "We want to get closer, but do not forget that we are very concerned".<sup>104</sup> The Albanian legation in Rome pointed out that this year the work of Albanian "criminals" had intensified. She considered any of their activities, even purely cultural, hostile. The Legation complained that Koliqi had been given 6 million lire available for De Rada's demonstrations, while "reactionary" elements such as Mentor Çoku, Eqerem Telhaj, etc. had organized, at the instigation of Italy, Islamic associations and had entered the representations of Muslim countries to work against the communist regime. She also claimed that, at the time of the presidential crisis, the Italians were preparing to stage a provocation against the Albanian embassy to exert pressure.<sup>105</sup>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969, described as an aspect of Italy's subversive activity against Albania its commitments to NATO, to which it was said that Italy had obligations, which it was fulfilling best and its role in this organization was in growing. A special aspect, according to her, was the development of espionage of NATO forces in cooperation with Italian espionage, especially against Albania. According to the MFA, Italy had allowed to operate in its country a number of intelligence centers of NATO countries (American, British, Greek, etc.) which acted against the government of Albania, using the Albanians who fled along with KOSOVO ALBANIANS.<sup>106</sup>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Italian authorities had recently paid special attention to the relations of political emigration with Kosovars and, mainly, with Kosovar intellectuals, using for this purpose the leaders of the "Bloc" as well as the albanological organizations, where the leaders of political emigration took an active part, "to deceive and divide the Kosovar mass through these people." She emphasized the attention that the Italian authorities paid to the activity carried out by the "Bloc" with the Arbëresh. The main goal of this "reactionary" organization was said to be to win over the mass of Arbëresh to have it as a political support. The "Bloc" had created several organizations with the

<sup>104</sup> AMPJ, year 1964, file 654, Report of the embassy in Rome "on Albania's relations with Italy" during 1964, Rome, February 15, 1965.

<sup>105</sup> AMPJ, year 1964, file 654, Report of the embassy in Rome "on Albania's relations with Italy" during 1964, Rome, February 15, 1965.

<sup>106</sup> AMPJ, 1969, file 393, MFA report on Italian policy towards Albania in recent years, August 1969



Arbëresh in recent years, causing many Arbëresh personalities to embrace the policy of the "Bloc" and carry out propaganda activities against the communist regime.<sup>107</sup>

Western support for immigration was prominent in the realm of anti-communist propaganda. Various countries such as Great Britain, USA, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Vatican, etc. made their radios available for political emigration or created specialized radio sound centers for Albania and the diaspora itself. Some Albanian emigrants also worked in these bodies, mainly for shows in the Albanian language, such as Tajar Zavalani, Andon Logoreci, Alfred Andoni, etc. on the BBC; dom Zef Shestani, Daniel Gjeçaj, etc., on Vatican radio, as well as others on the radios "Free Europe", "Voice of America", etc. where e.g. Talat Karagjozi worked for 30 years, as director of the Albanian language branch on the Voice of America radio. In the '70s - '80s, political emigration itself created several radios like that of BK, of Legality in the USA. The Yugoslavs also funded local radio stations in the United States for propaganda in the ranks of the Albanian and Kosovar diaspora.

Albanian emigration, in addition to cooperating with Western agencies in the fight against the communist regime in Tirana, continued its efforts to secure their support for the Kosovo issue. On May 19, 1975, a delegation of the Kosovo League<sup>108</sup> met in Washington MP Bromfeld, representative of the US Congress, who promised his support for the situation in Kosovo. In 1976 Vasil Andoni paid a visit to the ballistas in the USA. On this occasion, US Vice President Rockefeller received V. Andoni and E. Bardha in Detroit, and they took the opportunity to raise the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Zef Pali, given the situation in Kosovo, wrote that "Albanians, wherever they are, must get ready for more difficult days"<sup>109</sup>. While prof. Luan Gashi spoke on American television CBS, in the context of the week of enslaved nations, about the miserable situation in Albania and Kosovo.

But not everything went well in the relations between the Albanian political emigration and the western countries. Thus some western countries did not give him shelter and did not support L. Zog in some of his actions. The Spanish king "expelled" Leka in 1978 and, from Madrid he settled in Rhodesia, from where, after the victory of independence, he left for South Africa. This position was also held by some European countries, USA, Egypt, etc. Although L. Zogu repeatedly asked to be stationed somewhere near Albania, in Europe or in Mediterranean countries he was not allowed by them.

In the 1960s, during the detente between the US and the US, a tacit agreement was reached not to harm each other's interests, and there was a decline in the intensity of support and activation of political immigration. Dissatisfied with this situation, A. Ermenji complained that "during this period of peaceful coexistence, the Western world, not only has not had any definite policy towards communism, has not taken any initiatives to stop the rush, but even its human powers have come to be shattered"<sup>110</sup>.

In some cases, various groups or individuals of Albanian emigration expressed dissatisfaction with various media outlets in the West, for the inaccuracy of the presentation of their activity or the situation in Albania. BK argued, in some cases, with the BBC that it had not sufficiently reflected the views of this organization on the development of events in Albania<sup>111</sup>.

In the foreign press and in the Albanian political emigration, differences appeared with the real politics or with the hypothetical attitudes that were expected to be held by the Western countries towards the communist regime of E. Hoxha. The Albanian representations also provided information about the attitudes of the western press towards the Albanian

<sup>107</sup> AMPJ, 1969, file 393, MFA report on Italian policy towards Albania in recent years, August 1969

<sup>108</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1975, p.2

<sup>109</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1975, p.4

<sup>110</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1975, p.2

<sup>111</sup> Gazeta Besa, December 28, 1971, p.2

political emigration as well as about the coverage they have given to the activities and views of this emigration. The representation in Rome informed that the Franco-British press had written about a certain softening of the Greek policy towards Albania. Following the severance of diplomatic relations with the B.S. It was written in these newspapers that the Albanian national democrats in exile had immediately raised their voices, demanding that the Great Powers of the West guarantee the borders of Albania from any foreign interference. They also explained how harmful the policy of the neighbors had been, especially that of Greece, which claimed that it was at war with the Albanian people<sup>112</sup>.

In 1962, the Western press had stated that, although up to this time there had been no active undertaking by the Western Powers for the recognition of the Government of Tirana, it seemed that something was being done in this regard as well. On this occasion, the Italian press commented that there was a big difference between the views of Albanian nationalists and some western circles. Naturally, the nationalists demanded that the borders of Albania be guaranteed, in order to remove from the communist regime the only path it found in the popular masses and to provide the Albanian people with a wider freedom of action. And some circles in the West, perhaps deceived by the hope that the communists of Tirana could one day change direction, sought to help the Tirana regime.

According to the Albanian political emigration, the Western Powers would make two big mistakes if they softened their attitude towards the regime of E. Hoxha: First they would commit an injustice to the Albanian people n.q.s would seek to prolong the life of a tyrannical regime; Second, they would have lied to themselves if they thought they would have the result of turning the Tirana communists into pro-Western people. These Powers had also suffered defeats with Tito and Gomulka who, after all, were more liberal in their politics than the "redheads" of Tirana. The latter, as the French newspaper *Le Monde*, dated December 12, 1961, pointed out, were not able to play Tito's card and would not want to ask the West for what Albania lacked. They would never go out of their way and would always remain sworn Stalinists.

Anti-communist immigration propagated that if the Tirana clique had caused the Soviet base in the Adriatic to fail, it would soon make it the base of communist China, which would be no less dangerous to peace if it had atomic weapons, which it was said to produce them within a few years.

The political emigration press emphasized that if the West helped the Albanian people to change their difficult economic situation, even under the communist regime, the anti-communists would have no objection, and would even thank it with all their hearts. "But we are sure that the Western Powers will not be able to do such a thing, because the communist regime will never accept that the Albanian population be given direct economic aid and controlled by the West, just as it does not. received UNRRA aid in 1946 and President Eisenhower in 1955. Tirana communists will use this aid to extend their lives".<sup>113</sup>

After the breakdown of relations with the regime of E. Hoxha, the Soviets also tried to establish contacts with some of the Albanian fugitives, not only with the few elements that remained in the US and Eastern communist countries after the breakdown of relations between the two countries, but even with some of the political immigrants in western countries. The support that the Soviets gave to Panajot the Elder was obvious, as well as the contacts that the Soviet emissaries maintained with the chairman of the New York SSC, Rexhep Krasniqi.

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<sup>112</sup> AMPJ, 1962, file 652, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the problems followed with Italy during February 1962

<sup>113</sup> AMPJ, year 962, file 652, Report of the Albanian Legation in Rome on the problems followed with Italy during February 1962.

The regime thought that after the breakdown of Albania's relations with the USSR and the Eastern countries, there were signs of ballista rapprochement with the Soviets, Bulgarians, Romanians, etc., especially in terms of propaganda against Hoxha. This approach was concretized with the visits of Stavro Skënd in Moscow, Alfred Andoni and Sadik Premte in Bullagri, A. Andoni in Romania, etc. With the Soviet incitement, it was said that there was an "escape" of some individuals from the eastern countries to the West, some of whom also opened clubs such as in Sweden, or were active in activity against the government of E. Hoxha. The KGB tried to act, especially with fugitives from Kosovo and other Albanian areas in Yugoslavia. Also the embassies of the eastern communist countries in the West were activated in the direction of these emigrants. In this context, the West Berlin Canal has been used extensively for years.

But the fears and imaginations of E. Hoxha's regime for the cooperation of political emigration with "enemy" countries was in many cases beyond reality. Thus, after the sentencing of the military group led by Beqir Balluku, the regime was concerned that news was circulating in emigration that a foreign general had claimed that the coup leaders, driven by the Yugoslav government, wanted to stage a coup for to bring Albania closer to Yugoslavia and, through it, to BS later.

The Albanian intelligence confirmed that R. Krasniqi, chairman of the New York SCTL, had several meetings with the Soviet intelligence officer there, while intelligence agents of the Soviet embassy in Brussels had met with Kosovars there. Colonel Hill had also met with Leka Zogu, A. Ermenji, M. Bajraktari, etc. on this issue. There were also rumors, quite fantastic, that allegedly B. Balluku had sent a letter to M. Bajraktar for cooperation and that the conspirators had made a meeting with "reactionaries" in France. Zef Pali was said to have claimed that the conspirators were working to strengthen their positions in the army and in the leadership of the Party, aiming at its gradual disintegration.

These were mostly misinformation obtained without really being evaluated by the Albanian intelligence or the fabrications of its agents.

The Albanian intelligence also informed that, on the eve and after the breakdown of relations with Albania, the Chinese also showed interest in the political diaspora in the West, especially in the district of Leka Zogu, sending a journalist to his wedding. It was pointed out that the Chinese maintained some contacts with various elements in Europe and had invited to visit China special heads of emigration like p. sh, Mentor Çokun etc. It was said that Mentor Çoku had connected L. Zogu with the Chinese in Vienna and Paris.

### **8.3.2. Relations with neighboring Balkan countries**

#### **8.3.2.1. With Greece**

In the 60s and 70s, taking advantage of the ongoing battle between anti-communist immigration and people under the influence of the communist government in the US, the Greeks also tried to take advantage. A real battle took place for the possession of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the USA. Under the title "traitors of the nation defend Christianity", Balli Kombëtar unmasked P. Kotoko, who was removed as the only bishop of the Albanian church, but was progressive and supported the Greek claims for Southern Albania. Balli Kombëtar also denounced Bishop Marko Lipe, whom he described as a "provocative agent of the Greek Patriarchate."<sup>114</sup> BK sulmoi edhe kryetarin e organizatës panepiriotë në SHBA, Dr. Vasil Foton për çështjen e Vorioepirit.

From Zog's opponents, the communist intelligence had gathered information that L. Zog had allegedly established links with the Northern Epirotes for joint actions against the communist regime, and that he had his forces in Yugoslavia and Greece.

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<sup>114</sup> Newspaper "Besa" 30 May 1969, p. 2

At the 1967 Panepiriot Congress in Ioannina<sup>115</sup> calls were made for unification without distinction of the fugitives to be ready at the right moment for the liberation of Albania<sup>116</sup>. Greek Interior Minister Patakos also attended the meeting, while the Prime Minister sent him greetings.

At the KEVA congresses in 1960; in Ioannina in 1967 (attended by the leaders of the military junta), at the congress that took place after Karamanlis came to power in 1974 and later, KEVA, the most recently fled from Albania, stood at the forefront of subversive activity against Albania. The Panepiriot Confederation, which included northern Epirote fugitives and Northern Epirote emigrants to the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, was increasingly active against Albania. KEVA published the ultra-chauvinist leaflet "Ipiritikon Mellon" etc.

Meanwhile, Marko Lipe, a Greek agent, also fought against the Albanian autocephalous church in Istanbul. He tried to block its opening when Turkish authorities had given permission for the church to open. Lipa also addressed the issue to US President Johnson and UN Secretary General John Tan<sup>117</sup>, where he protested for its opening and requested the immediate closure of the albanian church<sup>118</sup>.

Communist intelligence continued to unfairly view some of the leaders of political emigration as agents in the service of Greece. Thus, one of the communist scouts, the ballist Qazim Prodani, was biasedly described as a Greek spy operating in Turkey, who was allegedly working on behalf of the QIP, to mobilize Albanians there against the RPSH and to constantly inform his bosses<sup>119</sup>. But in fact the vast majority of nationalist political emigrants were viewed with suspicion and hostility by the Greek government, and in some cases they were even convicted for refusing to cooperate with the Greeks for their anti-Albanian purposes. One of them wrote that when the Greek police asked him to call southern Albania Greek, he refused and, as a result, was imprisoned. "I have 10 years in prison and I am still suffering in exile in Greece, because they want to keep us in Greece by force and make us Greeks by force"<sup>120</sup> he wrote.

The Albanian intelligence had evidence that in 1980 the QIP had issued an instruction to contact and work with the Albanian diaspora on Greek interests. At the North Epirus meeting in Athens in February 1982, the slogan "freedom is not donated, but gained" was chanted. The Albanian government was afraid that KEVA was also making plans to organize a revolt in Albania through Greek territory.

Benefiting from the crisis of the communist regime and the increasing international criticism against him, greek nationalists attempted to brought around the country. Greek priest sevastianos published the book "vorio - crossed epirus" in 1984, and, at the same time, nikola stavro wrote "vorio - epirus and the us role in this.

### **8.3.2.2. With Yugoslavia**

In the years 1960-1980, the Yugoslav government, after the mass exodus of political immigrants from this country, significantly lost its influence in political emigration. But this does not mean that her agency activity and attempts to gain influence were interrupted, which were uninterrupted.

But apparently the fear of E. Hoxha's regime from the Yugoslav intervention, exploiting the Albanian emigration was much greater than the real danger.

<sup>115</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 1-2

<sup>116</sup> Besa newspaper, May 30, 1966 and October 24, 1968

<sup>117</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, May 1967, p. 4

<sup>118</sup> Gazeta Besa, May 30, 1966; October 24, 1968

<sup>119</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 1 -2

<sup>120</sup> Gazeta Besa, 30 May 1969.f. 1

In the years 1967-1968, the regime's intelligence agencies were concerned that a plan was being prepared for military intervention in Albania and for the overthrow of E. Hoxha's government. The information that Tirana had, suggested that the UDB was also activating the saboteurs to carry out acts of terror against the leadership of the Party and the state and that they were also acting under the orders of the CIA. Kosovo leaders F. Hoxha and V. Deva allegedly met with E. Koliqi in Rome and held talks with the command of the 6th US Fleet<sup>121</sup>. H. Fulci was also considered part of this conspiracy<sup>122</sup> who had attended the agrarian forehead party in Chicago on November 28, 1967. While Charlotte T. Reid, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress, had handed over to the "Kosovo League" a flag, which had flown for 48 hours in the top of the Capitol in Washington on the occasion of this holiday as "a sign of friendship and consideration"<sup>123</sup>.

In Tirana they believed that the plan to overthrow the regime provided: firstly, the preparation of political emigration for terrorist and diversionist acts and secondly, the organization of provocations by Kosovo, under the pretext of the demand for unification with Albania. It was even believed that this plan was presented to Tito, who liked it, because at this time the plan was being made for a military alliance between Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, proposed by Chinese leaders, which was also considered part of the plot by the Albanian government.<sup>124</sup>

Ky u quajt nga regjimi plani greko - jugosllav për përgatitjen e agresionit kundër RPSH me bosht Greqinë e Jugosllavinë. Mendohej se për këto qëllime CIA po përgatiste për veprim emigrantë politikë shqiptarë në Itali, RFGJ e gjetkë. Pohohej se ishte aktivizuar më shumë Xh. Deva me pasuesit e tij të Lidhjes së Prizrenit, që të dërgonte në Prishtinë e në Maqedoni grupe me pasaporta amerikane<sup>125</sup>.

"Arguments" from the trial held in 1968 in Kukës against 5 people served as arguments that this uprising was being prepared<sup>126</sup> (Rexhep Demiri, Faslli Thaçi, Rasim Brahimi, etc.) allegedly in the service of the CIA and UDB, former collaborators of M. Bajraktari and Asllan Zeneli during LANÇ, who had connections with the saboteurs Myftar Maloku, Halil Nerguti. Ramadan Velia and Rexhep Berisha for organizing an armed uprising. It was also stated that in the trial held in Korça against 7 persons<sup>127</sup>, allegedly in the service of the CIA, UDB and QIP, who had links to the saboteurs, it was discovered that they were seized automatic weapons, rifles, clothes and foreign coins, which they would use to activate the enemies. for organizing this armed uprising.

It was thought that the Yugoslav authorities had made Yugoslav territory available to Italian espionage and COOPERATED with it. As proof of this, an article was presented in the newspaper "Domenica del CORIERE" of June 1966, by Vitorio LOJAKONO<sup>128</sup>, who had allegedly gone to Yugoslavia to gather information on Albania. It was also claimed that the leaders of Legality were closely connected with the YUGOSLAVS, through Nik Sokol, Nderim Kupi, etc.

Another proof was considered the addition of local radios with anti-communist programs such as the beginning of broadcasts on May 12, 1965 in New York, by the radio "Voice of FREE Albanians" of BK, the activation of immigrant groups in Thessaloniki, Rome, Vienna, Munich, London, Madrid, New York and elsewhere.

<sup>121</sup> Gazeta Besa, March 7, 1968, p.2

<sup>122</sup> Gazeta Besa, March 7, 1968, p.2

<sup>123</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 1-2

<sup>124</sup> AMPB, year 1967, file 883, p. 1-2

<sup>125</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, June 1968, p. 1 -4

<sup>126</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, June 1968, p. 1 -4

<sup>127</sup> Voice of the People, July 1966

<sup>128</sup> Voice of the People, July 1966

The regime felt frustrated because it was finding that in the summer of 1967 the Soviets also campaigned, spreading rumors that the Greeks would attack Albania after Israel's attack on Egypt, and that Tito had also concentrated troops on the Macedonian-Greek border, as the Greeks would invade Yugoslavia. It was said that this plan was also confirmed by the Czechoslovak representative in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the Eastern, Yugoslav and Italian press supported this campaign, which contained data of fraud and pressure on the RPSH<sup>129</sup>.

The concerns of the regime did not diminish even after this situation passed. In the tour made in Europe in 1978, Nik Sokoli was said to have propagandized in the circles of fugitives and Kosovars that the liberation of Albania would be realized with the help of Yugoslavia, but everything had to be done as if organized by political emigration organizations. He once suggested that the fugitives return to Greece and Yugoslavia, enter Albania, connect there with the old bases, and create new ones, to prepare the conditions for organized interventions from outside Albania.

There were also rumors that Leka Zogu had drafted concrete plans for organizing the uprising against Albania and that he had the help and support of various states, especially the direct support of Yugoslavia.

The group "Albanian Heroism", which was called pro-Yugoslav by the Albanian police, in 1976 was said to have a plan to unify emigration; the creation of a government in exile and an army, with training centers in neighboring countries, interacting with L. Zogu and Legality.

The communist government became seriously concerned in 1981 after demonstrations in Kosovo, which it saw as a threat to its overthrow. The Albanian intelligence found that the Americans increased the care and information obtained from neighboring countries for Albania. In 1981, information was coming to Tirana that even the eastern intelligence, especially the KGB, wanted to enter with the "informbureaux" in Yugoslavia and abroad, and that through Kosovo, the Russians would solve the problem of Albania, that the situation in Albania would change in favor of Eastern countries and that the same would happen in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. There was talk of organizing provocations, to justify a military aggression and to exploit events in Kosovo. According to the Albanian intelligence, Nderim Kupa had stated that L. Zogu had agreed with the Yugoslavs on a conflict between Kosovo and Yugoslavia, as a pretext for intervention in Albania and that, in this case, the CIA and UDB would organize provocations through the Albanian political diaspora. to justify NATO intervention, after the creation of a free zone in Albania by diversionist groups.

The regime was so frustrated that it considered Kosovar patriots fighting against the oppressive Yugoslav regime as an obvious danger. According to them, the Kosovar nationalists (whom the state security called a "reaction") had hoped, in addition to support in the US, also in the united Western Europe, the Strasbourg European Council, the TPE, the Assembly of European Minorities (minorities), etc. , for the protection of Kosovo. This was considered a serious long-term threat to the communist regime in Albania.

MIA documents state that, in the summer of 1982, by order of the CIA, L. Zogu and N. Kupa had made a plan for intervention. Meanwhile, there were many diversionary acts, especially in the years 1981-82 by the Albanian political diaspora abroad and inside Albania. The regime was already finding that concrete preparations were being made by diversionist gangs by foreign spies, especially by the CIA, UDB, QIP, SISMI, etc., to promote the subversive activity of political emigration abroad and internal opponents. According to the Albanian intelligence, UDB was openly propagandizing that "the time has come for Albania to apply Rankovi polit's policy again with Albania"<sup>130</sup> Immigrants were also being trained in various countries that were part of NATO special units.

<sup>129</sup> Gazeta Besa, 28 November 1968, p.2

<sup>130</sup>E. Hoxha, Titists ..., p. 580.

But in reality the relations of nationalist political emigration with the Yugoslav and Greek governments remained cold and unfriendly. This tendency was also expressed in the Yugoslav and Greek press. The press reports of neighboring countries had a hostile and tendentious nature towards nationalist political emigration, mainly due to the annexationist objectives of these countries towards Albania. They saw the Albanian political emigration as an obstacle and opponent for these objectives. The Yugoslav government, expressing dissatisfaction with the criticism of its policy towards Kosovo and the Albanians by the Albanian political emigration, mobilized the Yugoslav press and radio and television to denigrate and discredit the Albanian emigration abroad. The main newspaper of the Communist League of Kosovo, "Rilindja" was also involved in this campaign.

In the 1980s and 1990s in Yugoslavia a small contingent of fugitives was treated, who were apparently disorganized. In fact, until the 1990s, Yugoslavia promoted the stabilization of Albanian refugees from Western countries in Yugoslavia, placing them in the border regions with the RPSSH.

#### **8.4. Economic immigration relations dealing with the communist government in the diaspora**

Albanian patriotic colonies (Albanian economic diaspora) in different parts of the world has played an important role in the Albanian National Movement and in the development of events in Albania. But on the other hand they have always been the object of intervention of foreign state agencies.

On the other hand, as researcher Robert Pichler points out, most labor migrants had a different attitude towards political issues in relation to political immigration. They had a different approach to the political system, although most were critical of it.<sup>131</sup> These differences between the two groups would cause controversy and controversy between them but also attempts to unify attitudes. The same author, referring to the relations between economic and political emigration from Yugoslavia, has made a distinction between emigration to Western Europe and those across the Atlantic. He points out that in Europe, the Yugoslav government's intelligence and influence on immigration was stronger, and this made the relationship between labor and political migrants more underground. Whereas in the countries beyond the Atlantic "there was a stronger rapprochement between radical nationalist circles and economic migrants. He singles out as a factor of these facilitations in the relations between the two groups the influence of the respective churches and religious institutions which were outside the influence of the Yugoslav communist regime."<sup>132</sup>

However for the Albanian case he finds that this influence of the churches was weaker than that of the counterpart institutions in the emigrants of other nationalities. Thus, according to him, Albanian nationalist groups such as the Ballists and Zogists developed a relatively smaller and less structured influence than their counterpart sebe groups, Croats, etc. This gap was filled by groups with ideological, leftist orientation, among which the most famous was the "People's Movement of Kosovo". Another reason for the revival of these groups, he mentions, is the "distorted image they had of the mother country".<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup>Robert Pichler, Migration, Diaspora and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, in the Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, "The Role of the Diaspora in State Formation", Prishtina 2012, p. 287

<sup>132</sup>Robert Pichler, Migration, Diaspora and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, in the Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, "The Role of the Diaspora in State Formation", Prishtina 2012, p. 287

<sup>133</sup> Robert Pichler, Migration, Diaspora and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, in the Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, "The Role of the Diaspora in State Formation", Prishtina 2012, p. 297-299.

Anti-communist political emigration also acted in the direction of economic emigration, which tried to orient this politically in the fight against the communist regime. This influence gradually increased until it achieved some important results, especially during the 60s. In the '60s especially after the breaking of the bs, political immigration increased efforts to penetrate in the old economic immigration societies in the usa, turkey, egypt, egypt, egypt

To penetrate in the albanian colonies, political emigration also used the clusters, tribe, provincial, religious beliefs, patriotic past of some immigrants, distributing the press in the apartments and religious institutions, visits and personal contacts, recommendations for recognition, anti-emunist schools albanian language, cultural or sports clubs etc.

A difficult propagandic work is done by the organization of political immigration to prevent economic immigrants to connect with the regime through the invitations that were raised.

Gradually with the expansion of diplomatic relations with the most countries where the albanian colonies were established, the communist regime created opportunities to strengthen the prophetic and activities. The regime used as much as possible the status of the mother homeland of the mother state for economic migrants. In this way the regime managed to use clean and fervent feelings of patriotism to arouse in those unpaid support and without reason for which, not only was the most fierce oppressive regime in the history of Albanians but that he had also brought serious damage to the national issue.

Strengthening communist propaganda and its quality in the albanian colonies affected the creation of a pro-communist current and against political immigration in diaspora and point. The most important propagandics of the regime were the newspaper "albania e re", albanian radio and television and other publications. Also the government of tirana supported financially and organizationally the propaganda from their different groups also in its albanian colonies by financing the press of the great organizers of their giants. The albanian pro-communist press was severally used and the foreign press was published many letters of the pro-communist elements in favor of the "achievements of socialist albania and socialist albania.

In some rsta the efforts developed by the procommunitate elements against political immigration which attempted to cooperate and penetrate in the patriotic, sat. The efforts of the regime and its people were going to the that they tried to hinder the crushes, personal friendship, joint activities everywhere like everywhere. The activity of the regime caused dissent in the colonies and their organizational forums. Such disorders path in albanian colonies in france, turkey, usa, argentina, egypt, australia etc.

After 1960, the activities and cooperation of the organizations of the political diaspora with the anti-communist Kosovar emigrants increased, focusing on cracking down on the activity of the Yugoslav agency in the Albanian political and economic emigration originating from Yugoslavia. There were attempts to connect more closely with the economic diaspora of old and new Kosovar Albanians.

Efforts were also made to connect with Kosovar emigration to engage him in the fight for the violated rights of Albanians, especially after the events of 1981 in Kosovo. The communist regime in Tirana strictly followed every Kosovar element, being concerned that the influence of anti-communist emigration was spreading. L. Zogu was extending his influence on Kosovar emigration with the motto of unification without any distinction of political party ideas for the liberation of Albania from communism and for the creation of ethnic Albania. For this purpose, the creation of cultural and sports groups, etc. was encouraged in France, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, USA, Canada, etc. L. Zogu collaborated with some of the leaders of the organizations that were to compromise with him and in 1978 in New York he celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Zogist monarchy together with the



100th anniversary of the League of Prizren, which was attended by many pro-Zogists. Several similar ceremonies were held in several other places. Leka introduced himself as chairman of the Military Council and thanked for the honor done to the monarchy and to him personally. He called for brotherhood and unity, for the recruitment of volunteers for the "national army" and for financial aid. He emphasized the efforts to liberate Kosovo from Slavic slavery and its unification with Albania. United Front "trying to unite with political emigration and Kosovar emigration.

Despite the positive results, there were still quarrels and disagreements. One of the leaders of emigration, Tahir Zajmi said: "this damn disease has started to become a chronic disease, do not love each other husband and hate each other ... has penetrated the immigration parties" He called "to cure himself from the fluidity of diaspora and disruption"<sup>134</sup>. BK described the newspaper *Atdheu i Legaliteti* as "the lamest and most stale notebook of exile, which emits the smoke of democracy".<sup>135</sup>

Ballist activists, zogists, blockers etc. Penetrated in the patriotic organizations of albanians in exile, strengthening anti-communist tendencies in them. Anti-communist organizations, referring to their experience, called that they should not believe in a cooperation and living with the communists<sup>136</sup>. In the battle with the philo-communist and communist elements in the diaspora, political immigrants were in some cases also the support of western states. Some western states have also adopted laws against the pro-communist activity of some pro-communist elements and societies. Like that they obliged albanian migrants to acquire foreign citizenship to implement their assumption through laws, schools and courses for immigrants

#### ***8.4.1. Main places where political immigration activities developed***

##### ***8.4.1.1. In America***

In the 60s, the most powerful organization of Albanian emigration, the Pan-Albanian Federation "Vatra" and the newspaper "Dielli" opened their doors to political emigrants, at the same time strengthening its anti-communist character. :

The Vatra Federation, in the first years after the liberation, in some cases supported the policy of the communist government and it was not oriented directly in its attitudes. With American help and influence, this organization slowly moved into anti-communist positions, crowning this evolution with the cooperation and acceptance of anti-communist political immigrants. The hearth continued to have the same organization as it had before, a leader and branch in several American cities, based in Boston. "Vatra" and "Dielli" had as their basic program the security of ethnic Albania.

In 1968, the political emigrants entered the presidency of Vatra and the central council, while the newspaper Dielli was run by Athanas Gegaj. The ties with the political emigration became so strong that in 1970 V. Andoni declared that the National Front had one foot in the old Ball, the other in Vatra, which according to him "has recently given living Albanian evidence before the danger of red and up to the servants of the black captivity (the Blocists)"<sup>137</sup> Bringing refugees to Vatra was not an easy process and took several years. A fierce political and propaganda war took place between the left-wing pro-communist elements and those anti-communist nationalists. Leftist elements after the arrival of anti-communist immigrants in Vatra, left Vatra after a fierce war, and publicly condemning their opponents in the press, in meetings and other forms, etc., Within the ranks of Vatra joined many ballists,

<sup>134</sup> T. Zajmi, *The Waters of Life and the Tears of the Heart*, 1970, p. 102 -103

<sup>135</sup> *Flamuri* newspaper, March 25, 1975

<sup>136</sup> *Gazeta Ndërgjegjia*, no. October 2, 1970, p. 9

<sup>137</sup> *Bulletin of the BK congress*, 1970, p. 50 - 51

Zogists, Bloc of anti-communist Kosovars. A group of anti-communist intellectuals also acted in it, which was considered by the Albanian communist authorities to be dangerous for the policy of the Tirana government, especially with the propaganda it made among the economic and Kosovar exiles. This group acted cleverly to approach the organization "Free Albania" in the US and other colonies, and tried to extend its influence in the Albanian Diocese in America, putting at the head of these new anti-communist organizations, etc.

For the merits in the activity against the communist regime of Albania, the anti-communist organization "Assembly of Captive Nations" (ACEN) decorated the Hearth with the medal "10th anniversary of ACEN", of the political diaspora from the eastern communist countries.

The main efforts were made especially against relations with the vatra organization, which has already showed signs of distance with the tirana regime. Vasil germenji, ali këlcyr, arshi pipa, rexhep mitrovica etc. They worked to penetrate in this organization and to strengthen its anti-communist and nationalist character. After long-lasting and sound arguments featuring political emigrants, Vatra positively assessed the patriotic contribution of emigrants Arshi Pipa, Hasan Dosti, A. Kui, etc., who described as good patriots and victims of the communist regime in Albania. Gazeta dielli on July 31, 1963 also appreciated the patriotic contribution of the famous albanian state, mehdi frasheri on the occasion of his death, which was recorded from. This attitude was also held by the assembly of the tax on 31 august 1963. Anti-communists like qerim panariti, xhevat kallajxhiu, athanas gega, eduart liço etc. They turned the sun newspaper into a press agency against the hoxha regime. They propagated the liberal and democratic spirit and ideology and denounced communism.

The unclear situation of the target that had prevailed in the '40s -50 'already ended and, in the '60s it took the character of a nationalist-liberal-democratic organization.

The introduction of political emigrants to the vatra federation was also justified with the amnesty declared to them by the popular assembly of rps in 1959, here she accepted many emigrants A. Pip V. Germenji, R. Krasniqi etc. For this contribution, the sun newspaper of 1965 was decorated by the "organization of slavery nations" with the medal for "great services" against freedom and against someone.

The sun in his writings positively re-evaluated the activity of A. Cup<sup>138</sup>, to eqerem fish<sup>139</sup>, of Ernest Koliq<sup>140</sup> etj.

As soon as it was elected on June 2, 1968, its chairman Peter Chiko<sup>141</sup> declared the need to have better relations with state department officers who were specially interested in albanian affairs<sup>142</sup>.

In April 1969 vatra organized a political seminar<sup>143</sup>, directed by V. Germenji e. E. Lico, on the subject "30 years after the fascist regime and 25 years of the communist regime". Former american diplomats the seminar focused on the policy analysis of the community regime of hoxha in 25 years of his rule.

The sunflower, after the '60s, were directed by immigrants with anti-communist profile as Kristo Thanasi<sup>144</sup>, that had been related to the bird; Sotir Laci<sup>145</sup>, former secretary of the Royal Legal in Athens, who was also speaker of the Voice of America; Athanas Gegaj, former secretary of the roma of new york, editor of the sun; Arshi Pipa, etc.

<sup>138</sup> Gazeta Dielli, no.6; No. 12, 1962

<sup>139</sup> Gazeta Dielli, no. 44; 46, January 1967

<sup>140</sup> Gazeta Dielli, March, June, September 1968

<sup>141</sup> Gazeta Dielli, July 1968

<sup>142</sup> Gazeta Dielli, July 1968

<sup>143</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, September 4, 1969, p. 1

<sup>144</sup> Bulletin of Legality, 1968, p. 18

<sup>145</sup> Gazeta Besa, March 7, 1968, p. 4

Hoxha's regime tried to react against strengthening the anti-communist tendencies of the Vatra Federation. In the 1960s and later, many vatrans were promoted in the US for their removal of VAT. Even returned to Vatra in Albania were forced to make letters, where the entry of political immigrants to Vatra was punished.

Fan Noli remained until the end of opposition to the approach of anti-communist immigrants to the vatra organization. He silent to the crimes of the communist regime and tried to cooperate with the government of Tirana to stop the fall of the Orthodox Church in the hands of the Greeks. He also dedicated his poetic work "album" to "the HEADQUARTERS THAT SAVED ALBANIA FROM THE FASCISTS AND THE BEYLERS".

Albanian political immigration attempted to protect the nationalist and patriotic character of the Albanian colonies also maintaining the pure national, church and institutional character of institutions and institutional churches. It also created religious societies with this profile and for this purpose. The same thing that Vatra did the sun do in protection of the national character of the Albanian Orthodox Church of America<sup>146</sup>. But the anti-communist nationalist elements faced a double challenge and very complicated with the pro-communist elements related to the government of Tirana and the governments that brought that they were. Foreign agents in the Albanian church, like bishop Marko Lipe, priest Kris Ellis etc. They were hurled to attack, from inside and outside the Vatra. For hostile actions against the Albanian church in the United States, Fan Noli expelled Kris Ellis<sup>147</sup>, a former lieutenant of the Greek Royal Army. While alive, Fan Noli badly exposed his "rival" Marko Lipe, whom the Greek church brought to America to replace Noli by trying to include the Albanian Church in the Greek Church of New York, which included all of America and Canada. Marko Lipe was illegally appointed bishop for Albanian churches in the United States<sup>148</sup>.

Patriot Dervish Rexhepi was very active in this period the Detroit lodges which had great influence in the Albanian colony and Zef Oroshi, who built several new Catholic churches.

After the death of Fan Noli, the Albanian anti-communist political emigration increased its activity and, in the assembly of the Albanian Episcopate, in July 1968, Bishop Laskos, placed at the head of the church with the approval of the communist government, was restricted as a Bishop.<sup>149</sup>

After Noli's death, the priest Kostandin Noni, who had previously operated in the US and Turkey, also appeared on the scene<sup>150</sup>. In 1948 he was been sent to the US by Greek espionage and deported by Fan Noli along with priest Krist Ellis. He followed the oath tactic against Marko Lipes.

Albanian anticommunist emigrants, finding the risk of Greek intervention, tried to compromise groups under the influence of Hoxha's government, although they tried to clarify the Albanian opinion that the municipality was trying to throw churches in hand as well as the Vatra organization. Which anti-communist nationalists described as two main obstacles weapons of the dissemination of communist ideology in the free world<sup>151</sup>.

There were quarrels and controversies in economic emigration as well. Hearth leaders quarreled over attitudes toward the fugitives. A. Athanasius resigned and left the post to Peter Chiko, who enjoyed authority in the State Department. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of "Diellit" Stavro Skëndi severely criticized Vatra in the newspaper "Besa", which denounced Vatra for the friendship with the protagonists of April 7, 1939 and the

<sup>146</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, August 1966, p. 3

<sup>147</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, December 1966, p. 4

<sup>148</sup> Gazeta Besa, 30 May 1969, p. 2

<sup>149</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, October - November 1968, p. 4

<sup>150</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, October 1967, p. 4

<sup>151</sup> The newspaper Conscience, October 1970, p. 9

acceptance of the leaders of BKI, who as fascists had declared war on US<sup>152</sup>. It did not take into account that the Americans themselves had not made such accusations and had accepted them in their own country and cooperated with them.

On the contrary, new quarrels and controversies broke out between BK and Vatra, where other groups joined, because Vatra accepted the legalists as its majority members in 1973. BK published the decisions of the board without the permission of other participants. BK also stepped up attacks against Zogists but also Greek agents like Bishop Lipes.

Vatra sent to Madrid its vice-president Hajdar Tonuz, a legalist, but this action was prohibited by its canon (article 5), that she should not engage in politics. In the '70s bk established a "responsible group of albanian resistance"<sup>153</sup>, who worked with economic immigration in australia, usa and here. In the '70s, a great campaign was against the "Free Albania" organization, its liberty newspaper in the USA, which was qualified as the "Voice of Tirana in America"<sup>154</sup>. Vatra made efforts to melt this organization and unite the whole diaspora around it. Here a real battle was held with the government of hoxha, which given strong, also financial support to "Free Albania".

Also in the '80s albanian political emigration tried to maintain the links and influence in the albanian colonies, working more with the new generation. The fire with the sun newspaper were at the parade of this anti-communist activity. She intensified the criticism against the "Free Albania" organization.

Invitations for visits to Albania of many delegations from the colonies, on cases of holidays or to vacation was a favorite tool of communist propaganda. During the visits, they were miscellaneously informed and processed by the state security bodies and activists of the communist government. So at the invitation of the regime george puleshi and that today dilogics were one of the first to come to our country from the USA. After returning to the USA, they declared that what they had listened before were very different from the achievements they had seen with their eyes in Albania. Many guests of the regime were letters to vatra members, to maintain the flag of patriotism by uniting it with the support of the regime and exporting from emigrant fabrics.

In the '70s and '80s, there was talk of unifying emigration through Vatra, expanding it with branches of the Albanian Diaspora everywhere, without distinguishing between these Albanian and Kosovar environments in exile.

#### **8.4.1.2. In Turkey**

A longer and long battle was from political emigration in Turkey to have an influence on the Turkish-Albanian brotherhood association. Their positions in this association were weakened in 1968-69 as a result of the influence of the communist government and its representation. Q. Prodani claimed that the association was put in the service of Tirana<sup>155</sup>. Already she had close links with the Embassy and Consulate of Albania in Ankara and Istanbul. Political immigration developed an intensive propaganda against and articleed sharp accusations, even introduced trials against pro-communist elements. Some Kosovo political immigrants joined you this activity, distributing also trafficking to explain immigrants from Albania and Kosovo and from riguim and rodig bk attempted that also the albanian heritage<sup>156</sup> not to be sent to albania, also making denounces to the law and police offices.

In general political immigration denounced the delegations and individuals coming to Albania.

<sup>152</sup> Besa newspaper, February 7, 1968 and September 1969

<sup>153</sup> Gazeta Besa, May 6, 1968, p. 3

<sup>154</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, July - August 1971, p. 4

<sup>155</sup> Gazeta Besa, January 1970, p. 3

<sup>156</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 15 May 1972, p. 12

#### **8.4.2. Albanian political emigration efforts to cooperate with Kosovo emigration**

As a result of political pressure and economic discrimination of the albanian population in yugoslavia was strong wave of emigration. According to incomplete data until the '90s there were 1,890,000 albanians in Turkey. According to official yugoslav statistics from 1954 - 1967, 340 thousand albanians migrated from Yugoslavia. Other countries were: 29,000 in Fry, 47,000 in Belgium, 3,000 in Switzerland, 30,000 in Argentina, 40,000 in Australia, 3,000 in Sweden, 30,000 in USA, 4,000 in Syria, 13,000 in France, including those who were forced to leave after the tragic events of 1981 and there in Kosovo and the albanian territories in Yugoslavia. In general these albanians developed a patriotic activity.

Albanian and Kosovo anti-communist political immigration done an organized work in the ranks of these emigrants. Some club societies were established in the Usa, Australia, Sweden, Fry, Canada, France, Belgium and elsewhere. She "Zafer" in Turkey, "Idriz Seferi" in Belgium, "Bajram Curri" in Australia, cultural centers "Isuf Gërvalla" in USA, Europe and elsewhere etc.

For these reasons, especially in the '70s,' 80s, the tendency of approaching and strengthening the ties of anti-communist immigration groups in the USA, Europe, Austria, in cultural and sports activities, albanian language schools and courses, religious organizations etc. of Kosovo immigration.

In the '70s legality approached some young intellectuals through the press office directed by Xhemal Laçi, Zef Pashko Deda, Reshat Agaj, Rasim Sina etc. This is how the ballists managed to expand connections with Kosovo immigrants in Turkey, Australia, USA, Sweden, Fry, etc. Bki, also establishing a network to support these emigrants, especially from albanian territories in Montenegro.

This is how the activity and lines of Kosovo organizations expanded such as Prizren connection, Kosovo connection, Vardar connection etc. political immigration had a great impact where most albanians, Chama and Kosovo were collected and where there was center for propaganda such as radio, press, propaganda guys, etc.

The KSHL of New York organized for years the issue of a guarantee for the immigration of kosovars in the USA<sup>157</sup>, here withdrawing from Europe's refugee camps. Every organization or political group given instructions to its members to enter the Kosovo groups, to attend the different centers and locals where they collect everywhere.

Q. Prodani and Tahir Kolgjini in Turkey made many efforts to help kosovars migrated there. Political immigration, which had already some decades emigrated and stabilized, helped young migrants coming from Kosovo and albanian areas in the south north, south gave other guarantees for stabilization, for links to foreign humanitarian organisms, for their system, etc.

Political immigrants expanded relations with Kosovo immigration also through religious societies like muslim, catholic in the USA, Australia, Belgium, France, Canada. This is how they were trying to approach them through activities for Kosovo especially after the 1981 events in Kosovo.

The political immigration press attempted to inform kosovars of the situation in albania, on the policy that the communist regime followed within the country and against the United States.

In the first phase during the years 1945-1966 the press for Kosovo had a more restricted power and focus concerning the denounce of the press in Kosovo. But after this time until 1990 the press recognized a great development and increased its quality, problems. After the 1950s, Western governments began to increase interest in kosovars in exile, fleeing

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<sup>157</sup> Gazeta Shqiptari i Lirë, September - October 1970, p. 2

Albania and Kosovo. Kosovar anti-communist emigration would create a wide network of organizations with different influences: Ballista, Zogist, Blockist, etc.

The main groups were:

- The "Kosovo League" organization - was established in 1957, with the support of the British and the Ball Agrarian of A. Ermenji. This was directed by Nexhat Mitrovica, Luan Gashi, Hafez Isuf Azemi, etc. This claimed to have been established as early as 1943, when BK in Mukja defended the thesis of Ethnic Albania. She claimed that she was the successor of Balli Kombëtar, in which she had "the greatest hope, the safest proof for the realization of Ethnic Albania". She praised Rexhep Mitrovica, whom she considered as the central leader of the Albanians, for the realization of Ethnic Albania. Balli Kombëtar also stated that "the Kasovare League was established with the help of the work of Balli Kombëtar"<sup>158</sup>.

The Kosovo League announced in its program: the unification of expatriate Kosovars, to protect their rights and those of Kosovo; to encourage the resistance of Albanians in Yugoslavia, for an autonomous administration and the recognition of the right to self-determination; to fight with all his might, for the Albanian nation "to be liberated and to become an Ethnic Democratic Albania". This organization also predicted the fall of the communist regime in Albania. She propagated that Kosovars who were victims of the Titoist regime had supported her ideas, that she had penetrated Kosovo and other Albanian areas as well as Kosovar emigration. In November 1973, in Chicago, the Kosovo League held its first congress in exile, inviting all political groups to attend. In this forum, A. Ermenji called on Kosovars to make efforts for self-determination, for organizing resistance and unification for the liberation of Kosovo and for Ethnic Albania<sup>159</sup>. The Kosovar League denounced Hoxha's government, that it had not raised its voice for the protection of the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia, that the SNP had left Kosovo in captivity since the Mukje meeting, that Kosovars have nothing to expect from the communist government of Albania etc., She published the newspaper "Përpyjekja Kosovare". It soon found widespread support for Albanian emigration from Kosovo and established several branches in the US, Turkey, Australia, Canada, etc. Further, there were quarrels between its leaders and those of BK. After the events of 1981, the "Kosovo League" supported the struggle of the people of Kosovo and other Albanian territories in Yugoslavia for national rights. The organization "Third League of Prizren" was established in 1962 in New York, with secretary Ismet Uk Sadiku (Berisha). Great influence on him had Xh. Deva, who in 1966 also became its chairman, a post he held until his death. R. Krasniqi also had a great influence. The First Congress of this organization took place in November 1966 and was very aptly chaired by Xh. Deva.<sup>160</sup> The Third League of Prizren created secret armed and propaganda groups in Kosovo. The communist government of Tirana followed with great concern the movements of this organization and these groups, as it thought that they would act against it as well. Her close cooperation with the leaders of Legality, BKI, BK, etc. was also seen with concern. She attracted many expatriate Kosovars in her ranks. Its program had as its central axis: Ethnic Albania, the protection of Kosovar rights in the spirit of League I, and II of Prizren; "to always be ready to contribute strongly to the liberation of Albania from red tyranny"<sup>161</sup>; her desire for fraternal relations with Albanian emigration groups, the rejection of the representation of the Kosovo issue by any other Kosovar group, which she did not know, the recognition of Xh Deva as a

<sup>158</sup> Bulletin of the congress of BK, (speech of L. Gashi), 1970, p. 85

<sup>159</sup> Bulletin of the congress of LK, 1973, p. 35

<sup>160</sup> Idriz Lamaj, Xhafer Deva ... p.15

<sup>161</sup> Newspaper Shqipëria e Re, August 1968, p. 4

spiritual leader, the support of Legality as a historical organization for Ethnic Albania, etc. By irredentism she understood, not only the rights as Albanians, but "especially the acquisition of the right of self-determination and secession from a foreign state, unification with a common, free and self-governing homeland." Some of its leaders like Xh. Deva, Haki Terpeza, etc., carried out diversionary activities, sending armed groups to Albania.

Even in her ranks there were contradictions between her factions. The factions of Xh. Deva, who constituted its most anti-communist part, and that of I. Sadiku and Hysen Tërpeza, who were less predisposed to the fight against the communist regime in Albania. These had disagreements about the forms and tactics of war. Xh. Deva was fully supported by the New York SCTL, BKI, Legality, etc.

There were branches in the USA, France, Turkey, FRY, Beijing, Australia, Canada, etc .. but they were weakened due to internal strife and war that made the Kosovar leftist element. With the exception of the Kosovo League, it maintained links with other anti-communist groups. According to a US Senate report on Yugoslavia in 1969, Yugoslav espionage had attempted to infiltrate and destroy anti-communist groups in exile. While the American journalist Jack Anderson wrote that, Tito's agents had tried to make provocations and assassinations against Kosovar political exiles, referring to the assassination of Isuf Azem in Chicago in 1971.<sup>162</sup> In the 1980s, the League of Prizren did not openly speak out against the communist regime and was distancing itself from other anti-communist groups, focusing on nationalist policy towards Ethnic Albania.

- "Free Kosovo Committee" - was established in 1965 in Canada headed by Mitat Vranica, who was previously part of the League of Prizren. This committee propagated that Kosovo should become a separate state, and then join Albania. He denounced both the communist regime in Tirana and the Albanian communist leaders in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. He had few members and little influence, kept in touch with Croatian anti-communist groups.
- "Kosovo National Resistance" - was established in 1975 in Brussels with some refugees from Kosovo. It was for Ethnic Albania and for the defense of Kosovo. He also denounced the communist regime of Albania. Its activity was intensified especially after the events of 1981 in Kosovo. Published a newspaper of the same name.
- The organization "Albanian Covenant" - was established in 1977 by the merger of the groups "League of Vardar" in France, "Association Ismail Qemali" and "Skanderbeg Club" in the FRG, "Democratic Faith" in Kosovo and the FRG and the League of Prizren in France, which were previously united as "Kosovar revolutionary national democratic Albanian organizations" led by Reiz Hoxha, Emil Kastrioti (Emin Fasilja), Hysen Çela, etc. She formed groups with Albanian economic migrants in the FRG, Sweden, Belgium, etc. In its program it declared the war: for a free democratic Albania, ethnically and geographically and historically united from Preveza to Bar; ideological war of the communists in general and the communist regime in Albania in particular, then the unification of Albania with Kosovo. She denounced Marxism - Leninism as foreign to the Albanian nation, which disappeared and violated its traditions. The issue of the regime, according to this organization, would be resolved with the will of the people. Its motto was "Homeland above all", and it propagated the unification of all anti-communist groups, offering its mediation for this purpose.

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<sup>162</sup> Flamuri newspaper, 28 November 1979, p. 9

- The "Committee for the Defense of Kosovo" was created in Belgium by Kosovars fleeing after the events of 1981 in Kosovo. This organization had many quarrels between political groups within it. The agrarian and Zogist ballists dominated.
- The "Albanian and Kosovar Youth in the Free World" organization in New York, led by Tahir Kërnađa and Maliq Arifi, consisted of young Kosovars.

#### **8.4.3. Establishment of a wide network of small anti-communist organizations**

During the years 1960-1990 in the Albanian emigration was created a wide network of political and social organizations where political emigrants participated, and even in some of them, they participated together with economic emigrants. Below we list some of them:

- "The" November 28 "Association" - in Argentina, created by ballist Isuf Luzi, had a prominent anti-communist profile and activity. It acted against the "Skanderbeg" Society there, which in some periods, was under the influence of pro-communist elements. However, it had few members and rarely published the pamphlet of the same name.
- "Albanian Society" - of Brisbane (Australia), in 1963 fell under the influence of ballists. It had poor activity and few members..

Some small groups, with less than 100 members, mostly political fugitives, stayed with them and carried out political activity against E Hoxha's communist regime. Some of them were:

- "Muharrem Bajraktar's "Independent Group", created in Greece in 1946 - 1947 and announced in 1949. For a while he was a member of the Committee headed by the Paris Agrarian Ball, then in the '60s he came out on his own with ballistic tendencies. M. Bajraktari had gathered around himself mainly a minority of lumjans;
- "Muslim Association" - created in Italy by Mentor Çoku, to influence Muslim environments in exile and towards Muslim countries, mainly Arab;
- "Anglo-Albanian Association" - first established in 1922 and reorganized in 1954, where all groups of anti-communist fugitives and economic exiles in England were gathered. He carried out a continuous activity against the communist regime of Albania;
- "Albanian resistance in exile" -created in 1963 in US headed by Mit'hat Dinen, son of Fiqiri Dines. It consisted of many dibrans. He held an open stance against the communist regime.
- "Group of Intellectuals" created in 1969 in the USA. Made an attempt to create the "New Hearth" with intellectual political immigrants, but failed.
- "Cham League" - created in 1973 in the US, led by Selfo Hoxha and Bilal Xhaferi. This was focused on the protection of the national rights of Chameria and its unification with Albania. He was under the influence of the ballistae and approached the Kosovar alliance. In 1977 he approached Legality. She split into two groups and further her activity dropped. He published the newspaper "Krahu i Shqiponjës" with pronounced anti-communist content.
- Kosova "Kosova Relief Fund" was an anti-communist group created in 1978 in the USA, led by Sami Repishti. It operated as a charity for Kosovo and Kosovars.
- "Albanian Muslim Youth" created in 1978 in France;
- "Joint National Front for the Liberation of Albania", created in 1982 in France, after secession from Legality;
- "National Committee of Albanians in Europe", established in 1981 for the protection of Kosovo's rights;
- "Youth Group" in Sweden and "Iliria" group which was a cultural association in Belgium. These two were groups of prosaic youth.



Many other groups have also operated in the Albanian political diaspora, which have not had a long life. It is worth mentioning the efforts to create a "socialist party" by Isuf Luzi and Vasil Germenji; "Section of the Socialist International" by Sadik Premte (Pocket); "Christian Democratic Party" by Kol Bib Mirakaj; "Association of University Students" in Italy; "Assistance Committees" in Rome, England, Cairo, etc .; Democratic Group or Albanian Patriotic Movement in France, Independent Group in USA, Democratic Group in Rome, Friends of Albania Association in Rome; Ballisti's Fist in Greece, Besa Group and Turkish-Albanian Brotherhood Association in Turkey, etc.

"Albanian-American Catholic League" created in 1963 in the US led by Zef Oroshi (Coku); "The First Albanian Helvetic Teqe" established in 1963 in the USA by Halil Dushi; "Muslim Social Service", established in 1964 in Italy; "Albanian American Islamic Center", established in 1965 in the USA, headed by Mufti Sali Mufti <sup>163</sup> etc.

Several cultural and sports centers or groups and clubs were also established in the US and elsewhere, some near Albanian schools, in order to bring together the Albanian community. Albanian political emigration had a lot of influence in these organizations, therefore they were considered hostile by the State Security bodies. Religious institutions and other institutions opened many mosques, churches, tekkes, tombs and various places, which were frequented by the Albanian and Kosovar diaspora. In them, from time to time, there were meetings, congresses, meetings, manifestations, picnics, fundraising, religious ceremonies, etc., where propaganda against the communist regime took place. These too were under the surveillance of the Albanian communist agency.

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<sup>163</sup> Former mufti of Shkodra and Kosovo during the war

## CONCLUSION

Albanian anti-communist political emigration originated from the end of the Second World War in Albania. Waves of emigration to western countries began in the last months of the war and continued with intensity immediately after its end. Anti-communist emigration had a nationwide spread from almost all provinces of the country, but in the area of political Albania, the largest groups of emigrants were from Northern Albania and Southern Albania. While political emigration from Central Albania was relatively less. This extension was related to the intensity of the armed conflict between Albanians in these areas.

Political emigration was created as a result of several reasons.

First as a result of the establishment of the communist dictatorship in Albania. This was the main reason, which, not only did not create opportunities for national reconciliation, after the dramatic conflicting developments that had taken place among the Albanians themselves during the Second World War, but the establishment of the communist dictatorship was a source of deepening hostilities.

Secondly, the political emigration of a large number of Albanians was a result of the Civil War that took place in Albania in the period autumn 1943-November 1944. In this context the groups of political emigrants can be classified:

- Albanian nationalists, who until the autumn of 1943 were members of the anti-fascist resistance forces. As a result of the declaration and provocation of the Civil War by the SNP, they collaborated directly or indirectly with the Germans, in order to suppress the communist movement, which they identified as the main enemy and danger. In this category are listed a significant part of the forces of the National Front.
- Albanians, who cooperated directly or indirectly with the Italian occupiers from April 7, 1939 to autumn 1943, participating in the administration of the collaborationist government or in the military units of the occupier. Some of them were directly involved in the suppression of patriotic anti-fascist forces and factions during this period. This group consisted of several political leaders who in the past were known for cooperation with Italian politics or armies in Albania. But in this group there were also nationalists not previously implicated with the Italians, who, considering the occupation as a committed fact, in the broader context of World War II, thought of cooperating with the Italian occupying authorities for these reasons.:
  - To realize the unification of ethnic Albanian lands, under a single state which would be under Italian protectorate.
  - To fight against the communist threat.
  - To help create a civilian administration that would help their compatriots in difficult times of war.

In fact, it is difficult to clearly distinguish patriotic motives and inspirational inspirations from pragmatist, achievement and careerist ones among this group of people and politicians.

- Albanian nationalists who cooperated directly or indirectly with the German occupiers from the autumn of 1943 to November 1944, participating in the Albanian government of that time or in its security forces. These forces engaged directly or indirectly in fighting with partisan forces led by the SNP. This group generally consisted of irredentist nationalists, some of whom at the beginning of the twentieth century had been pro-Austrian and pro-German, due to the great and substantial assistance that Austria-Hungary had given to the creation of the independent Albanian state, or due to culture German they had received in Austrian and German schools.

In the conditions of the beginning of the Civil War and the obvious danger of establishing a communist dictatorship at the end of the war, they chose as the least evil the cooperation with the Germans, whom they called as a transitional military force. They aimed, with this policy, to achieve the following objectives: to suppress the communist movement; to unite ethnic Albanian lands into a single state, under German protection; to provide a civilian government that would serve their countrymen.

For this group did not weigh much the prospect of ending the war with the defeat of Germany and the dangers that came from cooperating with it.

Albanian nationalists with monarchist tendencies. Some of them collaborated with the communist movement within the framework of the National Liberation Front and fought against the Italians until the outbreak of the Civil War by the communists. Further, they remained passive and did not take part in the Civil War nor cooperate with the Germans. At the end of the war they were attacked by the communists and treated as enemies.

Another part of the monarchists led by King Zog were not in Albania during the war. They tried to organize a United Liberation Front in emigration and achieved this goal, expressing their readiness to come to Albania and engage in the fight against the Italians. But their efforts were thwarted by the opposing stance of neighboring countries, mainly Greece, and by the abandonment of this project by the British government.

- Many special nationalists who were really engaged in the fight against the Germans in Albania, but who were anti-communists and were hit militarily by partisan forces, ended up in political emigration. Brothers Kryeziu and Muharrem Bajraktari stood out in this group.
- At the end of the war, with the establishment of the communist regime, many other individuals left the country for fear of the consequences that the victory of the communists would have on their lives and property. These were large landowners, merchants, high officials, prominent intellectuals, and so on. In emigration they would be involved in various anti-communist organizations or stay away from engaging in anti-communist activities.

In the years 1945-1946 the Albanian political emigration faced major challenges of its existence and stabilization in concentration camps. Immigrants who settled in Western countries (Italy, France, England, USA, etc.) can be said to be relatively luckier, as, although with many difficulties, the treatment was relatively better.

While the emigrants who settled in Greece lived in much more difficult economic, social and sanitary conditions. Also, some of them, who had a prominent nationalist profile and record, were subjected to political discrimination and political pressure from the Greek government.

Immediately after leaving Albania, the process of organizing political emigration began. The pillars of this organization, especially until 1949, were the political parties and organizations that had operated in Albania during World War II. These organizations differed among themselves from the political program, the attitude towards the events of World War II in Albania; the way and forms of organization; attitude towards the Great Powers and neighboring countries; the way of articulating the national issue, etc.

Initially, the major political organizations Balli Kombëtar and Legaliteti maintained their political-organizational cohesion. Even, unlike Balli Kombëtar, Legality became even more complete, as its leaders and activists, who had acted during the war in Albania, were added by A. Zogu and the Zogist elements who had been in exile during the war.

At the same time, new political groups were created, such as the Peasant Party led by the Kryeziu brothers. While the main group that was formed very soon after the start of forced emigration, was the Independent National Bloc. This political group mainly consisted of activists who had participated in the civil and military administration during the Italian and German occupation, or even in the Fascist Party.

The basic political tendency throughout the Cold War was the efforts to politically unite all anti-communist immigration into a single organization. The most obvious and greatest success was the creation of the National Committee "Free Albania" (KSHL), which later underwent changes and underwent various reorganization processes. The KSHL was initially built on the basis of the representation of political groups, taking the form of a united anti-communist front.

Although the vast majority of political emigration was represented and united in the NACC, the union was not complete due to opposition between different groups of political emigration. Outside of him remained a powerful grouping such as the BKI. The causes of this phenomenon are several: The main principal cause was the political profile of the BKI, especially the past of its key leaders, who had been involved in the quisling administration during the occupation. The main opponent of the inclusion of BKI in KSHL was Balli Kombëtar. The main principle motive of this opposition was the concern that the fight against the communist regime would be compromised if groups and individuals politically compromised during the war were included in this front of anti-communist resistance.

But there were also selfish and personal motives that fueled these contradictions, which were related to the intentions to dominate the KSHL.

The unification process was also difficult due to deep political and ideological divergences between different groups and leaders. Typical political divergences were those between the National Front and Legality, which were mainly related to the form of the regime. Balli Kombëtar was determined that after the overthrow of the communist regime, a democratic republic (most thought parliamentary) would be established according to the model of democratic republics of the most developed western countries. He opposed the restoration of the Monarchy.

Legality propagated the restoration of the Monarchy by linking it to the restoration of the legitimacy of the state. But he agreed to compromise with the National Front on these fundamental issues. The form of the regime should be determined by a plebiscite and free elections of the Albanian people; If voted for the return of the Monarchy it would be fully democratic, just like the advanced European Democratic Monarchies. Here was the point of compromise between these two main organizations that paved the way for the establishment of the NACC and their cooperation until the fall of the communist regime.

The KSHL was the central governing body for organizing anti-communist activities during the Cold War. In the years 1949-1953 this prayer took on the features of a diversionist war with armed actions against the regime. Later it took place mainly in the form of a wide and varied propaganda against the communist regime.

But although the ANC existed and operated throughout the Cold War period, the influence and role of political parties or groups did not weaken, but remained of fundamental importance.

After 1953 the KSHL underwent a reorganization process by removing the basis of representation based on political groups and establishing individual representation. The causes of this drastic change were:

- Imet Failures in the anti-communist operation of 1949-1953.
- Continuation of contradictions and disputes with the governing bodies of KSHL, which were based on party quarrels. These quarrels had weakened the strength and cohesion of the KSHL.

- Efforts of Western agencies to unify political emigration, which in the event of a crisis and the fall of the communist regime to be presented as an organized and unique force.
- Imet The intentions, primarily of the US government, to eliminate foreign, unfriendly US influence that various countries, especially neighboring ones, had with certain groups and individuals of political immigration.
- The aim was to prevent the penetration of the communist agency in the ranks of the emigrants, which was easier through the groups.

The reorganization brought new disagreements, this time both between groups and with foreign missionaries, who followed the directives of the western government, in organizing and assisting the Albanian anti-communist emigration.

Albanian political emigration tried and cooperated with foreign states, governments, agencies and individuals. Most and positive part of it cooperated with western countries, mainly with the USA, Great Britain, Italy, France, etc. The backbone on which this cooperation was built was the joint battle against world communism and in this context also against the communist regime of Albania.

Political emigration also tried to protect the national interests of Albanians in the framework of cooperation with Western governments and agencies, emphasizing the Albanians in Yugoslavia and repairing the fatal consequences of the genocide in Chameria. Although no tangible results were achieved in this regard, the debates and information sent en masse to Western chancelleries as well as international organizations had a positive, at least sensitizing, impact.

Albanian political emigration cooperated extensively with a number of international organizers, and in some of them was a full member. This cooperation was important in popularizing the Albanian war against communism and in defending and propagating the Albanian national cause.

Neighboring Balkan countries (Greece and Yugoslavia) used special groups and individuals of political emigration to serve the objectives of their nationalist strategy towards Albania and the wider Albanian nation in the Balkans.

They almost completely failed in their attempts to exploit anti-communist political emigration with a clear patriotic physiognomy. This category of emigration made up the vast majority of it.

Western powers, tactfully, tried to bring anti-communist nationalist political emigration closer to neighboring countries by encouraging both sides to compromise. The Greek and Yugoslav governments were encouraged to change the direction of their policies, respecting the independence, territorial integrity, and human rights of Albanians within their states, and focusing on cooperating with Albanian anti-communist emigration in the fight against the communist regime and the withdrawal of Albania. on the West side. While the anti-communist nationalist emigration was encouraged to avoid the harsh anti-Greek and anti-Yugoslav propaganda as well as the maximalist demands towards these states, in order to benefit from their help in the battle against the communist regime.

In a small and insignificant part of the anti-communist emigration the neighboring states Greece and Yugoslavia exercised influence and organized it in different societies and committees. Behind the battle against the regime, there was hidden the intention to use these immigrants and organizations, as mechanisms to achieve anti-Albanian objectives of these countries. From a social point of view, the Greeks exploited a part of the Albanian emigration of the Orthodox faith with Greek tendencies, as well as originating from the Greek minority in Albania. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, exploited some emigrants from Albania under the pretext of communism but of Slavic origin. These organizations were in constant war with the Albanian nationalist anti-communist organizations.

The antagonisms between nationalist political emigration and neighboring states were never extinguished during the Cold War, although they were kept under control. At their core were divergent national aspirations and interests between the two parties.

Political emigration also established relations with the Albanian economic emigration. These reports were complex. Generally in the diaspora, a strong and continuous battle took place between the anti-communist political emigration and the communist regime in order to extend its influence in the Albanian diaspora.

Gradually the communist regime came always losing positions while the political one strengthening them. A turning point in this direction was the year 1960 when political immigrants penetrated the "Fire" Federation of the USA and its attitude towards the government of E. Hoxha changed significantly.

Political immigration organizations cooperated, but also had quarrels with various economic immigration organizations. The common ground and the field where they cooperated unreservedly was the defense of the Albanian national cause, first of all the issue of Kosovo.

The cooperation was also done for the protection of the Albanian national institutions in the diaspora, in the first place the protection of the Albanian character of the orthodox churches, but also for the Albanian schools etc. In many cases this collaboration was productive and inspiring.

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